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DESEGREGATING POLITICS: "ALL-OUT" SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION EXPLAINED
James S. Liebman*
The problem is that we are no longer certain what kind of question public school desegregation really is.
-J. Harvie Wilkinson II1
"In other words, "I asked, "under this.. approach, the courts would
have given priority to desegregatingnot the students but the money and
the control?"
- Derrick Bell 2
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I. Is DESEGREGATION DEAD?
School desegregation is not dead. 3 It lives quietly in what used to
be the Confederate South. Notwithstanding the Reagan and Bush Administrations' ten-year campaign to limit the legal, remedial, and tem4
poral scope of court-ordered integration plans throughout the nation,
3. By desegregation, I mean the actual attendance together in public schools of

significant proportions of black and white children as a result ofjudicial or administrative orders issued by authorities outside the school district or by school authorities
themselves as a result of litigation or the threat of litigation. More particularly, I mean
the removal of statutory or other barriers to multiracial public schools and the mandated
revision of attendance and transportation patterns that together cause "critical masses"
of African-American and white children actually to attend school together. See W.
Hawley, Strategies for Effective Desegregation: Lessons from Research 41-43 (1983)
("critical mass" achieved when black and white students each represent at least 20 percent of students in most schools and classrooms). Absent a critical mass of each race,
desegregation is not achieved simply because schools and classrooms reflect the racial
makeup of a school district, or school as a whole. Apart from a critical mass, however,
no particular racial mix is required. Because school desegregation initiatives on behalf
of Latino children and other ethnic minorities have been rare, see infra notes 15-16 and
accompanying text, I generally refer to black and white children.
In this Article, I use the terms "African-American," "black," and "black American"
interchangeably. Acknowledging the latter two terms' empirical inaccuracy, I nonetheless prefer them because, in my opinion, they reflect the many historical forces that
single out members of the group for special reference and self-reference better than
terms focused only on (some of) the ethnic affiliations of the group's members. Capitalization vel non of the words "black" and "white" poses a difficult problem. On the one
hand, sensitivity to the divergent forces to which the two groups have been subject,
respect for African-Americans' historically empowering self-designation as "Blacks,"
and aversion to whites' often preclusive self-designation as "Whites" recommends differentiating "Blacks" and "whites." See Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331,
1332 n.2 (1988). On the other hand, a concern that my designation not imply any imperative as to how individuals or groups ought to designate themselves recommends
consistent treatment and (along with my personal distaste for the capitalized "Whites")
the lower case. On balance, I have chosen the latter course. See generally Thomas,
"Rouge et Noir" Reread: A Popular Memory of Herndon v. Georgia (forthcoming in Duke
Law Journal, 1991) (collecting sources and discussing "difficult and delicate" issue of
racial designation).
4. See N. Amaker, Civil Rights and the Reagan Administration 31-58 (1988); Days,
Turning Back the Clock: The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights, 19 Harv. C.R.C.L. L. Rev. 309, 319-30 (1984); Karst, Private Discrimination and Public Responsibility: Pattersonin Context, 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 44-49 & n.173; Selig, The ReaganJustice
Department and Civil Rights: What Went Wrong, 1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 785, 829-34;
West, O.C.R. Director Admits Laxness in Enforcement, Educ. Week, Dec. 6, 1989, at 1,
col. 6; see also United States v. Georgia, 691 F. Supp. 1440, 1444 (M.D. Ga. 1988),
appeal dismissed, 890 F.2d 1166 (11th Cir. 1989) (although noting that most of the
affected school districts filed motions to dismiss a Justice Department lawsuit to terminate 11 Georgia desegregation plans and that the Department's actions are "totally inconsistent with the adage 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it,'" district judge permits
Department to proceed so long as it bears the affected districts' litigation expenses).
But cf. Miller, Williams Charts a New Agenda for Rights Office: Moves Seen as Break
with Reagan Policies, Educ. Week, Sept. 5, 1990, at 1, col. 1 (noting recent revitalization
of Department of Education's civil rights enforcement efforts); Snider, Justice Argument
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desegregation persists in southern rural areas where substantial numbers of black Americans continue to reside and in southern urban areas
where school districts were organized in 19705 to encompass not only
the inner city but also the suburbs. 6 By many accounts, moreover, desegregation is an effective and accepted-one may even say
respected-member of the family of social institutions active in those
parts. 7 From a southern perspective, reports of desegregation's demise8 are not exaggerated, but wrong.
Signals Key Shift on Desegregation: Bush, Reagan Officials Differ on Oklahoma Case,
Educ. Week, June 20, 1990, at 1, col. 1 (surprisingly moderate position taken by Justice
Department in school desegregation brief recently filed in Supreme Court).
5. Desegregation is too young to die. Although conceived in principle in 1954, see
Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), virtually nowhere was it
born in fact until 15 years later-in 1969-70. In that year, the Supreme Court not only
reiterated that "all deliberate speed" was no longer enough, compare Brown v. Board of
Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (establishing "all deliberate speed" regime)
with Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964) (criticizing "all deliberate
speed" approach and urging faster-paced desegregation) and Green v. County School
Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-39 (1968) (same) but more importantly, held (twice) that "now"
meant "now," see Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 290, 291 (1970);
Alexander v. Holmes County Bd.of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam).
6. See W. Hawley, supra note 3, at 4 ("The greatest progress in desegregation has
been in the South where changes have been dramatic and lasting"); G. Orfield, Public
School Desegregation in the United States, 1968-1980, at 1-12 (1983); F. Welch & A.
Light, New Evidence on School Desegregation 6, 8, 18-21 & Tables 8-11, 61 (U.S.
Comm'n on Civil Rights Clearinghouse Publication 92, 1987); James, City Limits on
Racial Equality: The Effects of City-Suburb Boundaries on Public-School Desegregation, 1968-1976, 54 Am. Soc. Rev. 963, 974-76, 982 (1989); Orfield, School Desegregation in the 1980s, Equity & Choice, Feb. 1988, at 25, 26 (as of 1984, less than 30% of all
black children in the South attended 90%-plus minority schools compared to over 55%
in the Northeast; "cities with the most integrated schools were under large-scale,
mandatory, city-suiburban plans"). The recent "reverse" migration of blacks to the
South enhances the significance of the desegregated schooling that predominates there.
See U.S. Census Bureau, The Black Population in the United States: March 1988, at 2-4
(Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 442, 1989) (for first time in a century,
proportion of African-Americans living in South increased in the 1980s, rising from
52% to 56%o).
7. See, e.g., J. Hochschild, The New American Dilemma: Liberal Democracy and
School Desegregation 179-83 (1984) (strongest support for school desegregation by
whites occurs among southerners whose children are or have been involved in
mandatory desegregation plans); You Were Wrong, Mr. President, Charlotte Observer,
Oct. 9, 1984 (editorial), reprinted in Washington Post, Oct. 10, 1984, at A15, col. 3
("Charlotte-Mecklenburg's proudest achievement of the past 20 years is not the city's
impressive new skyline or its strong, growing economy. Its proudest achievement is its
fully integrated public school system"); supra note 6; infra notes 665-668 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Bell, Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, in Shades of
Brown: New Perspectives on School Desegregation 90, 91 (D. Bell ed. 1980) [hereinafter
Shades]; Carter, A Reassessment of Brown v. Board, in Shades, supra, at 20, 26; Kirp &
Jensen, The New Federalism Goes to Court, in School Days, Rule Days: The Legalization and Regulation of Education 368 (D. Kirp & D. Jensen eds. 1986) [hereinafter
School Days]; Lawrence, "One More River to Cross"-Recognizing the Real Injury in
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Desegregation lives on as well in many places outside the South.
The desegregation success stories in Buffalo, Columbus, Dayton,
Denver, Minneapolis, St. Louis, San Diego, and Wilmington-New Castle are as frequently mentioned as the well-regarded plans in CharlotteMecklenburg, Greenville, Jacksonville, Louisville, Nashville-Davidson,
and Tampa-St. Petersburg. 9
Consider also the findings of the only major study of school desegregation conducted by the federal government during the Reagan
years-a study condemned in advance by one well-known researcher as
having been designed to underestimate desegregation's success:10
" Since meaningful desegregation began in the early 1970s, there has
been a powerful nationwide trend away from isolatingblack students
in black schools: In the 125 school districts studied, the percentage of black students attending virtually all-minority
schools fell from 62 to 30, while the proportion attending
schools that are 26 to 75 percent white climbed from 17 to
44 percent.11
" Court- and administratively ordereddesegregationplans are responsible for the diminishing racialisolationof African-American students:
a. All 10 of the sampled school districts experiencing the
largest decline in segregation during the period studied
"adopted one or more major desegregation plans." 1 2
Brown: A Prerequisite to Shaping New Remedies, in Shades, supra, at 48, 49; sources
cited infra note 49.
9. See, e.g., W. Hawley, supra note 3, at 31-40; J. Hochschild, supra note 7, at
26-34, 46-70; J. Raffel, The Politics of School Desegregation: The Metropolitan Remedy in Delaware 174-95 (1980); F. Welch & A. Light, supra note 6, at 41, 43 & Tables
13, 14; J. Wilkinson, supra noe 1, at 44, 95, 156-60, 189, 200-03, 242-45; Hawley &
Smylie, The Contribution of School Desegregation to Academic Achievement and Racial
Integration, in Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy 281, 289 (P. Katz & D. Taylor eds. 1988) [hereinafter Eliminating Racism]; Levine & Eubanks, The Promise and
Limits of Regional Desegregation Plans for Central City School Districts, 1 Metropolitan
Educ. 36, 37-43 (1986).
10. See Adviser to U.S. Desegregation Study Quits, Saying It's Biased, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 30, 1985, at A12, col. 6 (claiming that, by excluding districts with less than 15,000
students, only sampling districts with between 15,000 and 50,000 students, and including all districts with over 50,000 students, the study gave too little weight to the southern plans that have been the most successful and too much weight to the large-city plans
that have engendered the most white flight).
11. F. Welch & A. Light, supra note 6, at 4; see id. at 16 & Table 6; see also James,
supra note 6, at 969-70, 974-75 (similar results from study of segregation and desegregation in 65 metropolitan areas). Because the Reagan Administration study linked increases in interracial attendance to court-ordered plans, see, e.g., infra text
accompanying note 12, and because the 44% figure in text applies to schools that satisfy
the "critical mass" requirement, the study documents substantial amounts of desegregation as that term is defined supra note 3.
12. F. Welch & A. Light, supra note 6, at 40-41 & Table 13. Experiencing the
greatest decline in school segregation in the period studied was the school district defendant in the Supreme Court's first "all-out" desegregation decision, Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Fourth on the list of most improved districts is the defendant in the Supreme Court's most recent "all-out" desegre-
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b. School segregation increased or remained static in less
than 2 percent (2 of 109) of the sampled districts operating under major court- or administratively ordered deFor districts without major
segregation plans.
desegregation plans, the rate of segregative increase or
stasis was nearly 70 percent (11 of 16).13
c. Although, overall, only 13 percent of the districts in the
sample lacked a court- or administratively ordered school
desegregation plan, 85 percent of the districts in which
school segregation 4showed no improvement or worsened
had no such plan.'
d. African-American attendance with white children "increased sharply between 1968 and 1980," but the trend
among Latinos-who rarely were the subject of desegre5 -was "toward less
gative initiatives during the period'
6
classmates."'
exposure to white
Nor is desegregation a vestige of some bygone period of judicial
activism. In the 1980s, federal courts ordered major new school deseggation case, Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526 (1979). F. Welch
& A. Light, supra note 6, at 41, Table 13; see id. at 43, Table 14 (listing 10 most thoroughly integrated districts as of mid-1980s, among them, Columbus, Ohio, see
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Wilmington-New Castle, Delaware, see Buchanan v. Evans, 423 U.S. 963, aff'g mem., 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del. 1975)
(three-judge panel); and Pasadena, California, see Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v.

Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
13. F. Welch & A. Light, supra note 6, at 40, 67 & Table 12. During the period
when school segregation was dropping substantially in districts with school desegregation plans, housing segregation stagnated or increased. See, e.g., R. Farley & W. Allen,
The Color Line and the Quality of Life in America 140-45 (1987); Massey & Denton,
Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic Segregation Along
Five Dimensions, 26 Demog. 373, 376-88 (1989); Tobin, Introduction: Housing Segregation in the 1980s, in Divided Neighborhoods: Changing Patterns of Racial Segregation 8, 10-11 (G. Tobin ed.) (32 Urb. Aff. Ann. Rev. 1987) [hereinafter Divided
Neighborhoods].
14. F. Welch & A. Light, supra note 6, at 40 & Table 12, 66; see also James, supra
note 6, at 978 (study of 65 metropolitan areas concluding that "[flederal court intervention [has] had a strong desegregative effect").
15. See W. Hawley, supra note 3, at 3-4; G. Orfield, supra note 6, at 3-13.
16. F. Welch & A. Light, supra note 6, at 16. Between 1968 and 1980, the proportion of Latinos attending virtually all-minority schools increased by over 15% while the
proportion attending schools more than 75% white dropped from 24 to 13%. Id. at 4;
accord G. Orfield & F. Monfort, Change and Desegregation in Large School Districts
28-33 (Nat'l School Bds. Ass'n Council of Urban Bds. of Educ.,July 1988); Woolbright
& Hartmann, The New Segregation: Asians and Hispanics, in Divided Neighborhoods,
supra note 13, at 138, 138-57.
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regation plans in Buffalo, 17 Indianapolis,' 8 Kansas City, 19 Little Rock,20
Milwaukee, 21 St. Louis, 22 Yonkers, 23 and in the suburbs northeast of
Pittsburgh. 24 Major litigation seeking new or expanded desegregation
plans is pending in Charleston, South Carolina, 2 5 DeKalb County,
Georgia, 2 6 Denver, 2 7 Fort Wayne, 28 Hartford, 2 9 metropolitan Kansas
City, 30 Nash County, North Carolina, 3 ' Queens, New York, 3 2
Oklahoma City,3 3 and Topeka. 3 4 And litigation or other governmental
enforcement efforts aimed at desegregation are contemplated in metro17. See Arthur v. Nyquist, 514 F. Supp. 1133, 1139-41 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 661
F.2d 907 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
18. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1 101, 1104 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980).
19. SeeJenkins v. Missouri, 904 F.2d 415, 419 (8th Cir. 1990);Jenkins v. Missouri,
855 F.2d 1295, 1299-301 (8th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990).
20. See Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School Dist. No. 1, 778
F.2d 404, 407-08 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986).
21. See Board of School Directors v. Thompson, (E.D. Wis. settlement agreement
filed Aug. 10, 1987).
22. See Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1297 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 816 (1984).
23. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1288-89
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2821
(1988).
24. See Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 539 F. Supp. 335, 338 (W.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 703
F.2d 722 (3d Cir. 1983).
25. See United States v. Charleston County School Dist., 738 F. Supp. 1513, 1515
(D.S.C. 1990); Snider, In Charleston, Desegregation Case Dismissed, Educ. Week, June
20, 1990, at 9, col. 1.
26. See Educ. Week, Nov. 22, 1989, at 3, col. 2; Newman, Steps to End 'Racially
Identifiable' Schools Ordered, Educ. Week, Oct. 25, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
27. See Snider, High Court to Rule on When Districts End 'Dual' Status, Educ.
Week, May 9, 1990, at 1, col. 5.
28. See Parents for Quality Educ. with Integration, Inc. v. Fort Wayne Community
Schools Corp., 662 F. Supp. 1475, 1477, 1482 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
29. See Sheff v. O'Neill, No. 360977 (Hartford/New Britain Super. Ct. May 18,
1990);Johnson, Suit in Connecticut Challenges Schools as Racially Divided, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 28, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
30. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 904 F.2d 415, 425 (8th Cir. 1990) (order denying rehearing en banc).
31. See Rocky Mount City Bd. of Educ. v. Nash County Bd. of Educ., No. 89-836
(E.D.N.C. filed May 4, 1989) (discussed in Note, Attacking School Segregation Root and
Branch, 99 Yale LJ. 2003, 2020 n.96 (1990)).
32. See Parents Ass'n v. Ambach, 738 F.2d 574, 580, 583 (2d Cir. 1984).
33. See Snider, Court Reaffirms its Decision in Key Desegregation Case, Educ.
Week, Oct. 25, 1989, at 6, col. 5; Snider, Oklahoma City Ordered to Return to Busing
Plan, Educ. Week, Aug. 2, 1989, at 7, col. 1.
34. See Snider, New Decision in Topeka Case Details Deep Rift Over Court's Continued Role, Educ. Week, Jan. 10, 1990, at 8, col. 1; Snider, Topeka's Schools Remain
Segregated, Court Rules, Educ. Week, June 14, 1989, at 5, col. 1.
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politan Memphis8 5 and St. Paul8 6 as well as in a number of school districts in Arkansas, 7 Connecticut,38 Florida,8 9 Massachusetts, 40 and
Mississippi. 4 1
Still, in many of the nation's northern and western cities-where a
sizeable proportion of the nation's minority students reside 4 2-it fairly
may be said that school desegregation is not alive. 43 In some places,
desegregation has yet to be conceived (in New York, Chicago, and
Philadelphia, for example 4 4); in others it was stillborn (Detroit, for example 45 ) or died young (Los Angeles4 6 and Atlanta4 7 ). Applied to
many of America's cities, therefore, predictions of desegregation's extinction-often attributed to the Supreme Court's suburbs-protecting
35. See Educ. Week, Feb. 7, 1990, at 2, col. 2; Appeal Set on Duval County Busing
Ruling, Educ. Week, Oct. 26, 1988, at 4, col. 2.
36. See St. Paul Desegregation Plan Features Scholarship Incentives, Educ. Week,
Nov. 2, 1988, at 2, col 2.
37. See Educ. Week, Nov. 15, 1989, at 3, col. 5 (interdistrict desegregation suit
involving three Arkansas districts); Arkansas Pushes School Districts to Demonstrate Racial Equity, Educ. Week, Sept. 28, 1988, at 2, col. 2.
38. See Connecticut Panel Begins Desegregation Study, Educ. Week, Oct. 25,
1989, at 3, col. 3; Johnson, Connecticut Schools Get a Voluntary Racial Plan, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 6, 1989, at B2, col. 5; Connecticut Judge Backs Waterbury Desegregation
Plan, Educ. Week, Feb. 15, 1989, at 2, col. 2.
39. See Educ. Week, Aug. 1, 1990, at 4, col. 4; Federal Judge Orders Release of
Dade Desegregation Records, Educ. Week, May 16, 1990, at 2, col. 1; Florida District
Violated Rights Laws, O.C.R. Finds, Educ. Week, Feb. 21, 1990, at 21, col. 1.
40. See Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., Off. of Educ. Equity, 1987-88 Annual Report 2-24 (1988).
41. See Miss. District, N.A.A.C.P. Reach Settlement in Civil-Rights Lawsuit, Educ.
Week, Apr. 18, 1990, at 3, col. 3; Smothers, Mississippi Schools Facing Move to Stem
Resegregation Tide, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1989, at B13, col. 1; see also Snider, E.D.
Reviewing Magnet-School Grant Compliance, Educ. Week, Sept. 5, 1990, at 41, col. 5
(recent Department of Education desegregation enforcement initiatives in several districts in New York State and Washington State); Miller, Cavazos Acts on Long-Dormant
Civil-Rights Cases, Educ. Week, Aug. 1, 1990, at 43, col. 5 (recent Department of Education desegregation enforcement initiatives in Illinois and Michigan).
42. See W. Matney & D.Johnson, America's Black Population: 1970-1982 1-3 (Bureau of the Census Special Publication PIO/POP-83-1, 1983); James, supra note 6, at
966; Orfield, Housing Patterns and Desegregation Policies, in Effective School Desegregation: Equity, Quality, and Feasibility 185, 189-91 (W. Hawley ed. 1981) [hereinafter
Effective]; For Urban Schools: A Statistical Portent, Educ. Week, June 22, 1988, at 31,
col. 1.
43. See, e.g., R. Farley, Blacks and Whites: Narrowing the Gap? 22-33 (1984); Bell,
Introduction, in Shades, supra note 8, at i, viii; Bullock, Equal Education Opportunity, in
Implementation of Civil Rights Policy 55, 70-71 (C. Bullock & C. Lamb eds. 1984);
James, supra note 6, at 975, 979; Orfield, supra note 42, at 185.
44. SeeJ. Hochschild, supra note 7, at 32; F. Welch & A. Light, supra note 6, at 40
& Table 12; James, supra note 6, at 975.
45. See Milliken v. Bradley (Miliken 1), 418 U.S. 717, 752-53 (1974).
46. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 544-45 (1982); School Rights
Lawsuit Ended in Los Angeles, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1989, at B7, col. 1.
47. See Orfield, supra note 42, at 191-93 ("Atlanta compromise" ending desegregation litigation there).
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decision in Milliken v. Bradley 1 4 8 -are widespread and not without ba50
sis.49 Nor, given the Court's recent record in related contexts, does
its sudden interest in school desegregation after more than a decade of
quiescence portend the reform's resuscitation. 5 '
48. Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
49. SeeJ. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 225, 228 ("Milliken v. Bradley might one day
be regarded as this century's Plessy v. Ferguson"); Bell, supra note 43, at viii; Fiss,
School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3, 33, 35
(1974), reprinted in Equality and Preferential Treatment 155 (M. Cohen, T. Nagel & T.
Scanlon eds. 1977) [hereinafter Equality] (because "the Milliken limitation creates an
insulated position for suburbanites," "Milliken means that we may have to live with allblack [city] school systems"); Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation
and the Corrective Ideal, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 728, 763, 775, 778 (1986) [hereinafter
Gewirtz, Choice"]; Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale LJ. 585, 645, 647 (1983)
[hereinafter Gewirtz, Remedies] ("Milliken I essentially foreclosed interdistrict relief");
James, supra note 6, at 965, 975, 983; Lawrence, supra note 8, at 57; Taylor, Brown in
Perspective, in Effective, supra note 42, at 15, 29; Note, Judicial Right Declaration and
Entrenched Discrimination, 94 Yale LJ. 1741, 1753 & n.71 (1985). For the contrary
views of two federal judges, see Doyle, Social Science Evidence in Court Cases, in Education, Social Science, and theJudicial Process 10, 12-13 n.21 (R. Rist & R. Anson eds.
1977) [hereinafter Education]; Heaney, Busing, Timetables, Goals, and Ratios: Touchstones of Equal Opportunity, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 735, 779 & n.289 (1985).
50. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2377 (1989) (restricting causes of action available to redress on-job racial harassment); Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2121, 2126 (1989) (increasing Title VII plaintiffs' burden of establishing prima facie case that employment practices have unlawful
disparate impact on minorities); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706,
730 (1989) (requiring evidence of past discrimination in industry to insulate cities' minority set-aside programs affecting contracts with that industry against equal protection
challenge).
51. The Court last directly addressed constitutionally mandated school desegregation in 1979. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526 (1979);
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979). In the first half of 1990, the
Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Tenth Circuit properly reversed a district
court order terminating a judicially mandated school desegregation plan, see Board of
Educ. v. Dowell, 110 S. Ct. 1521 (1990). In that same time period, while declining to
review the propriety of an extensive court-ordered desegregation plan, the Court upheld by a 5-4 vote the district court's power to enjoin state-law impediments to a tax
increase needed to fund the plan, see Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins I), 110 S. Ct. 1651,
1666 (1990); see also id. at 1676-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (questioning constitutional propriety of uniquely extensive magnet-school and
school-improvement remedy). Between 1979 and 1990, the Court's decisions in desegregation cases were limited to peripheral questions. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins
(Jenkins I), 109 S. Ct. 2463, 2469 (1989) (attorneys' fees); Crawford v. Board of Educ.,
458 U.S. 527, 542 (1982) (state may rescind school desegregation laws more exacting
than fourteenth amendment requires); Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458
U.S. 457, 486-87 (1982) (overturning state's efforts to block localities' voluntary school
desegregation initiatives). The reappearance of proto-"separate but equal" views
among members of the federal judiciary, of a sort not publicly expressed from that quarter for decades, indicates the current legal fragility of school desegregation. See, e.g.,
Jenkins v. Missouri, 904 F.2d 415, 426 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bowman, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) ("I am... troubled by the implicit premise that appears to
guide the panel opinion.., that black children somehow will be better off if they are
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What is more, the legal, intellectual, and moral bases for desegregation remain unstable even now, 52 thirty-six years after Brown v. Board
of Education 1.53 Indeed, once the focus of desegregation shifted in the
1970s from simply "enroll[ing] a few Negro children in formally allwhite schools" to "reshap[ing] the metropolitan apartheid into which
the country had so regrettably lapsed,"' 4 the weight that desegregation's justifications had to bear increased at the same rate as the
number of bus rides potentially entailed. At that point, the fissures that
some long had suspected in the reform's legal, intellectual, and moral
undergirding became apparent to all-and, in the opinion of some,
positively disastrous for further desegregation. 5 5
"The problem," as Judge Wilkinson wrote a decade ago,
is that we are no longer certain what kind of question public school desegregation really is. Twenty years ago we
were convinced it was a matter of showing southern
school segregation to be morally wrong. But with busing,
good moral arguments exist on both sides. To the extent
that desegregation has become less a moral question, or
at least more a moral standoff, is it also less clearly a constitutional6 requirement the Supreme Court is entitled to
5
impose?
In Judge Wilkinson's view, it was precisely these plausible doubts about
desegregation's justifications-rather than (as some have charged5 7 ) an
removed from classrooms where they enjoy majority status and are transported to more
distant classrooms where they will comprise a distinct minority").
52. See, e.g., R. Dworkin, Law's Empire 360, 382-91 (1986); A. Gutmann, Democratic Education 160-70 (1987); M. Walzer, Spheres ofJustice 214-26 (1983); Shane,
School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1041, 1041-43 (1984). For the most part, I focus here on the question of Brown in the
school desegregation context and not on the decision's more general implications. I do
so to keep the scope of the discussion within manageable bounds, to draw upon and
locate my work within a well-developed tradition of school desegregation scholarship,
and, as I explain later, to explore the field in which Brown has been most meaningful.
See infra notes 721-767 and accompanying text.
53. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
54. J. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 133.
55. See, e.g., N. Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public
Policy 104 (1975); L. Graglia, Disaster by Decree: The Supreme Court Decisions on
Race and the Schools 258-83 (1976); T. Sowell, Civil Rights: Rhetoric or Reality?
13-35 (1984); R. Wolters, The Burden of Brown: Thirty Years of School Desegregation
6-7, 138-39, 288 (1984); Cooper, The Coercive Remedies Paradox, 9 Harv.J.L. & Pub.
Pol'y 77, 80-81 (1986). For earlier criticism, see also, e.g., Kurland, Foreword: "Equal
in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 158 (1964) (questioning desegregation as a remedy);
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 33
(1959) (questioning segregation as a violation); Memorandum for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (No.
1713) (remedial doubts).
56. J. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 132.
57. See Bell, supra note 8, at 95, 97; Freeman, School Desegregation Law: Prom-
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unseemly inclination "to buy 'peace in our time' " at the expense of
"discord in the next"-that led the Supreme Court in Milliken I to immunize tens of thousands of children in Detroit's suburbs from any role
in desegregating the city's schools. 58 Moreover, notwithstanding the
Court's endorsement of "all-out desegregation" in some of its postMilliken I encounters with the issue, 59 these same nagging justification
questions lead some to fear-and others to hope-that the Court's impending foray into the desegregation field will end in the reform's all60
out retreat.
Desegregation is not dead in theory any more than in practice.
Nor need Milliken I be understood as an aberration or an early warning
of desegregation's justificatory or its actual demise. Rather, as I
demonstrate below, desegregation remains vital not only on the ground
in the South but also, potentially, in the law's contemplation and, once
the law is understood, in the nation's and even possibly its citizens'
hearts and minds. In particular, I argue that we have misunderstood,
even morally demeaned, desegregation by seeing it as "merely" a corrective for the educational effects of racial separation or discrimination in
the administration of public elementary and secondary schools. 6' More
accurately and justifiably, desegregation should be seen as a relatively
simple solution in an important sphere of public life to the fundamental
political problem at the core of the fourteenth amendment-perhaps
the defining problem of American history and one that remains today
62
the most troubling domestic issue facing the country.
ise, Contradiction, Rationalization, in, Shades, supra note 8, at 70, 85; see also Note,
Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal Protection Law,
92 Yale L.J. 328, 336-42 (1982) (Court's anxiety over scope of relief in desegregtion
cases caused it to develop restrictive intent standard and other limitations on the equal
protection right).
58. SeeJ. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 228; accord id. at 226-29.
59. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 459-61 &
nn.2, 3 (1982); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979);
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 454-55 (1979). But cf. Crawford v.
Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 542 (1982) (fourteenth amendment does not shield desegregation plan imposed by state courts under state law from effects of changes in that
law); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton 1), 433 U.S. 406, 420-21 (1977) (remanding for further findings leading to desegregation plan affirmed in Dayton II);
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 440 (1976) (limiting integrative
modifications of desegregation plan).
60. See supra note 51 and accompanying text; sources cited supra note 55.
61. Tying the desegregation decisions to the educational effects of racial separation
or discrimination are, e.g.: Fiss, The Jurisprudence of Busing, 39 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 194, 204-08 (1975); Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 731-54; Reynolds, Individualism Versus Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 Yale LJ. 995, 998-1003
(1984); Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 Tex. L. Rev. 411,
455-60 (1973).
62. "[R]ace is not like other public problems. Throughout America's history, racial

issues have been high among, if not central to, the country's most important concerns;"
they perpetually "threaten[] to tear this country apart." D. Bell, supra note 2, at 4, 37.
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Realizing that no one has ever characterized school desegregation
as a simple solution to any past or present national ill, 63 I nonetheless

regard it as both serviceable and simple. The problem desegregation
solves is the ingrained willingness of our political system to count what
I here call "the racist opinion"-that citizens of one race, as such, are
less deserving than those of another race of political respect and concern-as a valid basis for deciding how to allocate society's scarce material and autonomy-enabling resources. I conclude that public
education may provide the only sphere of public life in which this problem is solvable at all, or at least is solvable in a direct and realistic way,
and accordingly that there is much to the view that we must look (as did
the Supreme Court in Brown) to a direct solution in that sphere as our
best hope for a less direct solution in other spheres.64
In Part II, I examine five prominent theories of desegregation:
that it (1) equalizes educational opportunities or outcomes; (2) homogenizes school populations or integrates black children into the educational institutions of the previously ascendant race; (3) corrects the
effects of certain tortious wrongdoing by school officials; (4) prohibits
such wrongdoing; or (5) deters it. I conclude that none of these theories is capable of simultaneously explaining and justifying desegregation as that practice actually has developed in this country.
In Part III, I revisit the problem of segregation as a prelude to
advancing a more fitting justification for desegregation. Offering a version of liberalized republicanism, I argue: that the fourteenth amendSee W.E.B. DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk 54 (NAL ed. 1969) ("The problem of the
twentieth century is the problem of the color line"); W. Jordan, White over Black:
American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (1968); E. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom (1975); G. Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem
and Modern Democracy (1944); C. Woodward, The Strange Career ofJim Crow (1974);
Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1356-64; Hertzberg, Wounds of Race, The New Republic,
July 10, 1989, at 4 ("Race is the wound that will not heal"); infra notes 449-457 and
accompanying text.
63. See Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case: Its Significance for Northern
School Desegregation, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 697, 698 (1971) [hereinafter Fiss, Charlotte];
Fiss, The Fate of An Idea Whose Time Has Come: Anti-Discrimination Law in the Second Decade After Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 742, 768 (1974) [hereinafter Fiss, Fate]; Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 730 ("extraordinary practical
obstacles"); Reynolds, supra note 61, at 1002-05 ("runaway social experiment"); Yudof,
supra note 61, at 448 ("painfully costly").
64. It should be clear already why I think the issues addressed in this Article are
worthy of scholarly comment. A related question is why these issues are appropriate for
comment by a white scholar. Although I accept many aspects of "the minority critique"
of white civil rights scholarship-namely, the neglect of minority scholarship and the
victim's perspective generally-I believe that the solution is to make scholarship in the
field more, not less, inclusive. Compare Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on
a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 561, 566-73 (1984) (criticizing
history of white domination of civil rights scholarship) with Kennedy, Racial Critiques of
Legal Academia, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1745, 1788-801 (1989) (responding to objections to
white scholars' continued participation in civil rights discourse).
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ment requires all political participants, broadly defined, to treat all
individuals affected by the political process as their equals; that in our
pluralistic society, 65 treatment as an equal requires political actors to
render equal respect and concern in the political process to all other
people based on the capacity of all people to generate their own equally
worthy visions of the good; that deviations from the principle of equal
concern fundamentally corrupt the political process and, if long and
broad enough, threaten the continued existence of the polity; that racism constitutes just such a deviation, which continues pervasively to
corrupt the nation's political processes; and that racial segregation-in
schools and in other -public settings6 6 -is perhaps the most virulent
form of this polity-threatening corruption.
Having located the violation found in the desegregation decisions
in the political (and not, for example, in the educational) process, I undertake in Parts IV and V to show that the Supreme Court's method of
identifying and then remedying that violation accomplishes two political-process-oriented (or "processual" 6 7) goals: First, at the liability
stage, by requiring proof of intentional, system-wide discrimination,
the Court's desegregation methodology identifies situations in which,
as a result of racist corruption, the political process has so fundamentally broken down that it requires reform and not simply repair. Second, at the remedial stage, by in essence actualizing the hypothetical
situations that modem political theorists posit as the ideal positions
from which to construct acceptable principles of justice, the Court's
methodology rather elegantly effectuates that political reform.
Part V proceeds to a discussion of why the political reform
achieved via desegregation is less problematic in the sphere of public
education than in other spheres, thus explaining the Court's otherwise
curious confinement of the remedy to that sphere. Finally, Part V applies my reformative model to a number of vexing issues posed by desegregation decrees, ranging from the role of parental choice and the
timing of a decree's termination to the interdistrict-relief question at
issue in Milliken I. On the last issue, I argue that Milliken I, rather than
being fatal to all but the most crabbed visions of desegregation, in fact
consists with the concerted migration from the South of desegregation
as an effective instrument of political reform.
65. By "pluralistic society" I do not refer to a society governed according to the
dictates of so-called "interest group pluralism" or "pluralist political science" but instead to a social and political system premised on "the acceptance and celebration of
diversity.., within society." Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale LJ. 1493, 1503, 1507
(1988); see infra notes 378, 422.

66. See infra notes 419-438 and accompanying text (defining "public").
67. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1808 (1981) (processual: "of or
relating to a legal process"); accord Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, in
Equality, supra note 49, at 84, 131.
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FIVE THEORIES OF DESEGREGATION

DoctrinalDots

Brown v. Board of Education 168 held unconstitutional state statutes
requiring or permitting local school districts to segregate black and
white public school children. Rejecting the "separate but equal" regime of Plessy v. Ferguson,6 9 the Supreme Court held that "in the field of
public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."' 70 Supporting its
conclusion with social scientific evidence that segregated schools afflict
African-American children with comparative educational and other
harms, the Court concluded that racial segregation "generates a feeling
of inferiority as to Negroes' status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."'7'
Brown v. Board of Education 1172 thereupon ceded to local officials
and federal district courts the duty to define what Brown I required of
systems operating dejure racially segregated schools, telling those authorities only that they should take such steps "as are necessary and
proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis
with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases." 73
After returning to the desegregation issue only intermittently and
inconclusively during the next thirteen years,7 4 the Supreme Court in
Green v. County School Board 75 made clear for the first time that it did not
suffice constitutionally for a school or district to "throw its doors open"
to blacks and whites on a facially neutral basis. 76 Overturning decrees
permitting freedom-of-choice plans, the Supreme Court ruled that pre68. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

69. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Although Plessy arose in the common carrier context, the
Court frequently relied upon it in the education context. See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275
U.S. 78 (1927); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908); Gumming v. Richmond
County Bd.of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
70. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.

71. Id. at 494 & n.11.
72. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
73. Id. at 301.
74. "[Flrom 1955 to 1968, the Court abandoned the field of public school desegregation. Its pronouncements were few... [a]nd its leadership was almost nonexistent."
J. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 61-62; see, e.g., Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198, 199-200
(1965) (per curiam); Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965) (per curiam); Calhoun v. Lattimer, 377 U.S. 263, 264-65 (1964) (per curiam); Griffin v. County School
Bd. 377 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1964); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 688 (1963);
McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674 (1963); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7
(1958). See generallyJ. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 78-102 (criticizing Court for providing weak leadership in school desegregation field in late 1950s and early 1960s);
Gewirtz, Remedies, supra note 49, at 611 n.62 (discussing Court's lack of involvement in
desegregation disputes between 1955 and 1968).
75. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
76. Id. at 441; accord Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968);
Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1968).

1990]

DESEGREGATING POLITICS

1477

viously segregated school districts must adopt or be ordered to adopt
plans that " 'so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of
the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future.' ",77 The Court
insisted, and a year later took steps, finally, to insure that districts vol79
untarily or compulsorily adopted such plans "now,''78 "forthwith,"
80
and "immediately."
The Court also held for the first time that such
plans must discharge an "affirmative duty" 8' on the part of desegregating districts (1) to take effective steps to eliminate the "vestiges" of
prior discrimination,8 2 and (2) to refrain from any action, however benignly or neutrally motivated, that has the effect of maintaining or in83
creasing the degree of racial separation in the schools.

In the following decade, beginning with its 1971 decision in Swann
v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education8 4 and ending with its 1979 decisions in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman 1185 and Columbus Board
of Education v. Penick,86 the Supreme Court insisted that desegregation
plans achieve "the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation,
taking into account the practicalities of the situation."8 7 The Court issued and upheld "all-out desegregation"8 8 decrees that effectively defined "desegregation" as "integration" and mandated studentattendance techniques-for example, rezoning, the pairing and clustering of schools, and busing-that lead to the actual and extensive mixing
of the races in most or all schools. 8 9
77. Green, 391 U.S. at 438 n.4 (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145,
154 (1965)).
78. Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
79. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 14 (1971).

80. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam).
81. Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38 (quoted in Columbus Bd.of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S.
449, 459 (1979)).

82. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 459; accord, e.g., Dayton Bd.of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton
1), 433 U.S. 406, 417 (1977); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 203 (1973);

McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971); Swann, 402 U.S. at 15; Green, 391 U.S. at
437-38; see also Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 408 (1986) (Green "held that voluntary choice programs in the public schools were inadequate and that the schools must
take affirmative action to integrate their student bodies") White, J., concurring,'joined
by Burger, C.J., and Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ.).
83. See, e.g., Missouri v.Jenkins (Jenkins II), 110 S.Ct. 1651, 1666 (1990); Dayton
Bd.of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979); United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1972); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 459-60 (1972); North Carolina State Bd.of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S.
43, 45 (1971); see also Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971)
("measure of any desegregation plan is its effectiveness").
84. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
85. Dayton II, 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
86. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
87. Davis, 402 U.S. at 37; accord Swann, 402 U.S. at 26.
88. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 214 (1973).
89. See, e.g., Dayton II,443 U.S. at 538; Columbus, 443 U.S. at 458-59; Keyes, 413
U.S. at 201-02; McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971); Davis, 402 U.S. at 37;
Swann, 402 U.S. at 27-30; see also Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S.
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On the other hand, the Court excluded from its definition of the
conditions requiring desegregation thefact of racial separation of students in the public schools-however widespread and educationally
harmful that separation might be. Instead, as a predicate for judicial
intervention, the Court insisted upon purposive segregation-whether
manifested in explicitly race-conscious statutes as in Brown or in facially
neutral but invidiously motivated policies and practices as in its first
northern case, Keyes v. School District No. 1.90 At the same time, the
Court conformed its treatment of northern and western segregation to
the southern decisions' demand that guilty districts discharge the twopart affirmative duty to desegregate that the Court had established in
Green.9 1 In addition, the Court devised a pair of rebuttable presumptions that allowed plaintiffs to rely, without more, upon proof of (1) racially motivated segregation on a "system-wide" basis (i.e., affecting a
significant part of a school district), followed by (2) the expanded or
continuedfact of racial separation in the district's schools, to establish
that the continued or expanded condition of racial separation is linked
92
to the earlier violation.
Reaching a rather different outcome in Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman I, 9 the Court held that a small number of discrete racially
discriminatory actions by a northern city school board did not justify
applying the continuing- and expanding-effects presumptions or imposing a full-blown desegregation remedy. 9 4 And it held in Milliken v.
Bradley 195 that the massive and effective segregation of the Detroit
(city) School District by the Detroit School Board and the State of
457, 474-75 (1982) (overturning state statute that interfered with school district's voluntary all-out desegregation plan); North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S.
43, 46 (1971) ("all reasonable methods [must] be available to formulate an effective
remedy"). As social scientific researchers have since documented statistically, the
Court's "effectiveness" criterion generally requires mandatory assignment and transportation measures, notwithstanding the Court's statements, see, e.g., Swarn, 402 U.S. at
28-29, that no particular measures are required. See, e.g., J. Hochschild, supra note 7,
at 73 ("On average, the proportion of totally isolated black students is reduced in
mandatory districtwide plans by 97 percent but in voluntary plans by only 5 percent ....
Regression analysis shows essentially the same results-mandatory student reassignment has a vastly greater effect on levels of school segregation than any of eleven other
political, demographic, or economic variables"); F. Welch & A. Light, supra note 6, at
6-7; Hawley & Smylie, supra note 9, at 282-83. A precise racial balance in every school
is not required. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434 (1976);
Swann, 402 U.S. at 24.
90. 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973); accord, e.g., Columbus, 443 U.S. at 464.
91. See Dayton 11, 443 U.S. at 538; Columbus, 443 U.S. at 458-59; Keyes, 413 U.S. at
213-14; see supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
92. See Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 540-42; Columbus, 443 U.S. at 458 & n.7, 466-68;
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 207-11; Swann, 402 U.S. at 26; Goldstein, A Swann Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 27-28 (1978).
93. Dayton I, 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
94. Id. at 417.
95. Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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Michigan did not justify extending the "all-out" remedial regime described above into Detroit's suburbs, notwithstanding the impossibility
of providing Detroit's discriminated-against black school children with
any meaningfully integrated classroom experience within the boundaries of that 80-percent-minority district. Noting the absence of discrimination by and invidiously motivated segregative effects in the suburbs,
the five-person majority in Milliken I overturned a plan compelling fiftythree suburban school districts enrolling half a million pupils to take
part in desegregating the 276,000-pupil Detroit city district and directed the district court to install in its place a wholly intradistrict
plan.9 6 In both Dayton I and Milliken I, the Court emphasized requirements of specific linkage between discriminatory cause and segregative
effect and between violation and remedy, insisting that "the scope of
the remedy [be] determined
by the nature and extent of the constitu'9 7
tional violation."
B. Connecting the Dots: Criteriafor a Satisfying Picture
The foregoing description of the cases does not do justice to the
rich and complicated history of school desegregation. 98 It should,
however, suggest the scattered and to some extent formless pattern of
doctrinal dots that analysts seeking to draw a satisfying picture of desegregation have long struggled to join. 99 To borrow and extend Professor Yudof's description of the difficulty: "How have the courts
managed to transform [Brown 11's] requirement of racially neutral admissions and assignment policies into an affirmative ... obligation to
integrate the public schools," then refused to enforce that obligation
on behalf of admittedly discriminated-against African-American children attending all-minority schools in Dayton and Detroit? 10 0
96. See id. at 733 & n.14, 745, 753; see also Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 11), 433
U.S. 267, 283-91 (1977) (affirming orders requiring Detroit district to provide, and
Michigan partially to fund, compensatory education programs in lieu of comprehensive
integration plan for four-fifths black district).
97. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 744; accord Dayton I, 433 U.S. at 420.
98. See L. Graglia, supra note 55, at 18-257; R. Kluger, SimpleJustice (1975); G.
Orfield, The Reconstruction of Southern Education 102-51 (1969); J. Wilkinson, supra
note 1, at 11-249; Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 Stan. L. Rev.
61, 63 & n.7 (1988) (citing authority); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62
Minn. L. Rev. 1049, 1088-93, 1099-102, 1107-14 (1978); Read, Judicial Evolution of
the Law of School Integration Since Brown v. Board of Education, 39 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 7, 11-48 (1975); Shane, supra note 52, at 1062-77.
99. A major part of the problem is that the first dot-Brown I-won't stand still.
SeeJ. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 29 (Brown I used brevity as a "mask for ambiguity");
Freeman, supra note 98, at 1057; Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political Reconstruction, Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform,
76 Va. L. Rev. 349, 351-55 (1990); Wechsler, supra note 55, at 34.
100. Yudof, supra note 61, at 448; accord Fiss, Charlotte, supra note 63, at 697
("riddle of the law of school desegregation"); see also J. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 222
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An obvious answer to this question is that the dots do not form a
coherent picture but rather mark the erratic trajectory of a series of
case-specific compromises achieved by shifting coalitions of the Court's
changing personnel. Without disputing this answer, I reject it as a
working principle in favor of the possibly fictive assumption of doctrinal coherence. I do so for three reasons. First, lawyers and lower court
judges must proceed as if the cases cohere. Second, in making up their
minds and in "compromising" with their colleagues on the placement
of the next dot, the Justices themselves will have recourse to the coherence assumption. Third, that assumption has particular force in this
instance because existing doctrine has remained unusually stable in
nearly all of its particulars for over a decade and a half (since Milliken I)
and in important respects for over two decades (since Green ).101 As a
result, the day-to-day activities and expectations not only of hundreds
of federal judges but also of thousands of school districts and millions
of parents and children depend, and for years have depended, upon
existing doctrine. 10 2 The decisions accordingly do not just delineate a
set of legal rules; more importantly, they define a full-fledged social
practice that deserves explication as such, and that has the capacityespecially if explained in a morally satisfying way-to exert important
inertial pressure on the next judicial "compromise." 10 3
The story of scholarly efforts to provide a philosophically satisfying
explanation of the Court's desegregation doctrine is as long and involved as the doctrinal developments themselves. This story, too, has
been sketched elsewhere, 10 4 but in order to continue my own story, I
need to outline the five principal scholarly models of desegregation and
the ways in which each fails to provide a descriptively and normatively
satisfying explanation of the desegregative enterprise.
(Green and Milliken cannot be squared); Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism,
Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 57, 87, 99, 102, 105 (1978) (individually, cases are "a patchwork of
unintelligibility;" collectively, cases are "incoherent").
101. Indeed, the National School Boards Association (NSBA), as amicus curiae, advocated review of the "termination" issue on which the Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari precisely because the issue is one of the last remaining open questions in the
school desegregation field. See Snider, Court to Decide on Obligation in Unitary Districts, Educ. Week, Apr. 4, 1990, at 1, col. 1 (quoting NSBA's brief); supra note 51; infra
notes 805-828 and accompanying text.
102. For partial lists of school districts with major school desegregation plans, see
F. Welch & A. Light, supra note 6, at 116-76; James, supra note 6, at 969-70.
103. See Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L.
Rev. 723, 760-62 (1988).
104. See Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1,35-52 (1976); Dworkin, Social Sciences
and Constitutional Rights: The Consequences of Uncertainty, in Education, supra note
49, at 21, 25-30; Freeman, supra note 98, at 1065-67; Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 Calif. L. Rev. 275, 298-374
(1972); Shane, supra note 52, at 1044-49; Yudof, supra note 100, at 88-106.
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In examining the five models, I use the two standard evaluative
criteria corresponding to our concerns with practice and theory: A
model must "both fit[] and justiy] what has gone before."' 10 5
The criterion of fit asks whether a desegregation theory provides
"a decent interpretation of American constitutional practice"-whether
it proposes a paradigm or model that "capture[s our] everyday legal
problems" and explains why judges "are curious about and responsive
to particular facts."'10 6 Fit does not demand that a theory explain every
outcome the Court has reached, much less every explanation given for
every outcome. But fit does demand as a threshold matter that a theory
explain the basic structure of the social arrangements that the case law
is substantially responsible for shaping1 ° 7 In the current context, fit
requires that a theory generally account for the basic outlines of the
violation and remedy that the Court's desegregation decisions define,' 0 8 and that the theory satisfactorily answer a series of questions
105. R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at 239; accord id. at 139, 230-43, 255-58 (conception of law should "show practice in its best light" then "display some argument why law
on that conception provides an adequate justification for coercion"); J. Ely, Democracy
and Distrust 88-89 n.*, 101 (1980) (relying on "argument from the nature of the Constitution" and "overtly normative" argument about "consistency with democratic theory"); J. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State 51-53, 167, 172-253 (1985)
("appropriateness" and "justificatory" analyses described and exemplified); J. Rawls, A
Theory ofJustice 20 (1971) ("reflective equilibrium" seeks a theory that "both expresses
reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered [moral] judgments"); M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice 43-44 (1982) ("two different
kinds ofjustification coming together"-one appealing to a "standard of descriptive...
plausibility," the other to "our considered convictions about justice"); J. Wilson, Equality 8 (1966) (analytic philosophy's method of "moving back and forth between" prescription and description, "language and life"); Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 5 (1983) ("explanation
and purpose"); Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 Yale L.J.
1, 67 (1989) (discussing R. Dworkin) ("Interpretation exists in this tension between historically given practice and normative intelligibility"); Michelman, Welfare Rights in a
Constitutional Democracy, 1979 Wash. U.L.Q. 659, 669 (judges use "methods and contents of the philosophical literature to inform and clarify that reasoning process once its
constitutionally connected premise is in place"); Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in
the Equal Protection Context: Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 73 Geo. L.J.
89, 91-98 (1984) (exemplifying appeals to justification and fit in critique of "colorblind" approach to equal protection requirement); Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 127, 128 (background theory used to interpret and test principles derived from case law).
106. R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at 366; Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 540 & n.12 (1972) [hereinafter Fletcher, Fairness] (citing T.
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 23 (2d ed. 1970)); Fletcher, Punishment
and Compensation, 14 Creighton L. Rev. 691, 703, 694 (1981) [hereinafter Fletcher,
Punishment].
107. See R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at 230, 240 ("some coherent theory" such that
a single "official with that theory could have reached most of the results the precedents
report;" interpretation "flawed if it leaves unexplained some major structural aspect of
the text").
108. See supra note 3 and text accompanying notes 68-97.
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begged by those decisions: Why has the Court limited the violation to
intentional discrimination (Why just intent?) against blacks and members
of other special groups (Why just race?)? And why has the Court limited
desegregation to the sphere of education (Why just, or primarily,
schools?), while limiting its decrees in that sphere almost exclusively to
mandatory integration (Why just desegregation?)?
Fit with the doctrinal data plays an important role in my analysis
for several reasons. First, like other modem interpreters, I doubt our
capacity to build "morality from the ground up" and prefer a "practical
morality" that seeks "an interpretation" 1 0 9 of "the standing features of
[a] practice ... rather than the invention of something new." 10 It is
again significant in this regard that desegregation's standing doctrinal
features have persisted in important respects for decades.1 1 My enterprise, therefore, is to try to explain those practices before advocating
that we scrap thirty-six years ofjudicial handiwork and start over. Second, there are a number of pragmatic reasons why our desegregative
practices deserve explanation-and, if possible, justification and, ifjustified, retention: (1) Those practices represent one of the longest-running efforts at sustained social reform in this country's history. (2) That
effort has taken institutional root in the daily operation of more of the
nation's towns and cities and psychological root in the daily lives of
more of the nation's parents and children than virtually any other social
reform of its time and kind. (3) The length and scope of that reform
has enabled practitioners and researchers to begin to amass a workable
fund of knowledge about how to make the reform work best. And most
importantly, (4) our actual desegregative practices have had salutary
effects on children and schools, citizens and communities, and the
political process. 1 2 A theory gives up too much, therefore, if it
prescribes substantially less desegregation than the Court in fact has
ordered or if it premises the reform's justifiability on the Court's going
substantially further than it is willing to go in ordering desegregation.1 13 Finally, practice provides an especially firm, familiar, and lawyerly starting point for assessing legal conceptions." 14
109. M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars xv (1977).
110. R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at 67; accord Monaghan, supra note 103, at
727-39. See generally M. Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism 35-66 (1987)
[hereinafter M. Walzer, Interpretation] (social critics should elaborate on existing moralities and tell stories about societies more just than, but still similar to, their own). Put
differently, fit inevitably is important in order to break ties between competing theories,
each morally satisfying on its own terms.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 101-102.
112. See infra notes 665-697 and accompanying text.
113. The questions comprising my fit analysis-Why just intent, race, schools, and
desegregation?-were chosen carefully in this regard. A theory's conclusion that the
Court erred in posing or answering any of these four questions would imply that current
desegregation practice ought to be either disruptively contracted or unrealistically
expanded.
114. See G. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 73-75, 107-09 &
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The criterion of justification, as I use the term, requires not only
that a theory be coherent and internally cbnsisient, determinate
enough to qualify as a paradigm or model, and connected to a general
moral or political principle that is defensible as a matter of abstract
justice. In addition, justification requires that the defensible moral or
political principle to which the theory is connected be consistent with
"our considered convictions of justice"-i.e., with moral or political
convictions that are held generally in our society (even if usually at a
relatively high level of abstraction)." 5 The justification criterion thus
includes a broadly focused fit requirement of its own. 1 6 Although controversial, 117 a demand for moral justification seems appropriate in the
case of desegregation, both as an interpretive aid in a perplexing legal
sphere 1 8 and as a means of determining whether a highly contested set
ofjudicial practices with widespread social consequences can be placed
"in a better light from the standpoint of [the community's] political
morality." 19
n.69 (1982); R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at 139, 229-38; Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 351-52 (1974); Fletcher, Fairness, supra
note 106, at 540 & n.12; Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. 308, 312-13 (1985). Because the cases are more definitive of current practice than
the Constitution itself, my fit analysis proceeds from the cases. Later, however, I conclude that the cases "fit" the Constitution. See infra notes 484-503, 591-603 and accompanying texts.
115. J. Rawls, supra note 105, at 19-20; accord R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at
164-65, 177-85, 249; Rorty, Solidarity or Objectivity?, in Post-Analytic Philosophy 3,
5-6, 12, 15-16, 18 n.12 (J. Rajchman & C. West ed. 1985); see also Sherry, Civic Virtue
and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L. Rev. 543, 574-75
(1986) ("normative schemes" are "embedded in society and social roles"). "[T]o say
that we must work by our own lights, that we must be ethnocentric," is, of course, to
eschew any strict claim of neutrality and to acknowledge "culturally contingent" results.
Rorty, supra, at 8; Fallon, What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 Harv.
L. Rev. 1695, 1712-13 (1989); see Kahn, supra note 105, at 31; infra notes 374, 627,
652.
116. See Gutmann, supra note 114, at 312-13; Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political
Not Metaphysical, 14 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 219, 225 (1985) (favored justification process
"starts from within certain political tradition").
117. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 67, at 128. Compare J. Ely, supra note 105, at
48-54, 56-59 (criticizing noninterpretive efforts to derive fundamental values from
moral philosophy for application in constitutional adjudication) with id. at 75 n.*, 79 &
n.20, 88-89 n.*, 100, 101, 187 n.14, 237-38 n.54 (using utilitarian, liberal, and republican political and social theory, assertedly immanent in Constitution, to help understand
Constitution's basic structure and provisions) and Ely, Professor Dworkin's External/
Personal Preference Distinction, 1983 Duke L.J. 959, 979-81, 985 n.79. (same) and
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale L.J.
1063, 1066 n.9, 1067, 1070, 1077 (1980) (disavowing possibility of divorcing constitutional adjudication from reliance on extra-textual substantive values).
118. See Michelman, supra note 105, at 669; Sunstein, supra note 105, at 136.
119. R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at 256.
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Five Theories

In this section, I divide the numerous scholarly interpretations of
desegregation into five theories that illustrate the divergent goals
ascribed to the remedy: (1) the Equal Educational Opportunity theory;
(2) the Integration theory; (3) the Correction theory; (4) the Prohibition theory; and (5) the Prophylaxis theory.1 20 Although the five theories overlap and may be grouped in a number of ways, I separate them
here to facilitate analysis, and array them in essentially the chronological order in which each came to dominate the scholarly scene. I also
periodically analyze the five theories using two dichotomous measures-a product/process measure and a private law/public law
measure.
The product/process measure categorizes desegregation theories
based on whether they view the motivating force behind desegregation
as, on the one hand, the singling out of certain goods-for example,
knowledge, instruction, interracial contact, or wealth-"as so important
that they must be insulated from whatever inhibition the political process might impose," or on the other hand, a concern "with how decisions effecting value choices and distributing the resultant costs and
benefits are made." 12 1 The product/process distinction overlaps a
right/remedy distinction: The product-oriented approaches that dominated early desegregation theory tend to view desegregation as a
schools-specific equal protection right. By contrast, the process-oriented approaches that more recently came into vogue view desegregation as a schools-specific remedy that the courts deploy in response to a
more generally defined equal protection right.
The private law/public law measure categorizes the competing theories based on whether they perceive desegregation as aimed at private,
interpersonal deviations from existing norms (analogous, for example,
to traditional tort remedies) or at public, socio-structural imbalances,
inefficiencies, or injustices (analogous, for example, to a regulatory system for preventing and compensating the victims of industrial
120. For alternative categorizations, see sources cited supra note 104.
121. J. Ely, supra note 105, at 75 n.* ("value-focused" versus "process-oriented"
theories); see also M. Sandel, supra note 105, at 17-19 ("teleological" versus "deontological"); Crenshaw, supra note 3,at 1341-42 ("equality as a result" versus "equality as
a process"); Dworkin, De Funis v. Sweatt, in Equality, supra note 49, at 61, 67-68
("equal treatment" versus "treatment as an equal"); Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 4:
Political Equality, 22 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1,3-5 (1987) ("consequentialist" versus "process"focused; "outcome test" versus "input test"); Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1162, 1177 (1977) (whether "conforms to a controlling standard"
versus whether "is the result of a process that is appropriate"); Tushnet, An Essay on
Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363, 1370, 1382-94 (1984) ("needs" focus versus "rights"
focus). See generally Kymlicka, Rawls on Teleology and Deontology, 17 Phil. & Pub.
Aft. 173 (1988) (analyzing different substance-process distinctions drawn by various
modern political philosophers).
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accidents) 122

1. The Equal EducationalOpportunity Theory. - A number of commentators have read Brown I to require state and local public officials to
provide black children with a given level of education, namely, the level
generally afforded white children.123 For the most part, these writers
have understood this constitutional and public-law requirement to encompass a mandate to provide black and white children with the same
education by educating both in the same, hence in integrated,
122. See Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 Harv.
L. Rev. 4 (1982). For commentary drawing similar distinctions, see B. Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law 24-37 (1984) ("appraisal of individual actions" in search for
isolated behavior that "against the background of presumptively legitimate social practice" is deemed to be deviant versus "structural account" of existing practice and of
ways in which "existing practice, taken as a whole, may [or may not] be considered ineffident or unjust"); M. Damaska, The Faces ofJustice and State Authority 71-88 (1986)
(distinguishing "reactive" and "activist" approaches to formal adjudication); P. Schuck,
Agent Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts 268 (1986) (distinguishing
"private law" and "public law" approaches to toxic tort litigation); W. Keeton, D.
Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 1, at 5-6, § 2,
at 7 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter W. Keeton] (proceedings to compensate "individuals,
rather than the public, for losses which they have suffered within the scope of their legally recognized interests" versus proceedings to protect "interests common to the public at large, as they are represented by the entity which we call the state"); Fletcher,
Punishment, supra note 106, at 692-93, 698 (legal theory designed either to "rectify the
private imbalance generated by the defendant's causing harm" or to "rectify the public
imbalance generated by the defendant's wrongdoing"). The private law/public law inquiry cuts across rather than duplicates, the product/process inquiry, inasmuch as we
can imagine consequentialist private-law approaches (e.g., deterrence-focused tort
schemes) as well as process-focused private-law approaches (e.g., compensation-focused
tort schemes), and we can imagine consequentialist public-law approaches (deterrent
criminal justice regimes) as well as deontological public-law approaches (retributive
criminal justice regimes). See id. at 693, 698-99.
123. See, e.g., B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 246-47 (1980); J.
Dewey, Democracy and Education 98 (1916); A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at 161-63;J.
Hochschild, supra note 7, at 172-73; Bell, supra note 8, at 98-101; Carter, supra note 8,
at 26-27; Edmonds, Effective Education for Minority Pupils: Brown Confounded or
Confirmed, in Shades, supra note 8, at 108, 109; Fiss, supra note 61, at 200, 207; Fiss,
Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 Harv. L. Rev.
564, 588-89 (1965); Freeman, supra note 98, at 1067; Lawrence, supra note 8, at 51-52;
Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1105, 1133 (1989);
Shane, supra note 52, at 1084-85; Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal
Protection, 82 Yale LJ. 123, 152-53 (1972); Note, Reading the Mind of the School
Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 Yale LJ. 317,
346-49 (1976) [hereinafter Note, Reading]. For criticism of the Equal Educational Opportunity theory, see M. Walzer, supra Aiote 52, at 221-24; Black, The Lawfulness of the
Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L.J. 421,430 n.25 (1960); Brest, supra note 104, at 9, 18
n.76, 45-46; Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 150, 168 (1955); Dimond, School
Segregation in the North: There Is But One Constitution, 7 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1,
15-17 (1972); Dworkin, supra note 104, at 24-26; Taylor, The Crucial Role of Education in Achieving the Civil Rights Goals of the 1980s, 37 Rutgers L. Rev. 961, 963-64
(1985); Yudof, supra note 61, at 412-13, 420-30, 435-45.

1486

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1463

schools.' 24 Thus, while the desired end is a given level of education,
the constitutionally or at least empirically mandated means to that end
is generally understood to be a racially integrated education.1 2 5
That a number of commentators have adopted the Equal Educational Opportunity theory is not surprising, given: (1) Brown I's statement of "the question presented: Does segregation of children in
public schools solely on the basis of race... deprive[] the children of
the minority group of equal educational opportunities?"; 1 26 (2) its discussion of the relative educational disadvantages suffered by AfricanAmerican children in segregated facilities; 12 7 (3) the plaintiffs" 28 and
the Court's 12 9 assumptions about the advantages of interracial education; (4) the Court's conclusion that segregation "deprives minority
children of equal educational opportunity";13 0 (5) the then sketchy but
now substantial body of evidence establishing that black children educated in racially mixed schools score higher on I.Q. and achievement
tests, are more likely to attend college and fare better there, and attain
greater success in the job and housing markets, than do black children
educated in racially homogeneous environments;l 3 ' (6) the Court's discussion of the particular importance of public education;' 3 2 and (7) the
Court's subsequent endorsement, when integration has been impossible, of alternative educational-enhancement remedies.' 3 3
Nonetheless, as an explanation of the desegregation doctrine as it
actually developed-judged, that is, by the criterion of fit-the Equal
Educational Opportunity principle is a failure. In particular, most proponents of the Equal Educational Opportunity approach assume, and
124. See, e.g., A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at 161-62;J. Hochschild, supra note 7,
at 172-73; Fiss, supra note 123, at 583-617; Lawrence, supra note 8, at 50-54.
125. See Fiss, supra note 61, at 204, 207. But cf. Liebman, supra note 99, at
370-435 (nonintegrative means to equal educational opportunity end); infra notes 140,
142 and accompanying text (same).
126. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). The Court
immediately answered its question: "We believe that it does." Id.
127. See id. at 494-95 & n.1 1 (racially separate education may "[retard] the educational and mental development of negro children").
128. See R. Kluger, supra note 98, at 319-21; Carter, supra note 8, at 22-23; cf.
Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1377-78 (symbolic and dignitary harms, not educational
ones, were the focus); Monaghan, Law and the Negro Revolution; Ten Years Later, 44
B.U.L. Rev. 467, 471 (1964) (desegregation activists are "in fact not primarily interested
in education" but in "integration into the mainstream of society").
129. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494 & n. 11.
130. Id. at 493.
131. Compare authorities cited in id. at 494-95 n. 11 (citing modest amount of social scientific research available at time suggesting that school segregation has harmful
educational and psychological effects on African-American children) with authorities
cited infra notes 675-691 and accompanying text (discussing more recent, sophisticated, and convincing social scientific research documenting school desegregation's salutary educational and other effects on African-American children).
132. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493.
133. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken H), 433 U.S. 267, 280-88 (1977).
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no one has offered any good reason to doubt, that racial separation per
se, rather than any cause of that condition, accounts for the educational
inequalities discussed in Brown 1.134 Because educationally harmful
"segregation can exist even when students are not assigned to schools
on the basis of race.., but rather on the basis of some ...

innocent

criterion, such as geography," the Equal Educational Opportunity theory insists that the desired end-state of an equal, hence integrated, education accrue to all black children regardless of how they came to be
13 5
separated from their white peers.
The problem with the legal premise underlying the Equal Educational Opportunity principle is, of course, that the Court, after flirting
with the premise for several years,' 3 6 rejected it in Keyes 137 and in numerous later decisions limiting the reach of the equal protection clause
in race cases to purposive discrimination. 38 In order to answer the
134. See, e.g., A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at 161, 162; Fiss, Charlotte, supra note
63, at 707; Freeman, supra note 57, at 75, 83-87; Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 319-20 (1987)
("Does the black child in a segregated school experience less stigma and humiliation
because the local school board did not consciously set out to harm her?"). But cf. Brown
I, 347 U.S. at 494 ("detrimental effect" of segregation "greater when it has the sanction
of law"); Note, Reading, supra note 123, at 346-49 (similar).
135. Fiss, supra note 49, at 15-16; accord R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at 24; Fiss,
supra note 61, at 200, 207-08; Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 731; Lawrence, supra
note 8, at 52-54; see also infra note 675 (evidence suggesting that segregation's educational harms originate in the fact, and not in any particular cause, of racial isolation).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. Of Educ., 407 U.S. 484,
489-90 (1972); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 459-60 (1972); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971); Green v. County School
Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968); see Yudof, supra note 61, at 449; see also Cisneros v.
Corpus Christi Indep. School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
413 U.S. 920 (1973) (straightforwardjudicial application of Equal Educational Opportunity theory).
137. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973). Justices Douglas, id. at
215-16, and Powell, id. at 217-36, dissented from this holding. Justice Powell later embraced it. See, e.g., Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 991-95 &
n.1 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
138. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 225, 229 (1985); Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617, 622 (1982); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,
464 (1979); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 276-79 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); infra notes 466-483 and accompanying text. Not
only the "Why just intent?" but also the "Why just race?" and "Why just desegregation?" questions elude answer by the Equal Educational Opportunity theory. Thus, the
theory implies that state and local officials violate the Constitution (1) whenever any
group of children (for example, poor children) is "particularly harm[ed]," Fiss, supra
note 49, at 15, by some educational policy, and (2) whenever any available educational
strategy (for example, equalized funding for schools and districts) would forestall the
harm. See, e.g., Horowitz, Unseparate But Unequal: The Emerging Fourteenth
Amendment Issue in Public School Education, 13 UCLA L. Rev. 1147, 1162-65 (1966).
The Court's decisions, however, reject both understandings of the Constitution. See,
e.g., Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328-30 (1983) (upholding residency require-
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question "Why just intent?", therefore, Equal Educational Opportunity
theorists have had to adopt one of two views: either that the intent
inquiry is designed to preclude further desegregation, in deference to
whites who oppose the reform, or that the inquiry is not a serious requirement at all.
Adherents of the former view argue that the unpopularity of desegregation among whites, rather than any good doctrinal or philosophical
reason, has led the Court to adopt a deliberately preclusive intent test.
Faced with this politically decisive white hostility, these writers propose
a negotiated retreat to what they believe is in any event higher educational ground: Blacks should give up the unpopular quest for
mandatory integration, and with it Brown I's holding that separate
schools can never be equal. In return, the courts should relax the intent requirement and begin ordering state and local officials to furnish
black children with "model black [i.e., separate but enhanced and truly
equal] schools." 13 9 As Judge Carter explains the shift in perspective:
"While we fashioned Brown on the theory that equal education and inment denying tuition-free public education to alien children living in district with someone other than their parent or guardian); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973) (upholding substantial district-by-district disparities in funds
available to educate children stemming from state's reliance on property taxes to fund
public education); cases cited infra note 169.
139. Bell, supra note 8, at 101; accord D. Bell, supra note 2, at 118, 112-21. In
Professor Bell's view, the "separate but enhanced" route is necessitated by "the interestconvergence dilemma"-that the courts will provide African-American children with
only such beneficial relief in school desegregation cases as concurrently benefits middle
class white citizens. D. Bell, supra note 2, at 22, 44-45, 51-74, 103-21, 154; accord D.
Bell, Race, Racism and American Law 20-44 (2d ed. 1980); Bell, supra note 8, at 90; D.
Bell, Remembrances of Racism Past: Getting Beyond the Civil Rights Decline 4-8
(1989) (unpublished manuscript, delivered at A Century of Civil Rights Struggle: A
Conference on Racial Justice in the United States, Madison, Wisconsin) [hereinafter D.
Bell, Remembrances]; Dudziak, supra note 98, at 62-4, 117-20; Monti, Brown's Velvet
Cushion: Metropolitan Desegregation and the Politics of Illusion, 1 Metropolitan Educ.
52, 57-63 (1986). For application of an interest-convergence approach outside the desegregation area, see Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have
What Minorities Want?, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 301, 304-05 (1987); Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in The Politics of Law 96 (D. Kairys ed. 1982);
Steel, Nine Men in Black Who Think White, N.Y. Times Mag., Oct. 13, 1968, at 56.
Professor Bell has suggested the tactical retreat discussed in the text as a means of using
the desire of white middle class citizens to avoid further desegregation as the leverage
necessary to convince them, in return for an end to further desegregation, to fund enhancements for all-black schools and to convince the courts to relax some of the stringent requirements, including the intent test, for affording black children relief. See Bell,
supra note 8, at 98-101. Without, for the moment, disputing the interest-convergence
thesis, but see infra notes 377-385, 649-650, 759 and accompanying text, I remain puzzled by the conclusion Professor Bell draws from that premise. I do not understand
what interest the white majority would have in enhancing black schools were the civil
rights movement-as Professor Bell proposes-to give up the threat to whites that Brown
I's integration requirement presents. See Hawley & Smylie, supra note 9, at 294; Heaney, supra note 49, at 810; infra note 650; cf. D. Bell, supra note 2, at 121 (economic
improvements among blacks may have to precede enhanced educational opportunity).
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tegrated education were one and the same thing, the goal was not integration but equal educational opportunity. Brown requires equal
educational opportunity. If that can be achieved without integration,
140
Brown has been satisfied."
Whatever Brown I itself may have mandated, however, its offspring
since Keyes have not required equal educational opportunity. Rather,
they have required purposive discrimination. And that requirement has
such a tight grip on desegregation law and "suspect classification" adjudication in general that the Court is unlikely for now to abandon it
even in return for the proffered concession that separate schools can be
equal.' 41 In any event, because this branch of the Equal Educational
Opportunity theory abandons desegregation, and any semblance of fit
with the precedential data, I abandon it. I note, however, that the educational and political strategies upon which adherents of "separate but
enhanced" all-minority schools would rely to achieve the theorists' educational goals offer little immediate hope.of4 2matching desegregation's
quality-of-life-enhancing accomplishments.
140. Carter, supra note 8, at 27; accord Bell, A Model Alternative Desegregation
Plan, in Shades, supra note 8, at 124, 125-39; Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban
Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 777, 795-807 (1985);
Ravitch, Desegregation: Varieties of Meaning, in Shades, supra note 8, at 30, 38-46;
Committee on Policy for Racial Justice, Visions of a Better Way: A Black Appraisal of
Public Schooling 37 (Joint Center for Political Studies 1989); Congress of Racial Equality, A Proposal for Community School Districts, in The Great School Bus Controversy
311, 311-12 (N. Mills ed. 1973); see also B. Ackerman, supra note 123, at 270 (favoring
"compensatory educational effort that would provide blacks with an education no less
liberal than the imperfect variety provided suburban whites"). For discussion of the
capacity of all-minority schools to achieve educational success, see, e.g., T. Sowell, Black
Education: Myths and Tragedies 259-63 (1972); U.S. Dep't of Educ., Schools that
Work: Educating Disadvantaged Children 17, 23-25 (1987) [hereinafter Schools that
Work]; DuBois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools, 4 J. Negro Educ. 328 (1935).
But see Hawley & Smylie, supra note 9, at 304; infra note 142 (paragraph (1)).
141. See supra note 138.
142. In regard to the three principal strategies for achieving equal educational opportunity in racially separate schools--"effective schools" methodology, AfricanAmerican political control of city school boards and other political institutions, and decentralization of the administration of local schools, see supra note 140-consider that:
(1) Despite scattered and episodic exceptions, all-black elementary and secondary schools in this country before Brown provided abysmally low quality
instruction. See, e.g., J. Anderson, The Education of llacks in the South,
1860-1935, at 148-83 (1988); Edmonds, supra note 123, at 118-19; M.
Homel, Down from Equality: Black Chicagoans and the Public Schools
1920-41, at 58-84 (1984); J. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 19-20; Heaney,
supra note 49, at 752-56.
(2) The criteria that "effective schools" research associates with the high test
scores achieved at a small number of all-minority public schools-strong
school leadership, a pervasive instructional focus, order, high expectations
for students, and frequent testing-have not been shown to be either
causal or replicable. See Elson, Suing to Make Schools Effective, or How to
Make a Bad Situation Worse, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 889, 889-901 (1985); Oakes,
Improving Inner-City Schools: Current Directions in Urban District Re-
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Other adherents of the Equal Educational Opportunity theory have

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

form 30-37 (Center for Policy Research in Educ., Report No. JNE-02, Oct.
1987); Purkey & Smith, Effective Schools: A Review, 83 Elem. Schools J.
427, 436-48 (1983); Stedman, A New Look at the Effective Schools Literature, 20 Urb. Educ. 295, 297-311 (1985); authority cited in Liebman, supra
note 99, at 394 n.151.
The Comprehensive School Improvement and Planning Office of the New
York City Board of Education, which in the early 1980s generated many of
the studies on which "effective schools" advocates rely, e.g., Ratner, supra
note 140, at 777, 796-98, 805 n.93, has not succeeded in exporting effectiveness to most of the district's minority schools. See Liebman, supra note
99, at 382 n. 119; Berger, How 2 Schools So Alike Can Be So Different, N.Y.
Times, July 24, 1990, at BI, col. 2.
A comprehensive evaluation of the other program on which "effective
schools" advocates principally rely, see Ratner, supra note 140, at 805-06
& nn.94, 95, Milwaukee's Project RISE, establishes that the program has
not thus far succeeded. See Walsh, SES, Academic Achievement, and Reorganization of Metropolitan Area Schools: Preliminary Implications of the
Milwaukee Area Study, 1 Metropolitan Educ. 78, 88-89 (1986); see also
Oakes, supra, at 35-36 (disappointing experience in other cities).
Due to the substantial and growing degree to which state governments control the political and economic resources necessary to improve local
schools, see Liebman, supra note 99, at 380-81 & n. 113, 400 & nn.174-75,
as well as the slow rate of increase of African-Americans elected to local
public office, the movement toward black control of city government has
not appreciably improved minority schools and school systems. See, e.g.,
D. Bell, supra note 2, at 93; Fiss, supra note 67, at 129-30; Franklin, Preface, in Committee on Policy for RacialJustice, supra note 140, at i, x ("Accession to office by blacks ... in no way guarantees that'they will be able to
bring about significant changes ... . since political power and economic
resources frequently remain firmly rooted in the old, mainly white power
structure"); Hawley & Smylie, supra note 9, at 285; Pettigrew, New Patterns
of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 Rutgers L. Rev.
673, 675 (1985).
Although new, "school-based management" initiatives are afoot elsewhere,
see Liebman, supra note 99, at 393-97 & nn.150, 165; Philadelphians
"Commit" to Site-Based Management, Educ. Week, June 20, 1990, at 5,
col. 1; Bradley, New York City Schools Take 1st Step Toward Management
at the School Site, Educ. Week, May 9, 1990, at 5, col. 5; Bradley, Uneasy
Alliance Marks Launch of L.A. Plan, Educ. Week, Apr. 11, 1990, at 1, col. 3;
Snider, Chicago Elections Usher in New Era of Reform, Educ. Week, Oct.
18, 1989, at 1, col. 4, New York City's and Detroit's 20-year experience with
decentralized schools has been disappointing, see, e.g., A. Gutmann, Liberal Equality 193, 191-97, 275-78 nn.63-90 (1980); D. Rogers & N.
Chung, 110 Livingston Street Revisited: Decentralization in Action 206-15
(1983); M. Zimet, Decentralization and School Effectiveness 146-52
(1973); Berger, School Panel Gets Accounts of Corruption, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 13, 1990, at BI, col. 5; Berger, School Superintendent in Queens
Tells of Costly Patronage Scheme, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1989, at AI, col. 1;
Lewis, 20 Years After Decentralization, Restructuring of Schools Is Urged,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1989, at A1, col. I; Snider, Elections for Boards in New
York City Draw Record-Low Fractions of Voters, Educ. Week, May 10,
1989, at 5, col. 5; Lewis, School Boards Found Failing to Meet Goals, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 5, 1988, at BI, col. 5; Perlez, Citing Disarray, Quinones Ousts
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stuck by desegregation and instead questioned the seriousness of the
intent test. These theorists accuse the Court of only pretending to
"give the moralists what they want" by means of the stated requirement
of an evil act. In reality, these theorists argue, the Court covertly took
back what it ostensibly gave the moralists by adopting a series of allegedly circular and all but explicitly irrebuttable presumptions (1) from
the fact of segregation to evil intention, then (2)from that evil intention
to a fiat characterization of the continuing fact of segregation as the
14 3
consequence of the evil intentional act.
However plausible this "window dressing" characterization may
have been in the early 1970s, the Supreme Court since has undressed
the window in two important ways. First, by vacating and remanding
two lower court desegregation decisions following its full embrace of
the intent requirement in the 1975 and 1976 Terms, the Court rejected
the first 180 degrees (i.e., the effect-to-intent half) of the circle of presumptions supposedly designed to neutralize the intentional-discrimination and actual-effects requirements.1 4 4 Second, in Milliken 1 145 and
Dayton 1,146 the Court reversed lower court decisions that had ordered
School Board, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1987, at Al, col. 2; Rubin, The Graying
of School Decentralization, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1987, at 27, col. 2; Rule,
Locally Run Schools Disappoint Minority Educators and Parents, N.Y.
Times, June 27, 1980, at Al, col. 1.
(7) The interracial contact foregone by "separate but enhanced" remedies
"may be a uniquely necessary ingredient" of a number of advantages
shown to follow from school desegregation. Braddock & McPartland, The
Social and Academic Consequences of School Desegregation, Equity &
Choice, Feb. 1988, at 5, 10. Such contact, for example, is critical to reducing racial prejudice and apparently improves the ability of blacks upon leaving school to secure higher paying jobs in integrated settings and to
succeed in integrated higher educational, employment, and housing situations. See Camburn, College Completion Among Students from High
Schools Located in Large Metropolitan Areas, 98 Am. J. Educ. 551, 559
(1990); Hawley & Smylie, supra note 9, at 282, 294; Walzer, Thoughts on
Democratic Schools, 23 Dissent 57, 61-62 (1976); infra notes 675-696.
143. See, e.g., Fiss, Charlotte, supra note 63, at 698; Fiss, supra note 49, at 18, 26,
35 (intent requirement "dressing designed to improve the [decisions' moral] ... acceptability"; "[not] of much significance"; and "for purposes of appearance"); Goldstein,
supra note 92, at 28; Ortiz, supra note 123, at 1131-34, 1150.
144. See Housing Auth. v. Buckley, 429 U.S. 1068, 1068-69 (1977) (vacating decision in United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 541 F.2d 1211, 1220 (7th Cir. 1976),
which presumed intent from foreseeable effects, and remanding for reconsideration in
light of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)); Austin Indep. School Dist. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 990, 990 (1976) (vacating decision in United States v. Texas
Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1976), which presumed intent from foreseeable effects, and remanding for reconsideration in light of same cases); see also Note,
supra note 31, at 2004 & n. 11 (lower court decisions denying school desegregation relief
based on lack of proof of intentional discrimination).
145. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 753 (1974).
146. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton 1), 433 U.S. 406, 421 (1977).
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racially integrative relief for tens of thousands of African-American
children who, whatever else could be said, were attending almost entirely racially homogeneous schools.' 4 7 By the mid-1970s, therefore,
proponents of the Equal Educational Opportunity theory were forced
to contend either that those decisions were wrong or that the theory
was. 148
Because my endeavor here is to defend the desegregation decisions and the practices they engender on the basis of philosophically
sound principles, I depart from further discussion of the Equal Educational Opportunity theory at the point where it admittedly departs from
those decisions. Before I leave it, however, let me note a double-barreled criticism often leveled against the theory. Probably because its
147. Notice also how significantly this assertedly cosmetic gloss on the Equal Educational Opportunity theory actually changes the theory. The gloss switches the circumstance triggering judicial intervention from educational inequality itself to inequality
along racial lines. This move from education to race not only limits the range of children the theory serves, cf. supra note 138 (pure Equal Educational Opportunity theory
implies a right to minimally adequate education for nonminority groups), but also weakens the theory's most important normative justification, namely, the horizon-expanding
function that liberal polities often call upon compulsory education to perform for all,
and not just minority, children, see infra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
148. E.g., Fiss, supra note 49, at 18, 28, 30-31 (Milliken I shows that fact of"segregation is not at the center of the Court's concern"); see Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 47-48 (1979); Freeman, supra note 57, at 85; Lawrence,
supra note 8, at 57; Yudof, supra note 100, at 97. Accepting the premise that American
history leaves no doubt that segregation and its attendant educational harms are a product of intentional governmental discrimination might conform Equal Educational Opportunity theory to an intent requirement of sorts. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. I,
413 U.S. 189, 222-23 (1973) (Powell,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("the
familiar root cause of segregated schools in all the biracial metropolitan areas of our
country" is "segregated residential and migratory patterns ... perpetuated and rarely
ameliorated by action of public school authorities"); W. Wilson, The Declining Significance of Race 110, 120, 152 (1978); Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1341-42 & n.48;
Dimond, The Anti-Caste Principle: Toward a Constitutional Standard for Review of
Race Cases, 30 Wayne L. Rev. 1, 42-61 (1983); Lawrence, supra note 8, at 50-54, 63,
66. This theory, however, also abandons a purely outcome-focused goal of educational
enhancement in favor of a deontological call for racewide compensation-or reparations-for racewide invidious harm. See D. Bell, supra note 2, at 123-39; Fiss, supra
note 67, at 127 ("blacks as a group wereput in that [chronically subordinate] position by
others and the redistributive 'measures are owed to the group as a form of compensation"); Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323, 380, 383-85 (1987). Although Judge Wisdom has viewed
school desegregation in the South in something like this light, see, e.g., Williams v. City
of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1573 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1984) (Wisdom,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F. 2d.
836, 869 (5th Cir. 1966), reh'g granted, 380 F.2d 385, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 890 (1967),
the Supreme Court has rejected the view. See, e.g., Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 745 (forbidding inclusion in remedy of districts not shown to have committed or been affected by
intentional discrimination); Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208. However compelling the moral justification for this theory, therefore, see infra notes 176-179, 249-250 and accompanying
text, it does not satisfy the fit criterion.
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chief proponent readily conceded the point,1 4 9 the Equal Educational
Opportunity theory has been criticized as overly concerned with "inconclusive" empirical premises about the educational benefits of integration and insufficiently concerned with the theory's moral basis.' 5 0
In my view, both criticisms overshoot the mark.
There are indeed a number of uncertain empirical premises afoot
in the desegregation area. But for me the least troubling assumption of
all is this: that black children-having been confined from birth until
their eighteenth year in a consistently and thoroughly segregated social
environment-will find it difficult thereafter to succeed should they
choose one of the many life plans offered by our society that require
significant contact with members of the majority, and demographically,
economically, and politically dominant, race.1 5 1 Indeed, assumptions
such as this long have driven the nation's commitment to providing all
citizens with a free public education. 152 In any event, now that most
legal scholars have given up their impatient wait for empirical proof of
this assumption, social scientists have begun producing it.153
For similar reasons, I do not doubt that compelling moral principles undergird the Equal Educational Opportunity ideal. True, Equal
Educational Opportunists have not very carefully explained what they
mean by "equal educational opportunity."1 54 But some relatively strict
149. Professor Fiss has preferred to defend the theory as intellectually satisfying
rather than "moral[ly] imperative." Fiss, Charlotte, supra note 63, at 698; Fiss, supra
note 49, at 18.
150. Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 737; accord Brest, supra note 104, at 9, 18
n.76, 45-46; Cahn, supra note 123, at 158; Dimond, supra note 123, at 15-17, 46 n.184;
Dworkin, supra note 104, at 24-26; Yudof, supra note 61, at 435-38, 446, 459-60;
Yudof, supra note 100, at 107.
151. See, e.g., B. Ackerman, supra note 123, at 242; A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at
119;J. Dewey, supra note 123, at 20-21; Walzer, supra note 142, at 61 ("in ghetto and
slum schools, children are prepared for ghetto and slum life").
152. See infra note 156.
153. Compare Fiss, Fate, supra note 63, at 768 ("evidence to document the value of
integration is thin" as of 1974; "it is embarrassing to continue to use time as an excuse")
and authority cited supra note 150 (arguing that empirical studies of desegregation's
educational effects are inconclusive) with infra notes 675-696 and accompanying text
(recent more encouraging empirical data).
154. Equal Educational Opportunity theorists have not carefully specified: (1)
Whether they seek to equalize knowledge as a perfectionist good in itself or as an antiperfectionist means of helping all citizens pursue their own visions of the good. SeeJ.
Dewey, supra note 123, at 818-94 (surveying competing philosophical views on goal of
education); see also infra notes 455-458, 668-696 and accompanying text (empirically,
desegregation better serves antipefectionist than perfectionist goals, inasmuch as desegregation improves graduates' life chances in higher educational, employment, and
other settings more than it increases learning levels); infra note 156 (antiperfectionist
understanding fares better philosophically in our culture). (2) What kind of equalization they demand: what might be called "equal access" (extrinsic barriers to access removed), "equal chances" (social contingencies also removed), "equal ability" (natural
contingencies also removed), or "equal outcomes" (motivational contingencies also removed). See A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at 128-34;J. Rawls, supra note 105, at 71-75;
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version of that ideal is critical to most modem notions of a just liberal
state, in which-to the extent possible without abolishing the familythe government is understood to have a responsibility to provide a free
public education to all its young citizens in order that each of them may
choose and embark upon a career as free as possible of the conse1 55
quences of social contingency.
Indeed, upon closer analysis, it seems clear that the problem with
the Equal Educational Opportunity view is less its lack of any, and more
the breadth of its, moral basis-particularly when its redistributive impulses threaten, in a culturally unacceptable way, to invade contexts
other than public education.1 56 That threat materialized as early as the
Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 3: The Place of Liberty, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 2-3, 18-19
& n.20 (1987); Jencks, What Must Be Equal for Opportunity to Be Equal, in Equal Opportunity 47, 66-73 (N. Bowie ed. 1988); see also infra notes 675-696 and accompanying text (evidence that desegregation neutralizes some social contingencies and even
one contingency (I.Q) once thought to be natural, changes motivation structures, and
exposes children to a wider range of life possibilities, thus increasing likelihood of
matching aptitudes and appetites with fulfilling careers). (3) How much equality is required-how far must desegregation close interracial gaps to be counted a success. See
Liebman, supra note 99, at 356 (in some places, desegregation has reduced black-white
achievement gap by a third).
155. See, e.g., B. Ackerman, supra note 123, at 28, 139, 155-63; J. Dewey, supra
note 123, at 104 (democratic society must provide citizens with schooling "of such amplitude and efficiency as will in fact and not simply in name discount the effects of economic inequalities" and equip graduates "to be masters of their own economic and
social careers");J. Rawls, supra note 105, at 73;Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia,
in The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson 262 (A. Koch & W. Peden eds.
1944); see Michelman, Constitutional Welfare Rights and A Theory ofJustice, in Reading Rawls: Critical Studies of a Theory ofJustice 319, 334, 344 (N. Daniels ed. 1975)
[hereinafter Reading Rawls]; infra notes 736, 737. See generally Liebman, supra note
99, at 367-70 (discussing important function assigned to public education by modem
liberal thinkers and polities).
156. Although grounded in moral principles of some sort, theories of constitutionally mandated redistribution, are not grounded in our own considered convictions ofjustice and accordingly violate the "moral fit" justification criterion. See, e.g., J. Ely, supra
note 105, at 135-36; supra text accompanying note 116; infra notes 176-179 and accompanying text. The same argument, however, does not apply to school desegregation. First, desegregation is less redistributive than it at first appears. Unlike affirmative
action quotas, for example, desegregation does not require that whites forswear a benefit in order that African-American children may receive it. See Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 300 n.39 (1978) (Powell, J.) (plurality opinion); see also
Liebman, supra note 99, at 364-67 (comparing modestly redistributive effects of desegregation and more thoroughly redistributive effects of other race-based remedial action). Nor does desegregation inflict any measurable intellectual or psychological harms
on white children. See infra notes 574, 664, 683-685, 800-804 and accompanying text.
But cf. Liebman, supra note 99, at 365-66 (extent of desegregative redistribution vis-ivis white parents); infra notes 574-575 and accompanying text (same). More importantly, our history and traditions are less squeamish about constitutionally mandated
redistribution of educational resources than of other resources: (1) Although none of
the 50 state constitutions contains anything like an explicit requirement of state-provided nutrition, shelter, employment, subsistence, or even physical security, all but two
contain provisions expressly assuring young people the right to a free public education.
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mid-1950s when the Court extended the dictates of Brown to spheres
other than public education.1 5 7 By doing so, the Court forced Equal
Educational Opportunity theorists either to extend their distributive
claims to other spheres, thereby forsaking the case law and culturally
acceptable principles,1 58 or to explain why the "right" to desegregative
distribution that they found in Brown did not arise in the other spheres
in which Brown applied, thereby at least forsaking symmetry.
To conclude, then, my problem with Equal Educational Opportunity theory is not empirical nor primarily philosophical (unless the theory is extended beyond the sphere of education), but mainly that one
must look elsewhere in order to find a morally satisfying principle
served by the desegregation decisions and the practices they have
produced.1 59
2. The Integration Theory. - At least two versions of the Integration theory may be identified. According to the Universalist version,
the Constitution defines racial integration as a desired end either for
See Liebman, supra note 99, at 367-68; Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare
Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 962, 1010 n.139
(1973); Ratner, supra note 140, at 814-16. Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of
Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1007 (1989) (state has no constitutional duty to ensure
personal safety of citizens); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)
(American constitutionalism generally obliges state to "let people alone" but not "to
provide services, even so elementary... as maintaining law and order"). (2) The Court
frequently has noted the importance of state and local governments' obligation to provide free public education. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982)
(plurality opinion) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979); San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973) (quoting Brown v.
Board of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (" 'education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local government' "); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
213 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,400 (1923). (3) The ideal of a single, eyeopening public education for all children to experience in "common" as a means of
leveling economic and social differences is a foundational tenet of American educational
and political theory. See L. Cremin, American Education: The Transformation of the
School: Progressivism in American Education, 1876-1957, at 9-10 (1969); D. Ravitch,
The Great School Wars: New York City, 1805-1973, at 62, 171 (1974); Braddock, Crain
& McPartland, A Long-Term View of School Desegregation: Some Recent Studies of
Graduates as Adults, 66 Phi Delta Kappan 259, 260 (1984); Karst, Why Equality Matters,
17 Ga. L. Rev. 245, 266 n.103 (1983); supra note 155.
157. See infra notes 724-725.
158. Compare infra note 163 (citing authority reflecting tendency of outcome-focused desegregation theorists to come eventually to advocate forthright social redistribution) with supra notes 138, 156 (doctrinal and philosophical difficulties with broadly
focused distributivist theories) and infra notes 176-178 and accompanying text (same).
159. The authorities discussed notes 154-156 suggest two reasons why the Equal
Educational Opportunity theory, although potentially palatable philosophically, has not
been adopted by the Supreme Court: (1) the theory's tendency towards an unacceptable
distributivism, and (2) a conviction, supportable under federalism and Republican-communitarian notions, see infra notes 409, 708, that substantive education-focused imperatives are the concern of state not federal constitutional law. We thus should look for
desegregation's justification in a realm in which the Constitution gives the national government and its courts substantial but nonredistributive authority. See infra note 510.

1496

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1463

instrumental reasons, for example, that interracial contact broadens
choice horizons, or simply because racial interaction is good in itself' 6 0
Inasmuch as the Universalist view was explicitly devised to palliate the
asserted empirical uncertainty of the Equal Educational Opportunity
theory,1 6 1 it is not surprising that a skeptical empiricist, Christopher
Jencks, gave the view its dearest expression: "[T]he case for or against
desegregation should not be argued in terms of academic achievement.
If we want a segregated society, we should have segregated schools. If
we want a desegregated society, we should have desegregated
' ' 16 2
schools.
The alternative, Redistributive, version of the Integration theory
holds that black children as a group have a substantive right not only to
an equal share of the fruits of, but also to integration within, society's
dominant educational institutions. In the Redistributive view, this
group right of black children is part of the group right of black
Americans generally to an equal share of the fruits of, hence to integration within, the nation's dominant social, political, and economic institutions. 163 Whether explained as just compensation for 370 years of
160. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 225-26 (1973) (Powell,J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 214-15 (Douglas, J., concurring); M.
Walzer, supra note 52, at 217, 223-24 (via desegregation, "schools should aim at a pattern of association anticipating that of adult men and women in a[n ideal pluralist] democracy," namely, a pattern characterized by free association among members of
diverse communities);J. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 173-75, 199; Brooks, Racial Subordination Through Formal Equal Opportunity, 25 San Diego L. Rev. 881, 950 (1988)
(integration necessary "to provide cultural diversity within racially isolated school districts"); Karst, supra note 4, at 36, 50-51 ("best long-term remedy for the private beliefs
and behavior that perpetuate the effects of racial caste is the integration of our public
life, from school to workplace to marketplace"); West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A
Pragmatic Definition of the iberal Vision, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 673, 716, 731 (1985) (integration "promotes liberal ends" through "the release of human potentialities and the
enlargement of the human experience"); Yudof, supra note 61, at 456-58 (universalist
ethic attaches "positive value to integration" based on "tradition that demands a universal society undiminished by racially identifiable institutions" and on fear that
"[s]egregation of the races in public institutions, employment, and housing will inevitably lead to conflict and the destruction of democratic values and institutions"). For critical commentary, see Brest, supra note 104, at 11, 48; Dworkin, supra note 104, at 25;
Fiss, supra note 61, at 204, 207; Freeman, supra note 98 at 1073-75 (lampooning theory
as seeking a society in which "everybody is a creamy shade of beige"); Monaghan, supra
note 128, at 474, 485; Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-and Its Future, 42
Ohio St. LJ. 223, 245 (1981).
161. See Yudof, supra note 61, at 434-39, 456-57.
162. C.Jencks, M. Smith, H. Ackand, MJ. Bane, D. Cohen, H. Gintes, B. Heyns &
S. Michelson, Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in
America 106 (1972) [hereinafter C. Jencks].
163. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1341, 1352; Dimond, supra note 123, at
4-5, 53-54; Fiss, supra note 67, at 127-29, 134-35 (assimilating Equal Educational Opportunity theory to broader Redistributive theory); Parker, supra note 160, at 249-51;
Yudof, supra note 100, at 80, 82 (abandoning Universalist in favor of "group protection" theory). For criticism of the Redistributive approach, see infra notes 176-178.
Empirical evidence verifies the assumption of integration-focused Redistributivists that
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concerted society-wide subordination of African-Americans, 164 as a
prerequisite for social stability or solidarity, 16 5 or simply as a humane
response to large and persistent disparities among groups in society,
the Redistributive view would have the courts do exactly what its name
implies-redistribute wealth, political power, and status from dominant
groups in society to subordinate ones, most particularly to blacks.
Neither version of the Integration theory fits the Supreme Court's
desegregation jurisprudence, as proponents of both versions readily acknowledge. 16 6 Neither version, for example, countenances the result in
Milliken I, which confined Detroit's black children to all-black schools in
the central city and kept them out of predominantly white schools in
the surrounding suburban districts.' 6 7 Nor can either version explain
why the Court confines the desired end of mandatory integration to
situations in which purposeful discrimination is the immediate cause of
racial separation. In addition, both versions have difficulty: (1) finding
constitutional authority for the view that participation and association
with others in important institutions should be universalized, even
against the will of members of the forcibly assimilated groups,16 8 or
that the equal protection clause levels economic disparities' 69 and principally protects groups, not individuals;' 70 (2) explaining why the Court
securing the full benefit of white educational institutions requires blacks' integration
within those institutions and not simply the institutions' replication in minority commu-

nities. See Braddock &McPartland, supra note 142, at 70 (a principal benefit of minority attendance at integrated schools, not available in all-minority schools, is information

about and personal introduction to employment and other opportunities in the
predominantly white community).
164. See sources cited supra note 148.
165. See Fiss, supra note 49, at 128.
166. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 104, at 19-25; Fiss, Fate, supra note 63, at 746-47
n.10; Fiss, supra note 49, at 85-88, 94, 122-23; Goldstein, supra note 92, at 28-31;
Yudof, supra note 100, at 88. Indeed, the Court generally has eschewed "the T word"
itself. See Fiss, supra note 49, at 32. True, as of 1973, the Universalist theory was "consistent" with what the Supreme Court had "done rather than what it ha[d] said." Yudof,
supra note 61, at 450. But since 1974 that has not been true. See supra notes 137-138
and accompanying text.
167. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 745, 753 (1974).
168. The case law, particularly in the area of education, is to the contrary. E.g.,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925) ("fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children"); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923); infra note 740; see Fiss, supra note 61, at 207
(no "constitutional peg for the universalist ethic"); Monaghan, supra note 128, at
474-77 (forced "racial or religious 'balance'" is "alien to the spirit of our laws").
169. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1988); San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 47 (1973); Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56, 74 (1972);James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
170. See City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 721 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)) (equal protection right
"'guaranteed to the individual'" and "'personal' "); Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown
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has limited the class-wide integration remedy to blacks and a few other
racial groups and not extended it, for example, to insular religious
groups and persistently impoverished whites;1 7 1 and (3) justifying the
Court's limitation of the integration remedy to schools and its failure to
extend the2 remedy, for example, to the employment and housing
17
spheres.
Having failed the fit test, most versions of the Integration theory
also score low on the justification measure. One version of the Universalist theory would deprive schools of their character as one-time, eyeopening, and choice-expanding instruments of the modern liberal state
and make them instead the initial building block of a homogenizing and
choice-excluding state. In this Platonic or nationalistic mode, the Universalist ethic can be faulted as being too pervasively "result oriented"-as imposing on all citizens a single, state-mandated vision of
the universalized good.1 73 In its search for the strong "ethical princi11), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351
(1938); Greenberg, Race Relations and Group Interests in the Law, 13 Rutgers L. Rev.
503, 507 (1959).
171. Compare, e.g., Fiss, supra note 67, at 124, 128 n.67, 131 (group disadvantaging principle requires redistribution in favor of all groups with a perpetually low "socioeconomic position") with cases cited supra note 170 (forbidding intentional race-based
governmental segregation and subjecting it to integrative remedies) and cases cited
supra notes 138, 169 (permitting intentional wealth-based governmental segregation)
and cases cited supra note 168 (limiting power of states to insist upon integrating unwilling members of insular religious groups with other children in public school). Once one
ties blacks' "special position" in equal protection theory to their past exclusion and susceptibility to prejudice, Fiss, supra note 67, at 128-29, the theoretical focus shifts, it
seems to me, from a single desired end-state (e.g., equal wealth) to a deontological principle associated with the fairness of the process by which citizens arrive at their heterogenous end points. See supra note 147-148.
172. See Yudof, supra note 61, at 457-58 (Universalist principle extended to public
employment and housing); see also Arendt, Reflections on Little Rock, 6 Dissent 45, 50
(1959) ("most startling point of the whole business was the Federal decision to start
integration in, of all places, the public schools. It certainly did not require too much
imagination to see that this was to burden children, black and white, with the working
out of a problem which adults for generations have confessed themselves unable to
solve"). Universalists offer three answers to the "Whyjust schools?" question: (I) Education unlike other governmental services and largess is a constitutionally recognized
"fundamental interest[]." See, e.g., Dimond, supra note 123, at 5-6 n.19, 10 n,42;
Ortiz, supra note 123, at 1134-37; supra note 155. But see San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973). (2) Public schooling has long served as society's "most pervasive means" of assimilating citizens to a set of shared values and a
"common destiny." Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231
(1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); accord Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 315 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting);J. Dewey, supra note 123, at 24; Yudof, supra
note 61, at 458. (3) Even if adults cannot create an ideal world for themselves, they
should do so for their children. E.g., C. Jencks, supra note 162, at 256; Walzer, supra
note 142, at 58.
173. See J. Dewey, supra note 123, at 97-106 (criticizing Platonic and Hegelian
approaches that scorn the "free development of individuality in all its variety,"
"subordinat[e] the individual to the [superior interests] of the social whole," and em-
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pie" that supposedly is lacking in the empirically grounded Equal Educational Opportunity theory, this version of the Universalist approach
places itself out of the running as a viable principle for explaining and
guiding judicial action in a modem liberal state.
As the other Universalist vision illustrates, however, integration
need not mean totalitarianism. Rather, as strong pluralists like John
Dewey and Michael Walzer have made clear, the ideal of racially and
socially integrated public institutions may be understood as a monotonic means to a liberal society's diverse ends. Such institutions, for
example, may help engender the intergroup tolerance and respect necessary to maintain a plural society, or they may expand the range of
discernable options among which a liberal society encourages individuals to choose.1 74 The modestjustification problem that remains for me,
therefore, is not that this version of the Universalist ideal has no place
in our traditions and culture-it assuredly does-but only that its place
is insufficiently central to support the full weight of so controversial a
remedy. "[S]ociety," that is, "will not ...submerge every value to the
175
single one of integration."
Nor, of course, has our society shown itself willing to accept anything like the unabashedly ends-focused, leveling, and corporatist
premises of the Redistributive theorists. As others have pointed out:
(1) "What is remarkable is that this country has never been swept up by
a political movement devoted to leveling."' 76 (2) "If a society can be
said to have an underlying political theory, ours has not been a theory
of organic groups but of liberalism, focusing on the rights of individuals ....
,,177 And (3) "[Tihe [redistributive] standard.., leaves little or
no room for true governmental choice, since almost every governmen78
tal act affects the relative social position of blacks and whites."'
phasize social stability and disciplinary training rather than personal development); A.
Gutmann, supra note 52, at 23-28; Walzer, supra note 142, at 63-64; Yudof, supra note
61, at 457 (noting "controversial" nature of his "utopian .assimilation[ist]"
view).
174. See West, supra note 160, at 716, 731; sources cited supra note 155; infra
notes 736-740.
175. Monaghan, supra note 128, at 485; see also Brest, supra note 104, at 48 ("Universalist ethic" not "so obviously right or widely held, that it can be read into the Constitution"). This reasoning accounts forJustice Powell's curious opinion in Keyes in which
he combined the Court's most hawkish position on the violation-any denial of integrated schooling violates the equal protection clause-with its most dovish position on
remedy-the violation is insufficiently important to warrant mandatory busing relief.
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 225-26, 242-50 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
176. Karst, supra note 156, at 261-63; accord J. Ely, supra note 105, at 87-101,
135-36, 162.
177. Brest, supra note 104, at 49; accord Alexander, Modem Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 3, 26 n.84 (1981);
Nagel, Introduction, in Equality, supra note 49, at i, viii-ix.
178. Alexander, supra note 177, at 26; accord Brest, supra note 104, at 11 (Redistributive theory "would affect an enormously wide range of practices important to the
efficient operation of a complex industrial society").
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Most importantly, to the extent that moral principles with lasting
historical currency in this country have fueled reform, they have done
so by condemning governmentally sanctioned group identification-by
forbidding the singling out of persons for harm, not because of an individual trait of their own choosing but because of their actual or assumed possession of a trait attributed to an unpopular group to which
they more or less involuntarily belong.1 79 The Redistributive theory's
"group-disadvantage" focus dangerously forswears the reform-driving
potential of this aspect of modern liberal theory.
Desegregation theorizing is a burial ground for disappointed predictions. In 1971, Professor Fiss "forecast" that the Supreme Court
would soon jettison "the unrealistic assumption that all present segregation is a consequence of past wrongdoing" and instead "focus attention on the segregated patterns themselves." 1 8 0 As we have seen,
however, product-focused approaches to desegregation-whether in
their Equal Educational Opportunity or their Integration incarnations-cannot explain the recent decisions. 181 Two years later, Professor Yudof's crystal ball told him that "future desegregation decisions
will depend more upon the acceptance and evolution of ethical principles than on ... empiricism... [or t]he vagaries of the predictive sciences." 1 8 2 Once again, however, this scholarly prediction was at least
half wrong. Although scholars indeed began to search for a more
philosophically satisfying explanation for desegregation, that search
did not lead away from "the vagaries of predictive science" but
squarely into them. Thus, in an effort to escape the two prior theories'
doctrinal and moral overambition, the next wave of scholarship abandoned the prior theories' socio-structural and outcome focus and fixed
instead on an individual- and process-oriented enterprise of empirically
identifying and correcting identifiable wrongs perpetrated by identifiable wrongdoers against the identifiably wronged. In the process, desegregation was transformed from a right into a remedy.
179. Consider the breadth of the modem legal scholarship that accepts this premise. See, e.g., D. Bell, supra note 2, at 95;J. Ely, supra note 105, at 155-58; Brest, supra
note 104, at 5-7, 12; Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1357-64, 1370-74; Freeman, supra
note 98, at 1052-53; Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8, 23 (1977); Kennedy, supra note 64, at 1794, 1816-18;
Lawrence, supra note 134, at 330; Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 10, 10-11, 34, 37-38 (1987); Tribe, supra note 117, at 1074.
180. Fiss, Charlotte, supra note 63, at 706. But see Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979) and Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick,
443 U.S. 449, 455-58 (1979) (belying the first half of the prediction) and Dayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton I), 433 U.S. 406, 413 (1977) and Milliken v. Bradley
(Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 740-41 (1974) (belying the second half).
181. See supra notes 134-148, 166-172 and accompanying text.
182. Yudof, supra note 61, at 459-60.
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3. The Correction Theory. 18 3 - According to the Correction theory,
segregation involves an official's or agency's evil act with evil effects.
The desegregation decree eradicates both evils-the violation by
means of a prohibitory injunction that forces defendants to stop discriminating, the effects by means of a mandatory injunction that, by
18 4
desegregating the district, eliminates the injury "root and branch.
Given that much of the Court's desegregation rhetoric since Green has
been self-consciously corrective,18 5 it is not surprising that much de86
segregation theorizing since Green has had a corrective cast.'
Corrective theory's long suit is its capacity to solve the "lack of a
moral imperative" problem that allegedly undermined earlier theories.1 8 7 The moral imperative on which the Correction theory relies is
identical to the compensatory imperative that some theorists since
Aristotle have understood to motivate the law of torts.1 88 In the words
of two modem tort theorists: "The argument depends upon 'a deep
sense of common law morality that one who hurts another should compensate him.' "119 Or, as Corrective desegregation theorists argue,
"[t]he distinctive moral force of the corrective approach . . . builds
upon the strong moral claim that purposeful discrimination is a wrong
whose effects should be eradicated."' 9 0 The appeal of this "You hurt
me, you pay me" model-to desegregation, as well as to tort, theo183. "Compensation theory" is an equally suitable name for this approach to desegregation. See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
184. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968); see Gewirtz,
Choice, supra note 49, 729-39.
185. See, e.g., Columbus Bd.of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 459 (1979); Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1970); Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38;
Fiss, supra note 148, at 4-5, 46-50; cases cited infra notes 197-199.
186. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 104, at 34-36, 42; Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49,
at 729. For criticism, see L. Graglia, supra note 55, at 76-87, 258-83; E. Wolf, Trial and
Error: The Detroit School Desegregation Case 251-82 (1981);J. Wilkinson, supra note
1, at 112-13, 133-45, 222-24; Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1293-94 (1976); Dworkin, supra note 104, at 26-28; Fiss, supra
note 49, at 17-38; Freeman, supra note 57, at 75, 81-82; Shane, supra note 52, at
1044-76; Yudof, supra note 61, at 448-56; infra notes 236, 262.
187. See, e.g., Fiss, Charlotte, supra note 63, at 698; Yudof, supra note 61, at 462
n.266.
188. See Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics 111-17 (D. Ross trans., rev. ed. 1980);
other sources cited infra notes 193, 200. See generally Posner, The Concept of Corrective justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10J. Legal Stud. 187, 191-201 (1981) (discussing work of several modem corrective tort scholars).
189. R. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability: Toward A Reformulation of Tort Law
25 n.25 (1980) (quoting Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 Colum. L. Rev.
1401, 1412 (1961)); accord Fletcher, Fairness, supra note 106, at 538 & n.4; Posner,
supra note 188, at 190. For discussion of the uncertain extent to which tort law actually
adheres to a deontological principle of fairly distributed losses, see W. Keeton, supra
note 122, § 2, at 21-23 & nn.7-12; Fletcher, Fairness, supra note 106, at 556-69; infra
note 229 and accompanying text.
190. Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 729.
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rists-is that it is simple, 19 1 individualistic,1 9 2 and by hypothesis
nonredistributive. 19 3
"[C]orrective justice requires-annulling a departure from the preexisting distribution of money or honors" that occurs when "an act of
injustice... caus[es] injury." 1 94 Although annulment through criminal
sanctions can suffice, 195 Corrective desegregation theorists generally
advocate annulment through tort-like, compensatory mechanisms. 1 96
The tort analogy is appealing because it better fits the decisional data:
the Court's desire to " 'restore'" the losses of segregation's " 'victims,' " rather than to punish the perpetrators; 97 the Court's preoccupation with proportionality between the decree and the violation's
effects and not between the decree and the violation itself;' 9 8 and the
Court's resort to tort doctrine directly.1 99 Compensation also conforms more closely to the antiredistributive ideal, by requiting victims
for their undeserved losses as well as requiring perpetrators to yield
200
their ill-gotten gains.
191. R. Epstein, supra note 189, at 25.
192. See, e.g., P. Schuck, supra note 122, at 262-63; Goldstein, supra note 92, at
30-31.
193. See, e.g., Aristotle, supra note 188, at 115, 117; R. Epstein, supra note 189, at
12-13; Coleman, Mental Abnormality, Personal Responsibility, and Tort Liability, in
Mental Illness, Law and Public Policy 107, 123 (B. Brody & H. Engelhardt eds. 1980);
Fletcher, Punishment, supra note 106, at 695-97; Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at
734-35.
194. Posner, supra note 188, at 200 (emphasis deleted).
195. See id. at 191, 194, 202; see also G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law
409-20, 459-67 (1978) (presenting corrective rationale for criminal punishment);
Morris, Persons and Punishment, in On Guilt and Innocence 31, 34-35, 38-39 (1976)
(similar).
196. Compare Brest, supra note 104, at 42 (corrective desegregation theory contends that desegregation's principal moral function is compensatory: "to remedy the
upset or outrage occasioned by the wrongdoer's frustration of the victim's justified expectations-to remedy the loss of the anticipated enjoyment of benefits possessed or
reasonably expected") and Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 729 (similar description of
the corrective ideal underlying desegregation) with Posner, supra note 188, at 194 (compensatory tort theory emphasizes victim's "right to be compensated by the wrongdoer
for injury resulting from the invasion").
197. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (quoting
Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974)) (desegregation "decree must
indeed be remedial in nature, that is, it must be designed as nearly as possible 'to restore
the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the
absence of such conduct' "; see also D. Bell, Remembrances, supra note 139, at 7-8
(criticizing Court for its solicitude towards perpetrators of segregation).
198. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton I), 433 U.S. 406, 420
(1977); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971).
199. See, e.g., Missouri v.Jenkins Uenkins II), 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1657, 1665 (1990);
see also Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 290 (desegregation remedies are "'compensatory' ").
The tort analogy now is commonplace in related spheres of constitutional adjudication.
See, e.g., Abernathy, Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts, 77 Geo. LJ. 1441,
1446-47 (1989).
200. This rationale explains modem corrective theorists' "preoccupation" with
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Corrective desegregation theory thus commits itself to satisfying
the two critical requirements of the compensatory tort model: the identification of a principle of fairness that regulates relations between two
parties by entitling one of them to advantageous aspects of the existing
distribution of resources; 2 0 ' and the private-law narrowing of attention
to distortions in the relationship between those two parties that occur
only when one party violates the fairness principle and injures the
other.20 2 In the latter regard, because compensatory tort theory seeks
as precisely as possible to redress the implicit transfer of wealth from
an identifiable plaintiff to an identifiable defendant that ensues when

the defendant wrongfully injures the plaintiff,20 3 the theory requires
close and direct relationships between the paying party and the injurious event and between the payment and the amount of injury suffered.2 ° 4 To ensure that these relationships are established, and to
maintain the theory's simplicity and individualistic character, the Corrective version of both tort and desegregation theory obliges the plaintiff "to demonstrate causation by establishing two analytically distinct
links between the defendant's conduct ... and the plaintiff's injury":

that particular conduct caused the plaintiff's injury, and that a particular defendant bears responsibility for that conduct. 20 5
Corrective theory tries to solve the "fit" problem that frustrates the
Equal Educational Opportunity and Integration theories by more satisfactorily explaining the intentional discrimination requirement. Upon
analysis, however, Corrective theory's answer to the "Why just intent?"
question remains incomplete. More importantly, the theory cannot ancompensation. Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J.
Legal Stud. 477,488 (1979); see, e.g., Coleman, supra note 193, at 123; Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A Principled Defense of Joint and
Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1141,
1179-81 (1988); see also Posner, supra note 188, at 191, 194, 202 (puzzling over corrective tort theorists' preoccupation with compensation).
201. See Posner, supra note 188, at 190-203. Corrective desegregation theorists
accept this requirement. See Brest, supra note 104, at 6-12; Gewirtz, Choice, supra
note 49, at 737.
202. See Aristotle, supra note 188, at 114-15 (corrective justice "looks only to ...
whether one is in the wrong and the other is being wronged, and [whether] one inflicted
injury and the other has received it"); infra notes 203-204.
203. Fletcher, Fairness, supra note 106, at 542; accord Epstein, Self-Interest and
the Constitution, 37J. Legal Educ. 153, 154 (1987); Posner, supra note 188, at 198.
204. See R. Epstein, supra note 189, at 25; P. Schuck, supra note 122, at 29-30;
Fletcher, Punishment, supra note 106, at 699.
205. P. Schuck, supra note 122, at 29; accord Wright, supra note 200, at 1180-81.
Corrective desegregation theory accepts this requirement: "The unique moral force of
the corrective conception.., rests upon an empirical claim that must be established in
each case. Corrective steps are justified only to the extent that prior wrongs have current effects. Before initiating a remedy, therefore, courts must sort out which, if any,
present conditions are traceable to past discrimination and... must determine when the
remedy has actually eliminated those effects .... " Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at
782-83; accord id. at 732.
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swer the "Why just desegregation?" question. Most importantly, the
theory's causation component makes the theory both too narrow in
some respects and too broad in others to explain the desegregation
decisions. Because attempts to amend pure Corrective theory to avoid
these fit problems run aground on justification difficulties, I discuss fit
and justification simultaneously.
a. Why Just Intent? - Pure Corrective theory is incomplete: The
theory says how the law should react when one person injuriously
wrongs another, but it does not say what constitutes a wrong. To resolve disputes, therefore, correctivists must supplement their theory
20 6
with an extrinsic conception of justice that does define the wrong.
Corrective desegregation theorists have defined the wrong in the
desegregation cases as public officials' intentional assignment of
African-American children to racially identifiable schools.2 0 7 This definition neatly fits the decisions 20 8 and is potentially compatible with
Corrective tort theory. 20 9 What remains to be provided, however, is a
morally satisfying justification for this definition. Why, that is, apart
from fit, should infliction of segregative harms be actionable at all?
And, if the infliction of such harm isactionable, why draw the line at
intent rather than at some other acceptable plateau, such as the reckless
2 10
or negligent infliction of harm or the infliction of harm itself?
In seeking correctively appropriate justifications for various defini206. See, e.g.,J. Rawls, supra note 105, at 10-11; Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a
Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale LJ. 1055, 1079-80 (1972); Posner, supra note
188, at 190-91, 196, 203 ("corrective justice is a procedural principle: the meaning of
wrongful conduct must be sought elsewhere"); Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and
the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 Geo. L. Rev. 963, 985, 992-93, 1004-05 (1981);
Waldron, Criticizing the Economic Analysis of Law, 99 Yale LJ. 1441, 1451 (1990).
207. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 104, at 34-36; Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at
729.
208. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526, 534
(1979), Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979); Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
209. True, intentional wrongs may seem more congenial with modem notions of
criminal law than with contemporary notions of tort law, but the intentional torts that
persist today, see W. Keeton, supra note 122, at §§ 8-15, have respectable antecedents
in compensatory theory going back to Aristotle. See Posner, supra note 188, at 190 &
n.13, 201-02. Likewise, the duty to respect an individual's dignity as well as her person
and property presents no problem for corrective theory. SeeJ. Rawls, supra note 105, at
10-I1. Finally, racial discrimination redistributes resources in a manner appropriate for
corrective redress because discrimination often increases the relative status of whites
(especially poor whites) by decreasing the status of blacks. See infra note 346 and accompanying text. But cf. infra notes 223-225 and accompanying text (possible incompatibility of Corrective theory's ban on intentional legislative discrimination and
compensatory theory's private-law dictates).
210. Why, for example, should officials who harmfully relegate African-American
children to educationally "ultrahazardous" ghetto schools not be subjected to strict liability? See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 520 (1977) (strict liability for ultrahazardous activities).
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tions of wrongful conduct, modem tort theorists have vacillated be-

tween conventionalist and natural-rights theories. 2 1'
Curiously,
Corrective desegregation theorists have taken the conventionalist tack.
They premise "the strong moral claim that purposeful discrimination is
a wrong whose effects should be eradicated" on a belief that it is the
consequences of purposeful discrimination that "most people believe
' 2 12
[to be], the distinctively terrible wrongs that blacks have suffered.
The conventionalist tack is a curious one for desegregation theorists to take 2 13 because any even moderately concrete understanding of
"what most people believe" would validate the Court's 1896 separatebut-equal holding in Plessy v. Ferguson 2 14 and also the Court's noxious

resolve in that case to ignore what black Americans-who were not
then, and are not now, "most people"-believed. 21 5 Likewise, such a
211. See also Posner, supra note 188, at 196 (drawing somewhat similar distinction
between compensatory theories focused on wrongdoers' "responsibility" and ones focused on victims' "rights"). Compare R. Epstein, supra note 189, at 3-4 (emphasizing
concept of causation based on "common sense notions of individual responsibility") and
Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8J. Legal Stud. 419,440,454 (1979) (concept of
wrong embedded in everyday understandings of causation) and Fletcher, Fairness, supra
note 106, at 547-48 (wrong defined as creation of uncommon risks) and Schwartz, supra
note 206, at 1003 (advocating negligence test because it "does a reasonably good job of
identifying that conduct which public morality would regard as wrongful") with Epstein,
supra note 200, at 488, 496-99 & n.63 (abandoning earlier conventionalist approach
and defining wrong as violation of "the 'natural' set of entitlements that I think are
generated by a concern with individual liberty and property rights") and Fletcher, Fairness, supra note 106, at 569, 572 (defining wrong as violation of personal or proprietary
rights that plaintiff has not waived) and Wright, supra note 200, at 1180-81 (wrong
defined as violation of rights "based on the moral status of individuals as project pursuers"). On whether deviations from conduct that maximizes social utility can be defined
as wrongful consistently with corrective justice, compare Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra
note 206, at 1079-81 (affirmative answer) and Posner, supra note 188, at 192-93 (same)
with Fletcher, Fairness, supra note 106, at 547 n.40 (negative answer).
212. Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 729, 737; accord Brest, supra note 104, at
5, 35, 42; Fiss, Charlotte, supra note 63, at 705.
213. See generally J. Ely, supra note 105, at 69, 67 n.* (not sensible to employ
"value judgments of the majority as a vehicle for protecting minorities from the value
judgments of the majority"; the "law the legislature passed is likely to reflect the way
contemporary community values bear on the issues in question"); G. Stone, L. Seidman,
C. Sunstein & M. Tushnet, Constitutional Law 536 (1986) [hereinafter G. Stone] (quoting Brest, supra note 104, at 5) ("[I]f the antidiscrimination principle really 'rests on
fundamental moral values widely shared in our society,' why is special judicial scrutiny
required when it is violated?"; Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The
Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 Yale LJ. 1177, 1204 (1990)
(conventionalist approaches useless when discrimination is itself an entrenched convention); Fiss, supra note 67, at 150-51 (especially given that public morality may echo
government coercion, "deference to the prevailing popular morality seems particularly
inappropriate when what is being construed is a constitutional protection of
minorities").
214. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
215. "We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act,
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standard might not validate the Supreme Court's 1954 holding in Brown
and even today might not validate desegregation.2 1 7
More broadly, if the entitlements protected by Corrective theory

1,216

but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." Id. at
551. See Purcell, Alexander M. Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution, I1 Harv. C.R.C.L. L. Rev. 521, 539 (1976) (Plessy thus satisfies "conventional" standard); see also
sources cited infra note 494 (discussing widespread acceptance of racial segregation in
late nineteenth-century America). The tort analogy invites recourse to relatively nonabstract, majoritarian conventions. See Schwartz, supra note 206, at 987-88 (conventionalist notions of fault warrant virtually conclusive deference to legislative judgments via
the doctrine of "negligence per se" and heavy reliance on juries as community representatives); infra note 216.
216. See J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 92 (1980)
(two years after Brown I, over half the population still opposed giving blacks right to
attend school with whites); J. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 21 (Brown I's "greatness" lies
precisely "in the entrenched sentiment it challenged"). It is not clear, for instance, that
tort law's traditional "community standard," see W. Keeton, supra note 122, § 32, at
173-75, 183, 188 nn.44-48, would have compelled or even countenanced Brown I's invalidation of segregation statutes that had been duly enacted-and in many cases recently amended and strengthened, e.g., 1945 Mo. Laws 1700; see J. Choper, supra at
90-91-by the representatives of strong majorities in a number of American states. Nor
would a national "what most people believe" standard necessarily validate the initial
desegregation decisions inasmuch as close to a majority of American states as of the
time of Brown I had segregation laws. See L. Graglia, supra note 55, at 18; infra note
483 and accompanying text; see also G. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 76 (1954)
(widespread racial prejudice at time of Brown); Sandalow, supra note 121, at 1186-87
(proposing national consensus standard validating action endorsed by "legislation recently enacted by most states").
217. Although I have not taken a poll or figured out how to phrase the question, my
intuition is that most people do not believe "that [i] purposeful discrimination is a wrong
[ii] whose effects should be eradicated." Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 729. Rather,
I fear that, if we separated this claim into its two parts, we would measure significantly
fewer responsive-chord decibels on the latter question ("effects should be eradicated")
than on the former one ("discrimination is wrong"). In order to validate the intent test
in conventionalist fashion, presumedly "most people" must believe not only that intentional discrimination is offensive but also that the cost of a mechanism for redressing
that harm is worth bearing. See Fiss, Charlotte, supra note 63, at 698. See generally W.
Keeton, supra note 122, § 54, at 361-62 (cost of redress bears on existence vet non of
duty of care in general tort law). For like Judge Craven, I assume that the "bedrock of
public opinion" on which support for the Brown decision "now rests" is something like
the notion "that school assignments and other legal distinctions based upon race are
denigrating to the minority ethnic group" and ought to stop. Craven, The Impact of
Social Science Evidence on the Judge: A Personal Comment, 39 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 150, 153 (1975); see L. Graglia, supra note 55, at 77;J. Wilkinson, supra note 1,
at 133, 139-40, 183-84; Gutmann, How Liberal Is Democracy?, in Liberalism Reconsidered 25, 42 (D. MacLean & C. Mills eds. 1983) (busing decisions may violate "people's
legitimate expectations based upon their democratic traditions and conventions"). The
empirical sands underfoot shift less treacherously when we refine the question further
and ask how much people are willing to pay in order to effectuate each part of that moral
proposition. Inasmuch as talk and injunctive paper are cheap, people need not pay very
much to effectuate the "discrimination is wrong" part of the proposition. But when the
extraordinary costs of "traditional mandatory integration remedies" are factored in, one
begins to sense a distinct deafening among the public to complaints about the harmful
effects of segregation. Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 730-31.
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derive from social institutions and the expectations these institutions
generate, 218 then Corrective desegregation theory presumedly cannot
invalidate segregation because segregation is itself an expectations-creating social institution. 2 19 Likewise, if Corrective justice protects privileged aspects of the existing distribution of wealth, 2 20 and if "common
22 1
sense" notions "widely shared in our society" do the privileging,
then Corrective principles ought to defend and not defeat the distributive choices made by the community's official representatives. 2 22
Corrective theory's difficulty justifying liability for legislative judgments might be ameliorated by moving from a relatively concrete to a
more abstractly conventionalist definition of wrongful conduct 2 23 or to
a natural-law definition. 2 24 These approaches, however, encounter yet
another difficulty posed by the decisions: Why, apart from what many
people actually may believe, should discrimination by officials but not by
private citizens constitute an interpersonal wrong redressable through
constitutionally mandated desegregation? Corrective theorists have yet
to explain why a notion of the privileged distribution of resources that
is muscular enough to invalidate intentional interference with that distribution by the legislature acting in the interest of society as a whole
does not also invalidate similar interference by individuals acting in
218. SeeJ. Rawls, supra note 105, at 10-11.
219. See Black, supra note 123, at 424; Karst, supra note 4, at 5-8.
220. See supra text accompanying note 193.
221. R. Epstein, supra note 189, at 3-4; accord Brest, supra note 104, at 5.
222. This reasoning may account for Professor Epstein's conversion from a conventional to a natural-rights-based definition of wrongful conduct, see supra note 211, in
the process of developing a restrictive view of proper distributive behavior by the state.
See R. Epstein, Takings 306-29 (1985); Epstein, supra note 200, at 496-97 & n.63.
Professor Epstein's move to a natural-rights notion of distributive justice lying outside
corrective theory illustrates the futility of efforts to identify an intentional-discrimination
(or any other) test intrinsic to corrective theory. True, Aristotle made it a tenet of corrective theory that the decision maker should resolve disputes solely on the basis of what
the parties have done (their conduct) and not on who they are (their status). Aristotle,
supra note 188, at 114-15; accord Fletcher, Fairness, supra note 106, at 547 n.40. And
intentional legislative discrimination offends that tenet by making decisions based on
individuals' racial status, not their conduct. The conduct/status distinction breaks
down, however. For example, correctively unobjectionable laws forbidding theft are not
status neutral, but in fact privilege the victims' property-holding status. As such, corrective theory can be faulted for lacking any intrinsic basis upon which to distinguish between, on the one hand, laws that give people a property right in their possessions and
forbid nonconsensual takings and, on the other hand, southern segregation laws, which
gave whites a "property right in their 'whiteness,'" D. Bell, Remembrances, supra note
139, at 6, and forbade nonconsensual integration. In addition, although Aristotle limited tort judges to corrective justice, he imposed no such conduct-not-status limitation
on legislators. See Aristotle, supra note 188, Book V, ch. 3-4.
223. See, e.g., A. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 98-100,
175-78 (1970); Chayes, supra note 186, at 1316.
224. Corrective tort theorists drawing upon natural rights theory include: Epstein,
supra note 200, at 488, 496-99 & n.63; Fletcher, Fairness, supra note 106, at 569, 572;
Wright, supra note 200, at 1180-81. See supra note 211.
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their own, assumedly selfish, interest. 2 25
At least as developed so far, therefore, Corrective desegregation
theory has not defined "the wrong" any more successfully than has
Corrective theory generally. In particular, Corrective desegregation
theorists have not constructed a convincing justification for treating intentional legislative, but not private, discrimination as the wrong. As
discussed below, however, more than one such rationale is available to
explain the deep moral convictions that Correctivists have convincingly
linked to the legislative-intent standard. 22 6 Once we have discussed
those justifications, it will be clear that it is not the intent standard but
rather Corrective theory's crabbed private-law approach to rights,
wrongs, and remedies-to which we next turn-that prevents the Correction
theory from adequately explaining and justifying
desegregation.
b. Why Just Desegregation?- The "Why just desegregation?" question poses a more vexing problem for the Correction theory: If the
compensatory version of private-law tort theory provides the proper
measure of the violation, then why should it not also provide the
proper form of the remedy-namely, damages? Why, if the purpose of
desegregation law is to restore the distributive balance that the defendant threw out of kilter by injuring the plaintiff, may we not presume in
this as in most other areas, 2 27 that the balance can be restored by an
exchange of money between the litigants? Why, at the least, should the
plaintiffs be denied the opportunity to decide for themselves in the first
instance whether or not "a monetary surrogate for their injuries" 228
225. See generally Karst, supra note 4, at 4-11 (questioning inattentiveness of constitutional jurisprudence to private discrimination's vast stigmatic harms). Constructing
a correctively satisfying explanation for immunizing private, one-against-one conduct
while penalizing otherwise similar legislative action is particularly difficult given corrective theory's private-law penchant for narrowing the focus of concern to two discrete
parties. See supra notes 200-205 and accompanying text. One answer to this problem
is suggested by Professor Epstein's work discussed supra note 222: Arguably, intentional legislative discrimination-say, in deciding to turn public property into a parking
lot rather than subsidized housing-provides a decent proxy for (what by libertarian
hypothesis is) illegal legislative redistribution of wealth from blacks, who get too little
return on their taxes, to whites, who get too much. By contrast, an individual's discriminatory decision to sell his property to a white-owned parking lot company rather than to
an African-American home builder does not directly or by proxy deprive the latter of
any property interest in which he (by libertarian hypothesis) has an entitlement. Even if
one accepted the libertarian hypotheses that inform this reasoning, but see infra note
376, and even if the reasoning justified the intentional-legislative-discrimination proxy
for the wrong, the reasoning would not explain why desegregation, rather than traditional forms of "just compensation," is the remedy.
226. See, e.g., infra notes 330-333 and accompanying text (Professor Dworkin's
treatment of intentional discrimination as a forbidden "external" preference); infra Part
III (intentional governmental discrimination treated as offense against liberal egalitarian
assumptions about individuals' equal capacity to define themselves).
227. See Wright, supra note 200, at 1179.
228. Fletcher, Punishment, supra note 106, at 692.
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provides an adequate remedy at law, i.e., whether or not to pray for
damages? The answer, it seems to me, is that, like modem tort law, the
desegregation decisions use injunctions to serve a public-, not a private-law function 229 -a function that accordingly is not necessarily
trumped by the remedial preferences of individual plaintiffs and that is
fundamentally inconsistent with the private-law assumptions that the
Correctivists believe underpin the desegregation cases.
c. Overcorrection. - Even if the compensatory tort analogy is extended no further than Correctivists take it, their theory cannot explain
the bulk of the Court's desegregation decisions. Pure Corrective theory both limits and commits the remedy to curing the actual effects of
the violation, i.e., to eliminating the "conditions of black disadvantage
... causally linked to the defendant's [violation]." 23 0 Contrary to these
dictates, the desegregation decisions are both over- and under-corrective; they neither limit nor fully commit the remedy to relieving the
identifiable harms imposed on identifiable children by the discriminatory acts of identifiable defendants.
Turning first to the ways in which "all-out desegregation" remedies are overcorrective, recall that the "unique moral force of the corrective conception . . . rests upon an empirical claim that must be
established in each case," namely, that there is a direct and identifiable
"link between present conditions (which are the focus of the remedy)
and prior wrongful acts." 23 ' Manifestly, the all-out desegregation remedies the Court actually has imposed-which require nearly all white
and black students in the defendant district during at least some portion of their elementary and secondary careers to abandon their neighborhood schools and board buses bound for other schools-do not
heed this imperative. Although in all of the Court's cases, substantial
racial discrimination against African-American children had been found
dating back many decades, 23 2 there was no finding that many of the
white parents and children directly affected by the remedy had taken
part in or profited by the violation. Nor was any exemption allowed for
white children or parents who could establish that they were entirely
innocent of any violation or unjust enrichment. Nor, finally, did the
federal courts predicate the remedies in those cases on findings linking
the effects of the violations to most or even a majority of the black children benefited thereby-many of whom, for example, had come to the
district or been born after the violations occurred and all of whom had
229. See W. Keeton, supra note 122, § 88A, at 631-32 (injunctions no longer limited to situations in which damages are inadequate; use turns on social value of enterprise being enjoined).
230. Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 732.
231. Id. at 782-83; accord supra text accompanying note 205.
232. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton H), 443 U.S. 526, 534-40
(1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 466-67 (1979); Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 198-205 (1973).
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been influenced by vast demographic and other forces in addition to
23 3
official segregation.
In short, an "ethical void still exists" when the Supreme Court's
all-out desegregation decisions are viewed from a Corrective perspective: "[T]he cost of the remedy is placed on those who were neither
perpetrators nor beneficiaries of the past wrongful conduct,"2 3 4 and
"the identity between the victim of the discrimination and the beneficiary of judicial actions tends to disintegrate. 2 3s 5 Vis-A-vis both "innocent" white children and violationally unaffected black children, the
"all out" relief endorsed by the Supreme Court violates one of the first
principles of Correction theory, namely, that the remedy compensate
23 6
but not redistribute.
233. For example, during the decades- or even century-long period of the typical
violation, see, e.g, cases cited supra note 232; infra note 272, the city probably received
two large waves of black and white in-migrants during and after the World Wars and
suffered a large suburban out-migration of whites and jobs during the four decades following the creation of the Federal Housing Administration in 1936. As a result of these
and other shifts, the city by now probably has a ghettoized, if intermittently regentrified,
predominantly minority, central-city core surrounded by a layer of racially transitional
neighborhoods ringed in turn by increasingly affluent layers of predominantly white upper-middle class neighborhoods somewhere in the midst of which lies a city-suburbs
boundary. See sources cited infra note 258. Overlay this narrative map with a neighborhood-school assignment plan and it should be clear that there are an awful lot of causes
and effects with which to contend. Although important, therefore, see sources cited
infra notes 258, 303, discrimination by officials is not the only plausible cause of
segregation.
234. Fiss, Fate, supra note 63, at 770; accord Brest, supra note 104, at 36; Gewirtz,
Remedies, supra note 49, at 605; see also Posner, supra note 188, at 197 ("if the injurer
is not the source of the compensation, then someone else, who is innocent, must be, and
why is not that innocent party a victim of the wrongdoer's injurious conduct?"). The
Supreme Court briefly flirted with a purely corrective approach in Justice Rehnquist's
decision for the Court in Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton I), 433 U.S. 406, 420
(1977) (remedy for school board's three minor violations limited to curing violations'
"incremental segregative effect[s]"), then expressly rejected that approach (overJustice
Rehnquist's dissent) in Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 531 & n.5, and Columbus, 443 U.S. at 458
n.7, 465-68 ("incremental segregative effects" test applies only to minor violations;
broader remedial holdings of Swann and Keyes control in cases of "systemwide"
violations).
235. Fiss, Fate, supra note 63, at 770; accord Shane, supra note 52, at 1062-76;
Yudof, supra note 61, at 455-56.
236. See, e.g., P. Schuck, supra note 122, at 287; Brest, supra note 104, at 42;
Nagel, supra note 177, at ix ("One does not automatically compensate for wrongs to
some members of a group by benefiting other members.... Either the member benefited must himself have been hurt as the result of injustice to others, or the benefit to
him must indirectly benefit others who have been victims of injustice."); Wright, supra
note 200, at 1182 (corrective justice allows "full but not excessive compensation"). The
intellectual assault on desegregation by officials and judicial nominees of the Reagan
and Bush Administrations has focused on this moral defect of the remedy from a Corrective perspective. See, e.g., T. Eastland & W. Bennett, Counting by Race 122-42
(1979); L. Graglia, supra note 55, at 116-32;J. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 133; Cooper,
supra note 55, at 80-8 1; Reynolds, supra note 61, at 1003; see also Kitch, The Return of
Color-Consciousness to the Constitution: Weber, Dayton, and Columbus, 1979 Sup.
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Corrective theorists are aware of the disjunction between their theory in its pure form and the Court's all-out desegregation decisions.
Professor Gewirtz, for example, has constructed a detailed argument
designed to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Because that
argument is the most thorough gap-bridging attempt of which I am
aware, I discuss it here to illustrate my skepticism that the Corrective
theory's explanatory capacity can be enhanced without destroying its
moral power.
In order to conform Corrective theory to Swann, Keyes, and kindred
decisions, Professor Gewirtz interprets the so-called Swann (continuing-effect) and Keyes (expanding-effect) evidentiary presumptions as devices for relieving plaintiffs of the need explicitly and mechanically to
link cause and effect, violation and remedy. 23 7 Understood correctively, the Swann presumption provides that proof of (1) purposive governmental segregation on a "systemwide" basis as of Time A, say 1954,
and of (2) the fact of racial separation at Time B, say 1990, and of
(3) the absence of concerted desegregative efforts between Time A and
Time B, creates a presumption that the de facto segregation at Time B
23 8
Simis the "continuing effect" of the dejure segregation at Time A.

ilarly understood, the Keyes presumption provides that proof of (1) purposive governmental segregation in Area A, comprising a "substantial"
part of a school district, and of (2) the fact of racial separation in Area B
elsewhere in the district at the same time, and of (3) the absence of
concerted efforts to contain the effects of the segregative acts in Area A,
creates a presumption that the de facto segregation in Area B is the
"expanding effect" of the de jure segregation shown in Area A. 23 9 By
way of these devices, Corrective theorists would deem officials' intentionally discriminatory imposition of segregative attendance patterns in
a substantial part of the district to be the cause of racially separate-infact attendance patterns that exist later in time and elsewhere in the
district. 240 The defendant could rebut the presumption by proving that
racial separation would obtain at Time B and in Area B even had the
Time A and Area A discrimination never taken place. 241 Corrective
theorists argue that traditional evidentiary principles support this use
Ct. Rev. 1, 9-12 (all-out desegregation cases constitute improper "system of covert reparations-transferring wealth to blacks from [innocent] nonblacks"); Laycock, Notes on
the Role ofJudicial Review, the Expansion of Federal Power, and the Structure of Con-

stitutional Rights, 99 Yale LJ. 1701, 1730 &n.108 (1990) (busing cases improperly seek
"a status quo that never would have existed even if the Constitution had not been
violated").
237. See Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 740-41, 751-52.
238. See Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 537-40; Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189,
211 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971).
239. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 461 (1979); Keyes, 413
U.S. at 211-12.
240. See Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 740-41, 751-52.
241. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 213.
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of the presumptions because the devices "lead to a preferred allocation
of error costs" to the "proven wrongdoer." 24 2
I have three objections to this attempt to assimilate to Corrective
theory the above version of the presumptions and the Court's decisions
relying on those presumptions. 243 First, the Correction theory's moral
imperative, which depends upon a direct link between the tortious act
of a specific wrongdoer and the conditions the remedy requires that
wrongdoer (and only that wrongdoer) to eradicate, gets utterly lost in
the black box forged by the continuing- and expanding-effect presumptions.2 4 4 Especially troubling in this regard is the curious leap the presumptions make from evil intention to temporally and geographically
separated harmful effects without any meaningful account of the causal
process presumed to be at work or of how illegal causes are distinguished from neutral demographic and preferential ones. 2 45

Second, although the presumptions purport to satisfy Corrective
theory's requirement of an identifiable victim, by putatively linking all
currently segregated African-American children to prior discriminatory
acts, the devices do not claim to satisfy the theory's requirement of an
identifiable wrongdoer. The presumptions, that is, do not endeavor to
link all of the parents and children who actually "pay" for the remedy
to the violation. 24 6 For this reason, I am unconvinced by an appeal to
evidentiary principles favoring placement of error costs on proven
wrongdoers, inasmuch as Corrective theory supplies no good reason
for identifying all of the white children included in the Court's desegre242. Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 786-87.
243. Although I do not think the presumptions assimilate the decisions to Corrective theory, I do believe they play an important role in explaining desegregation. See
infra notes 565-573 and accompanying text.
244. When deployed as stand-ins for proof of causation, the two presumptions are
susceptible to the criticism that they substitute "contrived," "hypothesized," and "theoretical possibilities" for actual linkages, Fiss, Charlotte, supra note 63, at 700, 705; accord Fiss, supra note 49, at 19; that they are "not supported by natural probabilities,"
Fiss, supra note 61, at 207; and that they are "self-contradictory," "verbal gimmickry,"
Freeman, supra note 57, at 80. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,
506-07 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Chayes, supra note 122, at 50; Kurland,
Brown v. Board of Education Was the Beginning, 1979 Wash. U.L.Q. 309, 362. Professor

Gewirtz argues that these attacks are inconsistent in their conjoined assertions that the
presumptions are conjectural and all but irrebuttable. Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49,
at 788 n.191. There is no inconsistency, however. If, after hearing evidence, a court
believes that there is a 20% chance that government segregation caused existing attendance patterns, a 20% chance that identifiable neutral factors caused the segregation, and
a great deal of uncertainty, a presumption in favor of either litigant would have only
conjectural support at the same time as it would be irrefutable because of the likewise
conjectural support for the opposing party's theory.
245. The problem is not solved by dividing the leap into two shorter ones-from
intent to local effects, thence to chronologically and geographically distant effectsgiven the tenuous empirical assumptions that continue to plague the latter leap. See
supra note 244.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 203-205.
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gation remedies as wrongdoers. 24 7
Third, once one presumptively subjects the vast demographic patterns found in the Supreme Court's intradistrict decisions to the Corrective imperative, there is no morally or intellectually satisfying
explanation for the Court's holding in Milliken I that forbade an interdistrict remedy and thereby left uncorrected the similar racial-isolation patterns found in Detroit. Either the intradistrict decisions are not
(i.e., are more than) corrective or the interdistrict decision is not (i.e., is
2 48
less than) corrective.
d. Undercorrection. - As the last point illustrates, the desegregation decisions not only "cure" too much to be corrective; in even more
compelling ways, they cure too little. Thus, a Corrective analysis that
honestly acknowledged the genesis of school segregation would have to
take "a sweeping and interconnected view of American racial history,
moving from the slave auctions to exploitation of slave labor... to the
Jim Crow laws of past and present centuries, to the Negro's ...internment in the [urban] ghetto." 249 The Court's decisions do not take that
tack, however. Instead, they discard "large chunks of the Negro's oppression" and "whittle[] [away] the enormity of our unpardonable past
'250
into some narrow and manageable channel.
247. See also infra note 248 (explaining why vicarious liability does not provide a
sufficient basis for identifying all, but only, the white children included in the Court's
desegregation decisions as wrongdoers). In his earlier article, Professor Gewirtz argues
that it is important to acknowledge the "innocent" character of many white families affected by "all-out desegregation" remedies. Gewirtz, Remedies, supra note 49, at
591-608. This argument makes correctively problematic his later article's placement of
virtually the entire weight of the corrective justification of desegregation on the assertion that it is "a preferred allocation of error costs" to subject those same "innocent"
white families to the "extraordinary" burden of an all-out desegregation remedy.
Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 786-87, 730-31. As we will see, Professor Gewirtz's
first article lets the white families off too easily. See infra notes 573-577 and accompanying text. Although Professor Gewirtz notes that evidentiary presumptions also may be
justified as contributing to a determination of the truth, he does not defend the Swann
and Keyes presumptions on this basis because of the devices' palpable risk of error. See
Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 744, 754; Gewirtz, Remedies, supra note 49, at
666-67.
248. Milliken I thus undercuts another answer to the overcorrection critique,
namely, private-law tort theory's mechanistic resort to vicarious liability to avoid having
to immunize a corporate wrongdoer's "innocent" shareholders, employees, suppliers,
and customers from the effects of a crippling judgment against the corporation. For if
Swann did not overcorrect when it effectively made "innocent" parents and children who
happened to live in Mecklenburg County vicariously liable for the state's and the county
district's violations, it is difficult to see why Milliken I did not undercorrect when it held
that state residents who happened to live in suburban districts (i.e., in political units
created by the state) were not vicariously liable for the state's and the city district's violations. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 770-72 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (vicarious liability a valid basis for including suburbs in remedy); Note, supra
note 49, at 1753-54.
249. J. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 140.
250. Id.; accord D. Bell, supra note 2, at 48 (Court "unwilling to recognize and
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Consider also, that officially mandated school segregation existed
in this country for well over a century before Brown 1,251 so that as of
1954, 1970 (when school desegregation actually began in earnest), and
even 1990, the majority of as yet uncompensated victims of school segregation have been adults, not children. Yet, so far as I am aware, no
school desegregation remedy has ever compensated graduates of segregated elementary and secondary public schools for the educational,
economic, psychological, or political harms they have continued to suffer throughout their adult lives as a result of their segregated and inferior schooling. 25 2 Most particularly, desegregation remedies have never
compensated anyone, child or adult, for what we usually think of as the
most compensable of all harms-the lost earnings and wealth that demonstrably flow from the poor schooling, confinement to neighborhoods with substandard, typically rental, housing, and lost job
opportunities that in turn demonstrably flow from officially mandated
253
school segregation.
Consider, finally, that, even as to the tiny subset of effects of intentional segregation that the Court's desegregation remedies do address
(namely, current school-attendance effects), substantial undercorrection consistently occurs under the Court's decisions as a result of:
(1) the Court's reluctance to address the segregated-schooling consequences of the residential segregation that was the official policy and
the ubiquitous product of virtually all federal, state, and local housing
remedy the real losses resulting from long-held, race-based subordinate status");
Brooks, supra note 160, at 894-95; Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1342.
251. See, e.g., Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 209 (1849) (upholding Boston School Committee's policy of segregating blacks); J. McPherson, Battle
Cry of Freedom 88 (1988); Hall, Negroes Ask for Equal Education Facilities (1787), in A
Documentary History of the Negro People in the United States 19 (H. Aptheker ed.
1951); Heaney, supra note 49, at 738-39 & nn.9, 14, 20, 743-45, 748-56.
252. Because desegregation in its early days cost many black teachers their jobs
based on claims that blacks were too poorly educated in segregated schools to teach
white children, see Watson, School Integration: Its Meaning, Costs and Future, 4J.L. &
Educ. 15, 15 (1975), the remedy harmed far more adult graduates of separate schools
than it compensated. Although the Court used to interpret the "disparate impact"
prong of Title VII's ban on employment discrimination as a form of compensation for
the "childhood deficiencies in education and background of minority citizens,"
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973); accord Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971), the Court recently has backed away from that view,
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 2124-25 (1989).
253. See, e.g., United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 600 F.2d 518, 525 (5th Cir.
1979); Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1492 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd on this
ground, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 70 (1987)
("forced segregation ruins attitudes," .isinherently unequal," and "produces low
achievement which ultimately limits employment opportunities and causes poverty").
The classic description of official racism's cumulative causation of harms to AfricanAmericans is found in G. Myrdal, supra note 62; see also Braddock, Crain & McPartland,
supra note 156, at 260-62 (recent compendium of comparative economic harms visited
on black graduates of segregated public schools); infra note 303 (connection between
school and housing segregation).
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agencies in this country until the 1960s; 25 4 (2) the ease with which intentional discriminators can obscure their illicit motivation and thereby
avoid liability;2 55 and (3) the ruling in Milliken I that no multidistrict
remedy, hence no remedy at all, is available for the intradistrict segregation affecting black children who reside in districts that, often partly
as a result of the districts' own segregative actions, have by now be2 56
come virtually all black.
In order to explain the decisions' palpably undercorrective attributes, Corrective theorists have found it necessary to draw a line between "broad and narrow" effects and to subject only the latter to a
cure.2 57 Once again, however, the price of improving the theory's descriptive capacity is the devaluation of its moral currency.
The problem with any distinction between narrow and broad effects is, of course, its susceptibility to arbitrariness in contravention of
the Correction theory's moral imperative. To begin with, Corrective
theorists cannot avoid the charge of arbitrariness by attributing the decisions' undercorrection to difficulties of proof of the mundane sort
that all plaintiffs face. For it is not very difficult for litigants and courts
to find buried in the history of most cities any number of examples of
identifiable official wrongdoers whose identifiable discrimination saddled identifiable black adults as well as children with identifiable economic and other harms of a type that the Court's decisions do not
redress. 258
254. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 728 n.7 (1974); Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 23 (1971). Compare Note, Housing
Discrimination as a Basis for Interdistrict School Desegregation Relief, 93 Yale LJ. 340,
340 (1983) (affirmative answer to question reserved in Swann) and cases cited infra
notes 556, 855 (same) with Bell v. Board of Educ., 683 F.2d 963, 968 (6th Cir. 1982)
(negative answer). See generally infra note 258 (impact of official discrimination on segregation of neighborhoods and schools); infra notes 556, 855, 857 (offering explanation
of apparently conflicting case law).
255. See, e.g., D. Bell, supra note 2, at 72, 170-71;J. Ely, supra note 105, at 128
n.*, 137-38, 145, 147, 171; Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 36, 62-63 (1977); Karst, The
Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 San Diego L. Rev. 1163, 1163-65 (1978);
Kennedy, McCeskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101
Harv. L. Rev. 1388, 1418-19 (1988); Lawrence, supra note 134, at 319-21 & nn.3-14;
Soifer, Complacency and Constitutional Law, 42 Ohio St. LJ. 383, 397 (1981).
256. See Gewirtz, Remedies, supra note 49, at 646-48 (Milliken I undercorrective).
The two last mentioned causes of undercorrection may arise, on occasion, under any
compensatory regime due to case-specific evidentiary difficulties or judgment-proof defendants. As is discussed below, however, the desegregation cases, like, for example,
mass exposure cases, are so inherently fraught with these kinds of difficulties that a substantial question arises whether morally satisfying, private-law corrective techniques are
meaningfully available. See infra notes 265-284 and accompanying text.
257. See Brest, supra note 104, at 34-36; Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at
731-33, 783, 796 n.217 (Constitution "does not provide a remedy for all harms causally
linked to purposeful discrimination" and is only "narrowly corrective;" goal of eliminating effects of past discrimination an illusion if taken literally).
258. The segregative process in most cities is similar, its details banal, its identifi-
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Although other criteria for distinguishing "narrow" and "broad"
effects may be identified, those criteria are uniformly arbitrary-as, for
able perpetrators, victims and effects manifold. See G. Myrdal, supra note 62, at
348-53, 618-39. First, a given part of the city was literally defined as "for blacks."
There, long before 1954, the city situated its all black schools (named, for example,
Lincoln, (Booker T.) Washington, and Bethune); and there the city made its AfricanAmerican citizens live, using racial-zoning ordinances, the strategic location of blacksonly public housing projects, parks, and recreational facilities, racially disparate law-enforcement practices, and restrictive covenants that realtors dared not violate lest the
state revoke their licenses. These practices developed during the first large migration of
blacks into the city during and following World War I and were in full flower during the
even larger in-migration in the 1940s and 1950s. As thousands of new black families
moved into the metropolitan area, inundating the relatively few blacks who lived there
before, the in-migrants had but one place they could locate assuming only that they
chose to live either in a structure that they purchased or rented or that the government
provided or within a reasonable distance of the only schools their children were permitted de jure to attend (free transportation from elsewhere was not provided) or near to
one of the established churches of their denomination, which previously located in the
ghetto because racial zoning ordinances, violence, or restrictive covenants forbade any
other location. Then, just as urban black communities began to burst at the seams,
spilling block by block into nearby white neighborhoods, the Federal Housing Administration embarked on a calamitous policy, lasting from 1936 until the 1960s, of refusing
to insure mortgages except on new homes located in racially homogenous neighborhoods. As a result: (1) the vast suburbanization process of the 1940s-1960s all but
excluded African-Americans (no developer could afford to risk prospective buyers' access to FHA mortgage insurance by selling to a single black individual); (2) FHA financing was virtually unavailable in older urban areas, so newly formed white families with
young children were discouraged from moving into older urban areas, black families
were discouraged from moving anywhere else, and the housing stock in older areas rapidly deteriorated for lack of federally backed investment; and (3) blacks accumulated
essentially no real property wealth at a time when the property wealth of white citizensreal property comprising the largest category of wealth held by Americansmushroomed. Consider, finally, that: (1) explicit public-housing segregation in most cities in the country continued until the last few years of the 1960s, (2) most of the residential relocation caused by the urban renewal and highway-building booms of the 1950s
and early 1960s took place on a more or less explicitly segregated (whites-to-the-suburbs, blacks-to-the-city) basis, and (3) well into the 1980s, public school, housing, relocation, transportation, and other state and municipal officials have been found to have
continued intentionally to discriminate against blacks in deciding where to locate facilities and to whom to allow access to their facilities. See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers
Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1364-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988); Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485,
1490-95, 1501-05 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in relevant part, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986)
(en banc), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 70 (1987); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs,
637 F.2d 1101, 1109-1111 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); K. Jackson,
Crabgrass Frontier 190-230 (1985); Fossett & Orfield, Market Failure and Federal Policy: Low-Income Housing in Chicago 1970-1983, in Divided Neighborhoods, supra
note 13, at 158, 158-80; Kain, Housing Market Discrimination and Black Suburbanization in the 1980s, in id., at 68, 68-94; Lawrence, supra note 134, at 366-67 &
nn.231-38; Logan & Schneider, Racial Segregation and Racial Change in American Suburbs, 89 Am.J. Soc. 874, 884-87 (1984); Rabin, The Roots of Segregation in the Eighties: The Role of Local Government Actions, in Divided Neighborhoods, supra note 13,
at 208, 208-26; Yinger, The Racial Dimension of Urban Housing Markets in the 1980s,
in id., at 43, 43-67.
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example, are lines between one discriminatory governmental actor and
another,2 59 one time period and another,2 60 and one type of identifiable harm and another.2 6 1 Once distinctions such as these are drawn,
moreover, the Correction theory immediately falls prey to the principal
argument of its post-Milliken I critics-that the theory trivializes a complex and dynamic "social system" of governmental discrimination by
choosing to recognize and punish26 2only occasional and sporadic manifestations of the systemic wrong.
Even more fundamentally, if there is a moral imperative to eradicate the effects of "what most people believe are the distinctively terrible wrongs that blacks have suffered"-and if those wrongs include that
blacks "were deliberately subordinated and remain so today largely because of the effects of purposeful discrimination extending throughout
American society over many years" 26 3-then arbitrary distinctions such
as those listed above, which stop so substantially short of eradicating
identifiable effects, purely and simply disobey the imperative. Finally,
even having paid so dearly in moral terms, the above distinctions still
do not accomplish their explanatory task. For none of them yet explains Milliken I, in which the Supreme Court acknowledged the lower
courts' findings that identifiable school officials committed recent identifiable acts of discrimination with current location-of-attendanceeffects on
identifiable African-American children, but held that those findings did
not support the interdistrict remedy that admittedly was necessary to
264
cure those effects.
259. See supra note 254 and accompanying text (distinguishing actions of school
and nonschool officials).
260. See Brest, supra note 104, at 42. The lengthy and continuing nature of many
governmental violations as well as the difficulty of uncovering them and their effects
make statutes of limitations unsatisfactory dividing lines. See cases cited supra notes
232, 258.
261. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 104, at 34-36 (arguing that only correctable harm
is psychological effect of identifying some schools as for blacks and others as for whites);
Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 751-53 & nn.75, 766, 774-75 (only "relevant" and
correctable harms are "racially concentrated attendance patterns," racially identified
schools, and some educational deficits of children still in school).
262. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 8, at 94; Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1341-46;
Delgado, supra note 139, at 342; Fiss, supra note 148, at 46-48; Freeman, supra note
98, at 1049-56, 1108-09; Goldstein, supra note 92, at 30-32, 42-43; Karst, supra note
4, at 25-26; Lawrence, supra note 8, at 50; see also Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse:
The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 Geo. LJ. 1719, 1720 (1989) (similar attack on
corrective approaches to section 1983 adjudication). Most of these critics attribute the
Correction theory's underconceptualization of the problem to its process-oriented character. The analysis here, however, reveals that the theory's private-law contours are
responsible for its blinkered view of the violation and its obsessive demand that the
existing distribution of rights and resources be preserved.
263. Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 729.
264. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 723-29, 744-45 (1974). Professor Gewirtz's effort to draw a nonarbitrary line between narrow and broad effects, and
thus to explain Milliken I, does not avoid these problems. Arguing that the corrective
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e. Private-Law Solutions to Public-Law Problems. - Ultimately, private-law Corrective approaches fail to respond satisfactorily to insidimoral imperative is subject to "permissible remedial limits" that "override corrective
goals," Professor Gewirtz would let courts cut off the corrective enterprise at the point
where its effects-eliminating advantages to black children are substantially outweighed
by certain of its disruptive disadvantages to innocent white children. Gewirtz, Choice,
supra note 49, at 732-34, 780; Gewirtz, Remedies, supra note 49, at 591-608, 634, 647;
accord Brest, supra note 104, at 36, 42, 47 & n.214. Although disagreeing with the
balance he believes Milliken I actually struck, Professor Gewirtz concludes that the Court
was engaging in something like this balancing process when it excused suburban children from the remedy. Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 779-82; see Gewirtz, Remedies, supra note 49, at 647-50. But see infra note 315 (Milliken I limited scope of
cognizable violations, not range of available remedies). The first problem with this explanation is the slipperiness of a theory that can as easily explain a desegregation regime
in which as important a decision as Milliken I is the law as one in which Milliken I is not
the law. See supra text accompanying note 115; infra notes 320-322 and accompanying
text. The second problem is how Milliken l's immunization of "innocent" whites living
in suburban areas lying outside the central-city-only Detroit district can coexist with
Swann's refusal to immunize similarly "innocent" whites living in suburban areas lying,
for wholly fortuitous reasons, inside the defendant county-wide district in that case. See
Fiss, supra note 49, at 38. Once Corrective theory accords white parents and children
the status of innocent nonviolators, any process that weighs their interests in the remedy-defining balance invites the stingy result of Milliken I and threatens the generous
holding of Swann. Third, in order even to contemplate the possibility that the interests
of white children in attending schools near home could overwhelm the interest of blacks
in eliminating "the distinctively terrible wrongs that blacks have suffered," Gewirtz,
Choice, supra notes 49, at 729, it is necessary-still arbitrarily-to ignore a huge chunk
of those wrongs. Compare supra notes 232-233 and accompanying text (segregation's
immensely harmful educational, psychological, and economic effects on blacks) with
supra note 156 and infra notes 574, 664-674, 683-694, 800-804 (desegregation's only
modestly harmful effects on whites). Fourth, when as in Milliken I the wrongdoers at
fault are state officials, it is hard to see why their constituent voter-taxpayers-who to
this extent are not innocent because they can "throw the bums out of office"-should
not have to pay for 100% of the officials' mal-, mis-, or nonfeasance, just as state taxpayers often pay 100%Y of the damages owed the victims of the state's negligently operated
school buses. See supra note 248. Finally, consider the logic of this "remedial limits"
explanation: Desegregation remedies inevitably require "innocent" whites to forego
certain rights and resources owned by them. In order to ameliorate that redistributive
result, it sometimes is fair that victimized African-Americans bear a likewise redistributive cost, hence desegregation remedies sometimes require black victims to forego certain remedial rights and resources otherwise owed to them. This logic "explains" the
desegregation decisions by analogizing them to a "corrective" tort system that permits
persons negligently harmed in accidents occurring at Third and Main to recover damages from otherwise uninvolved red-headed people but limits the damages to 40%0 of
the total. Although red-headed people might be assuaged by the fact that the system is
"fairer" than one allowing the victims to recover 100%o of their damages from innocent
persons, the victims can make a convincing argument that the 100%o solution is the
fairer one. See Coleman, Justice and the Argument for No-Fault, 3 Soc. Theory & Prac.
161, 177 (1975). But see Waldron, supra note 206, at 1452-54. In any event, even if the
40% limitation-or any other interest-balancing constraint-made the system less comparatively redistributive, hence from a corrective perspective less comparatively immoral, the system remains unconscionably immoral from a corrective perspective as to
nearly everyone involved. See infra notes 311-322 and accompanying text (criticizing
similar "remedial limits" argument premised on equitable concerns).
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ously prevalent, decades-long, metropolitan-wide, multidisciplinary,
and variously harmful public racial discrimination for the same reasons
that private-law compensatory tort approaches fail to respond satisfactorily to mass toxic disasters. The complicated character and massive
scale of the problem in both situations cause the correctively critical
prerequisites of an identifiable plaintiff and an identifiable defendant 26 5
to elude proof, notwithstanding that unjustly enriched wrongdoers almost certainly have visited harms on large numbers of victims. As a
result, the compensatory system's vaunted moral integrity evaporates.
Recent tort scholarship has focused attention on the plight of cancer victims who can show that they have been exposed to a toxic agent
that increases the incidence in the population-but may be only one of
many causes-of the cancer suffered by the plaintiffs, and who also can
show that the toxic agent was manufactured by at least one-but who
cannot specify which-member of a defendant group of chemical companies. 26 6 The plight of residentially and educationally segregated
black children is analogous. These children likewise can show that they
have been exposed to the discriminatory acts of a number of school and
housing officials any one or combination of which-along with myriad
"neutral" factors-may have caused the plaintiffs' segregation.
The most problematic feature of both mass toxic tort and Corrective desegregation litigation is the difficulty of proving specific causation of injuries that, regrettably, are not "substance-" or
discrimination-"specific. ' 26 7 For example, what result should obtain if
thousands of plaintiff victims can show that forty-five percent of the
cancerous or segregative conditions existing in the relevant population
are the responsibility of the defendant chemical companies or the defendant school and housing officials, but none of the victims can show
more than a fifty-percent likelihood that their own cancer or segregation is the defendants' fault?268 Should all of the plaintiffs lose, as
ought to occur if the traditional tort system and the preponderance-ofthe-evidence rule are retained (in which case, what becomes of the
moral imperative that all nonreciprocal harms be compensated)?269 Or
should all plaintiffs win, as might occur, for example, under a regime of
presumptions or other burden-shifting devices (in which case, what becomes of the moral imperative that reciprocal harms not result in redis265. See supra notes 200-203 and accompanying text.
266. See P. Schuck, supra note 122, at 302 nn.4, 6.
267. Id. at 185, 261-62; accord Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,
481-82 (1979) (Powell,J., dissenting) ("de facto segregation has existed on a large scale
in many of these cities, and often it is indistinguishable in effect from the type of de jure
segregation outlawed by Brown").
268. P. Schuck, supra note 122, at 268.
269. Compare id. at 262-68 (undercompensatory result of tort system in mass exposure cases) and Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A 'Public Law' Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 851, 877-81 (1984) (same) with
sources cited supra note 262 (undercompensatory results in desegregation cases).
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tribution of resources)? Or, finally- to use the so-called "public law
vision of the tort system"-should all plaintiffs win but receive compensation for only forty-five percent of their injuries (in which case, what
becomes of both moral imperatives)?270
Both kinds of cases present the further difficulty of linking a given
plaintiff's harms known to have been created by some one of the defendants to the defendant actually responsible.2 71 Although burdenshifting devices and allocation measures that tie damages to market
shares have been used, they, too, deviate from the Corrective imperative that "one who injures (and none other) pays the cost of the injury
(but no more)."
Both kinds of cases also involve: "large scale, because of the
number of potential plaintiffs [and] defendants ...; spatial dispersion,
because of the large number ofjurisdictions having plausible claims to
provide the governing law; temporal dispersion, because of the duration of exposure and the fact that injuries might not fully manifest
themselves for ...years; and enormous cost, because of all the[se] factors." 27 2 In addition, the devices available to assure manageability in
both kinds of cases-class actions, judicial participation in case management and settlement, judicial notice and other forms ofjudicial selfeducation, substitution of statistical for individualized evidence, and
masters 27 3 -have the same de-individualizing and de-moralizing effects
(from a Corrective perspective) on the procedural front as the various
270. Rosenberg, supra note 269, at 905-25; see, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod.
Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 761-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.
1987); P. Schuck, supra note 122, at 186-88, 243, 268-69.
271. See, e.g., P. Schuck, supra note 122, at 29-30, 183, 268.
272. Id. at 262; accord id. at 262-68; Rosenberg, supra note 269, at 887-92. As
originally filed in 1977, the Kansas City interdistrict school desegregation case involved
close to 200,000 school children living in six counties in two states in two federaljudicial
districts in two federal judicial circuits and named as defendants over a dozen school
districts and their boards and superintendents, two state boards and two departments of
education, two states, and three federal departments. See School Dist. v. Missouri, 460
F. Supp. 421, 427 (W.D. Mo. 1978); Joint Addendum A (Excerpts from Record) to
Briefs of Appellants Kalima Jenkins, et al. and the School District of Kansas City, Missouri at A77, Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F. 2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (No. 77-0420),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987); see alsoJenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 660-61 &
nn.2, 3, 5 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987) ("Over the course
of 64 trial days, plaintiffs] called over 140 witnesses, offered 2,100 exhibits, and designated approximately 10,000 pages of depositions"); Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp.
1485, 1490-503 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir.
1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 70 (1987) (findings spanning a 120-year period
and actions by 12 school districts, the City of Kansas City and several of its agencies, the
State of Missouri and ten of its agencies, HUD and a number of its offices, and the
United States Department of Education).
273. See, e.g., P. Schuck, supra note 122, at 263-70; Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the Law's Reaction to Disasters, 11 Colum.J. Envtl. L. 1, 28-42 (1986); Weinstein, The Role of the Court in Toxic Tort Litigation, 73 Geo. LJ. 1389, 1390-91
(1985).
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harm- 7 and
damage- allocating innovations have on the substantive
4
2

front.

As in the toxic-tort context, the traditional tort approach is not an
effective response to the polycentric problems posed by the school desegregation cases correctively understood but instead is "an ostrichlike avoidance of them." 27 5 Moreover, the only alternative proposed in
the toxic-tort area that bears any kind of resemblance to desegregation
law-the so-called "public-law vision" of a classwide solution relying
upon proportional liability and probabilistic proof of causation 2 76 27 7
deserts the Corrective ideal in the most fundamental ways.
Lest this analysis leave the impression that the public-law-tort vision of simultaneous public-law deterrence and private-law compensation 278 provides a satisfying, if noncorrective, explanation for the
desegregation cases, consider finally the ways in which the segregation
situation is Less easily amenable to the deterrence-compensation goals
of that vision-from both moral and administrative standpoints-than
is the toxic-tort situation. 27 9 First, on the indeterminate-plaintiff issue,
litigants and judges in toxic tort cases can utilize the conclusions of a
well-established and scientifically accepted medical field-epidemiology-to determine whether and with what frequency certain chemical
274. See P. Schuck, supra note 122, at 262-66, 269-70; see also B. Ackerman,
supra note 122, at 33-34 & n.5 (linking, on one hand, a narrow private-law vision of
substantive law and narrow and individualistic procedures traditionally used in such
cases and, on other hand, a broader public-law approach to legal problems and looser,
more judicially activist procedures listed in text); M. Damaska, supra note 122, at 71-96
(noting link between dispute-resolving goal of legal rules in Anglo-American jurisdictions and autonomy-focused fact-finding procedures and comparing both to policy-implementing goal of legal rules and truth-focused fact-finding procedures in continental
jurisdictions); Chayes, supra note 186 at 1288-304 (discussing impact on adjudicative
procedures of transformation in American law from exclusive focus on resolving private
disputes to greater emphasis on resolving society-wide problems). Compare P. Schuck,
supra note 122, at 263-67 ("vices of mass tort class actions" from moralistic and individualistic perspective of traditional tort theory) with E. Wolf, supra note 186, at 295 (similar individualistically premised criticisms of class action litigation in desegregation
setting) and Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interest in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470, 482-516 (1976) (same) and Rhode, Conflicts
of Interest in Educational Reform Litigation, in School Days, supra note 8, at 278,
283-89 (same).
275. P. Schuck, supra note 122, at 267-68.
276. Id. at 270 (discussing Rosenberg, supra note 269).
277. See P. Schuck, supra note 122, at 274-76 ("By taking the giant step to a wholly
aggregative, distributive justice approach-one in which individual A is compensated by
[defendant] B even though A may not have been harmed by B or indeed by any responsible actor (other than Mother Nature)-the public law structure" may "destroy
whatever residual moral justification remains for shifting A's loss to B through tort adjudication" (emphasis deleted)); Posner, supra note 188, at 197-98.
278. See Rosenberg, supra note 269, at 905-25.
279. For criticism of the public-law response to mass-exposure cases, see P. Schuck,
supra note 122, at 268-76; Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public
Risk Management in the Courts, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 305-29 (1985).
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agents cause certain kinds of cancer. 2 80 In the segregation setting, by
contrast, the social scientific techniques available for isolating and
quantifying the potential causes of such social phenomena as racial residential patterns are far cruder and less uniformly accepted. 2 8 1 Accordingly, the various correctively dubious but potentially utilitarian means
that the courts and commentators have devised for allocating toxic tort
damages to defendants based on the quantified extent to which their
products increased the risk of particular cancers are not as meaning2 82
fully available in the school desegregation cases.
280. See P. Schuck, supra note 122, at 262, 272.
281. See, e.g., D. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy 22-56, 274-84 (1977); E.
Wolf, supra note 186, at 211; Goldstein, supra note 92, at 42 & nn.208-09. I do not rest
my conclusions here on the assertion that judges are incompetent to make correlationbased causation determinations as opposed to "mechanical" determinations or interpretive judgments. See Dworkin, supra note 104, at 23, 26-28, 31; Dworkin, Hard Cases,
88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1109 (1975). The available empirical data suggest that judges
acting within the confines of a multi-party, evidentiarily rationalized, adversarial system
are able competently to amass and analyze statistical materials and that they often do so
more effectively than, for example, legislators. See, e.g., M. Rebell & A. Block, Educational Policy Making and the Courts 206-12 (1982); Cavanagh & Sarat, Thinking About
Courts: Toward and Beyond ajurisprudence ofJudicial Competence, 14 Law & Soc'y
Rev. 371, 377-86 (1980); Chayes, supra note 186, at 1308. Many of the well-known
attacks on judicial competence in this regard are beside the point because they compare
the technical competence of judges to that of statisticians, rather than to judges' more
likely substitutes, namely, administrators and legislators. See, e.g.,J. Frank, Courts on
Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice 14-36, 81-102 (1949); D. Horowitz, supra,
at 24, 293-94. Moreover, to the extent that judges are properly accused of being "bad"
at statistical analyses because they are inexperienced, the answer is to give them more,
not less, experience and training. See B. Ackerman, supra note 122, at 65-71, 73-76,
107. Finally, far from being foreign to what judges do, making causal judgments plays
an important part in everyday common lawjudging. For example, when a court decides
that an entire industry's failure, say, to fence-in construction-site elevators constitutes
negligence because the probable future costs of injuries from unfenced sites outweighs
the probable cost of providing fences, the courts are making causal (i.e., correlational,
not mechanical or interpretive) judgments. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing,
159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & Econ. 1,
22-23 (1960). My point is not that judges are particularly bad at assessing causation or
that such assessments ought not to play a role in private- or public-law adjudication of
any sort, but only that judges and all other analysts will have trouble making the causation determinations demanded not only by private-law compensatory, but also by tortbased public-law/regulatory, approaches to school desegregation. Cf. infra notes
470-483, 503 and accompanying text (proposing use of historical, demographic, and
statistical evidence to answer interpretive questions posed by intent test in desegregation and other public-law contexts).
282. Compare P. Schuck, supra note 122, at 186-88, 243, 268 (in toxic tort context, statistically based proportionate damage rule is "readily" available to reduce recovery of individual plaintiffs when epidemiological studies establish the number of excess
diseases in relevant population caused by defendant class) and Rosenberg, supra note
269, at 866-68 (proportionate damage rule ideal in mass tort litigation) with, e.g.,
Swann v. Ciharlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22 (1971) (isolating effects of
official discrimination is difficult given "myriad factors of human existence" that cause
racial separation).
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Second, although it generally is not difficult to identify the manufacturers of a defective chemical agent sold for profit during a specified
period, it decidedly is difficult to identify which of the public officials
whose actions affect where people live and attend schools have intentionally discriminated during the relevant period. Thus, the toxic tort
cases do not really involve indeterminate defendants but rather a determinate class of defendants, the members of which are indeterminately
liable for particular injuries. The desegregation cases, by contrast, involve indeterminacy both as to who contributed to the problem and as to
when, where, and by how much. For this reason, and because of the
relative difficulty of quantifying political as opposed to for-profit economic responsibility for harm, neither a market-shares approach, which
provides a relatively simple and intuitively fair means of allocating damages among known but indeterminately responsible wrongdoers in the
toxic tort area,28 3 nor any reasonable facsimile provides a workable
method of distributing the monetary or injunctive remedial burden
among liable local, state, and federal school and housing officials and
28 4
their constituencies.
Third, even assuming that determinate victims and wrongdoers
could be identified, the money-damages remedy in the toxic tort and
like contexts provides a close to surgical means of transferring rights
and resources from the putative wrongdoer and no one else to the putative victims and no one else. The injunctive remedy in the school
desegregation decisions, by contrast, is far too blunt an instrument to
ensure a rearrangement of rights and resources that avoids robbing
some and enriching others.
f. Summary. - The Correction principle provides an incomplete
answer to the "Why just intent?" question and no answer at all to the
"Why just desegregation?" question. Nor, absent modifications that
shirk the Corrective moral imperative, can the principle explain either
the remedial breadth of desegregation decisions such as Swann and
Keyes or the remedial limitations of all of the Court's decisions-especially Milliken I. Most significantly, because Corrective theory promises
so much more in the way of nonredistributive compensation than it
produces, it leaves desegregation dangerously susceptible to attacks
from both sides.
From a left perspective, the Correction theory begs the claim that
the Court's decisions ferociously undercompensate in two ways: First,
the decisions crowbar a social system's longstanding and widespread
misdeeds with pervasive socio-structural consequences into the Correc283. See, e.g., P. Schuck, supra note 122, at 243; Rosenberg, supra note 269, at
866-68.
284. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-13, 607 P.2d
924, 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144-46, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (marketshare allocation of damages among DES manufacturers); P. Schuck, supra note 122, at
183-84.
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tive paradigm of an individual's momentary and idiosyncratic lapse with
only isolated interpersonal effects. Second, switching metaphors, the
decisions stack the deck against blacks by defining virtually every compensatory, hence morally good, deed done by the courts for blacks as
an at least equal and opposite redistributive, hence morally bad, deed
done to whites. Not surprising, therefore, is the left critics' Redistributive proposal to abandon Correction altogether, and with it the desegregation decisions, and to address forthrightly, and with whatever
moral force can be mustered, the necessarily outcome-focused needs of
28 5
African-Americans.
From the right, the Correction theory faces the internal criticism
that the theory's left critics anticipate, namely, that the decisions immorally overcorrect by redistributing the rights and resources of white
"third-party nonviolators," none of whom deserves to pay, to blacks,
28 6
only some of whom deserve to be paid.
The Correction theory thus leaves the Court's desegregation jurisprudence friendless, a begetter of "dashed black expectations and
white resentments." 28 7 For, given the length, width, and breadth of the
violation and its result, and their indiscriminate intermingling with
myriad "neutral" acts and consequences, and given the individualistic
and antiredistributive limitations on Correction theory's private-law
mechanism for sorting cause and effect, any purely corrective system
necessarily will "undercorrect," while any compensatorily modified
Corrective system necessarily will redistribute, and hence "undermoralize." Additional justification for the decisions is needed.
4. The ProhibitionTheory. - The Prohibition theory is a theory of
right with almost no theory of remedy. Accepting the Correctivists'
view of official racial discrimination as a prohibited deviation from interpersonal norms, the Prohibition theory limits the remedial object
when courts confront the wrong to henceforth prohibiting its recurrence. Taking to heart the Correction theory's private-law understanding of the violation and its antipathy to redistribution, the Prohibition
theory deploys the remedy exclusively against those harms that are
redressable without cost or benefit to anyone besides identifiable
wrongdoers and the identifiably wronged. Then, taking to heart the
difficulties of individually identifying the wrongdoers and especially the
wronged and of directing an affirmative injunction at those persons but
no others, the theory concludes that the best the courts can do is to
issue a negative injunction forbidding the identified wrongdoers to err
288
again in the future.
285. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 262.
286. See sources cited supra notes 55, 236.
287. J. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 113.
288. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 258 (1973) (RehnquistJ.,
dissenting); L. Graglia, supra note 55, at 76-87, 258-83; T. Sowell, supra note 55, at
13-35; E. Wolf, supra note 186, at 241-50; R. Wolters, supra note 55, at 6-7, 138-39,
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Prohibitory theory can be reached by a different route: The theory
tracks the outdated equitable principle that a violation of a right will be
prohibited via negative injunction, but that restoration of the status quo
2 89
ante generally will not be ordered via mandatory injunction.
Once Prohibitory theory abandons the goal of compensation, it no
longer advocates a deontological mechanism for restoring rights to the
victims of prior wrongs. 290 Rather, the theory is both product- and future-focused; it seeks a world in which the doers of the interpersonal
wrong of intentional segregation do it no more.
For the Prohibitory theorist, the law once was and should return to
being simple: Brown I held that statutory school-admission rules
designed to segregate black from white children violate the equal protection clause. 291 Brown 11 thereupon directed officials to admit black
children "to public schools . . .on a [racially] nondiscriminatory ba'

Although, true to the Corrective ideal, the Court in Green and
subsequent decisions experimented with curbing not only the violation
but also its harms, that task-as the Court began to recognize in
Milliken I-proved daunting and now should be foregone. 293 Instead,
sis." 292

288; Goodman, supra note 104, at 277, 286, 298-3 10; Kitch, supra note 236, at 9-11;
Laycock, supra note 236, at 1730 & n.108; Symposium: The 1985 Federalist Society
National Meeting, 9 Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol'y I (1986); sources cited supra notes 55, 266.
For scholarly criticism, see, e.g., Fiss, supra note 49, at 14-15; Gewirtz, Choice, supra
note 49, at 731, 734-35, 738-39; Yudof, supra note 61, at 446-48; sources cited supra
note 4 and infra note 308. Although some Prohibitory theorists claim that constitutionally mandated "colorblindness" dictates rejection of all but negative injunctive relief,
their rejection of even the modest and nonredistributive remedies that orthodox Correctivists would employ goes further than colorblindness requires. See City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706, 735-39 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(compensatory orders restoring to blacks what whites took from them out of racial animus are "colorblind"). In practice, however, orthodox Corrective approaches, see, e.g.,
supra note 234, may end up correcting rather little, given the difficulty of precisely isolating the effects of different causes of segregation, see supra notes 265-284 and accompanying text, hence Prohibitory theory may be said to arrive cheaply and directly (if by a
less morally defensible route) where pure Correction arrives after much cost and
tribulation.
289. See 4J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §§ 1338, 1359, 1359a (5th ed. 1941);
id. § 1359a (early restrictions have given way and it is now settled that a court of equity
can award mandatory as well as prohibitive injunctive relief). Desegregation decisions
appealing to equitable principles include: Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717,
737-38 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971);
Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
290. Nor may Prohibitory theory be explained as substituting a criminal-law model
for a tort model of corrective justice. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. For
the negative injunction upon which Prohibitory theorists inflexibly rely has neither the
punitive traits nor the capacity for proportionality with the violation that corrective penal sanctions require. See G. Fletcher, supra note 195, at 409-18, 461-66; Morris, supra
note 195, at 34, 38-39, 45.
291. See Craven, supra note 217, at 153.
292. Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 300.
293. See generally L. Graglia, supra note 55 (criticizing Court's "misguided effort
to further racial equality by means of compulsory integration").
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it should suffice today as assertedly as it did in the mid-1950s to effectuate Brown I's simple, prohibitive moral imperative by way of Brown II's
simple, prohibitorily injunctive imperative: School officials found to be
utilizing discriminatory admissions practices should be ordered to desist and to admit black children to their schools on a "nondiscriminatory basis" of those officials' choice. Should any African-American
child thereafter consider herself aggrieved by whatever new admissions
practice is adopted-be it a neighborhood school plan, a freedom-ofchoice plan, or whatever-she may protect herself by demonstrating
once again, if she can, that the new admissions practice, like the old
one, is intended to segregate. Should the child succeed in this second
suit, a second negative injunction would issue prohibiting the offensive
29 4
practice.
As a theory of what the Supreme Court has done in the desegregation cases, the Prohibitory approach is a self-confessed failure; its explanatory power ends in 1955 with Brown II. Thereafter, the theory
eludes by a wide margin every doctrinal dot on the historical page, including even Milliken I which, at the least, approved modest intradistrict
student-reassignment relief. 2 95 Consistently since 1968-as witnessed
by the Court's striking down the freedom-of-choice plans in Green and
its companion cases, 29 6 the neighborhood-school plans in Swann and its
companion case, 2 97 and the deannexation plans in two 1972 cases 2 9 8 the Court has ruled that, however innocently motivated, segregative-infact student-admissions plans imposed in the immediate wake of dejure
segregation violate the Constitution. 29 9 Indeed, only one lower court
decision has ever advanced a strictly Prohibitory theory, and the
Supreme Court expressly disapproved that decision in Keyes. s° °
The Prohibition theory does not, therefore, "fit." Nor does it "justify." True, by accepting the Correction theory's moral objection to
294. See sources cited supra note 288.
295. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717, 753 (1974).
296. See Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459-60 (1968); Raney v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443, 448-49 (1968); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S.
430, 442 (1968).
297. See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37-38 (1971); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971); see also Dayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526, 541-42 (1979) (subsequent invalidation of
neighborhood school plan); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 453 (1979)
(same).
298. See United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 489-90
(1972); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 459-60 (1972).
299. See also Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 225 (1964) (forbidding
district undergoing desegregation to shut down schools altogether and provide tuition
vouchers); Note, The Federal Courts and Integration of Southern Schools: Troubled
Status of the Pupil Placement Acts, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 1448, 1466-71 (1962) (discussing
lower courts' blanket rejection of facially neutral "pupil-placement" schemes).
300. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 200-01 n.l 1 (1973) (disapproving Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955)).
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saddling "innocents" with the cost of the remedy as well as equity's
resistance to mandatory injunctions, the Prohibitory view succeeds in
avoiding both the desegregation decisions' overcorrection vis-a-vis assertedly innocent third-party nonviolators and the objection often leveled against ends-focused theories that unhappy means do not justify
even very happy ends. But the cost of the Prohibition theory's evasion
of those two problems is the creation of two even bigger problems:
extreme undercorrection, and an inequitable failure to achieve the theory's own self-professed happy ends.
To support their approach, the Prohibitionists draw upon the paradigm of, let us call it, the "Ideal School District," a district that, for the
moment, is being run by above- or below-board segregationists. 30 1
The Ideal District, let us say, has twenty-five schools, fifteen for whites
and ten for blacks. Although both sets of schools are spread throughout the district, officials will not let black children attend the nearby
schools for whites, and the white children, with or without official sanction, will not attend the nearby schools for blacks. Once the Ideal District is ordered to refrain from these segregative practices, its Ideal
demography leaves its school board no not-obviously-discriminatory alternative to what amounts to a de facto integration plan. Thus, the
Ideal District's leaders need simply-and have no alternative but toadmit all children to all schools on a strictly geographic or choice basis,
and the wrong plus its effects are for the most part righted.
Outside a few rural districts in the South,3 0 2 no such Ideally segregated districts exist. Indeed, it is very likely because of segregation that
most school districts depart from the Prohibitionist's Ideal. For in the
"Typical School District" operated by above- or below-board segregationists, a court very likely will find that the offending officials either
intentionally put black schools where black children, but no white children, already were or caused in-migrating black children to move to
where black schools, but no white schools, already were. The court will
probably also find that the offending officials thereupon located all the
new white schools, which in turn affected white families' residential
preferences, as geographically far away from African-American neighborhoods as possible, probably in newer suburban areas where FHA,
relocation, public- and subsidized-housing, and other practices would
30 3
not let or help black families live.

301. See, e.g., L. Graglia, supra note 55, at 67-89.

302. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 432 (1968).
303. For a description of the paradigmatic situation, with illustrative citations, see
Dimond, supra note 123, at 20-32; supra note 258. For additional illustrative cases, see,
e.g., Keyes, 413 U.S. at 191-95; Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1, 20-21 (1971); Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1284-91 (8th Cir.) (en banc),

cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 586-98 (1st Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F.
Supp. 1276, 1294-358, 1388-518 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988);Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1490-95,
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When a prohibitory injunction issues in this Typical community,
the Typical school board probably will behave much like its Ideal counterpart. It will direct that admissions henceforth take place on either a
strictly geographic or strictly choice basis (pursuant to the latter of
which, choices in all likelihood will be influenced substantially by geographic proximity). 3°4 In the Typical District, therefore, the Ideal District's modest deviations from strict racial proportionality probably will
give way to only the minutest deviations from strict racial separation.
The Prohibition theory at this point affords two alternatives to
black children who suspect continued discrimination and who find
themselves still attending the same schools with the same black classmates the same several miles from the same schools attended by the
same white children as before. The black children may sue the school
board, alleging intentional discrimination anew, or they may accept
their fate and go on about their segregated business.
Should the black children choose the first alternative, they would
face the daunting prospect of consuming a lot of their own and the
courts' time and resources trying to prove that the school board's conclusion that children might best be required or allowed to attend the
schools nearest their homes was so exceedingly irrational that a court
should find it invidiously motivated.30 5 Remember, too, that under
Prohibitory theory, the court may not strike down a new, innocently
motivated admissions scheme simply because it preserves the effects of
the old, invidiously motivated one.3 0 6 Such action by the court might
force school boards, in order to distinguish current actions from prior
ones, to do by indirection what the Prohibition theory refuses to make
them do directly-namely, to integrate the schools by mixing at least
some "innocent" white children with some not-identifiably-injured
1501-03 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in relevant part, 807 "F.2d657 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 70 (1987); Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229,
234-51 (S.D. Ohio 1977), aff'd, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 443 U.S. 449
(1979); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428,434-38 (D. Del.) (three-judge panel), aff'd
mer., 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
304. See Kitch, supra note 236, at 9-10 (Prohibitory theorist advocating neighborhood-school remedy for neighborhood-school violation).
305. Any other student-assignment decision would subject the board to criticism of
either the reverse-discrimination kind, if it instead used an integratively racial criterion,
cf. Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) (reverse discrimination
claim in context of teacher hiring), or of the minimum-rationality kind, if the board instead used most other available criteria such as a preference for long-distance busing or
assignment to schools alphabetically or by lot, cf. Note, The Equality of Allocation by
Lot, 12 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 113, 113 (1977) (discussing advantages of allocating
"scarce goods" by lot as opposed to more common uses of "merit, market, and temporal priority").

306. E.g., Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 539 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 938 (1986). Rather, the first prohibitory injunction may cut off consideration of
pre-injunction actions unless those actions tell the court something specific about the
motivations of the present school board. See Mayor v. Educational Equality League,
415 U.S. 605, 622-23 (1974); Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514, 521-22 (1974).
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black children.3 0 7 Accordingly, even if the virtually undetectable results of their first judicial outing do not deter the black children from
setting forth a second time, the wholly undetectable results they have
reason to expect if they do try again almost certainly will dissuade
them.
Ultimately, therefore, having eschewed any compensatory goal, a
Prohibitory approach likewise provides virtually no incentive to the
Typical School Board to refrain from choosing segregative school-assignment patterns: If the district does discriminate a second time, it
may well escape being sued; if it is sued, it probably will escape liability;
if it is found liable, it assuredly will face but a second injunction forbidding discrimination but allowing it yet again to formulate a new, perhaps only marginally different, assignment policy-which policy is even
less likely to prompt a suit, which suit is even less likely to succeed, and
308
so on.
Although possible alterations of the Prohibition theory come to
mind that might mitigate its lack of fit and its compensatory and deterrent underachievement, none of those revisions is philosophically satisfying. For example, the theory might defend the desegregation
decisions as having created a remedy with such an in terrorem effect that
antidiscriminatory deterrence (and even occasionally some compensation) is assured or at least partially advanced. As we have seen, however, that approach-albeit far more successfully prohibitory-violates
the Prohibitory theorists' insistence upon so-called "colorblind"
nonredistribution.3 0 9 In addition, such an approach properly might be
rejected because it raises justification questions of its own. For instance: Why desegregation? Why not damages, to take the obvious
private-law example?3 10
307. Prohibitory theory thus commits the immoral act that Professor Black contends would have accompanied a contrary result in Brown I, namely, "making... law...
based on self-induced blindness, on flagrant contradiction of known fact." Black, supra
note 123, at 426.
308. See, e.g., D. Bell, supra note 2, at 159; Cavanagh & Sarat, supra note 281, at
408 (prohibitory remedies "provide little more than symbolic victories"); Freeman,

supra note 98, at 1079-81.
309. See sources cited supra note 288.
310. The possibility of damages illustrates thejustificatory difficulties of insistently
injunctive Prohibitory theory. Prohibitory theory abandons compensation as a goal, not
because of anything wrong with compensation but because of the corrective crudeness
of affirmative injunctions as a means of compensating. The same logic, however, that
leads Prohibitionists to reject the excessively blunt instrument of affirmative injunctions
as redistributive vis-a-vis "innocent" whites also should lead them to reject the excessively fine remedial tool of negative injunctions as even more redistributive vis-A-vis uncompensated blacks. The more logical solution would be to make good old-fashioned
private-law damages paid to identifiable victims the prohibitive price of future wrongdoing. That approach also would commend itself to equitable purists, given their preference for available legal remedies. A deterrent-damages-to-identifiable-victims approach,
however, does not provide a fitting or justifiable explanation of, or alternative to, desegregation: (1) It does not explain even one of the insistently injunctive desegregation
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One also might premise a prohibitory explanation of the cases on a
trio of equitable remedial principles more liberal and modem than the
archaic maxim that pure Prohibitory theory tracks: 3 1 ' (1) modem equity's tolerance of mandatory injunctions;3 1 2 (2) the "equitable cleanup" doctrine, which allows litigants who establish equity jurisdiction to
secure relief not normally available in equity if "necessary to the effective termination of the entire matter in dispute";3 13 and (3) the principle that "considerations of policy [and] expediency" limit the scope of
equitable relief.3 1 4 Together, these principles might be said to belie
any equitable justification for limiting relief to negative injunctions and
at the same time explain the decisions' only partial correction.
Proponents of something like this remedial-limits approach have
argued that it has two virtues: Given its equitable flexibility, the approach easily can explain what the Court has done in the desegregation
cases, although, admittedly, not what the Court has said.3 1 5 And, by
decisions. (2) It does not solve the "indeterminate plaintiff" and "indeterminate defendant" problem, hence it is likely to remain relentlessly undercorrective vis-a-vis undiscovered victims and underdeterrent vis-A-vis undiscovered wrongdoers. See P.
Schuck, supra note 122, at 262-68, 286-94; Rosenberg, supra note 269, at 863-66,
869-81, 900-02; supra notes 278-284 and accompanying text. And (3) it may well entail more dollars-and-cents costs-undercorrection notwithstanding-than our society,
regrettably, is willing to pay. Thus, "educational enhancement" substitutes for desegregation, which provide a rough measure of the educational damages that might be assessed, have proved quite expensive. See Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II), 110 S. Ct.
1651, 1667-68 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Brief of
Petitioner at 5-10, id. (No. 88-1150) (almost half a billion dollars spent on fewer than
40,000 black children-with no compensation for lost earnings and the like). Desegregation, by contrast, is cheap, rarely increasing districts' operating budgets by more than
two or three percent. Hawley & Smylie, supra note 9, at 287-88.
311. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
312. See 0. Fiss, Injunctions 124, 247-71,415-81 (1972); sources cited supra note
289.
313. Levin, Equitable Clean-up and theJury: A Suggested Orientation, 100 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 320, 320 & n.1 (1951); accord 1J. Pomeroy, supra note 289, §§ 181, 227, 231,
237e, 237f; 1J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence § 64 (14th ed. 1918).
314. 4 J. Pomeroy, supra note 289, § 1338; accord 0. Fiss, supra note 312, at
90-93.
315. SeeJ. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 223-29; Brest, supra note 104, at 36, 42, 47
& n.214; Gewirtz, Remedies, supra note 49, at 591-608; Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
33 (1989); Note, supra note 49, at 1741-43, 1751-55 & nn.62 & 76, 1762-65. In
Milliken I, the Court overturned an interdistrict remedy on the ground that such relief
required an interdistrict violation, not present in the case, and not on the ground that an
interdistrict remedy was too costly. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717,
744-46 (1974). The difference between the two rationales is important. Thus, faced
with proposals for interdistrict transfer plans that drastically limit remedial burdens by
making school districts' participation economically costless and children's participation
elective, the lower courts have not adopted the proposed remedy directly, as "remedial
limits" theory would seem to allow, and instead have demanded proof of an interdistrict
violation, as Milliken I's rhetoric seems to require. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 904 F.2d
415, 418-20 (8th Cir. 1990). One might try to solve this problem by claiming that
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forthrightly acknowledging what the Court's rhetoric has obscuredthat concerns about cost and public resistance are producing remedies
far narrower than the rights that were violated-the approach stimulates creative guilt and frustration that, over the long run, may compel
judges and legislators to expand available remedies.3 1 6
An attempt to assimilate a remedial-limits understanding of the
cases to corrective justice founders, given the decisions' overcorrection
as well as the vast extent of their undercorrection. 3 1 7 Even on equitable
grounds, the remedial-limits approach is questionable, given the "equitable clean-up" doctrine's preference for damages3 1 8 and given the extent to which the approach inequitably rewards wrongdoers for the
319
demographic and psychological success of their segregative wrongs.
Equally important is the indeterminacy of the re'medial-limits theory. Although the chancellor's foot is elastic enough to be the measure
of almost any remedy and remedial limit, it provides an unstable basis
on which to ground such momentous decisions as those to use injunctive rather than monetary relief; to compensate victims still in school
but not those already graduated; to direct relief at the violation's
school-assignment effects but not at its dignitary and economic harms;
to make children who object ride buses across previously sacrosanct
attendance-zone boundaries but not let children who volunteer ride
buses across school-district lines; 3 20 and the like. 32 1 Accordingly, even
if remedial limits could explain the cases 3 22 and justify them on the
basis of pliable, if correctively deficient, equitable maxims, the remedial-limits solution would remain too flimsy to warrant suspending the
search for a more satisfying theory of desegregation.
judges not only may respond to equitable concerns at the remedial stage but also mayand in Milliken I did---"take account of public attitudes and public resistance ... at the
rights-declaring stage." Gewirtz, Remedies, supra note 49, at 676. This strategy, however, raises all the objections discussed supra notes 213-222 and accompanying text to
using a conventionalist approach to the declaration of minority rights. See Note, supra
note 49, for additional objections to this strategy.
316. See, e.g., Note, supra note 49, at 1759-65- Normally, I would not premise a
"fit" objection solely on a theory's deviation from the decisions' rhetoric but not their
results. See text accompanying supra notes 106-119. That objection seems appropriate
here, however, because much of the theory's justification depends upon the Court's actually declaring what it has failed, and probably does not want, to declare-namely, that
it deliberately has chosen a skimpy remedy for the violation of a spacious right.
317. See supra notes 257-264 and accompanying text.
318. See 1 J. Pomeroy, supra note 289, § 237f; Levin, supra note 313, at 324.
319. See Note, supra note 49, at 1763; supra notes 256, 258 and accompanying
text.
320. See supra note 315.
321. See Laycock, supra note 236, at 1730 & n.108 (discussing D. Laycock, Modern
American Remedies: Gases and Materials 234-81 (1985)) (desegregation cases violate
equitable principles, which limit remedies to "restor[ing] victims to their rightful position[s]" in strictly corrective fashion).
322. But see supra notes 315-316 (inability of "remedial limits" theory to explain
Milliken I and other Supreme Court and lower court decisions).
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In sum, the abundance of post-Brown public morality at the Prohibition theory's front-end disappears at its status-quo-preserving backend, by which point it is clear that the theory accomplishes no good end
at all. Neither Brown's moral imperative nor its discrimination-freeworld objective is done justice by ineffectual shakes of the injunctive
finger.3 23 Indeed, had the Court thus prohibitorily dropped the matter
as of 1955, there is good reason to believe that the present-day strength
of Brown's acknowledged moral imperative would not have emerged
over the succeeding thirty-six years.
Accordingly, although the Prohibition theory persists in the literature and the culture, it does so doctrinally only by forsaking twenty
years' worth of post-Green decisions and morally only by leaving what
even it recognizes as "bad enough" alone. As such, the Prohibition
theory--in its pure form and in the remedial-limits form sketched
above-fails in its attempt to avoid the fit and justification problems
afflicting the Correction theory by retaining the latter's private-law focus 32 4 but moving in a more deterrent or ends-focused direction. Having thus far rejected product-focused theories of both the public- and
private-law varieties and process-focused theories of the private-law
kind, the way is charted for exploration of the remaining category of
simultaneously process-focused and public-law theories.
5. The Prophylaxis Theory. - Although others have flirted with
it,325 the Prophylaxis theory's only well-developed defense is found in a
short speech that Ronald Dworkin delivered at a law-and-social-science
conference in 1976.326 There, Professor Dworkin roundly criticized the
Equal Educational Opportunity and Correction theories for saddling
judges with critical causal determinations of the "school segregation
causes educational or demographic harm" variety. Judges, he concluded, are unfit or at least unwilling to make such conclusions because
they call for statistical as opposed to either mechanical (e.g., "brakes
fail, car crashes") or interpretive (e.g., "intentional discrimination is an
insult") judgments.3 2 7 Undertaking, then, to provide a properly judgelike explanation of the Court's "all-out desegregation" orders, Professor Dworkin holds those remedies explainable-and justifiable in terms
323. See D. Bell, supra note 2, at 52-56 (indicting system that condemns but does
nothing to cure effects of discrimination).
324. E.g., L. Graglia, supra note 55, at 36; Cooper, supra note 55, at 80-81;
Reynolds, supra note 61, at 996-98.
325. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 737-38 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (offering version of prophylaxis theory discussed
infra note 352); Shane, supra note 52, at 1044-49, 1092-97; Yudof, supra note 100, at
88 ("group protection" approach with deterrent overtones).
326. See Dworkin, supra note 104, at 28-3 1. For critical commentary, see Gewirtz,
Choice, supra note 49, at 739 n.33; Goodman, supra note 104, at 292-93; Yudof, supra
note 61, at 448-49; see also Fiss, Fate, supra note 63, at 764 (anticipatory criticism).
327. See Dworkin, supra note 104, at 26-28, 31; accord supra note 281; infra notes
561, 784 and accompanying text.
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of "political morality"-as measured doses of interpretive public-law
prophylaxis.
According to Professor Dworkin's much criticized, and since partially abandoned,3 28 political theory, the political "machinery" of the
modem liberal state is designed to compute the comparative social utility of alternative allocative measures by counting and comparing the
total number of votes (i.e., individual "preferences") favoring each alternative. The problem, however, is that some people's votes are no
better than monkey wrenches; they do not deserve to be counted because, by unduly magnifying certain preferences, they destroy the social-utility-measuring capacity of the machine. It is to screen out those
votes, Dworkin concludes, that we have a right to equal protection- of
329
the laws.
In an earlier work, Professor Dworkin had explained why he then
believed that one man's preference for allocating scarce resources to
himself as opposed to others is grist for the utility-toting political
machine, while another man's preference for dividing resources along
racial lines, whether or not he takes more for himself, is not. According
to this explanation, the political-utility computer breaks down unless it
strictly adheres to Bentham's maxim that "each man is to count as one
and no man is to count as more than one." 33 0 In Dworkin's view, moreover, the maxim is violated and the machine does break down if it is
designed so that it not only counts an individual's internal or personal
preference for his enjoyment of some goods or opportunities" but also
the individual's "external preference for the assignment of goods and
'33 1
opportunities to others."
From these premises, Professor Dworkin's desegregation theory
proceeds as follows: Because they reflect "external" preferences,
"[u]tilitarian arguments that justify disadvantage to members of a race
against whom prejudice runs will always be unfair arguments" unless
properly countable personal preferences would justify the same disad328. See R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at 382-86; R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle
66, 359-61, 365-66 (1985); Dworkin, supra note 154, at 10; infra note 343 (citing criticism of Dworkin's views).
329. Dworkin, supra note 104, at 28-29.
330. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 234 (rev. ed. 1978) (discussing J.
Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Moral Legislation xvi-xvii (J. Bums &J.
Hart eds. 1982)).
331. Id. For Professor Dworkin, it is fine for a given citizen to cast her vote for
building a natatorium but not a theater because she personally likes to swim and hates
Strindberg and Shaw. But it is not proper for another citizen to vote for the same result
because, although he would not frequent either facility himself, he nonetheless believes
on religious grounds that people who attend theaters but not pools are sinners, or on
racialist grounds that the theater is likely to beget more threatening interracial contact
than the pool. Counting the latter vote is forbidden because, by effectively "double
count[ing]" the former voter's "personal" preference for the pool through the inclusion
of the latter voter's "external" preference for the pool, the egalitarian utility-maximizing
machine is thrown out of whack. Id. at 233-35.
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vantage in the absence of racial prejudice.3 3 2 The problem is that it is
not usually possible to construct a utilitarian device that counts only
personal preferences. For personal and external preferences, especially when the latter are of the racially discriminatory variety, "are so
inextricably tied together, and so mutually dependent, that no practical
test" is available for distinguishing the personal and external aspects of
33 3
any individual's overall preferences.
At this point in Professor Dworkin's theory, two interpretive judgments, based on "pattern[s] of preferences within the community," intervene.33 4 Professor Dworkin begins with the nation's history of
"widespread and pervasive" prejudice.3 3 5 Against this background he
puts himself in the position of a judge faced with a racially segregativein-fact political decision-a decision, for example, that assigns children
to schools by drawing district lines in the "natural way" that "produces
segregated schools because neighborhoods are segregated. ' 3 3 6 Interpretively analyzing this situation, Dworkin-as-judge reaches two conclusions: first, that "[t]here is a high antecedent probability that any
community decisions on that issue will be corrupted" by historically
and culturally ingrained racial prejudice;3 3 7 second, that any uncorrupt
preferences relied upon by the board in choosing the neighborhood
school plan are necessarily "so intertwined with [the arguments based
on] prejudice that they cannot be disentangled to the degree necessary" to determine if the same result would have obtained even absent
338
the prejudice.
Against the background of historical racism, the judge must conclude that the "antecedent probability" that prejudice has determinatively corrupted any political decision that in fact disadvantages
African-Americans is so (interpretively, not statistically) high that the
equal protection clause forbids it. a3 9 For the Prophylactic theorist,
then, the equal protection clause does not simply seek prohibitorily to
screen corrupting preferences out of the utility-determining political
machine. In addition, the clause prophylactically insists upon discarding any segregative-in-fact decisions that emerge at the back-end of the
process, against the antecedently high probability that the prohibitory
screening device failed and that such decisions were corrupted by external racist preferences. The court accordingly must substitute its own
3 40
uncorrupt result, namely all-out desegregation.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id. at 237-38.
Id. at 236.
Dworkin, supra note 104, at 29.
R. Dworkin, supra note 330, at 237-38; accord Dworkin, supra note 104, at 30.
Dworkin, supra note 104, at 29.
Id.
R. Dworkin, supra note 330, at 237-38.
See Dworkin, supra note 104, at 30.
See id. at 30 ("The order speaks to those in political power and says this: 'If
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The explanatory power of the Prophylaxis theory is immediately
suspect inasmuch as the Supreme Court's fascination with prophylaxis
ended twenty years ago, and the Court has spent a good bit of the ensuing decades cutting back on the decisions spawned by that fascination. 34 ' Moreover, the apparently conclusive effect that the Prophylaxis
theory assigns to a racially segregative-in-fact result brings the theory
into conflict with the Court's insistence since Keyes upon actual empirical proof of segregative purpose; the theory provides no answer to the
"Why just schools?" question, inasmuch as many segregative governmental decisions in this country have as high an antecedent probability
of corruption as those in the sphere of education; and the theory cannot, as is so frequently the case, explain Milliken I and Dayton I, both of
which presented precisely the segregative-in-fact set of political decisions that would have led Professor Dworkin's interpretive judge to
smell an antecedently high probability of a radical-intervention-requir3 42
ing rat.
As a philosophical justification for the desegregation decisions, the
Prophylaxis theory fares somewhat better, but still does not quite succeed. Like the Correction and Prohibition theories, the Prophylaxis
theory builds upon the moral bedrock provided by the interpretive
judgment that racial segregation is an insult to the minority race, and,
hence, is wrong. In good public-law fashion, however, the Prophylaxis
theory avoids the Correctivists' and Prohibitionists' disappointingly
narrow remedial outcomes by "interpreting" into the equal protection
clause's prophylactically corrective and prohibitory ambit a far broader,
more structural, and more serious violation-the corruption of our
very political processes-justifying a far more intrusive remedy.
you refuse yourself to produce an outcome that negates the antecedent probability of
corruption, then we must impose upon you such an outcome.' ").
341. Compare, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-26 (1969) (adopting prophylactic rule restricting ability of potentially vindictive prosecutors, in violation
of the due process clause, to impose higher penalties after retrial on criminal defendants
who overturned their initial convictions on appeal) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 444-45 (1966) (adopting prophylactic rule forbidding admission at criminal trials
of in-custody statements obtained during interrogation of criminal defendants unless
prosecutor proves that, before making the statements, the defendant was apprised of his
fifth amendment rights to silence and to counsel during interrogation and expressly
waived those rights) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-60 (1961) (adopting prophylactic rule excluding admission at criminal trials of evidence obtained in violation of
fourth amendment) with, e.g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2879-81 (1989)
(limiting scope of Miranda rule) and Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 137-40 (1986)
(limiting scope of Pearce rule) and United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-08 (1984)
(limiting scope of Mapp rule) and Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484-88 (1976) (same).
342. The hypothetical case Professor Dworkin puts, focusing as it does on segregative-in-fact "district," as opposed to attendance-zone, "lines," is precisely the case actually presented in Milliken I. Only his and the Court's outcomes differ. Dworkin, supra
note 104, at 29. In Dworkin's own words, then, we must question whether he has
"draw[n] from [the applicable] line of precedent a characterization that seems to [be] a
more sensitive characterization ...

than any other." Id. at 24.

1536

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1463

Where I, like others, begin experiencing trouble with Professor
Dworkin's theory is at the divide he identifies between internal and external preferences. My complaint, however, unlike some others, has
less to do with whether utilitarian theory recognizes the divide and
more to do with Professor Dworkin's assignment of discrimination to
the "external" side of the gap.3 43 If, for example, one agrees, as I be343. Attacking the utilitarian bona fides of Dworkin's theory are Baker, Counting
Preferences in Collective Choice Situations, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 381, 383-87 (1978); Ely,
Commentary, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 525, 543-44 (1981); Ely, supra note 117, at 972-81;
Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 828, 838-46 (1979); Sager, Rights,
Skepticism and Process-Based Responses, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 417, 434-36 (1981); West,
supra note 160, at 715. Professor Dworkin responds in R. Dworkin, supra note 328, at
66, 360-72; Dworkin, A Reply by Ronald Dworkin, in Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence 282, 282-91 (M. Cohen ed. 1983). Endorsing the distinction that
Professor Dworkin draws, but doubting its derivation from utilitarianism as opposed to
some higher or amendatory principle, see, e.g., J. Wilson, supra note 105, at 128-29
(equal concern principle cannot be derived from utilitarian democratic theory, but preference for a constrained utilitarian democracy can be derived from the equal concern
principle); Ely, supra note 117, at 985-86 & n.79 (American Constitution reveals utilitarian influences, but its refusal to count racially discriminatory preferences offends "unmodified" utilitarian theory); Gutmann, supra note 217, at 27 & nn.9-10; Nagel, The
Limits of Objectivity, in 1 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 127 (1980).
Given the shellacking Professor Dworkin has taken on this point, I hesitate to say so,
but I believe that a better utilitarian defense of the internal-external distinction can be
made than I so far have seen: Assume along with Bentham, that the crux of utilitarian
decisional procedures is that each person counts as one and no person counts as more
than one. See J. Bentham, supra note 330, at xlvi-xlvii; Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare,
Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. Pol. Econ. 309,
315-16 (1955); Kymlicka, supra note 121, at 176-81. An obvious problem with a political system adhering to this one person, one vote principle is that on the first vote a
majority can express a preference that, in the future, the votes of members of a minority
group should count for only one-half. If, in that event, the system adheres to the one
person, one vote maxim in the first poll, it will have to violate that maxim in all subsequent polls by acceding to the majority's will and undercounting the votes of minority
members. Anticipating this possibility, the framers of a Benthamite constitution might
adopt a clause prohibiting amendment of the one person, one vote provision. Consider,
however, that in any manageable political system, a vote in a single election-usually of
an official-must suffice as a proxy for votes on the myriad decisions that the official will
make each day. Given that fact, a vote in a single election in which a majority not only
says "George for President" but also says "George, for the next four years, count blacks'
preferences as only one-half" might effectively amend the one person, one vote provision as to all decisions George makes until he stands for re-election. Anticipating that
possibility, the Benthamite Framers might buttress their "no amendment" clause with
an "equal future votes" clause forbidding the political process to count preferences of
the "in the future, count X for one half" or "count Y for two" sort, lest the counting of
such preferences in periodic elections have the consequence of effectively amending the
one person, one vote provision during the terms of office of elected officials. Thus,
although utilitarian democratic theory does not imply a distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding votes and may even resist the distinction as antimajoritarian,
see J. Ely, supra note 105, at 78-79, the distinction nonetheless may be necessary to
preserve the utilitarian democratic constitution. See also Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1, 12 (1987) (utilitarianism not "stable"
unless "assumptions are made limiting the content of... desires, preferences, or inter-
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lieve Dworkin does, that self-respect is a critical and scarce societal
good that is subject both to intense personal preferences and to strikingly different allocations among citizens depending upon how the government acts,3 4 4 then it does not take long to see that many racially
discriminatory views will fall squarely within the category of countable
internal preferences: "Thus if men take a certain pleasure in discriminating against one another, in subjecting others to a lesser liberty as a
means of enhancing their self-respect, then the satisfaction of these
desires must be weighed in [utilitarian] deliberations according to their
intensity. '3 45 Nor is this a fanciful example in the present context. A
principal historical explanation of the rise of both the slaveholding and
Jim Crow regimes in the South is precisely that they served politically to
enhance the comparative self-respect of the white yeoman and working
3 46
class vis-A-vis blacks.
This criticism is important because it leaves Professor Dworkin
without a description of the structural or public-law malfunction that
the desegregation decisions are supposed to repair. If, for example, an
Italian-American's preference for segregative legislation stigmatizing
African-Americans turns out to be no different in principle or effect
than the same voter's clearly "internal" preference for self-respect-enhancing legislation declaring October 12 to be a day of national celebration, then Professor Dworkin offers no good reason to deploy
desegregation to cure the former "perversion" of the system but not
the latter.
Additionally, the Prophylaxis theory does not explain why all-out
desegregation is the appropriately preventive remedy. The morally unsatisfying answer Professor Dworkin gives to the question is this: For
all the Prophylaxis theory can show, integrative remedies are "based
upon a mechanical formula that otherwise has no appeal. '3 4 7 Nonetheless, although "evidently arbitrary," such remedies are appropriate because they, unlike the '3 assignment patterns they replace, are not
"evidently . . .corrupt.

48

Were "all-out desegregation" orders the

ests"). All that (gingerly) said, I remain dubious that this particular definition of the
forbidden kind of vote (i.e., a vote for devaluing or revaluing some other person's vote
in some future formal or informal vote) encompasses all forms of racial discrimination
that the Court has addressed in its desegregation decisions, hence I do not conclude
that this defense (if such it be) of Professor Dworkin's ruminations on utilitarianism
serves as well to defend his desegregation theorizing.
344. See, e.g., R. Dworkin, supra note 330, at 235, 237;J. Rawls, supra note 105, at
180-83, 234, 256, 440-46, 547; B. Williams, Moral Luck (1981); Michelman, supra note
155, at 346.
345. J. Rawls, supra note 105, at 30-31.
346. See D. Bell, supra note 2, at 36-43, 51-74; A. de Toqueville, Democracy in
America 357, 375 (J.
Mayer ed. 1969); L. Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism: The
South Carolina Upcountry, 1800-1860, at 359-60 (1988); J. McPherson, supra note
251, at 56, 241-44, 506-07; C. Woodward, supra note 62, at 6-8, 60-95.
347. Dworkin, supra note 104, at 30.
348. Id.
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"only" 3 49 alternatives to segregative-in-fact neighborhood and choice

plans, Professor Dworkin's something-arbitrary-beats-something-corrupt answer just might do 3 5-0-although the more "arbitrary" or financially and educationally costly and unreasonable the remedy turned out
to be, presumedly the higher the justifying antecedent probability of
corruption would have to be. But desegregation may not be the only
alternative that is antecedently unlikely to be corrupt. One might well
expect adherents of the gilded-ghetto branch of the Equal Educational
Opportunity theory, for example, to step in here and propose a variety
of alternatives-sufficiently drastic and expensive to overcome or
weaken the antecedent probability of corruption-such as "separate
but enhanced" all-black schools or a plan for increasing the number of
black elected officials or for achieving community control of the
schools. Damages or reparations also would serve.
There is a another problem with the desegregation remedy as perceived by Professor Dworkin's Prophylaxis theory: If the violation lies
in the political process, then why remedy that violation by changing the
outcome of the process rather than the process itself?3 5' To this extent, some version of a prohibitory remedy, which responds to the
political violation with a prohibition against the political system's erring
again, might satisfy better because, at the least, it would better reflect
3 52
the violation.
The Prophylaxis principle's failure to provide a morally satisfying
answer to the "Why just desegregation?" question has important consequences. In particular, absent a justification for choosing desegregation as its one and only remedy, the Prophylaxis theory has no answer
to exemption requests from white children who claim that desegregation's high transactions costs make them worse off than they would
have been had no remedy been ordered or had one of the nonintegrative but equally prophylactic options listed above been utilized in desegregation's stead.
349. Id.
350. See Note, supra note 305, at 314.
351. See Yudof, supra note 100, at 86.
352. In an aside on desegregation in his opinion in City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson
Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989),Justice Scalia advances a version of the Prophylaxis theory.
See id. at 737-38 (Scalia, J., concurring injudgnment) (quoting Green v. County School
Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968)) (in school but no other setting, prior segregator's adoption of "race-neutral" admissions criteria that continue to produce racially identifiable
facilities is so ineffective at " 'dismantling the state-imposed dual system' that [it] might
'indicate a lack of good faith,'" hence Court forbids defendant simply to initiate "raceneutral" admissions and requires unspecified amount of desegregation for unspecified
time until dual system is "completely disestablished"). Like Professor Dworkin, Justice
Scalia begs the "Why just desegregation?" question because enhancement of black
schools or cession of political power to the African-American community might iseasily
establish "good faith." Justice Scalia also provides no explanation for treating the violation in school (but, for some reason, in no other cases) as something other than a failure
to adhere to "race-neutral" procedures.

1990]

DESEGREGATING POLITICS

1539

Accordingly, although avoiding the Equal Educational Opportunity and Integration theories' potentially distributivist aims, the Correction theory's morally draining causal uncertainties, and the Prohibition
theory's morally trivializing results, the logic of the Prophylaxis theory
does not lead all the way to the all-out desegregative outcome it purports tojustify. Something more still is needed in the way of both doctrinal explanation and philosophical justification. Because, however,
the Prophylaxis theory comes closer than the other theories to meeting
the fit requirement and avoids many of the other theories' philosophical difficulties, it makes sense, for the moment at least, to continue the
search for the still elusive explanation and justification of desegregation
doctrine and practice along the public-law and process-oriented way
35 3
that Professor Dworkin points. It is to that search that I now turn.
D.

A Hint of a Sixth Theory

I believe that there is a consistent explanation for all of the
Supreme Court's desegregation decisions-one that need not threaten
353. Below, I list a number of ways one might divide the various theories for comparative purposes. The asterisk indicates the category that includes the theory I
presented below:
1. Outcome-focused
Equal Educational Opportunity
Integration
Prohibition
2. Right-focused
Equal Educational Opportunity
Integration
Prohibition
3. Private-law-oriented
Correction
Prohibition

vs.

Process-focused*
Prophylaxis
Correction

vs.

Remedy-focused *
Correction
Prophylaxis

vs.

4. Accusatory*
Correction
Prohibition
Prophylaxis
5. Legislative-fact-dependent
Equal Educational Opportunity
Correction

vs.

Public-law-oriented*
Equal Educational Opportunity
Integration
Prophylaxis
Nonaccusatory
Equal Educational Opportunity
Integration

6. Temporary remedy
Correction
Prophylaxis (?)

vs.

7. Forward-looking
Equal Educational Opportunity
Integration
Prohibition
Prophylaxis

vs.

vs.

Interpretive *
Integration
Prohibition
Prophylaxis
Permanent remedy
Prohibition
Equal Educational Opportunity
Integration
Backward-looking *
Correction
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the holdings in Green, Swann, and Keyes in order to accommodate those
in Milliken I and Dayton I or vice versa, and one that connects all the
doctrinal dots into a coherent picture of the critically important enterprise upon which the Court embarked thirty-six years ago and that re35 4
mains substantially unfinished today.
In order to lay out my explanation and justification of desegregation, I begin in Part III by identifying the systemic political problem
that public school segregation poses. Next, Part IV proposes an idealized method of "reforming" or "reconstructing" political processes
corrupted by discrimination and segregation. Part V then returns to
the desegregation decisions themselves to show: (1) how closely they
in fact conform to idealized politically reformative solutions; (2) how
desegregation Reformatively understood uses an instrumentally Integrationist remedy with important Equal-Educational-Opportunity side
effects to accomplish simultaneously Corrective, Prohibitory, and Prophylactic objectives and how in doing so it nonetheless avoids most of
the corrosive empirical and moral problems that trouble the five competing theories; (3) why the remedy of desegregation has been principally confined to the field of education; and (4) why it is important to
keep the remedy in place in that potentially evangelical sphere. In the
last-mentioned spirit, Part V concludes with some remarks about the
desegregative work yet to be started in the nation's northern and westem metropolitan areas.
III.

A.

WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?

What's the Problem?

Why must there be desegregation? In Part II, I concluded that the
answer to this question is not supplied solely by either the educational
deficits that many African-Americans suffer; their absence from the
political, economic, and social mainstream; the harms inflicted upon
them as a result of their white fellows' interpersonal wrongs; or the
antiutilitarian willingness of a utilitarian political process to count "external" preferences. Here, I conclude that there must be desegregation
because there is racism in the political system; because the nation saw
fit after the Civil War to reconstitute itself under a system of government that assured its black citizens "exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored-exemption from legal
discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society";3 5 5 and because de
jure segregation constitutes just such legislation implying inferiority in
civil society: "To separate [black children] from others ... solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
354. See supra notes 5, 42-49 and accompanying text.
355. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879) (quoted in Brown v.
Board of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 490-91 n.5 (1954)).
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ever to be undone."3 5 6
It is true, of course, as the accepted judicial and scholarly view of
segregation has long held, that segregation, like other forms of governmental discrimination, is an "insult," one that is particularly egregious
when wielded against children.3 5 7 But private discrimination is an insult as well. Yet, except in its most virulent form, that kind of discrimination has not thus far been constitutionally forbidden, no matter how
ruinous it may prove to the dignity of its black victims.3 5 8 As the
phrases from Strauder v. West Virginia and Brown v. Board of Education I
quoted above suggest, and as an emerged and emerging consensus
among modem legal scholars and political theorists goes a long way
towards explaining, what is forbidden is segregation affecting blacks'
"status in the community" and in "civil society," i.e., their status in
3 59
those spheres in which citizens take part in their "legislative"
capacity.
The problem with segregation, then, is legislative racism, racism infecting political judgments about how organized society should allocate
scarce resources, educational or otherwise. The problem is the belief
that the government may give some people less "protection of the
laws" because those people, notwithstanding their status as members
of "civil society," are by someone's lights inferior. There is something
more here, then, than the fact that the government is a bigger and more
powerful insulter than the rest of us. There is something more here
even than the harms, grievous as they are, suffered by black Americans.
What I think an emerged legal-political-philosophical consensus reveals
is that there is here a harm suffered by us all and a recognition that
equal protection is self-protection for us all.
B.

Why Is That a Problem?

Our age is obsessed with equal protection.3 6 0 I cannot hope here
to describe that obsession entirely, much less to psychoanalyze it. But
neither can I avoid the question of the meaning of the equal protection
clause in the desegregation cases. Accordingly, by identifying some
356. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494.
357. E.g., Brunson v. Board of Trustees, 429 F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1970) (en
banc) (Sobeloff,J., concurring) ("segregation is forbidden simply because its perpetuation is a living insult to the black children"); accord Black, supra note 123, at 427; Cahn,
supra note 123, at 155; Dworkin, supra note 104, at 22.
358. See infra notes 392, 394, 456.
359. As I explain below, by "legislative," I mean the behavior of officials and citizens-acting in and through all agencies of government, see, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 239 (1961); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954)-that defines,
including via interpretation and enforcement, the rules by which society distributes its
scarce resources. See infra notes 386-438 and accompanying text.
360. For example, 11 of the last 26 Forewords to the Harvard Law Review's
Supreme Court issues (1963-1989) have been principally concerned with equal
protection.
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points at which the equal protection theorizing of others converges and
subjecting the synthesized conclusions to the fit and justification analyses I developed earlier, I briefly explain here my "legislative racism"
definition of the problem that the desegregation cases confront.
Although the equal protection clause3 6 1 assumedly means what it
says-we ought not, that is, interpret it inconsistently with its words-it
does not very clearly say what it means.3 6 2 Three things are clear, however, and they provide a useful interpretive starting point: First, the
clause imposes some kind of duty having to do with equality. Second,
that which must be equalized is denominated as protection. Third, the
bearer of the equalization duty is the state. I begin this Part by identifying a consensus among scholars in regard to each of these three points
of relative clarity in the clause. I then synthesize the three concepts
into a single, mainly liberal but partly republican view of the clause and
the problem it aims to resolve. Finally, after identifying the relationship of race, segregation, and intentional discrimination to that problem, I test my conclusions against the clause itself in historical context.
1. Equal. - It is possible to identify a verbal consensus of sorts
that begins to give content to the clause's arguably most important
word, "equal": Equality does not mean that minorities can never be
treated less favorably than others, but it does forbid "the denial to minorities of... 'equal concern and respect in the design and administration of the political institutions that govern them.' "363 This
formulation of the "antidiscrimination principle," or a version of it,
may be found in the writings of numerous equal protection scholars3 64
as well as political and other theorists representing liberal,3 65 natural
361. U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall.., deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
362. See, e.g.,J. Ely, supra note 105, at 12-14, 30-33 (clause "cannot intelligibly
be given content solely on the basis of [its] language and ... history"); Fiss, supra note
67, at 85 (clause "has no [facial] meaning"); Karst & Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and
Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 7, 24 (1979); Sherry, supra note
105, at 89.
363. J. Ely, supra note 105, at 82 (quoting R. Dworkin, supra note 330, at 180).
364. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 177, at 45-46 ("equal worth" and "equal regard"); id. at 44-49 & nn. 136, 138-39 (collecting authority); Baker, Neutrality, Process,
and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal Protection, 58 Tex. L. Rev. 1029,
1030-48 (1980) (equal counting; "equality of respect"); Brest, supra note 104, at 7
(clause forbids "assumptions of the differential worth of racial groups" or "racially selective sympathy and indifference"); Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1345; Fiss, supra note
67, at 130-31; Karst, supra note 179, at 5-6 (quotingJ. Rawls, supra note 105, at 256)
(" 'ethic of mutual respect and self-esteem' "); Lawrence, supra note 134, at 350; Tribe,
supra note 117, at 1072 ("equal respect in which we as a society aspire to hold each
individual").
365. See, e.g., B. Ackerman, supra note 123, at 171; R. Dworkin, supra note 330, at
234, 273; A. Gutmann, supra note 142, at 170 ("agreement among several diverse
strands of liberalism ... that people are potentially free and equal moral beings"); R.
Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 333-34 (1974); J. Rawls, supra note 105, at 75-83,
536 (each citizen "treated with the respect due to a sovereign equal"); M. Sandel, supra
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rights,3 66 feminist,3 6 7 republican,3 6 8 utilitarian,3 69 and laissez faire3 7 0
perspectives, among others.3 7 1 Ascertaining whether this verbal connote 105, at 19-20 (discussing Kant and Rawls); Galston, Liberal Virtues, 82 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 1277, 1287 (1988); Kateb, Democratic Individuality and the Claims of Politics,
12 Pol. Theory 331, 337 (1984); Richards, Moral Theory, The Developmental Psychology of Ethical Autonomy and Professionalism, 31 J. Legal Educ. 359, 362-64 (1981);
West, supra note 160, at 674, 681-82, 725; G. Kateb, Democratic Individuality and the
Meaning of Rights 11 (paper delivered at Columbia Legal Theory Workshop, Mar. 20,
1989).
366. See, e.g., R. Dworkin, supra note 328, at 59, 68;J. Wilson, supra note 105, at
22, 98; Rawls, supra note 116, at 236-37 n.19; J. Coons, Premises of a Descriptive
Equality 75-76 (paper delivered at the Columbia Legal Theory Workshop, Mar. 2, 1988)
("condition entailing the absolute value or dignity of persons").
367. Feminist theory accords persons equal respect not by ignoring their differences and deeming them alike but instead by divesting their differences of normative
significance. E.g., Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The KohlbergGilligan Controversy and Moral Theory, in Women and Moral Theory 148, 164, 169 (E.
Kittay & D. Meyers eds. 1987) (each "entitled to expect and to assume from the other
forms of behavior through which the other feels recognized and confirmed as a concrete, individual being with specific needs, talents, capacities"); Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 291, 365-69 (1985);
Marcus, Spiegelman, DuBois, Dunlap, Gilligan, MacKinnon & Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law: A Conversation, 34 Buffalo L. Rev. 11, 53
(1985) (Menkel-Meadow) [hereinafter Marcus]; Minow, supra note 179, at 32-33, 38
(need to respect each person's "distinguishing" features, reject any "single superior
perspective for judging questions of difference," and "resist the denigration implied by
difference"); Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 Yale LJ. 1713, 1718 (1988); West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 5-6, 21-28, 60 (1988); Note, Toward a
Redefinition of Sexual Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 487, 497-502 (1981).
368. See, e.g., A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at 44-45; M. Walzer, supra note 52, at
216 ("equality of consideration"); Gutmann, supra note 217, at 27, 45 (discussing authority); Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing
Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 Ind. LJ. 145, 183 & n.132
(1977-78) (citing J. Rousseau, The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right, in
The Social Contract and Discourses 1, 13-14, 30 (Everyman's ed. 1950)); Sunstein,
supra note 105, at 128, 140.
369. See, e.g., R. Dahli, A Preface to Democratic Theory 32, 34, 36-38 (1956); J.
Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance 167-70,
208-15, 238-42, 295-301 (1986).
370. See, e.g., Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 Creighton L. Rev. 487, 493-94, 496 (1979) (those law and economics
theories that understand the aim of social organization as the "universal enhancement of
each individual's expectations, not collective enhancement of the sum of all individual expectations" insist that the state, when market failure necessitates intervention, accord
equal weight to each citizen's preferences).
371. See, e.g., C. MacPherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval 51-52
(1973) ("equal effective right of the members to use and develop their human capacities"). See generally Dworkin, supra note 154, at 7-10 ("no significant body of political
opinion among us would either reject . . . outright or [significantly] qualify" the "abstract egalitarian principle" that state must show equal concern for life of each citizen);
Kymlicka, supra note 121, at 173-74, 178-81 (collecting views of various contemporary
Western political philosophers who endorse "equal concern" requirement); Rawls,
supra note 116, at 236-37 n.19; Sunstein, supra note 105, at 134, 143 & nn.30, 61-63
("prevailing understanding of equal protection is classically liberal").
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sensus advances the interpretive enterprise in any way requires answers
not obviously embedded in the "equal concern and respect" formulation to two additional questions: Respect and concern vis-A-vis citizens'
interest(s) in what? And, respect and concern from whom?
2. Protection. - Egalitarians might wish to see equalized either of
two broad categories of interests. The "perfectionist" egalitarian wants
every citizen to have an equal amount of some particular right or resource that the Constitution, or some other authoritative source besides the citizen herself, establishes uniformly for all.3 7 2 Some
adherents of the Equal Educational Opportunity theory, for example,
are educational input- or outcome-focused perfectionists, while some
adherents of the Integration theory focus their perfectionism on the
distribution among citizens of society's economic product or of participation in society's economic, political, and social mainstreams.3 7 3 By
contrast, "antiperfectionist" egalitarians do not demand that citizens be
treated equally by receiving equal amounts of some particular good.
Rather, antiperfectionist theory requires only that each citizen be
treated as the equal of all other citizens in his or her capacity to define
and to pursue his or her own good.3 74
Upon reflection, it appears that both the equal protection clause
on its face and the "equal respect and concern" consensus described
above take the same, antiperfectionist side in the perfectionist-antiperfectionist debate. To begin with, the word used by the Constitution to answer the question "Equalize what?" is decidedly
nonperfectionist: It does not conjure up visions of undefined or undirected persons queuing up to receive equal amounts of some legally
specified good or right that will define and direct them, but rather of
persons responsible for defining themselves and directing their own
projects who are seeking governmental protection in equal amounts
when they do so.
Likewise, the "equal concern and respect" consensus described
above is antiperfectionist. In the first place, "concern" and "respect,"
like "protection," suggest an active and self-defining personality that
372. See A. Gutmann, supra note 142, at 2; Kymlicka, supra note 121, at 181-82,
187-90.
373. See supra notes 123-125, 163-165 and accompanying texts.
374. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 121, at 3-8. On one view, antiperfectionism
differs from perfectionism by not requiring the state to distribute anything new to citizens but only to protect something citizens already have, namely, the capacity to choose.
See Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 Pol. Theory 81,
84-87 (1984) (discussing Rawls). On another view, antiperfectionism is a form of
perfectionism that requires the state to distribute "the capacity to choose," as opposed
to some other tangible or intangible good, equally to all citizens. See supra note 154;
notes 161-162 and accompanying text (some Equal Educational Opportunity and Integration theories use perfectionist means (equal distribution of educational resources) to
the antiperfectionist goal of enabling individual choice). Neither version of antiperfectionism is "neutral" because both require the state to value the capacity to choose above
other capacities. See supra note 115; infra note 627.
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partially pre-exists, rather than being defined by, governmental action. 375 The equal concern concept thus requires the government to
accord equality to each self-defined and heterogenous personality as
the government finds that personality, rather than homogenizing all
personalities by giving everyone an equal portion of some definitive
and unexchangeable good or resource. Moreover, when parties to the
consensus insist that the government afford all citizens equal concern
and respect, they generally seem to mean that the government, when it
sets about distributing scarce resources, should accord each person
equal status as a human being precisely because each person is, equally,
a potential creator of his or her own valid good and because each heterogenous person's self-defined good is equally worthy of governmental
3 76
attention and protection.
375. That individuals are assumed to be partly defined in advance of action by the
state does not imply that they are defined by exogenous desires, but rather that they are
defined by their own choices, including, quite possibly, choices that are altruistic or morally premised. Nor does self-definition imply immutability or atomism, inasmuch as a
person's interactions and cooperation with others constantly encourage and enable her
to redefine herself and may themselves be the objects of her redefinition. See, e.g.,
Herzog, Some Questions for Republicans, 14 Pol. Theory 473, 480 (1986); Michelman,
Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights, 41
Fla. L. Rev. 443, 448, 451 (1989); G. Kateb, supra note 365, at 13, 24-28, 30 (liberalism's negative injunction against interference with persons different from ourselves
implies affirmative injunction that we be receptive to options those persons pose); infra
note 420.
376. See Galston, supra note 365, at 1286-87 (discussing Locke, Kant, Mill,
Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman); Kymlicka, supra note 121, at 178-88; Sherry, supra note
115, at 568 n.118. Included in this consensus are, among others: CONSTITUTIONAL
SCHOLARS, e.g., Karst, supra note 179, at 8; Lawrence, supra note 134, at 350; Tribe,
supra note 117, at 1077; LIBERAL THEORISTS, e.g., B. Ackerman, supra note 123, at 11;J.
Rawls, supra note 105, at 212, 505; Gutmann, supra note 114, at 312; Richards, supra
note 365, at 362-64; Sandel, supra note 374, at 82, 86 (liberal view that "what is most
essential to our personhood[s]" are "not the ends we choose but our capacity to choose
them"); G. Kateb, supra note 365, at 10, 12 ("What one claims for oneself one must
concede to the rest," namely, the right "not necessarily [to] say or do great things, but
rather [to] say and do one's own things"); NATURAL RIGHTS THEORISTS, see, e.g., J.
Wilson, supra note 105, at 22, 97; Dworkin, The Original Position, in Reading Rawls,
supra note 155, at 16, 50-51;J. Coons, supra note 366, at 33-35; FEMINIST LEGAL THEORISTS, see, e.g., Benhabib, supra note 367, at 164; Cornell, supra note 367, at 360-63;
Marcus, supra note 367, at 53 (Menkel-Meadow); REPUBLICAN THEORISTS, see, e.g.,
Michelman, supra note 65, at 1533-35; Sunstein, supra note 105, at 134; UTILITARIAN
THEORISTS, see Kymlicka, supra note 121, at 176-81 (citing authority); LAW AND ECONOMICS THEORISTS, see Michelman, supra note 370, at 498.
Following Mill and Dewey, Professor West perceives a countertradition in liberal
thought that (1) rejects state neutrality towards individual choice because of the dehumanizing limits on choice set by most people's socially narrowed range of experience,
and (2) requires the state, in perfectionist fashion, to supply all people with a superior
"good life" devised by persons of "superior experience." West, supra note 160, at
681-90, 700-01, 710, 717-25. Following Dewey, I agree that state antiperfectionism
does not justify state passivity and deference to market choices in the face of socially
narrowed choice horizons, and instead entails active efforts by the state to broaden all
citizens' choice possibilities. Those efforts probably must include education for all chil-
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This identification of people's capacity to choose their own good as
the attribute that makes them equally human hence humanly equal, and
that, as such, deserves constitutional protection, derives support from a
number of sources. Among those sources are: (1) the empirical truth
of the proposition that we are all, in fact, alike in our differences-i.e.,
in our capacity to choose and to pursue different ends-and that we are
more like each other and less like other organisms in this particular
respect; 377 (2) the ubiquitous acceptance in western cultures characterized by "the fact of pluralism"3 7 8 of the included principle of religious
toleration; 3 79 (3) the recurrent appearance of the "equal capacity to
choose" principle in western thinkers from Rousseau, Kant, and Mill to
latter day republican, liberal, utilitarian, and feminist thinkers;3 8 0
dren, see infra notes 736-740 and accompanying text, and may include, for example,
subsidies for the arts and subsistence payments to the poor. See A. Gutmann, supra
note 142, at 9; see also R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at 212 (service of "general interest"
also allows legislation to favor disadvantaged or other groups without violating antiperfectionist principles). I believe modem liberalism parts company with Professor
West, however, when she obliges the state to impose on all of us the single good life that
a person of superior experience would choose for himself, rather than requiring the
state to respect the many good lives that each of us, once given partially state-subsidized
access to superior experiences, can choose for ourselves.
377. See, e.g., H. Arendt, The Human Condition 8, 175 (1958) ("Plurality is the
condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that
nobody is ever the same as anyone else"; human condition "has the twofold character of
equality and distinction");J. Wilson, supra note 105, at 22, 81-85, 102-04; Gutmann,
supra note 114, at 311 n.14; Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100
Harv. L. Rev. 4, 33 (1986); Minow, supra note 179, at 75.
378. E.g., Rawls, supra note 116, at 225; accord M. Sandel, supra note 105, at 50;
Gutmann, supra note 114, at 317. "Pluralism" has many meanings, including a brand of
politics that determines outcomes by plotting the vectors of constituents' desires, see,
e.g. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 32-34
(1985) (hereinafter Sunstein, Interest]; a social arrangement characterized by the coexistence of a number of self-defining and solidaristic familial, religious, ethnic, and other
groups, see, e.g., M. Walzer, supra note 52, at 216, 223; and a political and social arrangement characterized by cooperation among diverse self-defining individuals, see,
e.g., Michelman, supra note 65, at 1504 & n.38; Rawls, supra note 343, at 1-4; Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale LJ. 1539, 1540, 1572 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond]. I use the term in the last-mentioned fashion, although by focusing on
self-definition I include arrangements of the middle sort in which individuals come to
define themselves in terms of their membership in a group. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra
note 154, at 31; Rawls, Fairness to Goodness, 84 Phil. Rev. 536, 550 (1975); supra note
65; infra note 422.
379. See, e.g., Rawls, supra note 116, at 225; infra notes 387-390, 482 and accompanying text; infra notes 384, 434 (equal protection principle linked to injunction
against establishment of religion).
380. See supra notes 365-371 and accompanying text; supra note 376. Some feminist and other scholars question "the assumption that 'taking the viewpoint of others'"
"is truly compatible" with the liberal notion of an "objectified" person "reasoning behind a 'veil of ignorance.'" Benhabib, supra note 367, at 164-65. See M. Sandel, supra
note 105, at 30, 50-65; M. Walzer, Interpretation, supra note 110, at 5; Minow, supra
note 179, at 60 n.240. This view, however, misinterprets the veil of ignorance and similar "objective" stances as describing the "definitional identity" of human beings,
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(4) the principle's nonreciprocal ability to require and harmonize as
well as to coexist with both liberty and democracy;3 8 1 and particularly
(5) the principle's identification of a linguafranca or lowest common
denominator that makes communication possible among a pluralistic
society's diverse groups, each of which uses a different measure of
value;3 82 (6) the obvious importance of choice as a potential source of

satisfaction and as a foundation for other values;3 8 3 (7) the possibility
of enhancing unity, solidarity, and security by giving normative significance to an attribute in which we are all the same and, at the same time,
withdrawing normative significance from the many potentially divisive
ways in which we are different by recognizing those differences as
merely the variegated results of the capacity in which we are all normatively the same;3 84 and (8) the intuitive or culturally imbedded reasona-

Benhabib, supra note 367, at 166, rather than proposing a heuristic device to help individuals shed their own perspectives and acknowledge and assume those of others. See
Gutmann, supra note 114, at 312; Rawls, supra note 116, at 236-37; Sunstein, Beyond,
supra note 378, at 1567 n.160.
381. See R. Dworkin, supra note 328, at 372 (rights traditionally described as consequences of general "right to liberty are in fact the consequences of equality instead");
J. Ely, supra note 105, at 78-79 (Constitution's majority-rule presumption and antimajoritarian exceptions both designed to assure equality-the former the equality of
the many vis-a-vis the few; the latter the equality of the few vis-A-vis the many); The
Federalist No. 51, at 323-24 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (same);J. Wilson, supra
note 105, at 18, 128-33 (whereas pure democracy allows majority to disadvantage minorities and to subvert important liberties and whereas liberalism has no good way of
responding to white racists' demand to be separated from blacks because (the whites
believe) blacks interfere with the whites' well-being, an egalitarianism premised on the
capacity to choose implies a presumptive preference for democracy's "one person, one
vote" rule and conforms the definitive criterion of equality to the central focus of liberalism); see also R. Dworkin, supra note 328, at 59, 66 (criticizing Ely's view that "equal
concern" principle derives from rather than being amendatory of democratic theory);
Ely, supra note 117, at 963-64 (criticizing Dworkin's early view that "equal concern"
principle derives from rather than being amendatory of utilitarian theory); Gutmann,
supra note 217, at 27 (most modem democratic theorists qualify democracy with a
"nondiscrimination constraint").
382. SeeJ. Wilson, supra note 105, at 22-23, 40-44, 97 (given plural nature of our
self-defined values, capacity to choose is the only trait we have and value in common,
hence the only value that permits "communication or fraternity"); Michelman, supra
note 377, at 32-33 (feminist insight that our capacity to define ourselves or to be seen as
"different" provides the sought-for "common ground" and "makes possible normative
interchange that is, at the same time, (i) mutually intelligible, (ii) potentially critical of
any participant normative vision, and (iii) free of a priori privileged status for any vision"); G. Kateb, supra note 365, at 13, 17-18 ("a new sort of connectedness," a "working together by working apart," based on transformation of tolerance into receptivity);
see also Fletcher, Punishment, supra note 106, at 705 (need for "set of principles that
function as the lowest common denominator among diverse purposes and motives");
Minow, supra note 179, at 94 (except through mutual recognition of the other's capacity
to be different, "we confront tragic limits in our abilities to make meaning together" and
lack "a language to speak across conflicting affiliations"). But see Lopez, The Idea of a
Constitution in the Chicano Tradition, 37 J. Legal Educ. 162, 164 (1987).
383. SeeJ. Wilson, supra note 105, at 103-04.
384. See, e.g., id. at 97-98, 104, 40-44, 86; Arendt, supra note 172, at 48;
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bleness of the proposition that people should respect others'
apparently idiosyncratic projects as the price of others respecting theirs
and, therefore, as the otherwise exorbitant price of cooperation and
38 5
stability in a plural society.
3. The State. - If equal concern and respect for each other's capacity to choose is so important, then why should that duty attach only
to the state? And what is "the state"-how do we distinguish an individual's actions from those of the state?
Even here, the emerged consensus discussed above provides some,
albeit less clear, answers. To begin with, recall that the antiperfectionist or "equal capacity to choose" gloss on the equal protection principle
implies that personality partially pre-exists the state and enables each
of us to identify our own vision of the good.3 8 6 Recall, as well, that

religious freedom is the precursor and paradigmatic case of our equal
capacity to choose and that among religions there are many-including
Michelman, supra note 377, at 32-33 (solidaristic potential of feminist insight that
"[d]ifference is what we most fundamentally have in common"); Minow, supra note 179,
at 13, 33, 75 (capacity to achieve "impartiality" and construct community by accepting
each person's particularity, recognizing that there "is no single, superior perspective for
judging questions of difference" and realizing that difference is only meaningful as a
comparison, not as a negative characteristic of one of the traits being compared); Rawls,
supra note 116, at 249. The ascription of normative significance to differences that inevitably result from diverse individuals' exercise of their common power to choose is identified as the central evil at which the equal protection principle aims in, e.g., J. Wilson,
supra note 105, at 50-53; Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1357 n.98 (racism as "vision of
'normative whiteness' "); Marcus, supra note 367, at 20-21, 45-46, 53 (MacKinnon, Gilligan, Menkel-Meadow) (normative maleness); Minow, supra note 179, at 13, 32-36,
68-71 (attacking "assumed point of comparison: women are compared to the unstated
norm of men, 'minority' races to whites, handicapped persons to the able-bodied, and
'minority' religions to 'majorities' "); see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct.
3086, 3102, 3119-22, 3124, 3133-34 (1989) (opinions of Blackmun, O'Connor, Brennan, and Stevens, JJ.) (evil at which establishment clause aims is state's ascription of
normative significance to religious choices).
385. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 576 F. Supp. 1503, 1520 (D. Colo. 1983)
("viability of a pluralistic democracy ... depends upon the willingness to accept all of
the 'thems' as 'us' ");J. Wilson, supra note 105, at 22, 153, 158; Arendt, supra note 172,
at 47-48; Gutmann, supra note 114, at 313 (quoting Larmore, Book Review, 81 J. Phil.
336, 338 (1984) (reviewing M. Sandel, supra note 105) (liberal justice "makes claims on
us 'not because it expresses our deepest self-understandings,' but because it represents
the fairest possible modus vivendi for a pluralistic society"); Rawls, supra note 343, at 21.
In stating that we are free to choose our own good, I assume the standard "security
principle" limiting individuals' self-defined goods to those that do not threaten the
"person or property" of others. Dworkin, supra note 154, at 11, 29. Although I do not
think that the security principle ought to immunize most "morals" legislation from the
claim that it is unconstitutionally perfectionist, I believe that such legislation and the
decisions permitting it, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), are vestiges of
what I hope are fading assumptions about the demands of interpersonal security and not
proof that we routinely let the state choose among nondangerous good lives. But see
Fletcher, The Watchdog of Neutrality, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 2099, 2107-08, 2115-16
(1983) (reviewing B. Ackerman, supra note 123).
386. See supra note 375 and accompanying text.
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some that form an important part of the nation's heritage-whose adherents, although content to "live and let live," insist upon living by
themselves.3 8 7 Recall, finally, that an inducement provided to people
to abide by the "equal capacity to choose" principle in one-call it the
"public"-sphere is the freedom and security gained thereby to pursue
their own, even exclusionary, religious or other choices in other-call
them "private"-spheres. If recognition of the "equal capacity to
choose" principle in the public sphere is designed, and is attractive, as
a means to protect people's freedom in the private sphere, then the
recognition will not serve its purposes if it entirely displaces most people's private spheres.3 8 8 To extend the religious-tolerance analogy, the
nonestablishment principle governing the public sphere does not obviate, but rather demands, a free-exercise principle to protect.the private
sphere.3 8 9 The equal protection (or nonestablishment) principle ac387. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Old Order Amish).
388. See Larmore, supra note 385, at 338; Sullivan, supra note 367, at 1721-22.
389. The use of complementary but potentially conflicting nonestablishment and
free-exercise principles occurs not only in the religion context, see, e.g., County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3134-36 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part), but also in the associational-rights context, see,
e.g., New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2234 (1988) (city
may forbid "establishment" of gender norm in certain business activities, notwithstanding negative impact of doing so on "free exercise" prerogative of men to associate exclusively among themselves), and, as I argue here, in the equal protection context, see
infra note 392 (Constitution forbids government to "establish" one vision of good in
public sphere, in order that persons may freely exercise choice as to good in private
sphere). Rejecting 30 years of judicial interpretation, Professor Smith argues that the
establishment clause was not intended to require state neutrality among competing religious principles but only to forbid intervention by churches and the federal government
in each other's internal affairs. See Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 955, 971-75 (1989). Even if government neutrality was not a "live option" in 1791, however, taking steps to avoid religious
persecution and interfaith conflict was. Id. at 964-65 & n.44. Accordingly, if the neutrality principle provides an effective modem means of achieving the latter option in the
modem world, Professor Smith offers no good reason to shun that principle. See infra
note 503. In any event, Professor Smith also notes that the 1791 Framers may well have
designed the clause to legalize state religious establishments. See Smith, supra, at 964
n.44, 972 n.93. If, as Professor Smith assumes, the clause nonetheless now forbids state
establishments, we presumedly must mind the intent of the 1868 and not the 1791
Framers. See G. Wood, Republicanism, Remarks Delivered at the Columbia Legal Theory Workshop, Apr. 2, 1990 (principle of state neutrality among religions took hold in
ante-bellum period). Focusing the nonestablishment principle on the publid sphere and
the free-exercise principle on the private sphere solves two other conundrums that Professor Smith poses: (1) How can the "'shared intuitive ideas' " of as religious a society
as ours include a religious-neutrality principle? And (2) how can the neutrality principle
abide the laws the Court has upheld that single out particular religious adherents (e.g.,
Sabbatarians) for protection from burdens on those adherents' free exercise? See
Smith, supra, at 1012-14, 990-93. The answer is that a fervent desire to preserve a
broad space in society in which a multiplicity of religions may be freely practiced neither
clashes with the shared intuitive idea that the government should avoid endorsing any
one of those religions nor forbids the state to help preserve that "private" space against
incursions from the public and social spheres. Although it will not always be easy to tell
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cordingly must apply in a sphere large enough to induce people seeking the benefits and protections of that sphere to agree to accept the
principle and to enable persons accepting it to communicate, co-exist,
and cooperate, while still small enough to avoid dangerously repelling
too many people whose exclusionary choices (or free-exercise requirements) forbid their acceptance of the tolerance principle in too large a
3 90
segment of their lives.
The broadest notion of a public sphere, short of one without
boundaries at all, would require persons having control over any resource that someone else might wish to share or purchase-say a house
of worship or just a house-to exercise that control consistently with
the principle of equal concern and respect.3 9 1 Religious or cultural
separatists, that is, could cut themselves off from nonbelievers only by
truly living in "the middle of nowhere." Were the balance thus struck,
it is not hard to imagine a number of groups in our society finding too
small the inducement to accept the "equal capacity to choose" principle
in so big a sphere of activity.
A more modest definition of the public sphere sees it (1) as necessarily encompassing those political processes that set the rules governing how resources in the society are to be distributed and (2) as
being voluntarily expandable, say by majority vote of relatively encompassing constituencies, to economic and social activities large enough
when the state is preferring a sect and when it is clearing a space in which the sect's
adherents may freely exercise, the "no endorsement" test-which I below analogize to
the "no intentional discrimination" test-does a credible job of distinguishing the two
situations. See infra notes 426, 482.
390. See Rawls, supra note 343, at 3, 13-17, 20-21. Most modem political and
legal conceptions recognize a public-private dichotomy, although they vary widely in the
amount of territory they place on either side of the line. See, e.g., Ellickson, Cities and
Homeowners Associations, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1519, 1580 (1982) (law and economics
view that cities should be treated as private homeowners associations and freed of most
fourteenth amendment requirements but that homeowners associations as well as cities
should be subject to "public" duty ofjust compensation); Horowitz, The History of the
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1423, 1424-27 & nn.14-15, 17 (1982)
(liberals favor expansive private sector; republicans, legal realists, and modem critical
scholars favor broader public sector); Karst, supra note 4, at 8-11 (marketplace and
workplace included in public sphere); Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor
Law, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1358, 1387 (1982) (critical legal studies view that public sphere
should reach into workplace to assure "sexually pluralistic environments" there but that
public may not impose its idea of proper sexual preferences on individuals); Mnookin,
The Public/Private Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and Academic Repudiation, 130
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1429, 1429-34 (1982) (liberalism insists upon distinction as means of
protecting private spheres; left liberals assign morals to "private" and economic behavior to "public" sphere; right liberals reverse the assignments); Rawls, supra note 116, at
226-27, 240-41 & n.22 ("deep disagreement" over last two centuries between adherents of Locke's " 'liberty of the modems' " emphasizing private liberty and property and
Rousseau's "'liberty of the ancients'" emphasizing "political liberties and the values of
public life").
391. See, e.g., J. Wilson, supra note 105, at 129-30; Dworkin, supra note 154, at
36; Klare, supra note 390, at 1418; Parker, supra note 160, at 251.
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to have an important impact on how the rules set by the political process are implemented. 92 To the extent that a consensus exists here, it
seems to have formed around this more modest view, although this
consensus admittedly is less inclusive than the ones that support the
interpretations of "equal" and "protection" offered above. The "state
action" consensus holds as follows: Persons responsible for influencing how the government shapes and operates "the processes that structure choice among good lives" 3 9 3 may not base their decisions on
assumptions, assertions, or preferences of the "I am better than you"
or "my choice of (or capacity to choose) values is better than yours"
3 94

sort.

392. The public/private notion advanced here builds upon Hannah Arendt's division of human activity into three spheres-political, social, and personal. H. Arendt,
supra note 377, at 28, 38; accord Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and Public, 9 Pol.
Theory 327, 330-31 (1981). That notion is as follows: (1) In the political sphere, the
"equal concern" (or nonestablishment) principle always applies. (2) In the personal
sphere, the "equal concern" principle never applies (or, put another way, the right of
free exercise always applies). (3) In the social sphere, the "equal concern" principle
presumptively does not apply (or, the free-exercise principle presumptively does). Principle (3)'s presumption may be rebutted in favor of the "equal concern" principle, if
adherents of religiously, ideologically, racially, or otherwise exclusive views retain the
capacity to practice their beliefs in commodious times, places, and manners and if a
legislative majority properly concludes that (a) there are important reasons to promote
equality in the social sphere or (b) promoting equality in the social sphere will help
preserve equality in the political sphere against incursion by overly powerful social
groups. See infra note 423. This approach arguably explains the Court's decisions in
cases in which equal-access and associational interests clash. Compare Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661-62 (1944) (electoral primaries located in political sphere,
illustrating principle (1)) and Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-20
(1984) (dicta) (personal relationships afforded sanctuary from state interference, illustrating principle (2)) with New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct.
2225, 2230 (1988) (public interest in equal access to "private" clubs at which important
business is conducted outweighs the interest in private association, illustrating principle
(3a)) and BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-04 (1983) (limitation on
religious liberty justified by overriding governmental interest in desegregated schools,
illustrating principle (3a)) and Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-79 (1976)
(Congress may outlaw racial discrimination in private education that impairs individual's
right to contract, illustrating principle (3a)) and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-26
(1976) (approving statutory limits on private political contributions because limits promote equal access to elections, illustrating principle (3b)). See generally Karst, supra
note 4, at 18-24, 26-27, 46-47 (under current interpretation, thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments ban only slavery and discriminatory state action but permit Congress and
perhaps state legislatures to extend ban to discrimination in private schools, workplace,
and marketplace). On the last quarter century's legislative extension of the "equal concern" principle to the social sphere, see Failinger, Equality Versus the Right to Choose
Associates: A Critique of Hannah Arendt's View of the Supreme Court's Dilemma, 49
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 143, 144-45 & nn.l-4, 154 (1987); Fiss, Fate, supra note 63, at 745-48;
Freeman, supra note 98, at 1076-79.
393. A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at 45.
394. Most of the liberals cited supra notes 365 and 376 adhere to this view. There
are a couple of responses to possible left critiques, see, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 390;
Klare, supra note 390, of this public/private distinction: (1) The proposal below to en-
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Who, then, are the persons responsible for shaping and implementing the rules governing the distribution of resources and choice
among good lives? To answer this question, I join the recent effort to
ally liberal and republican theory.3 9 5 More precisely, I attempt to show
how the antiperfectionist liberalism that principally informs our notions
of "equality" and "protection" can help achieve the simultaneously liberating and unifying qualities that modern republicanism values once
the duty implied by egalitarian liberalism is extended, in classically
re39 6
publican fashion, to all citizens and not just to public officials.
Republicanism broadly understood conceives of the state as the
joint political action of persons denominated as citizens.3 9 7 A private
person becomes a public citizen when she exhibits "civic virtue," i.e.,
compass within "state action" the effectual conduct of citizens as well as officials tends
toward broader republican conceptions of the public sphere. See Brest, Further Beyond
the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 Yale LJ. 1623, 1625-26 &
n.12 (1988); Michelman, supra note 65, at 1531; see also Ortiz, supra note 123, at 1128
(subjecting constituents' actions to equal protection duty goes "a long way towards erasing the distinction.., between public and private action"). (2) Together with the allowance for legislative expansion of the "public" sphere to encompass the social as well as
the political arena, see supra note 392; infra note 423, the definition of state action
proposed here partially answers a principal objection to restrictive "state action" notions, namely, that they ignore economic and social power centers with vast political
influence. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 390, at 1428; Parker, supra note 160, at 251;
Pitkin, supra note 392, at 330.
395. Republicans making overtures to liberals include B. Barber, Strong Democracy 118, 308 (1984) ("reorient liberal democracy toward civic engagement and political
community" rather than "raze it"); Michelman, supra note 375, at 445-52 & nn.6, 10;
Sherry, supra note 115, at 578 & nn.163, 166; Sunstein, Beyond, supra note 378, at
1541, 1567-69. Liberals making overtures to republicans include Baker, Republican
Liberalism: liberal Rights and Republican Politics, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 491, 513-21 (1989);
Galston, supra note 365, at 1288; Gutmann, supra note 114, at 320-22; Kateb, supra
note 365, at 361-65; Rawls, supra note 116, at 226-27. In the middle are: Ackerman,
The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale LJ. 1013, 1035 (1984)
[hereinafter Ackerman, Discovering]; Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land
Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 837, 886-87 (1983). Lamenting the negotiations is Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 Yale LJ. 1825, 1831-35
(1987). Reviewing the bidding is Fallon, supra note 115, at 1730-31. See generally
Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 Yale LJ. 453, 484-85 & n.63
(1989) [hereinafter Ackerman, Constitutional] (citing numerous contributions to contemporary Republican thought); Symposium: Civic Republicanism and Its Critics, 14
Pol. Theory 423 (1986); Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 Yale LJ. 1493
(1988); Symposium on Republicanism and Voting Rights, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 409 (1989).
396. I henceforth use the terms "antiperfectionist" and "egalitarian" interchangeably. Notes 375-376 and 422 distinguish egalitarian liberalism from libertarianism and
from a rigid commitment to the exogenous origin of desires, market outcomes, and interest-group politics.
397. See Michelman, supra note 377, at 17 (republicanism "not a well-defined historical doctrine" but a loose " 'tradition' "); see also Letter from J. Adams toJ. Tiffany
(Apr. 30, 1819), reprinted in 10 Works ofJohn Adams 378 (C. Adams ed. 1856) (republicanism "may signify anything, everything, or nothing"). See generally Ackerman, Discovering, supra note 395, at 1027-31 (mobilization of citizenry in collective effort to
redefine the common good); Michelman, supra note 377, at 36-55; Sunstein, Interest,
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when she accepts the responsibility of engaging in joint political activity
devoted not to her own good but to the good of all.3 9 8 Republicanism
assumes that persons in their private activities, symbolized by the home
and family, will act in a self-regarding manner. But in the public-i.e.,
usually, the political-sphere, republicanism's definitive desideratum is
public-regarding action.3 9 9 Using whatever means are available, therefore, including civic education, public rituals, and a commitment to the
myth or reality of shared values or shared ancestry, the "government's
first task" is to create "citizens" by cultivating public spiritedness
40 0
among its people.
Thus defined and programmed, citizens in the republican conception govern themselves and their community in a particular way-via
participation in communal deliberations. 40 1 Those deliberations are
characterized by "practicalreason." 40 2 Practical reason is in part simply
the discussants' rhetorical expression of civic virtue in arguments that
are based on the common, rather than one's individual, good. Practical
reason includes as well the discussants' commitment, and their use of
communal deliberations, to identify "right" answers to public questions, i.e., answers that actually and acceptably identify the "general
good" and the best course for achieving that good. 40 3 Participation in
this process under these circumstances produces "public happiness," a
kind of fulfillment-in the classical view, the fulfillment of one's highest
potential as a human being-achievable only through the act of com4 °4
munal and public self-definition and self-government.
A principal attraction of republicanism is its capacity, in theory at
least, to promote social solidarity through the inclusive, participatory,
and fulfilling process of communal self-definition and self-government.
To accomplish this goal, republicanism attempts to synthesize will and
reason. It tries to create law that is simultaneously authoritative,because
all persons governed by it participate in its creation, and reasoned, because arguments in a law's favor consist in demonstrating how the law
contributes to the common good and not simply in certifying that the
40 5
law serves one's own interests.
supra note 378, at 31-38 ("dialogue and discussion among the citizenry" critical features of republican political processes).
398. See G. Stone, supra note 213, at 5; Sherry, supra note 115, at 551-55.
399. See Michelman, supra note 368, at 183-84.
400. G. Stone, supra note 213, at 5.
401. See, e.g., Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1070
(1980); Michelman, supra note 377, at 19; Pitkin, supra note 392, at 345; Sunstein, Beyond, supra note 378, at 1547-48.
402. Sunstein, Interest, supra note 378, at 31-32.
403. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 65, at 10; Sunstein, Interest, supra note 378,
at 31-32.
404. See H. Arendt, supra note 377, at 122-33; Michelman, supra note 377, at
38-41; Pitkin, supra note 392, at 331-38.
405. See Kahn, supra note 105, at 3-4, 7.
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From the perspective of modem liberal democracies, republicanism fails to satisfy for a number of reasons. The first reason is republicanism's preference for the public over the personal, both in its
definition of value (the general good) and in its limitation of the highest
forms of self-fulfillment to the public rather than the private sphere
(public happiness). Indeed, by letting a single publicly defined good
trump people's heterogenous, personally defined goods, and by adopting a perfectionist theory of personality that limits fulfillment to only
one type of action-i.e., joint, public-regarding action-pure republiassocicanism violates the antiperfectionist requirement that I earlier
40 6
ated with the fourteenth amendment's term "protection.
In addition, we need only look around ourselves to discover a pair
of compelling practical problems with pure republicanism-namely,
how few "citizens" among us are willing to drop their own plans and
projects (both selfless and selfish) and devote themselves to joint and
public action for the common good; 40 7 and how unlikely it is that those
citizens could discover a good common to as vast and pluralistic a populace as our own. 4 08 By itself, in fact, this last problem has led many
406. See The Federalist No. 10, at 78 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (conditions necessary for republicanism violate "first object of government," namely, preservation of liberty and "diversity in the faculties of men"); Ackerman, Discovering, supra
note 395, at 1032-37, 1043; Bell & Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics,
97 Yale L.J. 1609, 1612 (1988) ("seeds of teleology and hierarchy" in view that "role of
the human being as citizen" is truest to "essence of humanity"); Hirsch, The Threnody
of Liberalism: Constitutional Liberty and the Renewal of Community, 14 Pol. Theory
423, 424-29 (1986); Rawls, supra note 343, at 4 (given "fact of pluralism," securing
agreement on general and comprehensive conception of good requires "oppressive use
of state power"); Sandalow, A Skeptical Look at Contemporary Republicanism, 41 Fla.
L. Rev. 523, 524, 533-35 (1989). Horribles conjured up by republican notions of a
communally or politically identified common good include those discussed in: Brest,
supra note 394, at 1630 (book banning); Dworkin, Liberalism, in Public and Private Morality 113, 134-37 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978) (antigay legislation); Epstein, supra note
203, at 156 (repeal of antidiscrimination ban); Sandel, supra note 374, at 91 ("a darker
politics.., amid echoes of the moral majority"); Starobinski, Rousseau in the Revolution, N.Y. Rev. Books, Apr. 12, 1990, at 47 (political terror).
407. See, e.g., Ackerman, Discovering, supra note 395, at 1025, 1031-32; Dworkin,
supra note 121, at 13-17; Herzog, supra note 375, at 484; Macey, The Missing Element
in the Republican Revival, 97 Yale LJ. 1673, 1679 (1988); Pitkin, supra note 392, at 327;
Sullivan, supra note 367, at 1719; see alsoJ. Updike, Self-Consciousness: Memoirs 119
(1989) ("One source of my sense of grievance against the peace movement when it came
was that I hadn't voted for any of its figures-not for Abbie Hoffman or Father Daniel
Berrigan or Reverend William Sloane Coffin orJonathan Schell or Lillian Hellman.... I
had voted for Lyndon Johnson, and thus had earned my American right not to make a
political decision for another four years").
408. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 115, at 1698, 1734; L. Hand, Is There a Common
Will?, in The Spirit of Liberty 47, 52-56 (1960); Herzog, supra note 375, at 484; Rawls,
supra note 343, at 1-2; Sandel, supra note 374, at 91, 93; see also Sunstein, supra note
105, at 137 n.39 ("How a particular value becomes public is something of a mystery.").
Exemplifying the difficulty of identifying "public values" or the "general good" are the
conflicting views of several modern thinkers associated with republicanism on the question whether, under republican principles, "existing power relations" within the family
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observers to exclude pure republicanism from consideration by any but
small polities with "a homogenous population and . . . a common
4 09

past."
Enter, then, the modem day liberal republicans. These scholars
seek to avoid the classical theory's perfectionist tendencies while retaining its communal benefits. Modem republicans, that is, seek a lawmaking process that not only is reasoned as well as authoritative, but also is
personally liberating as well as socially adhesive.
Modem republicans propose that republicanism be saved from its
illiberal tendencies and made into a useful theory of the modem state
by "economizing" on-i.e., in some way moderating-the traditional
doctrine's onerous demands on citizens. 4 10 More precisely, liberally
economized republicanism replaces the theory's traditional form of
economization-limitations on citizenship based on wealth, gender,
race, and ideology4 tt'-with economizations more congenial to liberal
sensibilities. Among these writers' proposals are ones to economize republicanism by occasion- reserving participatory and public-regarding
are illegitimate. Compare Sunstein, Interest, supra note 378, at 56-57 (they are) and
Gutmann, supra note 114, at 309 (same) with M. Sandel, supra note 105, at 16, 30-34,
169 (they are not; rather, they come as close as any relations in modem society to
achieving the republican communitarian's solidaristic ideal) and Arendt, supra note 172,
at 55 (similar). Concluding that political processes powered by continuous public participation do not create solidarity but rather faction, hostility, and social disparities are,
e.g.: The Federalist No. 49, at 315 U. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); Fitts, The Vices
of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1567, 1618-39 (1988); Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful,
97 Yale LJ. 1663, 1665 (1988).
409. Arendt, supra note 172, at 47; accord, e.g., R. Dahl, supra note 369, at 15,
52-53 (views of Rousseau, Jefferson, and Madison); A. MacIntyre, After Virtue 210,
244-45 (2d ed. 1984); Fraser, Legal Amnesia: Modernism Versus the Republican Tradition in American Legal Thought, 60 Telos 15, 21, 23 (1984); Hirsch, supra note 406, at
433-35; Michelman, supra note 377, at 19, 21-22 & n.96 (antifederalist views); Rose,
supra note 395, at 910; Rossum, Representation and Republican Government: Contemporary Court Variations on the Founders' Theme, 28 Am. J. Juris. 88, 101-03 (1978);
Sullivan, supra note 367, at 1715. On just how small and homogenous a polity would
have to be to qualify for classical republican governance, seeJ. Dewey, supra note 123,
at 25 ("Inside the modem city, in spite of its nominal political unity, there are probably
more communities, more differing customs, traditions, aspirations, and forms of government or control than existed in an entire continent at an earlier epoch").
410. Ackerman, Discovering, supra note 395, at 1031-35; accord Kahn, supra note
105, at 6 & n.20; Michelman, supra note 377, at 58-60.
411. Traditionally, republics made identification and achievement of the "common" good easier by limiting the "citizens" whose good mattered to members of a single class, gender, race, faith, and/or ideological sect. See, e.g., J. Wilson, supra note
105, at 29 ("in Athens at its most democratic, it was never more than the powers of adult
male citizens which were intended to be equal: slaves, women, and resident aliens did
not count"); Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1374 (racism historically used in United States
to create artificial community among whites by juxtaposition with excluded blacks);
Hirsch, supra note 406, at 435-36; Kateb, supra note 365, at 53-55; Pitkin, supra note
392, at 335 (Hannah Arendt's republicanism denies citizenship "to all but a handful of
males").
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republican political action for special "constitutional moments" in history when the voice of the "people" truly must and may be heard.4 12
Other modem republicans economize by participant-reserving the
duties and privileges of "citizenship" to a small group of self-selected
persons who choose to accept republicanism's illiberal constraints by,
for example, standing for election as our official representatives 41 3 or,
in one version, accepting appointment as life-tenured judges. 4 14 Still
others economize by size-limiting republican communities to ones no
larger than municipalities and, in some cases, to ones too select to include any part of the state.4 15
To my mind, all these economizations are troublesome.
Economizations by occasion and participant demean republicanism to
at most either a once-in-a-lifetime affiir (those of us under sixty-five are
still waiting our turn) or an ongoing spectator sport.4 16 In either event,
the inclusionary, participatory, and fulfilling, hence most of the authoritative and adhesive, attributes of the theory's view of the state are foregone. Moreover, neither approach-but particularly the latter412. Ackerman, Discovering, supra note 395, at 1022-23; see Sandel, supra note
374, at 93 (during war).
413. See, e.g.,J. Ely, supra note 105, at 78, 79-82, 86, 99 ("citizen[ship]" limited to
elected representatives; civic virtue limited to their duty to accord "equal concern and
respect to minorities and majorities alike"); G. Wills, Explaining America 179-92
(1981); Ackerman, Discovering, supra note 395, at 1029-31; Rossum, supra note 409, at
106; Sunstein, Interest, supra note 378, at 34-35, 42, 46-48.
414. See, e.g., Fraser, supra note 409, at 20-21, 43, 51 ("substantive vision of the
good articulated within the republican polity" replaced by lawyers' and judges' "faculty
ofjudgment"); Michelman, supra note 377, at 66-77 ("judges represent practical reason
to the people" via exercise of "subjective right-answer thesis"); Michelman, supra note
65, at 1514, 1521-25, 1536-37; Minow, supra note 179, at 16, 81-82, 95. When the two
participatory economies are conjoined, law "speaks for 'the community personified.'
The community's integrity is the law's integrity as legislators make and judges construe
it." Michelman, supra note 377, at 72 (quoting R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at 175); see
also id. at 217 (virtue defined as "integrity" and limited to lawmakers and judges).
415. See, e.g., Cover, supra note 105, at 25-33; Rose, supra note 395, at 910-12;
Sullivan, supra note 367, at 1719-21.
416. See A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at 39 ("citizens stay at home while their
elected representatives make laws"); J. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment 518-24
(1975); Brest, supra note 394, at 1625-26; Michelman, supra note 65, at 1520-23, 1531,
1537; Parker, supra note 160, at 256; Pitkin, supra note 392, at 344 ("what distinguishes
(republican] political life is the potential for decisions made not merely in the name of the
whole community but actually by that community collectively, through participatory
political action"); B. Barber, The Conquest of Politics, ch. 1, at 26 (paper delivered at
the Columbia Legal Theory Workshop, May 4, 1987) (ruing post-war liberal political
philosophy's "preference for 'thin' rather than strong versions of political life in which
citizens are spectators and clients while politicians are professionals who do the actual
governing"). By requiring representatives to "stand above" rather than mirror the interests of their constituents, Sunstein, Interest, supra note 378, at 42, 52; accord
Ackerman, Discovering, supra note 395, at 1027-28, modem republicans sever the one
link between representatives and their constituents that allowed our own civic forbears
to accept representative democracy as a palatable substitute for classical participatory
republicanism. See Rose, supra note 395, at 884; Rossum, supra note 409, at 103-06.
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convincingly avoids an "ominously totalist," hence nonliberating,
search for a single "general good" or explains how we can expand the
pool of truly public-regarding citizens beyond the paltry numbers we
see around us. 4 17 Similarly, the proliferation of communities that
economization by size begets, although productive of authority and cohesion within each law-giving community, cannot achieve authority and
cohesion among those communities. 418 The possibility of each community's liberation thus poses the threat of the others' subjugation.
In any event, none of these theories of economization solves the
problem presented here-the development of a conception of "the
state" that is consistent with and gives meaning to a duty of equal concern and respect applicable to actors in some but not all spheres of
human activity. Toward this latter end, let me identify within the
"equal" and "protection" consensuses outlined earlier yet another liberal-republican method of economizing on the meaning and demands
of civic virtue, public reason, the general good, and public happiness.
In classically republican fashion, this alternative vision of citizenship and the state commits all persons participating in the political process at all times to a version of civic virtue. In liberal fashion, however,
it defines that virtue in terms of the egalitarian consensus identified earlier. 4 19 A person becomes a citizen when she accepts the responsibility
of engaging in political activity premised on the view that all persons
are equal in their capacity to define their own good and that all goods
so defined are equally worthy of her, and the political process's, respect
and concern. In her private activities she may act, as a person, in a selfor group-regarding manner and may pursue her own even exclusionary
ends. In the public political sphere, however, when she acts as a citizen,
she must abide by republicanism's liberally economized but still defini420
tive desideratum-equality-regarding action.
417. Michelman, supra note 377, at 23; accord sources cited supra notes 406-408.
418. See Kahn, supra note 105, at 59-63.
419. For other versions of "liberal virtue," see K. Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice 4, 11-12, 55-56 (1988) (liberal constraints on divisive reliance
on religious values as basis for political decisions); Ackerman, Discovering, supra note
395, at 484; Galston, supra note 365, at 1278-80 (cataloguing different definitions of
virtue that may be gleaned from liberal writers as diverse as Locke, Mill, and Emerson);
G. Kateb, supra note 365, at 10 (point of specifically political rights is not to use them to
press class advantage but to attain a moral status-self-governance); see also R.
Dworkin, supra note 52, at 176, 188-90 (virtue defined as adherence to concept of "law

as integrity").
420. More or less explicitly equating civic virtue with the equal respect principle are
Steele v. L. &N.Ry., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944) (duty of "citizens" of labor organization);
A.Gutmann, supra note 52, at 31-47, 56-70, 76-77, 118 (rather than inculcating "good
morals," public schools should teach "religious toleration and mutual respect for persons"); J. Ely, supra note 105, at 79-87; J. Sklar, Ordinary Vices 233 (1984) ("democratic liberal character" requires that each individual "respect humanity, the rational
moral element in himself and in all other men"); Galston, supra note 365, at 1287;
Rawls, supra note 343, at 10 n.17, 18 n.27, 20 (traditional conception of common good
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Thus constrained, citizens in this conception of the state govern
themselves and their community through whatever level and type of
participation they can manage, subject only to the restriction that their
economized practical reason-i.e., whatever arguments they make, as
citizens, to influence the outcome of the public debate-accept the
principle that all persons are equal in their capacity to choose their own
good lives and that all lives so chosen are equally deserving of the political process's respect and concern. 421 True, of course, different people
will choose to participate in different ways: some merely as voters,
others as letter writers and speakers, others as group or community
leaders engaged in more or less regular dialogue with officials, and
others as the appointed or elected officials themselves. But whoever
participates must have egalitarian-economized virtue and whoever discusses and deliberates must do so via egalitarian-economized practical
reason. Although the process no longer provides assurances or demands faith that its product represents the all-trumping "general
good," it at least makes an economized attempt to assure that, in reaching whatever outcome it produced, it treated no one's individually identified good as unworthy. To the extent, finally, that there are some
replaced with "a liberal conception ofjustice" that "includes the good of every citizen"
and is committed to "mutual acceptance on a footing of equality"); G. Kateb, supra note
365, at 13, 22 ("highest component of democratic individuality" is toleration transformed into responsiveness to alternative realities posed by different others). Although
intended to be more muscular, the conceptions of modernized civic virtue offered by
legal academia's two leading republicans seem to me to render down to the "equal concern" conception offered here. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 65, at 1505-06 ("inclusory, plurality-protecting conception of republican citizenship"); Michelman, supra
note 368, at 184 ("special citizen's ... mode of sympathy and respect for all equally");
Sunstein, supra note 105, at 128, 134, 135, 140, 165 (duty to forego actions that "are
not an effort to serve a public value, but reflect the view that it is intrinsically desirable to
treat one person better than another"); Sunstein, Interest, supra note 378, at 56-58, 65,
75; Sunstein, supra note 105, at 135-36, 145-58 (illustrating violation of "public value"
requirement with numerous discrimination cases); Sunstein, Beyond, supra note 378, at
1554-56, 1567 n.160, 1568 (in a plural society, there may be no "unitary public good;"
universalism may boil down to requirements of a well-functioning deliberative process
and "that political actors attempt to assume the position of those who disagree"). Economizing on virtue by limiting it to "equal concern" has the benefits of (1) directly linking
the reason why economization is necessary in the first place, i.e., our heterogeneity, to
the difference-denaturing economization technique actually chosen; (2) freeing liberal
republicanism of its baffling attempt simultaneously to preserve plural goods and to promote a "common" one; (3) foregoing any visionary demand for deliberative agreement
on common values; and (4) creating a favorable environment for-without demandingthe liberating transformation of participants' own values and projects through synthesis
with the perforce respected values and projects of others, see supra note 375.
421. The fourteenth amendment thus may be seen as supplementing the original
Constitution's Madisonian economization by participant, which based its hope of virtuous national rule on what Professor Wood has described as the "disinterested" character of a governing elite, with an economized version of Jeffersonian republicanism,
which premised the possibility of society-wide virtue on the "natural sociability" of all
human beings. G. Wood, supra note 389, at 4-5, 17-20, 29-33; see infra notes 595-596
and accompanying text.
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citizens who derive a special kind of fulfillment from other-regarding
action, including action premised on respect for other persons' values
or at least for their capacity to generate values, then this liberal-republican conception even holds out to those people the possibility of an
422
egalitarian-economized public happiness.
Notice how limiting virtue to liberalism's "equal respect and concern" requirement, while extending that duty to all citizens, consists
with a republican notion of the state and conserves some of republicanism's attractive qualities without keeping its illiberal flaws: On the one
hand, this approach reinvigorates republicanism's inclusionary understanding of the state as encompassing the actions of all citizens at all
(even "normal") times. To this extent, it retains more of old-time republicanism's participatory character than do most other economized
versions. 423 On the other hand, the approach limits republicanism's
civic-virtue, practical-reason, and general-good demands upon citizens
and the political process to observance of a single egalitarian principle
on which our society, or substantial elements within it, already have
reached consensus. To this extent, the approach is more consistent
with "life in the big polity" than are classical republicanism and most
versions of modern, economized republicanism.
In addition, the egalitarian principle that this approach equates
with virtue-that we are all alike in one very important way, which provides a common medium of communication and neutralizes the normative significance of the ways in which we differ-offers as good a
surrogate as we are likely to find in a large plural society for the solidarity-enhancing smallness, homogenous population, and common past
that permitted Classical Greek, Renaissance Italian, and Enlightenment
Swiss city-states to function as republics. As such, egalitarian-econo422. See Michelman, supra note 368, at 150-52 & n.30. In this same, other-regarding way, economized virtue produces a politics different from interest-group pluralism.
See Epstein, Modem Republicanism-Or the Flight from Substance, 97 Yale LJ. 1633,
1637 n.10 (1988) (interest-group pluralism excludes philosophies holding "that everyone in society should be willing to accept and tolerate persons whose beliefs and practices are different from their own"); Fallon, supra note 115, at 1707-09 n.154;
Michelman, supra note 375, at 448-49; Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689, 1694 (1984); supra notes 65, 378.
423. This view of state action provides an additional justification for legislatively
extending the "equal concern" duty to the social sphere, see supra notes 392, 394:
Given the extent to which the social and political spheres are intertwined and the extent
to which behavior in the former influences behavior in the latter, the legislature may well
conclude that its duty to foster virtue among citizens in the political sphere, see supra text
accompanying note 400, requires the extension of that duty to persons active in other
"public" contexts. See generally Karst, supra note 4, at 10-11 ("The behavior we call
private discrimination is not just the result of racism but the cause of further racism.").
Once we recognize that the "equal concern" duty applies to all individuals active in
politics writ large, it requires only an empirical judgment that the class of citizens who
inject their views into the political process roughly coincides with the class of persons
involved in other walks of "public" life to support the educative extension of the "equal
concern" duty to social activities conducted in a demonstrably "public" manner.
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mized citizenship approaches the modem republicans' aspiration of a
lawmaking process that is simultaneously authoritative, because all citizens (all persons who choose to participate) are responsible for its operation; reasoned, because appeals to one's own values and interests are
tempered by a commitment to respect those of all others; adhesive, because a quality that unites us all is constantly affirmed;4 24 and liberating,
because that quality is our difference and our capacity for self4 25
definition.
Still, this vision of a state whose participants are committed-when
they act as citizens-to according each other and all members of society
equal recognition needs greater resolution. How, most importantly, do
we tell citizens from persons? Consider, for example, the segregationist who assumes his soap box in Town Hall Square and begins preaching the virtues of racial separation in the schools when the mayor, city
council members, and members of the school board happen by. Surely,
such a speaker might conceive of himself as contributing to the political
dialogue and might harbor hopes, perhaps even well-founded ones,
that his oration will affect official policies. Is the mayor, therefore,
duty-bound to have the police arrest the self-proclaimed citizenspeaker for violating the equal protection clause? My answer to the
question of where persons stop and citizens begin is something like: by
their fruits shall they, citizens, be known. If, therefore, the speaker in
my example in fact incites the school board to revise the district's attendance zones to achieve greater racial separation, then at that point
the speakers' speech joins the boards' resolution as (unlawful) actions
of the state.4 2 6
424. See supra note 384 and accompanying text.
425. The problem of authority remains to the extent that citizens, who must abide
by an "equal respect" principle that they did not legislate, do not in fact accept that
principle. See Kahn, supra note 105, at 76-80 & n.354. Above, I list several reasons
why the "equal respect" principle is and ought to be rather widely accepted in our society. See supra notes 377-385 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 516-578 and
accompanying text (periods when and places where Americans pervasively have shirked
their equal concern responsibilities). Among those reasons is the wide space that acceptance of the "equal concern" principle in the public sphere clears in the private sphere
for numerous internally authoritative, reasoned, adhesive, and liberating communities
that, in the latter sphere, need not accept the "equal respect" principle or any other
ecumenical principle. See supra notes 385, 418 and accompanying text; see also R.
Dworkin, supra note 52, at 196-201, 212 (listing four equal-concern-focused conditions
under which communal obligations, although not chosen, become authoritative because
they satisfy the demands of "fraternity"). But cf. Cover, supra note 105, at 10, 16-17,
44 (larger community's ecumenism is fatal to creative anarchy of smaller communities);
Kahn, supra note 105, at 82-84 (doubting possibility of a simultaneously authoritative
and reasoned lawmaking process in an extended polity).
426. For examples of courts treating evidence that officials acceded to the racist
desires of their constituents as proof of equal protection violations, see Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 622-27 (1982) (racial
block voting); Memphis v. Green, 451 U.S. 100, 114-16 nn.23-24, 26 (1981); Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 n.20 (1980); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
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This conception of nonvirtuous citizenship stops short of punishing action that self-confessedly but unsuccessfully attempts to influence
political outcomes based on "we are better than they" thinking. Instead, the conception requires that the action actually have incited an
outcome premised on a lack of equal respect and concern. 42 7 The liberty-preserving reasons for this limitation are analogous to those that
convinced the Court to abandon a first amendment standard allowing
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 269 (1977); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373-76 (1967);
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 403 (1964) (racial identification of school board candidates on ballots); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400, 412 n.31
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 144-45
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d
126, 142-49 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); United States v. Missouri,
515 F.2d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975); Daily v. City of
Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1039 (10th Cir. 1970); Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d
853, 856 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956) (Stewart, J., concurring); United
States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1314-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aft'd, 837
F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988); United States v. City of
Birmingham, 538 F. Supp. 819, 828 (E.D. Mich 1982), modified, 727 F.2d 560 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 456 F.
Supp. 183, 187 (S.D. Ind. 1978), aff'd, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
838 (1980); Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410,427,438 (D. Mass.), aff'd sub nom.
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975);
Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 359 F. Supp. 807, 821 (W.D. Pa. 1973), appeal dismissed, 495
F.2d 1095 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974); Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872,
876-81 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd mem., 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (approvingly cited in Village of
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267); Dimond, supra note 123, at 30 n.127; Note, supra
note 31, at 2008-20 nn.32, 40, 61, 63-66, 71-74, 81-83, 94-97; see also Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968) (law forbidding teaching of evolution struck down
under establishment clause because it was adopted to conform to some constituents'
religious views); Eule,Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 Yale LJ. 1503, 1505-06
nn.5-6 (1990) (citing decisions) (constitutional review of laws enacted by citizens via
plebiscites using same standards used to review laws enacted by representatives).
Suppose, instead, that a legislator takes a "yes or no" poll of her constituents' views
on a proposal to mandate school integration across the state. Assume, as well, that a
strong majority of her constituents votes "no" on the bill in part based on an unexpressed desire to confine African-American children to urban districts. Is the legislator
forbidden to rely on the poll notwithstanding her conscientious wish to "mirror" her
constituent's desires? See supra note 416. Are her constituents who conscientiously
believe on religious or other grounds that interracial contact is a bad thing forbidden to
base their response to the poll on that belief? The answer is yes: The legislator violates
her "equal concern" duty when she fails to hold herself as well as her constituents to the
injunction against legislation premised on "we are better than they" thinking. Moreover, even if the legislator voted against the proposal after conscientiously, but unsuccessfully, attempting to separate her constituents' racist and nonracist preferences and
to mirror only the latter (and assuming that racist preferences hidden from the legislator
could be exposed in court), the constituents in my view have violated their constitutional
duty as citizens to foreswear inciting public action based upon a "we are better than
they" rationale.
427. By "incitement," I mean citizens' intentional injection of racially biased views
into "public" debates when those views count as "a," but not necessarily "the," motivating factor in an official decision, see infra note 469, and that have a relatively direct,
contemporaneous effect on that decision.
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punishment of speech presenting a "dear and present danger" of a
substantive evil that society has a strong interest in preventing and instead to insist that actionable "advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation" be "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
4 28
action."
My standard, of course, is even more protective of private liberty
than is the Supreme Court's free speech test inasmuch as it replaces the
Court's proscription against inciting "imminent lawless action" with a
proscription limited to the action itself. But I, after all, am concerned
with: (1) action that usually does not amount to the direct overthrow of
the republic or imminent physical endangerment; (2) a political process
in which the transformation of speech into action typically occurs in a
more mediated fashion than a fiery speaker's agitation of an angry
crowd; (3) all manner of self-defining behavior and not simply illegalityadvocating speech; and (4) identifying a public-private distinction that
not only avoids deterring citizens from defining their own exclusionary
ends but also lets them do so enough of the time that they, or most of
them, will be enticed at other times to forego exclusionary action. 42 9
428. Compare Schenck v. Unites States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The question in
every case is whether the words used ...create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantial evils Congress has a right to prevent.") with Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("[The constitutional guarantees of free speech and
free press do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."). See generallyJ. Ely, supra
note 105, at 105-16 (discussing "clear and present danger" and "incitement" tests in
first amendment context). Both the constitutional rule of Brandenburg ("You can believe
in it and say it, but you can't incite it") and the legislated rule of Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160, 176 (1976) ("You can believe in it (racial discrimination) and teach it to your
children, but you can't practice it" (by excluding blacks from admission to private
schools)) are analogous to the rule advanced here ("You can believe in it and live it in
your private life, but you can't cause the state to adopt it").
429. By limiting illegality to actual and intended incitement, see supra note 427, my
definition of "the state" eschews prior restraints and resists compelling unwilling private
persons to be public citizens. See sources cited supra notes 406-407. "Chilling effect"
considerations also justify limiting the remedy for politically effective "unequal concern" thinking to reforming the political process, see infra Part V, rather than, for example, criminally punishing or even assessing damages directly against errant citizens, at
least in the absence of the kinds of concerted action that the civil rights laws long have
criminalized, see 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988). The "speech and debate" cases draw a remedy.-based distinction similar to the one proposed here: On the one hand, those cases
immunize lawmakers from damages and other relief for enacting unconstitutional laws
because allowing such relief might corrupt the political process by causing legislators to
act out of "self-" and not in "the public interest." Spallone v. United States, 110 S.Ct.
625, 634 (1990). On the other hand, as long as the remedial action will not pervert the
legislative process in this way, the cases permit remedies for actual or contemplated
unconstitutional legislation that are designed to-and in fact do-effectively nullify or
avert legislation, necessitate the enactment of substitute laws, or otherwise subject legislators to speech-and-debate-chilling political risks. See Spallone v. United States, 110 S.
Ct. at 633-34 (upholding crippling contempt fines against city that forced recalcitrant
city legislators to change their votes); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union,
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Even with these limitations, this republicanized notion of equalprotection state action is controversial. 4 0 It should be no more controversial, however, than the various mainstream equal protection theories noted above that limit virtue, or the duty of equal concern, to
legislators alone.4 3 ' Thus, although it is true that the state-action notion offered here departs from any recognizable form of preference446 U.S. 719, 732, 737 (1980) (legislators cannot be enjoined to change unconstitutional law, but state officials can be enjoined from enforcing it); Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391,402, 405 n.29 (1979) (damages
not available against legislators themselves, but are available against regional legislative
agency); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1951) (Black, J., concurring)
(Court's holding that members of legislative committee cannot be sued "is not a holding
that their alleged persecution of Brandhove is legal;" "there is still much room for challenge to the Committee's action"); see also Smith, supra note 389, at 993-94 (by enjoining enforcement of religiously nonneutral legislation, establishment clause penalizes
legislators for expressing religious convictions and impinges on legislators' freedom of
expression). Acknowledging citizens' role in the legislative process, the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine extends a similarly partial-but-not-total immunity to citizen-lawmakers, in this
case under the petition clause. As in the test I propose, Noerr-Pennington considerations
that allow restriction of citizens' political speech are: (1) proof that citizens' political
advocacy corrupts the political process or seeks illegal legislation, see Fischel, Antitrust
Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 80, 94-95, 99, 107 & nn.141-45 (1977);
Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Processes, the First Amendment, and the Boundaries
of Noerr, 74 Geo. LJ. 65, 93-95 (1985); (2) the relatively nonintrusive nature of the
remedy ordered, see Fischel, supra, at 93-94; and (3) the imposition of a remedy only
after advocacy has caused actual harm to the particular process at issue, see id. at 103
(relief inappropriate where improper lobbying faces rebuttal before legislature acts but
appropriate where speech has immediate consequences). See Bill Johnson's
Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 740-41 (1983) (although NLRB may not prevent employer from filing meritorious state suit seeking injuction against picketing employees, Board may enjoin baseless suit that abusesjudicial process). Compare Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 140-41 (1961)
(lobbyists' misrepresentations to legislature before it acted on lawful legislation not offensive to legislative process and no basis for treble antitrust damages) with California
Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515 (1972) (harassing conduct
preventing competitors from gaining access to administrative process "corrupted" process and would warrant antitrust injunction).
430. Compare J. Wilson, supra note 105, at 129-30 (resisting subordination of
equality to liberty even in private sphere) with B. Ackerman, supra note 123, at 57-58
(political discourse should be limited by neutrality principle) and Rawls, supra note 116,
at 231 (although individuals may be guided by exclusionary thinking in private affairs,
they may be persuaded for sake of social stability that exclusionary "points of view are
not to be introduced into political discussion") with K. Greenawalt, supra note 419, at
11, 91, 94, 207, 216-17 (arguing on liberty and other grounds that citizens, as a last
resort, other arguments failing, may rely on exclusionary religious convictions to answer
important political questions, albeit subject to three tolerance-based constraints that approach equal-concern virtue) with Smith, supra note 389, at 993-99 (ill-advised and unrealistic to expect or require citizens to shed their religious convictions in the public
sphere) and Tushnet, Book Review, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1131, 1135, 1139-40 (1989)
(reviewing K. Greenawalt, supra note 419) (questioning view that, "'You can have [religious beliefs], but you can't act on them' ").
431. See supra notes 413, 416.
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respecting utilitarianism, so, also, do mainstream equal protection theories: Under both approaches, some politically expressed preferences
do not count.43 2 Moreover, any and all republican justifications for extending the duty to ignore some preferences to legislators is matched
and surpassed by my more fully republican commitment to including
"citizens," as well as legislators, within the politically elect. Likewise,
once mainstream equal protection theories acknowledge that "I am
better than she" logic has no place in the lawmaker's mind-whether or
not the logic was that mind's own product or was implanted there by a
constituent-those theories would seem equally to disavow the legitimacy of that logic whenever it appears in and incites the political process. Given that we almost always precipitate governmental action
through political advocacy directed at representatives, it makes little
difference (apart from the "chilling effect" concerns to which my "actual incitement" test responds 43 3 ) whether the forbidden logic is
4 34
screened out at the constituent or at the representative level.
By awaiting official misconduct before declaring that an actionable
departure from egalitarian-economized civic virtue has occurred, I beg
the question of how my version of economized republicanism differs
from the versions I criticize above for limiting the duty of virtue to officials. Also begged is the question of what this theory adds to vicarious
liability and like rationales for disadvantaging "private citizens" when
voiding actions by "public servants." The answer is that egalitarianeconomized virtue better fits and justifies our desegregative and other
practices. 43 5 As noted earlier, vicarious liability doctrine either is too
432. See supra note 343.
433. See supra notes 427-429 and accompanying text.
434. Again, insights from the establishment clause debate are relevant. See generally L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1294 (2d ed. 1988) (although "[Ilegislators
and political activists ought to be free to express the religious roots of their beliefs ....
at some point political speech becomes governmental speech" that is "constitutionally
problematic"); Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 846, 895-96 (1984) ("when [citizens] cast
their votes they are exercising governmental power just as much as their
representatives").
435. In addition to explaining "all-out" desegregation, a citizen-focused theory of
the state helps explain: (1) the equal protection and establishment clause cases making
it a violation for legislators "neutrally" to mirror their constituents' racially and religiously intolerant views, see supra notes 426, 434; (2) the Court's puzzling (or even
"[i]ntuitively... wrong") rulings paying no more deference in constitutional adjudication to laws passed by the people themselves via plebiscite than to laws passed by representatives, see Eule, supra note 426, at 1506-07; (3) the constitutional difference it
makes-even when all citizens are represented in the state legislature and when each
makes up only a tiny proportion of her representatives' constituency-that individual
citizens in some districts comprise a "tinier" proportion of their representatives' constituency than do citizens in other legislative districts, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
561-68 (1964); (4) the Court's preference for contempt fines that, in effect, penalize the
constituency as a whole rather than individual legislators for the legislature's failure to
adopt laws necessary to comply with fourteenth amendment decrees, see Spallone v.
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narrow to justify the outcomes in Swann and Keyes or is too broad to
explain the outcome in Milliken 1.436 Likewise, Professor Dworkin has
identified important situations in which private-law vicarious liability
notions are too narrow to account for the feelings of "group responsibility" that unimplicated citizens often experience in the wake of pervasive public-law malefactions. 4 s 7 As is developed below, the citizenincluding version of the state proposed here can explain these apparent
anomalies. 43 8 As a result-and despite its "merely" symbolic divergence from citizen-excluding versions of the state at the violation
stage-the citizen-including version acquires substantial moral and
practical bite at the remedial stage.
C.

Why (Especially) Race?

1. Why Race? - How does this analysis apply to the problem of
"legislative racism" introduced above? To begin with, for the first twothirds of the period during which this nation has been continuously settled by whites, the definitive status accorded blacks by the dominant
white culture was that of slaves-beings who in the imagination of the
dominant race and in the letter and spirit of the law were "nonpersons"
and who in actual and violently enforced fact had little or no capacity to
define and to pursue their own visions of the good.4 s9 On the eve of
United States, 110 S. Ct. 625, 633-34 (1990); (5) the reason why citizens' racially polarized voting justifies the remedial imposition of single-member districts under § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988), see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30, 80 (1986); and (6) the fact that citizens have no less, and may be given more,
constitutionally enforceable responsibility to keep their interventions in the political
process free of politically corrupting misrepresentations and harassment than do legislators themselves, compare California Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508, 515 (1972) (antitrust laws constitutionally may prevent citizens from intervening in
administrative process in manner calculated to harass intervenors' economic competitors and to corrupt administrative process) with Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,
376-79 (1951) (legislators immune from lawsuit alleging they used committee hearings
as bad faith means of harassing ideological opponents and suppressing free expression).
436. See supra note 248.
437. R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at 172-73 (vicarious liability doctrine cannot explain why "Germans not alive when Nazis ruled their country feel shame and a sense of
obligation toward Jews [and why] white Americans who inherited nothing from slaveholders feel an indeterminate responsibility;" the explanation lies instead in "a deep
personification of political... community").
438. See, e.g., infra notes 683-691 and accompanying text.
439. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 54, at 337 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)
(Constitution "decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them
in the mixed character of persons and of property," the latter because the slave by law is
"subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the
capricious will of another"); E. Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, at 78-89 (1988) (slaves' similar perception of their own condition); see
also J. Dewey, supra note 123, at 114 ("Plato defined a slave as one who accepts from
another the purposes which control his conduct");J. Ely, supra note 105, at 81 (slaves as
"nonhuman"); Rawls, supra note 116, at 240, 242 (slaves "not counted as sources of
claims" or "recognized as persons at all"); Leviticus, 25:39-25:46 (Jewish Pub. Soc. of
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the Civil War, moreover, the United States Supreme Court extended
that status as a matter of constitutional law to the nation's "free" black
residents, much as state law and the dominant race's imagination had
long since done. 440 "The infamy of the Dred Scott opinion" and the
cultural and personal opinions it reflected, "was precisely.., its bland
assumptions of racial superiority, its shameful equation of [humanity,
'44 1
hence] citizenship with whiteness."
Since the Emancipation Proclamation, the view of blacks as
nonpersons, 4 42 as the pejorative contrast to humanly "normative whiteness," 4 43 as persons lacking the will or capacity to define or to pursue
their own "goods"-as, even still, "irreparably different and less worthy than whites" of respect and concern-has persisted in the nation's
law and in the dominant race's imagination and stereotypes.4 44 A white
Am. ed. 1962) ("[Y]ou may also buy [slaves] . . .from among the children of aliens
resident with you .... But as for your Israelite brothers, no one shall rule ruthlessly
over the other."). Prominent among the "good lives" denied American slaves were ones
defined by their own African heritage; they could not, that is, even choose to be AfricanAmericans. See 0. Patterson, Slavery and Sodal Death 5 (1982) ("[sllaves differed from
other human beings in that they were not allowed freely to integrate the experience of
their ancestors into their lives to inform their understanding of social reality with the
inherited meanings of their natural forebears, or to anchor the living present in any
conscious community of memory"); see also J. Baldwin, The Evidence of Things Not
Seen 7 (1985) ("in this country, someone who looks White and who, refusing to deny his
Black ancestry, declares himself Black, has made a genuine and, sometimes, a genuinely
moral choice").
440. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05, 407 (1856)
(African-Americans not "people" within Preamble to Constitution because they had
been "considered... a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to
their authority"; blacks "so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect"); accord W.Jordan, supra note 62, at 101-35, 403-21;J. McPherson,
supra note 251, at 79-82.
441. Karst, supra note 156, at 269; accord Karst, supra note 179, at 13 (discussing
Dred Scott) ("A nonperson, in other words, could not be a citizen").
442. See Brest, supra note 104, at 7-8; Karst, supra note 156, at 269-70; Lawrence,
supra note 134, at 350; see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 403
(1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("persons [not] regarded as persons").
443. See Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1357-60 & n.98, 1373-74; Karst, supra note
179, at 6 n.25 (quoting E. Goffinan, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity 5 (1963)); sources cited supra note 346 (recurrent use in American history of blackwhite oppositional dynamic to bridge class, ethnic, and regional divides among whites
by virtue of their shared distinctness from blacks).
444. D. Bell, supra note 2, at 95; accord Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("what can more certainly arouse race hate.., than state
enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior
and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white
citizens?"); Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1359, 1377 (blacks' "stigma of 'otherness'"
"precludes their potentially radicalizing [visions of the good] from penetrating the dominant consciousness" and excludes blacks from the "community of equals" defined by its
members' ability to define their own life goals); Karst, supra note 179, at 8 (weakened
"sense of individual identity" because blacks not "regarded as... full human being[s],
worthy of respect and dignity" but rather "merely as a specimen of the stigmatized cate-
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school teacher in Atlanta crystallized the prevailing sentiment in reflections to a reporter on the possibility of having African-American children in her classroom:
I've known nigras all my life, and I didn't think they would
adjust to our schools. I have nothing against them. I just
thought their minds weren't like ours. And I still think many
of them have a long way to go.... Yes, I'm ready now to let
those that can do it come to our schools.... That's where I've
changed. 44 5
Accordingly, even though the so-called "liberty of the
modems" 44 6 -the enshrinement in modem conceptions of justice of
individuals' capacity, once artificial constraints are foregone, to ascertain and accomplish their own ends-"may function to mystify" in its
own, for example, antiredistributive ways, it nonetheless still reaches
out to those individuals whom our culture continues to define by their
differences as not quite "normal," "natural," or human. 44 7 In Professor Crenshaw's words, the egalitarian consensus, which embodies the
liberty of the modems in liberal legal thought, "remains receptive to
some aspirations that are central to Black demands and may also perform an important function in combatting the experience of being
excluded and oppressed. The receptivity to Black aspirations is

crucial . ...",448

2. Why Especially Race? - So far, most of what I have said in the
racism applies as well to the intervention of any
context of legislative
"nonneutral," 44 9 motivational reasoning in the political system, includgory"); Kennedy, supra note 64, at 1753 (African-Americans treated as "unfit to participate as equals in the cultural, social, or political life of the nation"). Note the precision
with which the dominant culture's persistent stereotypes about blacks-redolent with
notions of docility, emotionalism, and intellectual inferiority and thus of a lack of moral
independence-excludes blacks from Kantian and other modern notions of humanity;
see also Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1359, 1370-74 & n.153 (historical, sociological, and
psychological literature); Pettigrew, supra note 142, at 696 (studies showing that stereotypes still "lower white expectations of black performance" and "question the basic
'belongingness' of... black members").
445. Cole, How Do the Teachers Feel?, Saturday Rev., May 16, 1964, at 89.
446. Rawls, supra note 116, at 226-27.
447. Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1357; Minow, supra note 179, at 32.
448. Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1357. For these reasons, Professor Fiss's rejection
of the individualistic antidiscrimination principle and his embrace of a principle focused
on trait-defined groups, see Fiss, supra note 67, at 128, is problematic for members of
those groups who seek to escape the assertedly definitive and normative implications of
those traits. See Minow, supra note 179, at 34, 37-38; supra note 179 and accompanying text; see also B. Ackerman, supra note 123, at 242 (nation's treatment of black minority is paradigmatic case of violation of "equal capacity to choose" gloss on
antidiscrimination principle); R. Dworkin, supra note 330, at 237-38 (same); J. Rawls,
supra note 105, at 99, 545 (same).
449. B. Ackerman, supra note 123, at 10-12. But see supra notes 115, 374; infra
note 627 (questioning "neutrality" of theories that identify individual choice and value
creation as preeminent good).
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ing legislative sexism, religious intolerance, or even petty vindictiveness.4 50 But, however egregious other forms of exploitative, "I am
better than you," political discourse are generally, 4 51 in our particular
pluralist state, racism is worse. Legislative racism in this country is dangerously unjust not simply because it strikes at the necessarily egalitarian foundational premise of a pluralistic political system, but also
because of the sustained intensity with which it has buffeted that foundation throughout American history-because it has been with us so
long,4 5 2 has proven so intractable, 4 53 has wreaked such cumulative
harms, 45 4 and has threatened to destroy basic aspects of our political
system 4 55 and to draw into conflict two huge, virtually all-inclusive segments of the population that repeatedly in the past have shown themselves capable not only of a virtually total and alienating separation
from each other for long periods of time but also of sustained and or450. See, e.g.,J. Ely, supra note 105, at 137 & n.10, 141-43. Although I agree that
blacks are the "intended primary beneficiaries" of the fourteenth amendment, Fiss,
supra note 67, at 124; accord, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
682 n.3 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting), I also agree that the clause's language and its
underlying "equal concern" principle forbid its limitation to blacks or to race or to "race
plus nationality" only, seeJ. Ely, supra note 105, at 23-24, 30, 149; Sunstein, supra note
105, at 129.
451. See B. Ackerman, supra note 123, at 243-45.
452. See A. de Tocqueville, supra note 346, at 358 ("the inevitable danger of a
conflict between blacks and whites.., is a nightmare constantly haunting the American
imagination"); Morgan, Negrophobia, N.Y. Rev. Books, June 16, 1988, at 27; sources
cited supra note 62.
453. See, e.g., J. Ely, supra note 105, at 74, 84, 135; Brest, supra note 104, at 2;
Delgado, supra note 139, at 923.
454. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 104, at 10-12; Fiss, supra note 67, at 127-28;
Karst, supra note 179, at 24.
455. The race question, for example, threatens again, as it did in the 1850s, to
destroy one of the most important and otherwise durable foundations of the nation's
political stability-its two-party system. Thus, much of the commentary on the 1988
presidential election-the fifth out of the last six lost by the Democrats and the seventh
in a row in which the winning candidate did not receive a majority of both black and
white votes-focused on the question whether a national coalition that forthrightly indudes and claims to represent the interests of African-Americans can succeed politically.
See, e.g., Edsall, Race in Politics, N.Y. Rev. Books, Dec. 22, 1988, at 23; McPherson,
How Race Destroyed the Democrats' Coalition, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1988, at A35, col.
2; Oreskes, In Racial Politics: Democrats Losing More than Elections-Analysts See
White Flight to G.O.P., N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1988, § 4, at 5, col. 1; see also Crenshaw,
supra note 3, at 1362 n.119, 1376 nn.169-76 (similar commentary on 1984 election);
Dudziak, supra note 98, at 80 & n.104 (1948 election); Oreskes, The 1989 Elections:
Virginia; Joy of Democrats Diluted in Virginia-Wilder's Running Mates Got Much
Higher Vote Totals, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, at Al, col. 2 (1989 gubernatorial elections). Notably, until the year after the last election in which whites and blacks reached
consensus, see The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1988), and with the
exception of a brief period following the Civil War when a sizeable chunk of white citizens were effectively disenfranchised, the two-party system has survived only by disenfranchising large segments of the nation's black population.
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ganized violence against each other.4 56 Lest one think that those days
are past, moreover, one, as the saying goes, need only read the
4 57
newspaper.
456. See, e.g., Racially Motivated Violence: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-55,
154-61 (1989); Chicago Comm'n on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago: A Study of
Race Relations and a Race Riot (1922); 1 S. Drake & H. Clayton, Black Metropolis: A
Study of Negro Life in a Northern City 65-76 (1962); E. Foner, supra note 439, at
119-23, 425-59; H. Gutmann, The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750-1925, at
25-27, 386-99, 435-39 (1976); J. McPherson, supra note 251, at 145-62, 201-13,
506-07; Nat'l Advisory Comm'n on Civil Disorders, Report 19-87, 158-61 (1968).
457. See, e.g., Wilkerson, Racial Harassment Altering Blacks' Choices on Colleges,
N.Y. Times, May 9, 1990, at Al, col. 5; Glaberson, Racial Tension from Slaying Seen at
Trial, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1990, at BI, col. 5; Berger, Professors' Theories on Race Stir
Turmoil at City College, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1990, at BI, col. 2; Finder, Racism and
Arson: A New Chapter in an Old Story, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1990, § 1, at 40, col. 1;
Applebome, Two Sides of the Contemporary South: Racial Incidents and Black Progress, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1989, at A22, col. 1 ("A rising tide of racial incidents across
the South, including attacks and cross burnings, has provided a sour counterpoint to a
decade of electoral progress by blacks"); Blumenthal, Black Youth Is Killed by Whites;
Brooklyn Attack Is Called Racial, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1989, at Al, col. 1; Hays, July 4
Racial Clash Leaves Rosedale Split Over Its Image and Its Reality, N.Y. Times, July 30,
1989, § 1, at 32, col. 1; Barbanel, New Yorkers Pessimistic on Race Relations, Poll
Shows, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1989, at BI, col. 2; Kaufman, New Yorkers Wrestle With a
Crime: Whatever Role Race Had in Park Attack, It's Topic No. 1, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28,
1989, at Al, col. 2; Finder, Blacks Remain Shut Out of Housing in White Areas, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 13, 1989, at B1, col. 2; Education Called Key to Calming Racial Tensions in
Dallas, Educ. Week, Feb. 8, 1989, at 7, col. 4; More Than 200 Arrested in Miami; In 2d
Night of Racial Disturbances, N.Y. TimesJan. 18, 1989, at Al, col. 1; Slaying of a Black
in Portland Evokes Outrage on Racism, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1988, at A22, col. 1; Black
Church, Burned Twice, Vows to Rebuild, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1988, at A24, col. 4; Race
and a Death Dividing Two Neighborhoods on S.I., N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1988, at BI, col.
4; Wicker, Yonkers and the South, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1988, at A19, col. 2; Cuomo
Outlines Program to Fight Racial Prejudice, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1988, at BI, col. 5;
Carter-Ford Panel Says Race Issues 'Moving Backward,' Educ. Week, June 1, 1988, at 4,
col. 5; Death of Black in Jail Beating Stuns 2 Towns, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1988, at A14,
col. 1; Thousands in Civil Rights March in Georgia Town; Klan Aide and 13 More Are
Held, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1987, at Al, col. 2; Black Leaders Say Queens Attack Is Evidence of 'Pervasive Problem,' N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1986, at Al, col. 1; Why Here?
Faculty Members Interpret Racist Incidents on Campus, Stan. Observer, Nov. 1988, at
1, col. 3; State Starting an Investigation of Clash at Massachusetts U., N.Y. Times, Nov.
18, 1986, at B24, col. 1; M. Sovern, A Statement to the Columbia University Community, Mar. 23, 1987 ("This episode [involving interracial violence among students] has
brought to the surface tensions among our students" that "exist on virtually every campus"). For other sources documenting recent increase in overt racial hostility, see
Brooks, supra note 160, at 932-34 & nn.213-25; Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1333 n.3;
Kennedy, supra note 64, at 1782; Note, Combatting Racial Violence: A Legislative Proposal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1220, 1220 & n.1 (1988); sources cited supra note 258.
Or study the survey data. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1348 n.66 (citing
survey data); Jackman & Muha, Education and Intergroup Attitudes: Moral Enlightenment, Superficial Democratic Commitment, or Ideological Refinement, 49 Am. Soc.
Rev. 751, 763, 765 (1984) (racism remains prevalent including among well educated);
Lawrence, supra note 134, at 321, 328-44; Pettigrew, supra note 142, at 687, 673, 674
("growing convergence of results" attained through variety of research methods re-
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Why Especially-Segregation?

Plessy notwithstanding, state-enforced segregation is a particularly
virulent expression of political racism. As discrimination by division,
segregation disparages not only by word and intended effect but also in
deed. First, segregation makes a reality of the belief underlying it, that
the objects of the discrimination are different-indeed, separatedfrom humanity. If racism in all of its forms oppresses symbolically by
excluding African-Americans from belonging to the "human" race,
then racism expressed through segregation oppresses corporeally as
well by actually excluding African-Americans from the places and insti458
tutions where "humans" carry on their lives.
Second, segregation facilitates more and easier discrimination. By
dividing blacks from the rest of us-by creating what Professor Black
has called "a position of walled-off inferiority" 45 9 populated by what
Professor Crenshaw calls "a dearly visible 'other' " 4 6°-segregation
permits the rest of us more easily to target blacks for special disadvantage without having to risk our own interests. 4 61 Segregation does not
simply disparage a discrete and insular minority as such but, in addition, forcibly magnifies the group's discreteness and insularity4 62 so as
to enlarge and highlight the discriminators' target. 46 5 Segregation,
therefore, not only violates democratic pluralism's necessarily egalitavealing "subtle [and] indirect" but nonetheless "severe and difficult manifestations of
both individual and institutional racism [as] a prominent part of American life"). But
see Roper, Racial Tensions Are Down, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1990, at A19, col. 2; Roth,
Social Psychology's "Racism," The Pub. Interest, Winter 1990, at 26, 29.
458. See M.L. King, Jr., Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story 113
(1958) ('Justice and equality, I saw, would never come while segregation remained, because the basic purpose of segregation was to perpetuate injustice and inequality");
Black, supra note 123, at 424-25 & n.15 (segregation in South "a triumph of extreme
racialist over moderate sentiment"); Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1357, 1377.
459. Black, supra note 123, at 427.
460. Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1360.
461. This divide-then-discriminate strategy also facilitates more neutral-seeming,
e.g., "merely" geographic, discrimination. Cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973) (school financing disparities among school districts in
Texas do not violate equal protection clause).
462. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (antimiscegination
laws); Fiss, supra note 49, at 15.
463. See Carter, supra note 8, at 22; Shane, supra note 52, at 1084-85; Yudof,
supra note 100, at 87. Whatever else may be said about one minority's discreteness and
insularity as opposed to another's "diffuseness" and "anonymity," the former characteristics clearly enhance the probability of sustained and organized violence either by or
against the, for those reasons, self-identified, cohesive, visibly different, and physically
separated minority. See Arendt, supra note 172, at 47. CompareJ. Ely, supra note 105,
at 161 ("hostility" and "tendency to stereotype" can be diminished and checked by "increased social intercourse" of different racial groups; appreciating ways in which groups
are not different "is the beginning of political cooperation") with Ackerman, Beyond
Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 731-40 (1985) ("easy to identify groups...
that are not discrete and insular but are nonetheless victims of prejudice").
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rian premise by making disadvantageous allocative distinctions based
upon nothing more than personal differences; it also insists upon the
permanence and visibility of the difference, whether or not the people
disadvantaged thereby choose for themselves to make the disadvantag4 64
ing characteristic definitive of themselves or their good.
It may be true, as Senator Sam Ervin proposed two years after
Brown I, that "man" (or, better, a "man"), may find "his greatest happiness among people of similar cultural, historical, and social background. '4 6 5 And a pluralistic society lets that man harbor and even act
on that belief in his own private sphere. But when that "man" comes to
act as an American "citizen" and incites the political process to keep a
person with a background different from his in "her place" as defined by
her background, then the inference is unavoidable that he, as citizen,
seeks to accord her less respect and concern than he accords persons
sharing his own background, and hence that he has violated the equal
protection principle.
E.

Why Just Intent?

Obviously, my view of the problem in the desegregation cases attends the motivations that lead officials to act and those that lead citizens to incite officials to act: Citizens' effective incitement of official
action and officials' actions themselves violate the equal protection
clause when either the citizens or the officials premise their conduct on
a belief that the individuals disadvantaged thereby are less worthy of
respect and concern than are the citizens or officials themselves, or that
the disadvantaged individuals are not worthy creators of their own values. To this extent, my notion of what is and is not a problem in terms
of the functioning of the political process tracks the motive-centered
analyses of other process-based theorists4 66 and is susceptible
to the
467
same obloquy to which those analyses have been subjected.
464. Segregation thus commits two cardinal antipluralistic sins: It forces blacks to
be defined by their race, and then condemns that characteristic, which many blacks may
wish to include among their defining characteristics, as unworthy. See, e.g., Gewirtz,
Choice, supra note 49, at 747 (contrasting compelled and chosen racial separation);
Walzer, supra note 142, at 62 ("The residential segregation of black Americans is very
different from that of Irish Catholics, WASPs, Jews, and so on;" it is "a great deal less
voluntary and a great deal more thoroughgoing"); see also Ackerman, Constitutional,
supra note 395, at 533-35, 548 (segregation especially onerous because it deployed the
full power of the activist state against blacks, yet, via Plessy, was shielded from constitutional scrutiny as merely "social" bias).
465. Ervin, The Case for Segregation, Look, Apr. 13, 1956, at 32; see also .M.
Walzer, supra note 52, at 222-24 (noting black activists' argument that "most black
Americans would choose to live together, shaping... and controlling [their] local institutions," even if politics were "free of every taint of racism").
466. See, e.g., R. Dworkin, supra note 328, at 66; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale LJ. 1205, 1217-22 (1970); Sunstein,
supra note 105, at 131 n.16, 138-40, 145-50.
467. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 255.
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Nonetheless, when directed at my "equal concern" analysis, that
obloquy seems overstated for three reasons. First, a number of the oftheard complaints about process-oriented intent tests actually are complaints about private-law process-oriented tests-tests that not only require proof that the evil intention of an identifiable wrongdoer have
motivated the action in question but also limit the remedy to redressing
the identifiable harms that the identifiable wrongdoer's invidious actions caused identifiable victims. 4 68 As I demonstrate below, however,
a public-law process-oriented approach sheds the private law's fixation
on actual causation and with it the private law's severe remedial limitations. Under the public-law approach, once the plaintiffs establish that
the offensive motivation has corrupted the political process, they have
proved their public-law case and have established a right to have the
process publicly reformed. 4 69
Second, the "equal concern" test encompasses unconscious racism. Citizens and officials may deprive blacks of equal respect and concern in a number of ways. They may consciously set out to harm blacks
by counting their votes negatively. 4 70 They may ignore black votes that
they know were cast.4 7 ' Or, due to racial stereotypes or a lack of interracial empathy, they may fail to apprehend that, how, or with what intensity blacks are voting-as occurs, for example, when legislators fail
to realize that contemplated legislation would adversely affect black
Americans. 4 7 2 Whatever form the denial of equal concern takes, a seri468. See supra note 262; see also Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 732, 782-83
(causation, not intent, is most important limitation on private-law process-oriented desegregation remedy).
469. See, e.g., infra notes 529-564 and accompanying text. A public-law approach
to motivation also explains and emphasizes what Corrective theory cannot explain, and
what critics of the intent standard typically ignore, namely, that a violation occurs whenever an illicit motivation actually has corrupted the decision making process whether or
not that motivation is the primary, proximate, or but-for cause of the disadvantaging
outcome. E.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 225, 228 (1985); Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 270-71
n.21 (1977); Butts v. City of New York, 779 F.2d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1021 (1986); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400, 411
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); see Ortiz, supra note 123, at 1108-10,
1118; supra note 427; see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1785 &
n.7 (1989) (critical inquiry is whether gender was factor when employment decision
made).
470. See, e.g., Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) ("bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest"); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) (discrimination "made
an end in itself").
471. See, e.g., D. Bell, supra note 2, at 96; R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at 382;J. Ely,
supra note 105, at 82 n.33, 103, 135.
472. See, e.g., J. Ely, supra note 105, at 157; Brest, supra note 104, at 7-8, 14;
Karst, supra note 179, at 48; Lawrence, supra note 134, at 347.
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ous malfunction in the political machinery has occurred 4 73
Third, the "equal concern" approach permits a relatively objective
analysis of legislation and the process that produced it. Under that
analysis, official action is invalidated if it cannot help but convey the
impression that the disadvantaged group is not equally worthy of the
community's respect and concern. Although such an analysis often
would not annul legislation with a disparate impact on one group or
another--given that nearly all governmental action singles out some
individuals to bear a greater burden than others without implying anything negative about the disadvantaged individuals' humanity or standing in the community 474 -on other occasions the only interpretation of
the legislation, in historical context, is that the burdened class is less
worthy of respect than others.
One may reach the conclusion that disrespect-conveying legislation violates the equal protection clause by either of two routes. First,
the impression conveyed by a statute or other action may supply the
best available indication of its maker's or taker's intention. 4 75 This rationale has particular force when what is being inferred from the impressions official action conveys are the motivations of the citizenry as a
whole and not just those of the legislature.
Second, the overriding requirement that legislators treat all persons with equal concern and respect implies, without recourse to motive, that legislation is out of bounds if it in context conveys but one
reasonable interpretation-that members of the disadvantaged class
are less worthy of respect than others. This latter, "cultural meaning" 4 76 or (as I prefer to call it) "public-law motivation" standard captures most of the content of the antisubordination tests that many
scholars have offered as alternatives to the intent test, although it focuses less singlemindedly on the subordinating result of the action as
perceived by the victim and more on the meaning that the legislation
and process that generated it announce or convey to the citizenry at
large.

47 7

473. See Lawrence, supra note 134, at 348 (discussing "possible process-distorting
effects of unconscious racism on a governmental decision").
474. See supra note 376. For example, screening devices for oversubscribed jobs
and individual decisions in regard to the location of subsidized housing by themselves
may not convey a message about the persons disadvantaged thereby, although a pattern
of actions persistently disadvantaging the same group might do so. See, e.g., Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976). But cf. Lawrence, supra note 134, at
357, 365-74 (objective analysis may require different outcome in Arlington Heights and
Washington).
475. See Lawrence, supra note 134, at 324; see also R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at
361 (legislative motivation identified by "set of convictions [that] would provide the best
justification" for the law).
476. Lawrence, supra riote 134, at 324-27.
477. See, e.g., L. Tribe, supra note 434, at 1514-21; Black, supra note 123, at 426;
Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L.
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The Supreme Court's "intentional discrimination" holdings only
erratically "fit" the above analyses of unconscious racism and of legislation's conveyance of a racist message as I would apply those subtests.4 7 8 The Court's ambivalence is explicable, however, by dividing
the Court's intentional discrimination decisions into two categories.
The first category encompasses legislative discrimination, including
school segregation, that the Court understands as presenting a sociostructural or public-law problem. The Court adjudicates "public-law
discrimination" claims by examining the legislation's objective as well
as subjective purpose and by relegating the causation issue to an affirmative, no-causation, defense. The second category includes discrimination that the Court treats as merely a private-law infraction, subject to
strict proof by the plaintiff of subjective intent and at least "but for"
79
causation. 4
Rev. 1003, 1059-60 (1986); Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1377-79; Freeman, supra note
98, at 1070; Freund, The Judicial Process in Civil Liberties Cases, 1975 U. IlL. L.R. 493,
500; Kennedy, supra note 255, at 1419-20; Marcus, supra note 367, at 33-34
(MacKinnon); see also supra note 474 (cases in which public-law and purely outcomefocused tests might reach different results).
478. See Eule, supra note 426, at 1564-65 & n.279 (Court vacillates between
"loose[]' and "miserly" analyses of invidious intent). Compare, e.g., Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960) (invalidating irregular boundary line that almost
perfectly separated blacks from whites) and Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482
(1954) (followed by, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)) (invalidating jury selection procedures that give public officials opportunity to discriminate and
whose "result bespeaks discrimination, whether or not it was a conscious decision on the
part of any individual jury commissioner") and Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I) 347
U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (segregation invalid because it conveys "a feeling of inferiority as
to [blacks'] . . . status in the community") and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (segregation as "badge of servitude") and Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (actions that qualify as an "assertion of...
inferiority") with McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (absent case-specific
evidence identifying actual offending authority, system-wide statistical disparities in capital sentencing based on race of victim do not violate equal protection) and Memphis v.
Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 128-29 (1981) (no violation for city to construct barrier that
stopped traffic between African-American and white neighborhoods) and Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225-26 (1971) (criticized in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 243-48 (1976)) (no violation for city to close swimming pool rather than integrate
it) and sources cited supra note 474 (housing and employment discrimination).
479. Compare cases cited in Ortiz, supra note 123, at 1109-10, 1112 nn.24, 40-41
(decisions falling in first category; public-law treatment) and cases discussed supra note
92 (same) and cases discussed infra notes 481, 483, 543, 556, 560 and accompanying
text (same) with sources cited supra notes 474, 478 (decisions in second category; private-law treatment). Professor Ortiz likewise divides the Court's discrimination cases
into two categories, one made up of voting, jury, and school desegregation cases and the
other employment, housing, and capital punishment cases. See Ortiz, supra note 123, at
1115-32, 1142-45. I am not convinced, however, by Professor Ortiz's explanation of
the two categories as involving, respectively, "fundamental" and "nonfundamental" interests in the traditional equal protection sense: The life and liberty interests at stake in
the capital-punishment context surely fall within the Court's "fundamental" category,
while education is not by the Court's lights "fundamental." See sources cited supra note
138. Moreover, unlike Professor Ortiz, I read the two sets of cases as taking a different
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In particular, the Court's reliance in the former, public-law category of cases on objective indicia of illicit motivation is congenial to
both unconscious-racism and public-law-motivation analyses. 480 So,
too, are the Court's holdings in the school desegregation and other

cases in which a particular governmental process has produced a series
of highly visible, racially nonrandom outcomes that necessarily lead citizens to conclude that members of the disadvantaged minority group
do not receive or deserve the respect that the process accords other

citizens. 4 8 1 Likewise, the test the Court currently uses to answer the

highly analogous "equal concern and respect" questions that arise
under the establishment clause when governmental action distinguishes between members of different religious (as opposed to racial)

groups neatly conforms to the message-conveying or public-law-motivation subtest under discussion here.4 82 Also indicative of the capacity
of the unconscious racism and public-law-motivation subtests to "fit"
the prevailing liability standard are the numerous federal court decisions applying the Supreme Court's "objective indicia of intent" to
reach conclusions consistent with concerns for unconscious racism and
approach not only to intent but also to causation and as choosing between the two approaches on the basis of whether the Court conceives of the discrimination at issue as
embedded in the governmental process-as jury and voter discrimination and school
segregation historically have been-or as simply the occasional lapse of individual decision makers-as the Court currently is disposed to view employment, housing, and capital-punishment discrimination. See sources cited supra notes 474, 478. This same
public-law/private-law distinction also seems to be at work in a couple of recent Title
VII cases in which, by enhancing plaintiffs' causation and intent burdens and eviscerating the disparate-impact cause of action, the Court has sought to move the Title VII
remedy from astride the public-law/private-law divide to a place entirely on the privatelaw side of the line. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2123-25
(1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1798 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
480. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982); Columbus Bd. of Educ.
v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 461-65 & nn.8-12 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-68 (1977).
481. See, e.g., Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623-27; Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton
I/), 443 U.S. 526, 538-40 & nn.9-11 (1979); Columbus, 443 U.S. at 461-65 & nn.8-12;
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 198-205 (1973); Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 345,
347; Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 482; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S 356, 373-74 (1886).
482. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3102, 3119-22,
3124, 3134 (1989) (opinions of Blackmun, O'Connor, Brennan, and Stevens, JJ.) (citing
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-70, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)) (majority of Court favors establishment clause standard focused on whether purpose and impact of statute
"actually conveys a message" that religion or a particular religious belief is favored and
on "whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement"); see also City of
Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 721 (1989) (plurality opinion) (importing
same standard into equal protection analysis of affirmative-action classifications that,
although benign in intention, "may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead
to a politics of racial hostility"); supra notes 379, 387-390 and accompanying text; supra
notes 384, 392, 426-435 (linking nonestablishment and equal protection principles).
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for the message that governmental action disadvantaging minorities
4 83
conveys.
F. Fit Redux
The "equal capacity to choose" principle finds justification in a
number of modem political and legal theories and, particularly, in its
presence at their confluence. But what of the threshold question of fit?
What can be said about the principle's fit with the Constitution and
particularly with section one of its fourteenth amendment? As noted
above, that provision's open-ended language and multifaceted history
forestall definitive judgments about fit.4 84 Nonetheless, the preceeding
discussion permits a number of encouraging observations.
First, the "equal capacity to choose" principle generally fits the
three operative
words in section one---"equal," "protection," and
"state."' 48 5 Indeed, by focusing particular attention on and giving antiperfectionist content to the otherwise vague word "protection," 48 6
the "equal capacity to choose" principle makes good sense out of what
the amendment's framers conceived of as the most important term in
the clause.48 7 Second, by focusing attention on identifying and preserving those republican political processes (in particular, presumptive
483. Identifying the intent analysis in equal protection cases as "objective" or inclusive of unconscious racism are, e.g.: Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928, 943
(l1th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826 (1983); United States v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400, 412-13 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); Oliver v.
Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182-83 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 963 (1975). Relying on foreseeable racially disparate impact that is inexplicable
except in racial terms are, e.g., Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 536 n.9; Columbus, 443 U.S at
461-62; Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66; Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347; Little
Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404, 410 (8th
Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986); Diaz v. SanJose Unified School
Dist., 612 F.2d 411, 414 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 705 F.2d 1129 (1983); United States v.
Unified School Dist. No. 500, 610 F.2d 688, 692 (10th Cir. 1979); Arthur v. Nyquist, 573
F.2d 134, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978); United States v. Texas Educ.
Agency, 564 F.2d 162, 166 (5th Cir. 1977). Relying on various process-focused factors,
listed infra note 550, that are calculated to reveal unconscious racism and the interpretation the citizenry likely will give the legislation are, e.g.: Rogers, 458 U.S. at 622-27;
Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-67; Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d
1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1983); Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925, 929-31 (4th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982); United States v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1110 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); Flores v.
Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875 (1980); Resident
Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 143-44 & n.22 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 908 (1978).
484. See W. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment 71-80, 133-36 (1988); supra
note 362 and accompanying text.
485. See supra notes 363-438 and accompanying text.
486. See supra notes 372-385 and accompanying text.
487. SeeJ. ten Broeck, Equal Under Law 217 (1965); Fiss, supra note 49, at 95-96
& n.16; Karst, supra note 179, at 13-15; Tussman & ten Broeck, The Equal Protection of
the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 342 (1949).
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majoritarianism tempered by the citizen's duty of virtue) that serve as
the best means of achieving liberal-i.e., choice-protecting and enhancing-ends, the "equal respect and concern" understanding conforms
to the basic structure, the intellectual history, and many of the specific
4 88
provisions of the Constitution.
A third consideration is, to my mind, the most convincing: In essence, the interpretation of the clause offered above requires that the
political system treat all individuals, but particularly blacks-being creators of their own values and their own ends-as, in this sense, "fully
human." 4 89 That interpretation conforms directly to the least controversial of all of the clause's possible purposes-namely, to overrule
once and for all Dred Scott's equation in perpetuity of black skin with the
slave's dependent status as less than fully human. 490 Fourth, and to
similar effect, the "equal capacity to choose" gloss on the equal protection clause adheres closely to the meaning that the immediate beneficiaries of the clause-recently emancipated slaves- themselves gave to
their newly enacted, if never ftilly realized, rights.4 9 1 Fifth, the "equal
concern and respect" principle conforms to the language and holding
of the Court's earliest invalidation of governmental conduct under the
equal protection clause, Strauder, and to its most important invalidation
488. See J. Ely, supra note 105, at 77-101 (cataloguing constitutional provisions
designed to protect the political process); infra notes 591-594, 601 and accompanying
text (giving examples of those provisions). But see Lynch, Book Review, 80 Colum. L.
Rev. 857, 860-62 (1980) (reviewingJ. Ely, supra note 105).
489. Lawrence, supra note 134, at 350.
490. See Ackerman, Constitutional, supra note 395, at 509; Karst, supra note 179,

at 12-13; Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 Rutgers L. Rev. 387,
391-93 (1967); supra notes 439-441 and accompanying text.

491. See E. Foner, supra note 439, at 77-119. To freed men and women, equality
before the law meant more than ending legalized separation of families and punishment
by the lash and encompassed the full accouterments of "individual and collective autonomy"-what a South Carolina freedmen's convention called the right to "'develop our
whole being by all the appliances that belong to civilized society' "-including the right
to travel when and where they saw fit; to choose their own names; to dress as they
pleased; to conduct political, social, and religious meetings unfettered by white surveillance and white definitions of orthodoxy; to satisfy a "seemingly unquenchable thirst for
education"; and to practice subsistence agriculture on their own plots of land as the best

means of achieving "a measure of choice as to whether, when, and under what circumstances to enter the labor market," notwithstanding that cash crops grown on the white
man's larger plots might have been more lucrative for themselves and the white man.
Id. The "equal capacity to chose" gloss also adheres to a meaning blacks gave the rights
they sought in the Civil Rights Movement. SeeJ. Baldwin, supra note 439, at 22 ("The
Black demand . . . for desegregation [was] a demand that one be treated as a human
being and not like a mule, or a dog."); M.L. King, Letter from Birmingham CityJail, in A
Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr. 293 (J.
Washington ed. 1986) ("when your first name becomes 'nigger' and your middle name becomes
'boy' .. . and your last name becomes 'John,' and... when you are forever fighting a
degenerating sense of 'nobodiness'; then you will understand why we find it difficult to
wait").
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since then, Brown 1.492 Sixth, the principle fits the Court's motive-centered analysis in the desegregation decisions. 4 93 Finally, the principle
better fits the terms and history of the clause than the equal educational
opportunity, integration, redistribution, individually focused correction, and quasi-utilitarian principles underlying other desegregation
theories.
What, then, is to be made of the evidence that most of the legislators who passed upon the fourteenth amendment believed that it did
not forbid racial segregation? 4 94 My first answer parallels Brown's answer.4 95 The point is not the one usually attributed to Brown, however-that the practice of public education was virtually unknown in
1868 and, thus, could not have been on the drafters' minds. 496 Rather,
the point is that the practice of public education that could have been on
the drafters' minds is not the practice that the Court actually reviewed
in Brown. In the earlier period, citizen and state participation in "public
education" was voluntary and at best erratic, and the state's role was
essentially proprietary. As of 1954, by contrast, citizen and state participation had become compulsory and universal and the state's role all
but plenary. 49 7 It takes only a modest expansion of modem views of
the constitutionally unregulated "social" sphere to immunize the earlier practice.4 98 On the other hand, even the drafters' premodern vi492. See supra notes 355-356.
493. See sources cited supra notes 426, 470, 480, 481, 483.
494. Compare R. Bork, The Tempting of America 76 (1990) ("Brown is consistent
with [and even] . . . compelled by, the original understanding of the equal protection
clause") and Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 59-60 (1955) (Brown I consistent with intent of fourteenth amendment's framers) with R. Berger, Government by Judiciary 118-19, 191-92 (1977) ("impossible to conclude" that fourteenth amendment framers "intended that segregation
be abolished") and Monaghan, supra note 103, at 723 (quoting Tribe, How Relevant Is
'Original Intent' Doctrine?, Legal Times, Dec. 22, 1986, at 12, col. 1) (" 'those who
wrote and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment believed that it would permit racial segregation in public schools' ") W. Nelson, supra note 484, at 133-36 (individual congressmen divided on desirability of.school segregation; congressional debates did not
consider issue; some opponents and proponents of amendment during ratification debates assumed it forbade school segregation; during Reconstruction, Congress funded
Washington D.C.'s segregated schools but defeated amendment to 1875 Civil Rights Act
permitting racially separate schools).
495. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1954).
496. See Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 80 (1985) (O'Connor,J., concurring) (citing Brown I). But see Monaghan, supra note 103, at 728 (criticizing Brown I).
497. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493 & n.4; Ackerman, Constitutional, supra note 395,
at 533 & n.164 (citing authority); see also id. at 531-35 (not only educational practices
but also realization of state's power to affect private choices expanded between Plessy
and Brown I); supra note 156 (nearly all modem state constitutions include requirements that states provide free public education to all); infra note 735 (plenary public
role in operating or regulating modem public schools).
498. Compare Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) (no
"state action" in state's regulating private utility) and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163, 177 (1972) (no "state action" in state's licensing of discriminatory private
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sion of the constitutionally controlled
"civil" sphere probably would
499
encompass the later practice.
A second answer lies in the now infamous but at that time, let us
assume, sincere passage in Plessy v. Ferguson in which the majority acknowledged that a legislative "badge of inferiority" would indeed violate the equal protection clause but concluded that no such
advertisement accompanied "separate but equal" segregation. 50 0
Granting likewise that most of the fourteenth amendment's ratifiers sincerely believed that the provision's underlying principle did not extend
to segregation, we also may grant that many of them held that opinion
for the same reason as the Plessy majority: they believed that legislators
could enact segregation statutes without intending thereby to convey,
and without generally conveying, a message inconsistent with the
amendment's underlying "equal respect and concern" principle.5 0 1
Whatever the truth of that essentially factual, and doubtless psychologically naive, 50 2 assertion when the fourteenth amendment's framers and
the Plessy majority made it, the fact is that by 1954, and certainly today,
no such empirical assertion reasonably may be made about the myriad
legislative and administrative actions that are necessary on a daily basis
50 3
to maintain and operate racially segregated schools.
clubs) with Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723-24 (1961) ("state
action" in state's construction and maintenance of building occupied by privately owned
restaurant that excluded African-Americans). See generally supra note 392 (distinguishing constitutionally regulated "political" sphere from constitutionally unregulated "social" and "private" spheres).
499. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) (fourteenth amendment assures "political," not "social" equality); Ackerman, Constitutional, supra note 395, at
533-35 (contrasting premodern and modern views of public sphere); Collins, "Economic Rights," Implied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 Geo.
LJ. 1493, 1501-02 & nn.53-56, 1505, n.68 (1989) (post-Reconstruction Court's conception of protected "civil" and "political" spheres and the unprotected "social"
sphere).
500. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (quoted supra note 215).
501. See R. Bork, supra note 494, at 75-76, 82; W. Nelson, supra note 484, at
186-87.
502. See Lawrence, supra note 134, at 319-20.
503. See Black, supra note 123, at 421-30. Two principles are advanced here:
First, the framers' understanding at a relatively high level of abstraction of a highly abstract clause trumps conclusions that the framers may have reached, willy nilly, about the
principle's application to particular situations that are not, in terms, discussed in the
provision. See, e.g., R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at 359-63; J. Ely, supra note 105, at
118-19; Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. Rev.
204, 209-12, 222-23 (1980); Karst, supra note 4, at 14; see also Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1129, 1140 (1986) ("second order
preferences" may trump "first order preferences"). It may well be, for example, that
"the public understanding of the language," Monaghan, supra note 103, at 725, of the
first amendment's free exercise clause when the nation adopted it was that Christians or
adherents of "western" religions were protected but that polytheistic Hindus were not.
Yet, should the case arise today, it would be senseless to require the litigants to determine what James Madison, Patrick Henry, and the average yeoman farmer thought of
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What Is the Problem? Redux

What the passages quoted earlier from Strauder and Brown I suggest as a matter of decisional law, the consensuses described above affirm as a matter of acceptable principle: By allowing racism in the
political system, we reject a critical self-preservative premise of a liberal, pluralistic, and presumptively democratic state-namely, the philosophical idea, common to much modem political theory, that in a just
and well-ordered but heterogeneous society, the political system and
each one of us acting in and through it must treat every human being,
simply because she is a human being and is capable of generating her
own values, as the moral equal of every other human being. For a thoroughly plural society to function democratically, that is, there must be a
mutually recognized and protected equality among citizens based on
each citizen's right and ability to be different. For pluralism to work,
there must be a right to be plural-to be different-without for that
reason being deemed inferior and made worse off in civil society. Absent a mutually recognized and protected assumption of equality in the
political affairs of the pluralistic state-were it, for example, permissible
for the majority to attempt to impose its particular features or its vision
of the good as the standard by which to measure everyone else's share
of public security and support 5 4-either our plurality, or more likely
our state, would disappear.
Regarding the same point from the perspective of the individual,
not the process: Each of us has a vision of ourselves and of our good
that makes us different from the next person and that, we may even
think, makes us (spiritually, for example) more worthy than that person.
In order to protect our freedom to hold that belief, however, and to
pursue our own idiosyncratic good, we find it necessary, when we act
together through our political institutions, to undertake to forego asserting our or our life plan's superiority. Instead, insofar as we are acting not as persons but as citizens, we undertake to strip ourselves down
to our lowest common political denominator-our uniform ability to be
different, to have our own vision of the good, but also to tolerate each
other's visions to the extent necessary to allow sufficient social cooperaHinduism. For by now it is clear that what the first amendment framers meant by "religion" includes all persuasions, just as it is clear by now that the category of "unequal
respect" includes segregation. See supra note 389.
Second, times change, and so do the facts. Hence, the framers' uncodified assumptions of historical or even legislative fact-for example, that citizens and legislators can
insist upon racial segregation without thereby intending or conveying a "badge of inferiority"---should not bind interpretation decades and even centuries later about how the
provisions' underlying principle at whatever level of abstraction applies in particular
cases. But see Monaghan, supra note 103, at 728; Sandalow, supra note 121, at 1168;
Smith, supra note 389, at 960-62.
504. See supra notes 376, 385; supra note 474 and accompanying text (responding
to claim that majorities via morals and market-replacing legislation frequently impose
values on others).
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tion so that we may be secure in pursuing our own good. Hence, we
agree in our political lives to refrain from any effective action premised
or justified on the ground that some distinguishing characteristic of a
citizen, or of her particular life plan, makes her inferior to the rest of us.
Historically, the principal way in which this nation has deviated
from its commitment to equal respect and concern has been its treatment of its black inhabitants. In maintaining a racially subordinating
stance, our polity has taken extreme measures that it has applied to no
other group with such sustained intensity, including the endorsement
of enslavement, the authoritative declaration that blacks-"free" or enslaved-were less than human, and a century following of legalized internment of blacks north and south in "position[s] of walled off
inferiority." 50 5 From time to time, the rendering of African-Americans
as the official "other"-the normatively bad, "docile," "emotional," or
"unintelligent" half of the dichotomous pair whose normatively good
side everyone else united in forming-provided bonds that held otherwise ethnically, socially, and economically pluralistic white society together. 50 6 The Civil War showed once and for all, however, how
tenuous are bonds fashioned out of an official ideology of unequal respect and concern. Since the Civil War, therefore, the nation has been
committed in legal principle-and, for the last third of a century, in intermittent practice-to forging a new kind of bond, one that recognizes
our plurality as our strength and not as our republican achilles heel,
our diversity as our unifying characteristic, our opposing values as the
product of our homogenizing ability to give value, and our capacity to
be and to choose to be different as the definitive way in which we are
all, solidaristically, the same.
Critical to the cohesiveness and stability of a polity necessarily
united by this seeming paradox is a trade, an accommodation codified
in the fourteenth amendment's words "equal," "protection," and
"state." To preserve our definitive capacity to choose our own-even
exclusionary-values and projects as private persons, we commit ourselves when we act as public citizens to a "typically American" form of
civic virtue which demands that, in our role as "the state," we respect
and protect equally the persons that all others are and have chosen to
be. To preserve our right to free exercise in the private sphere, that is,
we commit ourselves to nonestablishment in the public sphere.
Understood this way, the problem in the desegregation cases is not
simply that the government has insulted some individuals, however offensive that is. Rather, the most fundamental and threatening problem
505. Black, supra note 123, at 427. The polity's "unequal capacity to choose"
stance towards blacks is best reflected, perhaps, by considering the group whose current
treatment best mirrors the historical treatment of blacks-convicted felons, whom society by law stigmatizes, separates from itself, deprives of political participation, and brutalizes in numerous more or less conscious and violent ways.
506. See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
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presented in these cases is that the political system, in its day-to-day
decision making with regard to who gets what, has repudiated this accommodation and corrosively undertaken to process and act uponi.e., to "establish"-the citizenry's or the legislators' belief that some
persons in society are not fully human, are not equally worthy creators
of their own values, and are not, in sum, deserving of equal concern
and respect. As Hannah Arendt wrote after President Eisenhower dispatched federal troops to Little Rock to protect a few African-American
children seeking to enroll at the city's formerly all-white Central High,
the "United States is not a nation-state in the European sense and
never was;" the "principle of its political structure is, and always has
been, independent of a homogenous population and of a common
past"; hence the nation's survival is "only due" to "its all-comprehensive, typically American form [of] equality [which] possesses an enormous power to equalize what by nature and origin is different." "The
point at stake, therefore, is not the well-being of the Negro population
50 7
alone, but, at least in the long run, the survival of the Republic."
There are a couple of important consequences of viewing the
school segregation problem in this legislative-racism light. First, the
perspective helps us to see just how systemic the problem really is. The
problem is thoroughly so. To begin with, legislative racism entails not
only a raft of dignitary, educational, and other harms to one group of
citizens caused by the process, but also a devastating harm to the process. Indeed, it entails as fundamental a "structural" defect in a pluralistic political system as is imaginable because, by establishing a "we are
better than they" orthodoxy, it denies the validity of plurality and corrodes the nonestablishment principle that lies at the core of our pluralistic political system.
Second, the legislative-racism perspective forces us to acknowledge how far backwards, as well as forwards, in the political process the
unjust racist opinion intervenes. In its worst form, 50 8 legislative racism
is not merely the aberrational corruption of a classroom by a teacher
here, of a set of schools by a superintendent there, or even of the year's
attendance plan by the school board throughout the district. Rather, in
its most virulent form, legislative racism means that the racist opinion is
intervening in the political process at hundreds of places at the level of
the constituency-i.e., that the racist behavior on the part of public officials is "representative," in the full republican sense, of a deeper and
wider antipluralist malady among the citizenry. However diligently and
even creatively officials carry out their racially-corrupted public charge,
the before-the-fact impulse and after-the-fact acceptance come democratically and ubiquitously from below.
Not only does this latter view of the problem underscore its sys507. Arendt, supra note 172, at 47-48.
508. See infra notes 529-564 and accompanying text.
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temic seriousness by revealing the breadth as well as the self-destructive nature of the corruption. In addition, it leads to the realization that
a constituency capable of politically working its racially corrupted will
through, say, a teacher, a superintendent, or a school board also very
likely will endeavor to advance its antipluralistic goals through
whatever other governmental agents may find it necessary or at least
politic to respond to that will. In its worst forms, therefore, segregative
racist legislation embodies a deep processual harm: It corrupts the pluralistic political system from its constituent base to its legislative apex,
and does so by way of an outcome-determining mode of "we, as such,
are better than they" political discourse that, in its historical and emotional intensity, as well as through its denial of the validity of pluralism
itself, is so highly corrosive that it threatens ultimately to shut down the
political system entirely.
I realize, of course, that this approach is seriously "accusatory. "509
For that reason, the application of the theory as a basis for judicial intervention commensurate with the seriousness of the problem it perceives warrants a good deal of caution and circumspection. As we
proceed, I hope to apply such caution and circumspection in my own
analysis and to show that the Court has abundantly adhered to those
qualities in its decisions in this area.
Notice how this simultaneously public-law and process-oriented
definition of the problem in the desegregation cases diverges from that
assumed by the competing theories discussed earlier. As developed
here, the problem is not simply the Equal Educational Opportunity theory's concern for educational harms in the public schools nor the Prohibition or Correction theories' private-law peeve regarding the fact or
effects of an occasional official's discriminatory wrong. Rather, the
problem is a far more "public" and processually pervasive one than
each of those theories contemplates, although one that encompasses
many of their concerns. Nor, on the other hand, is the problem perceived as a threat to some controversially product-focused Equal Educational outcome or to some Universalist-Redistributivist-Integrationist
ideal posed by the nation's lack of sufficient social, ethnic, or economic
homogeneity. Instead, the problem is perceived as something like
those potentially perfectionist ideals' opposite-namely, a threat to the
pluralistic ideal.
Finally, although the public-law, process-focused definition of the
problem outlined here remains closest to that offered by Professor
Dworkin in his rendering of the Prophylaxis theory, my derivation of a
citizen- and representative-focused "equal concern" principle from an
emerged liberal-republican consensus improves upon Professor
509. See Karst, supra note 255, at 1165-66. The approach here is more accusatory

than most because it focuses on current as well as past discrimination and directs the

accusation not only against public servants but also the public. It is less accusatory be-

cause the blame is collective not individual. See Lawrence, supra note 134, at 325-26.
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Dworkin's derivation of a similar but solely representative-focused
principle from a tenuously modified utilitarianism. Thus, we are ineluctably drawn to the other question that, as was noted earlier, the Prophylaxis theory cannot answer: Why is desegregation the solution?
IV.

WHAT'S THE SOLMTrON?

A. If It Is Broke, How Should We Fix It?
Before answering the question that closed the last section, let me
pose a more abstract one. Suppose a given society depends upon a
large and complex machine to allocate and distribute certain important
societal goods in a just manner. Suppose also that the machine's myriad valves, joints, and seals make it susceptible to sabotage at the hands
of a large and powerful group of citizens who are able to infuse the
system with a corrosive agent that not only causes the machine to allocate and distribute more goods to them than they deserve but also increases the likelihood of sabotage by other groups seeking to reclaim
their proper share of goods, threatens to contaminate the machine's
output, and risks eventually shutting down the machine. Suppose, finally, that the society's Constitution entrusts its Supreme Court with
authority to inspect, maintain, and repair the allocative-distributive
the machine functions according
machine and generally to assure that
5 10
to the Constitution's specifications.
Presented with this problem, the Court has several alternatives,
ranging from a tune up or other routine maintenance, to overhaul or
substitution of a new but identical unit, to all-out redesign and replacement. Three factors come to mind that might induce the Court to
choose the "redesign" option notwithstanding its high transition and
operating costs:
510. Although snuck in as an embellishment on a "hypothetical," this representation ofjudicial review accurately reflects my view of the matter. To put a well-ventilated
conclusion as succinctly as possible: Because the political process may be the problem,
that process cannot be left to decide whether there is a problem and, if so, how to solve
it. Rather, trouble-shooting and reparative tasks are more appropriately assigned to an
authority removed from the political process and competent both to assess the process's
conformity with the Constitution's "equal concern" principle and to remedy any nonconformity found. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53
n.4 (1938); B. Ackerman, supra note 122, at 310-12; J. Choper, supra note 216, at
67-70; R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at 375;J. Ely, supra note 105, at 73-104; The Federalist No. 81, at 483 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also R. Dahl, supra note
369, at 58 (Supreme Court as "deus ex machina that regularly saves American democracy
from itself"); Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 Pol. Theory 379, 384 (1981) (philosophically acceptable role ofjudicial review in democratic theory and practice). What I
add to prior thinking on the point, besides my both more and less liberally economized
view of the republican trouble being shot, see supra Section III.B, is a theory of processual repair that is lacking in other process-oriented conceptions, see infra notes
579-590, 597 and accompanying text.
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* The consequences of the machine's malfunctioning are
great.
• The citizenry's propensity for sabotage is great, and either
(a) the machine frequently has succumbed to that sabotage
in the past and efforts to sabotage-proof the machine
through maintenance, repairs, or overhaul historically have
not succeeded; (b) virtually all of the machine's many working parts are susceptible to sabotage; or (c) both.
* A viable, alternative design exists that is either (a) less susceptible to sabotage, (b) more likely to dampen the citizenry's desire or willingness to commit sabotage, or (c)
both. For this factor to be present, the new design's expense in terms of transitionally and operationally forfeited
resources must be justified by the degree to which the new
design diminishes the harmful effects of sabotage projected
in the first factor above, multiplied by the likelihood of successful sabotage projected in the second factor.
In the next section, I show that the problem posed by the desegregation cases is serious enough in its harmful societal consequences and
in its ubiquity and intractability to satisfy the first two conditions above
calling for processual redesign-or, as I shall call it here, for "reforming" or "reconstructing" the system. In the section following, I
set forth ideal specifications for reforming the system along the lines
required by the third condition above. Part V then shows that all-out
desegregation satisfies those ideal specifications, and, accordingly, the
third condition, by providing-although regrettably only "in the field
of public education"-a redesign of the political system that is sufficiently immune to racist sabotage and sufficiently likely to forestall such
sabotage in the future to justify its costs.
B.

Is It Broke Enough to Fix?

In Part III, I demonstrated why legislative racism in the form of
segregation is a serious, potentially life-threatening affliction of the
body politic. In doing so, however, I limited that characterization to
legislative racism "in its worst" or "most virulent" form. This section
explains why I think the problem framed by the desegregation cases
presents the worst-case situation and, as such, why the problem satisfies
the first two prerequisites for a reformative solution-namely, that the
antipluralist malfunctioning of the political process be both perilous
and persistent. My point of departure is the last Part's implication that
the systemic harms caused by legislative racism are the more dangerous-both to blacks and to the pluralistic political system itself-the
deeper the racist opinion is shown to have permeated down to and
through the constituency, the more widely it is shown to have pervaded
the various agencies of government, and the longer it has persisted in
doing both. I conclude below that the Court's desegregation remedy is
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best understood as being triggered by proof of harms ofjust this espedally pernicious, i.e., deep, wide, and lengthy sort.
1. Is History Relevant? - We begin with history. For historically,
this nation has gone well beyond the "simple fact" of racism to racism
as a culture, a way of life. 5 1 ' Without retelling that story, I make three
historiographical points: First, hardly any observer has addressed the
equal protection question over the last thirty-five years without concluding that, taken in the context of American history, any clear pattern
of state-sponsored racial separation raises at the very least an abnormally high "antecedent probability of corruption" in the political process. 5 12 Second, a number of those observers,Justice Powell andJudge
Wisdom included, have made convincing arguments that American history makes the antecedent probability of legislative racism high enough
when it comes to school segregation to justify dispensing with the formalities, assuming that official racism played a role in creating segre5 15
gated conditions, and judicially imposing a nonsegregative result.
Third, in their roles as historians, the federal courts have borne out the
empirical judgment underlying both the preceding points: An informal
review of West's FederalDigest and the Race Relations Law Reporter reveals
a remarkably high proportion of cases-probably over ninety percentin which plaintiff school children, state and local human rights agencies, and prior to the last two administrations, the Department of justice and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)/
Department of Education brought suit against one or more local school
districts and succeeded in convincing a trial or an appellate court that
at least one of the defendants had segregated the schools
5 14
intentionally.
Nonetheless, even a ten percent error rate counsels cautionhence my earlier promise to proceed cautiously, and to show that the
Supreme Court has proceeded cautiously, before making the intensely
accusatory judgments necessary to justify reconstructing the political
process as intensively as I intend to show desegregation reconstructs it.
There are two ways in which the Supreme Court's desegregation decisions may be seen to have insisted--quite cautiously-upon proof of
deep, wide, and lengthy racist corruption of state and local political
511. See supra notes 439-465 and accompanying text.
512. See Dworkin, supra note 104, at 28-29; accord Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112, 126-27 (1970); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948);J. Ely, supra note 105, at
153 n.64, 161 n.*, 169; Black, supra note 123, at 423; Fiss, supra note 61, at 210-11;
Lawrence, supra note 8, at 50-56; see also supra note 148 (collecting sources contend.
ing that America's racist past justifies assumption that invidious discrimination motivates
virtually all governmental decisions that result in racial segregation).
513. See, e.g., R. Dworkin, supra note 330, at 237-38; supra note 148.
514. See also F. Welch & A. Light, supra note 6, at 4, 40 & Table 12 (in large
sample of school districts in nation, 87%o had mandated school desegregation plan in
effect between 1968 and 1984); G. Orfield, supra note 98, at 108-12 (discussing role of

HEW).
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processes governing schools before concluding that those processes
were suffused with antipluralist afflictions of sufficient magnitude and
intractability to warrant reformation.
2. Massive Resistance. - The Court's decisions reflect a cautiously
arrived at conclusion of pervasive political corruption, first, in their historical progression-a progression that reflects a Court reluctant in
principle to believe, but unable on proof to blink, the worst about racism's permeation of the political processes governing southern schools.
Recall that the Court in Brown I refrained from issuing any remedial order at all, setting the matter down for oral argument again and
allowing a year to pass before issuing the "vague" remedial order in
Brown 11.515 Although requiring local school boards to make a "prompt
and reasonable start toward full compliance" with the Court's order to
"admit black children to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory
basis," Brown II invited local officials to determine for themselves how
and when to comply based on their own "good faith" assessments of
"the public interest." 5 16 Recent analyses of previously unavailable documents indicate, moreover, that the Court intended its "all deliberate
speed" directive to "signal flexibility"-apparently on the theory that
"gradualism and time" would lead naturally to the repeal of an earlier
period's explicitly racialist laws, thence to acceptance of, and compliance with, the Court's mandate that political processes be rid of racial
5 17
prejudice.
In the decade after Brown 11, neither acceptance nor compliance,
neither "good faith" efforts to remove explicitly segregative policies
nor any apparent "public interest" in doing so, surfaced anywhere in
the South. Instead, explicitly and virulently racist massive resistance
was the order of the day at every level of state and local government.
This story, too, is oft-told. 5 18 Recalling a fragment of it, however, reminds us of the enlightening and embittering education the Supreme
Court underwent after Brown in regard to the amplitude of southern
racism, as a generation of southern black children was systematically
thwarted in its efforts to secure an integrated education for itself. Consider, then, the thoughts and emotions that may have lain beneath Justice Black's precise and passionless recitation of the facts of Grifin v.
515. SeeJ. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 61-77.
516. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 295, 300 (1955).
517. Gewirtz, Remedies, supra note 49, at 610, 625; accord id. at 610 n.59 (citing
authorities); Elman & Silber, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and
Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 817, 827-31,
842-43 (1987).
518. See, e.g., N. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance 97-81, 237-50 (1969); A.
Lewis, Portrait of a Decade: The Second American Revolution 32-45, 208-10 (1964);
G. Orfield, supra note 98, at 102-50; H. Rogers & C. Bullock, Law and Social Change:
Civil Rights Laws and Their Consequences 69-111 (1972);J. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at
24, 51-52, 61-127; F. Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance 41-70(1973); Heaney,
supra note 49, at 765-68.
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County School Board 5 19 a decade and a week after Brown I:
This litigation began in 1951 when a group of Negro
school children living in Prince Edward County, Virginia, filed
a complaint... alleging that they had been denied admission
to public schools attended by white children ....
[After Brown I and Brown II, e]fforts to desegregate Prince

Edward County's schools met with resistance. In 1956... the
Virginia Constitution was amended to authorize the General
Assembly and local governing bodies to appropriate funds to
assist students to go ...

to nonsectarian private schools, in

addition to those owned by the State or by the locality. The
General Assembly met in special session and enacted legislation to close any public schools where white and colored children were enrolled together, to cut off state funds to such
schools, to pay tuition grants to children in nonsectarian private schools, and to extend state retirement benefits to teachers in newly created private schools ....

In April 1959 the

General Assembly abandoned "massive resistance" to desegregation and turned instead to what was called a "freedom of
choice" program.... At the same time the Assembly repealed
Virginia's compulsory attendance laws and instead made
school attendance a matter of local option.... Having as early
as 1956 resolved that they would not operate public schools
"wherein white and colored children are taught together," the
Supervisors of Prince Edward County refused to levy any
school taxes for the 1959-1960 school year, explaining that
they were "confronted with a court decree which requires the
admission of white and colored children to all the schools of
the county without regard to race or color." As a result, the
county's public schools did not reopen in the fall of 1959 and
have remained dosed ever since ....

A private group, the

Prince Edward School Foundation, was formed to operate private schools for white children in Prince Edward County and,
having built its own school plant, has been operating ever
since the closing of the public schools.5 20
Thirteen years of black struggle for integrated schools-eight without
integration, five without schools.
In 1964, over ninety-eight percent of the African-American children in the South still attended all-black schools, most in districts that
resolutely refused even to propose removal of explicitly segregative
mandates. 5 21 Although the Court announced in Griffin that "[t]he time
519. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
520. Id. at 220-23. Elsewhere, the pattern recurred-often with a leaven of violence. E.g., Heaney, supra note 49, 765-68; seeJ. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 45, 61,
78-84, 120-22, 97-102 (for "generation of black children in the South," Brown I
"scarcely mattered").
521. U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Fulfilling the Letter and Spirit of the Law: Desegregation of the Nation's Public Schools 4 (1976); accordJ. Wilkinson, supra note 1,
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for mere 'deliberate speed' ha[d] run out,"5 2 2 and four years later in
Green required plans that "promise[] realistically to work now," 5 23 it was
not until the Court5 24held twice during the 1969-1970 school year that
"now" meant now
that black children began attending school with
white children in appreciable numbers throughout the South. 525 Thus,
although it took southern communities only a couple of years to finish
desegregating their schools, it took over a decade and a half to force
them to begin.
Before deciding Green and the 1969-1970 cases inaugurating the
modem "all-out desegregation" era, therefore, the Supreme Court exhibited a surfeit of caution, circumspection, and patience. It did so, apparently, on the assumption that the extreme and widespread racism of
a bygone era that had necessitated passage of the fourteenth amendment and brought forth Jim Crow would slowly but naturally give way,
nearly a century later, to a more mature political process capable of
functioning without the antipluralistic "white over black" assumption.
What the Court found instead was a continuation, perhaps an intensification, of historical racism at a constituent depth, at an intergovemmental breadth, and over a decade-and-a-half, no-end-in-sight length
that more than sufficiently justified concluding both that the political
process governing public education was dangerously antipluralistic to
the core and that reparative efforts should give way to reconstructive
5 26
ones, assuming a viable reconstructive remedy could be found.
The scholarly literature has tended to treat the impact of Massive
at 65 (as of 1962, "not a single Negro attended white schools or colleges in Mississippi,
Alabama, or South Carolina").
522. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 234. The Court rued the slow pace of compliance in, e.g.,
Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965) (per curiam); Goss v. Board of Educ.,

373 U.S. 683, 689 (1963).
523. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
524. Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 290, 291 (1970);
Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam).
525. See supra note 5. HEW threats to cut off federal funds under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 prompted large numbers of southern districts to begin desegregating in the
mid-1960s and to finish doing so in the early 1970s. See G. Orfield, supra note 98, at
108-18. Where something called "desegregation" occurred prior to Green, it generally
took the form of "freedom-of-choice" plans under which the first few African-American
children to exercise the option to transfer to previously all-white schools were met with
more or less officially sanctioned retaliation and violence, and no whites invoked the
option to transfer to previously all-black schools. See, e.g., Monroe v. Board of
Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 457 (1968); Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443, 446 (1968);
Green, 391 U.S. at 441-42; U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Southern School Desegregation, 1966-1967, at 45-69, 88 (1967); Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 735-54; see
alsoJ. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 78 (four stages of desegregation: "absolute defiance,"
1955-1959; "token compliance," 1959-1964; "modest integration," 1964-1968; "massive integration," 1968-present).
526. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1971)
("[d]eliberate resistance" part of justification for "systemwide"-violation finding and
"systemwide"-remedy order).
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Resistance on the Supreme Court's developing desegregation jurisprudence as an "embarrassment"-likening the Court's behavior to an intimidated parent's fearful response to a persistently ill-behaved
child. 52 7 In my view, however, the Massive Resistance era served a critical, if disheartening, function. It confirmed what a dispassionate reading of the nation's history already suggested, but what a cautious Court
would not accept by presumption: that the infection of the political
process in the South by the racist opinion was wide, deep, and long;
that racially demeaning segregation represented neither the dead hand
of Jim Crow nor simply the demagoguery of a few retrograde politicians but the considered and heartfelt choice of recurring majorities of
the region's white citizenry; that, in Green's most famous phrase, antipluralist politics permeated the political system's "root and branch"
5 28
and accordingly required root-and-branch reconstruction.
3. System-Wide, System-Deep, and System-Long Violations. - In the
1970s, the Court's attention increasingly was diverted from the rural
South, as in Gnifn and Green, to urban areas in the South and especially
the North and West, as in Swann, Keyes, Milliken, Dayton, and Columbus.
By now, the Court not only had the nation's unrelentingly racialist history to guide its interpretive judgment about the depth, breadth, and
length of racism's contamination of state and local political processes
but also overwhelming proof that the still visible symptoms of that history were not truly vestigial, to use another of the Court's famous desegregation metaphors, but rather were signs of a festering root and
branch malignancy. Moreover, as early as Brown I the Court had good
reason to suspect that the racist opinion infected local and state political systems throughout the country: The Brown defendants filed a
state-by-state survey revealing explicitly segregative legislation in the
past and often the present of virtually every one of the forty-eight
States;5 2 9 the consolidated cases in Brown presented the question of the
527. J. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 65, 100-01; accord Freeman, supra note 98, at
1081; see, e.g., R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at 391; Bell, supra note 8, at 100; Black, The
Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 3, 22 (1970); Carter, The
Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 237, 246 (1968); Yudof, supra note
61, at 456.
528. Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38 (school boards operating dual systems have "affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch"). Although often
cited Correctively, Green's "root and branch" metaphor speaks not to the effects but to
the process or "system" of discrimination.
529. See Segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment in the States: A Survey of
State Segregation Laws, 1865-1953, Prepared for the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board
ofEducation (B. Reams, Jr. & P. Wilson eds. 1975); see also Beckett v. School Bd., 308 F.
Supp. 1274, 1311-15 (E.D. Va. 1969) (quoted in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S.
189, 228 n.12 (1973) (PowellJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) ("Only as to
the states of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Washington, Nevada, and Hawaii does it
appear from this nonexhaustive research that no discriminatory laws appeared on the
books at one time or another.").
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legality of segregation in Kansas and Delaware as well as Virginia and
South Carolina;5 3 0 and the Brown I decision itself noted that the "separate but equal schools" doctrine originated in an 1850 Massachusetts
SupremeJudicial Court decision, and pointedly commented that segregation "persisted" in the North and "has long been a nationwide prob'
lem, not merely one of sectional concern. "531
These suspicions were confirmed by the early 1970s, given the bythen conclusive historical treatment of segregation's invention in and
permeation of the North before it traveled South,53 2 the success of
HEW and private plaintiffs in demonstrating dejure segregation in the
North, 53 3 and other data showing, in Justice Powell's words, that the
"history of state-imposed segregation is ... widespread in our country"
and makes it "probable that all racial segregation, wherever occurring
and whether or not confined to the schools, has at some time been supported or maintained by government action." 53 4 As Justice Powell
asked: "'IfNegro and white parents in Mississippi are required to bus
their children... [because] of past dejure segregation. . . , should not
the same reasoning apply in Gary, Indiana, where no more than five
years before Brown the same practice existed?' ,,535
Nonetheless, despite the importunings in Keyes of the plaintiffs and
amici curiae and ofJustices Powell and Douglas to recognize thefact of
segregation "wherever occurring" as sufficient evidence of racialist
contamination of local and state political processes, a majority of the
Court once again took a more cautious approach. 53 6 The Keyes Court
limited the availability of "all-out desegregation" to cases involving
proof of a "deliberate racial segregation policy" with respect to a sufficiently "substantial portion of the district" to "constitute[] the entire
... school system a dual... system."' 53 7 When that finding is made, the
Court continued, "as in cases involving statutory dual systems, the
school authorities have an affirmative duty 'to effectuate a transition to
530. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 486-87 (1954).
531. Id. at 491 n.6 (discussing Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198,
200 (1849)); accord Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4-5 (1883) (four of five racial discrimination cases arose outside South); L. Litwack, North of Slavery 97-103, 114-23,
132-49 (1961); Dimond, supra note 123, at 54-56.
532. See C. Woodward, supra note 62, at 17-21.
533. See sources cited in Dimond, supra note 123, at 11-14.
534. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 228 & n.12 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
535. Id. at 228-29 (quoting Goodman, supra note 104, at 297); accord id. at 216
(Douglas, J., concurring); sources cited supra note 148.
536. See supra note 148. More particularly, although the Court did not set a standard so accusatory that America's racist past could not satisfy it (assuming such a standard exists), the Court did insist upon an extension of the accusation to the presentand to citizens as well as representatives-before proceeding with a remedy as muscular
as all-out desegregation.
537. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 214; accord, e.g., id at 203, 204; Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 457-60 & n.7, 465-68 & n.15 (1979).
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a racially nondiscriminatory school system.' "1538
In Keyes, as in Green, therefore, the emphasis lies squarely on the
existence of a racially contaminated political "system" and not, for example, on one or another of the system's individually identifiable effects. Moreover, Griffin's and Green's acknowledgment of the politically
express character and the historic and post-Brown resilience of the antipluralist, processual infection is mirrored in Keyes's requirementseach treated in a subsection that follows-of (1) "deliberate" segregation, that is (2) sufficient in its "substantial" geographic breadth and its
temporal length to qualify as (3) an antipluralist "policy" that contaminates "the entire... system" defined (4) not simply by the officials who
carry out that policy but also by a citizenry that persistently and perennially demands it. In sum, embedded in Keyes's requirement of proof of
deeply processual or systemic-in Justice Brennan's phrase "systemwide"-discrimination as a predicate for "all-out desegregation" 5 3 9 is
an insistence on case-specific proof of the first two prerequisites to a
properly cautious decision to reform rather than simply repair the
political process. 540
a. Systemic Intent. - First, consider segregative intent, a requirement that the Court adopted as a prerequisite to school desegregation
in Keyes a few years before deciding that it applied in other fourteenth
amendment contexts as well. 4 1 Although, as discussed above, an
"equal respect and concern" notion of equal protection naturally and
justifiably relies on an intent test,54 2 that test poses special demands in
school desegregation cases-principally, the difficulty of proving intent, not when a specific individual makes a single political decision respecting a discrete event, but rather when a multimember, multilevel
bureaucracy makes a series of decisions over the course of several decades with regard to scores of schools, hundreds of teachers, and
thousands of children5 4s Although a number of commentators urged
the Court to ameliorate these difficulties by allowing judges to presume
intent from the fact, foreseeability, or avoidability of an action's segregative impact,544 the Court rejected that view in the mid-1970s by sum538. Keyei, 413 U.S. at 203 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown H), 349 U.S.

294, 301 (1955)).
539. Id. at 208, 214.
540. See supra text following note 510 (dangerous and persistent political
malfunction).
541. Compare Keyes, 413 U.S. at 206 (requiring purposive discrimination in school
desegregation context) with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (announcing
new rule requiring purposive discrimination in all race-based equal protection contexts).
542. See supra notes 466-483 and accompanying text.
543. See, e.g., Keyes, 413 U.S. at 198-200 & n.10, 215; United States v. School Dist.,
521 F.2d 530, 536 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975); Hart v. Community
School Bd., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975); Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens
Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 Yale LJ. 111, 119-21 (1983);
Note, Reading, supra note 123, at 321-22.
544. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton 1), 433 U.S. 406, 421
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marily vacating two lower court desegregation decisions that presumed
intent from "foreseeable effects. ' '54 5 Henceforth, intent had to be
proved from scratch and not with the aid of ready-made evidentiary
short cuts.
These moves convinced commentators on the left that the Court
seized upon the intent requirement as a more or less bad faith means of
shutting down desegregation at the historical and geographical point
where the interests of blacks in extending the remedy diverged from
those of middle-class whites newly threatened by it.54 6 Commentators
on the right agreed that the intent test lowered the Court's violationidentifying sights, but tried to rationalize the adjustment on principled,
private-law, grounds5 4 7 As I have shown, neither view explains the
Court's remedially robust desegregationjurisprudence.5 8 Reconstructive theory, by contrast, gives the requirement of "reading the mind of
the school board" 54 9 a simultaneously less sinister, less parsimonious,
and more explanatory public-law aspect: Although the "systemic intent" requirement manifestly presents a high hurdle for plaintiffs to
surmount in school desegregation situations, it does so in order to justify a confident conclusion when the hurdle is cleared that the racist
opinion has intervened not simply in the isolated deliberations of an
occasional public official but throughout the political system at myriad
points and at its deepest constituent level. 55 0
Analyzing the "segregative intent" requirement this way clarifies
the requirement's application. What courts should be looking for is
not, or not simply, some specific official's race-tainted subjective state
of mind. Rather, they should be looking for sufficiently widespread indicia of the racist opinion's injection into the political process at the
deepest constituent level to warrant an interpretive conclusion that racism has corrupted the political process governing the schools root and
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring); Fiss, Charlotte, supra note 63, at 698; Note, Reading,

supra note 123, at 338 n.95 (citing authority).
545. See cases cited supra note 144.
546. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 8, at 98; Freeman, supra note 98, at 1069-71; Karst,
supra note 255, at 1163-65; Kennedy, supra note 255, at 1418-19; Minow, supra note
179, at 84.
547. See sources cited supra note 288.
548. See supra note 139; supra notes 141-142, 231-248 and accompanying text.
549. Note, Reading, supra note 123, at 317.
550. A concern for the depth and breadth of the points at which the racist opinion
has entered the political process explains the "objective indicia" of intent on which the
desegregation cases have relied, including, for example, a history of racism in the community; the segregative result's foreseeability and visibility to the public; deviations from
longstanding, hence probably publicly desired, procedures or policies when racially segregative actions are undertaken; rejection of less segregative alternatives that but for
segregative concerns would have been more attractive to constituents; racist remarks by
decision makers during political campaigns; and the conformity of segregative political
decisions to the expressly racial preferences of members of the constituency. See
sources discussed supra notes 426, 483 and accompanying text.

1594

COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1463

branch. 55 1 The Supreme Court, thus, has not used the so-called "objective" indicia of "intent" to reveal the racially tainted firing of a given
official's (or agency's) synapses but rather to permit the evaluative judgment that the political system, at the constituent level, is incapable of
functioning in a properly pluralistic manner.
b. Systemwide. - Keyes's process-focused "segregative intent"
standard is reinforced by the decision's requirement of proof that
whatever racial discrimination entered the political process have done
so on a "systemwide" scale. 55 2 To meet this "systemwide" requirement, the Court has looked for corrupted deliberations that affect not
simply the constituents whose children attend one school but those
whose children attend many schools; 555 not simply assignment policies
but siting, construction, transportation, and special education decisions;554 not simply students but teachers and administrators; 55 5 and
not simply educational demographics but "thicker" and more permanent housing patterns. 55 6 In addition, the Court has looked for corrupted decisions not simply during a single school board's tenure but
during numerous administrations. 557 What the "systemwide discrimination" requirement entails, therefore, is positive, case-specific
551. The question also might be posed as follows: Has a given constituency's political process governing schools produced such a long, continuous, and public series of
decisions disadvantaging blacks that the process conveys the interpretation that blacks
are less worthy of respect than other persons. See supra notes 474-477 and accompanying text.
552. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 203 (1973).
553. E.g., id. at 198-99 & n.10 (discrimination affecting 8 schools, serving 38% of
the district's African-American enrollment).
554. Id. at 201-02.
555. Id. at 201-02, 213-14.
556. Id. at 198-99 & n.10, 202-03, 213-14 (school policies with "reciprocal effect
on the racial composition of residential neighborhoods"). This constituency-focused
analysis helps explain the intuitively reasonable but doctrinally baffling reliance of some
desegregation decisions on racially discriminatory actions that segregated the schools
but were taken by officials who were not school officials or parties to the lawsuit and who
were not required to participate in the remedy. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I),
418 U.S. 717, 755-56 (1974) (StewartJ, concurring); Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d
1277, 1291 & n.21, 1294 n.27 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980);
Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F. Supp. 708, 789 (N.D. Ohio 1976), aff'd in part and remanded,
607 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 935 (1980); Evans v. Buchanan, 393
F. Supp. 428, 434-38 (D. Del.) (three-judge panel), aff'd mem., 423 U.S. 963 (1975);
Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 707-26 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed,
497 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974); Lawrence, supra note 8, at 57-59; Note, supra note 254,
at 340; infra note 857. Once it is clear that the violation focuses not on school officials
but on the political constituency interested in how the schools are governed, it makes
sense to examine all the officials and agencies through whom that constituency might
work towards racist ends. See infra notes 862-866 and accompanying text.
557. See, e.g., Keyes, 413 U.S. at 198-99, 200, 210-11; accord Dayton Bd. of Educ.
v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526, 529-41 (1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick,
443 U.S. 449,455-58 (1979); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
7 (1971).
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proof 558 of what Professor Dworkin, for example, would simply presume "based on our knowledge of our community, and a more general

sense of human nature" 5 59-namely,

that the relevant political constit-

uency's infusion of the process with corrosive racial prejudice is wide-

spread and pervasive. 5 6°
It is just this kind of interpretive judgment about the depth,

breadth, and length of the racist corruption of the political system that
Judge James B. McMillan, the trial judge in Swann, described when he

characterized his opinion in that case as giving "a full picture of how
urban segregation had come to pass and was still being maintained by
the most powerful of human forces-governmental and otherwise. '5 6 1
What is called for by the "objective intent" and "systemwide violation"
requirements, then, is proof of corruption of the pluralistic political
machinery sufficient in intensity, depth, breadth, and length to implicate "the state" in its republican entirety and to meet both the first

(intense harm) and second (chronic malfunctioning) prerequisites for a
systemically reformative remedy.

Will we find this magnitude and density of racism in the political
processes that administer schools in the last decade of the twentieth

century? I hope not. But the evidence we have is not hopeful considering racism's durability over the 400 years of white rule on this continent; its rampancy and obstinacy in the 1950s and 1960s; its frequency
in school desegregation settings, among others, in the 1970s and
1980s; its visibility in contemporary politics, as well as in public opinion
and other social scientific soundings; and, most ominous of all, its in558. SeeJ. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 199 ("systemwide violation" requirement is
"tedious, expensive,[] protracted," "involving school board minutes, attendance rosters,
old newspapers and city maps").
559. Dworkin, supra note 104, at 29.
560. R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at 237. The Keyes requirements transform judicial
opinions from the common law judge's short story analyzing an individual defendant's
discretely tortious actions and psychology to the public-law judge's novel sociologically
"dismantling" the entire social and political structure in which public schools are embedded. See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1289,
1314-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2821 (1988); Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School Dist. No. 1, 584
F. Supp. 328, 329-56 (E.D. Ark. 1984), aff'd in relevant part, 778 F.2d 404 (8th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986); Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F. Supp. 708, 711-96
(N.D. Ohio 1976), aff'd in part and remanded, 607 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 935 (1980), additional findings, 500 F. Supp. 404, 407-23 (N.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd, 662 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1981); Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410,
482-83 (D. Mass.), aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (Ist Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). See generally Dimond, supra note 123, at 20-32
(cataloguing myriad acts of commission and omission on which courts have relied to find
state-enforced segregation).
561. McMillan, Social Science and the District Court: The Observations of ajourneyman Trial Judge, 39 Law & Contemp. Probs. 157, 162 (1975); see also Black, supra
note 123, at 426 (quoted infra text accompanying note 784).
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crease and violent cast in recent years. 562
Another aspect of Keyes deserves mention here. Further illustrating the Court's cautious approach to processually reconstructive remedies is the threefold opportunity it affords defendants to exonerate
themselves even after plaintiffs prove systemwide discrimination. Defendants may avoid reformative relief by proving either (1) that the various indicia of systemic racial corruption of the political process do not,
in fact, bespeak "a policy to create or maintain segregation;" (2) that
they are discharging or have discharged their "affirmative duty 'to effectuate a transition to a racially non-discriminatory ... system;'" or
(3) that "a lesser degree of segregated schooling would not have re5 63
sulted" had the Board acted differently.
The first and to some extent the last of these rebuttal opportunities
go to reconstructive predicate number one-intense systemic harm.
More interestingly, all three rebuttal opportunities relate directly to
predicate number two-the intractability or irreparability requirement.
Separately or together, the three rebuttal opportunities enable defendants to show that, notwithstanding occasional or historical antiegalitarian lapses, they have succeeded in repairing the pluralistic
political process so that racism no longer pervasively intervenes and
that whatever segregation-in-fact results is the "natural" consequence
of a properly functioning system. 5 6
c. The Presumption Problem. - If we think of the various adjudicative requirements in Keyes as having been designed to reveal a pervasively and intractably "broke" hence severely harmed and harmful
political process, then we solve two of the problems that have given the
five theories discussed earlier the most trouble. The first problem is
the seriousness, and if taken seriously the empirical uncertainty, of the
so-called continuing-effect (Swann) and expanding-effect (Keyes) presumptions. I do take these presumptions seriously, thereby avoiding
the Equal Educational Opportunity, Integration, Prohibition, and Prophylaxis theories' rejection of or inability to account for the presump56 5
tions' recurrence and central place in the desegregation decisions.
But, by reorienting those presumptions, I also avoid the debilitating
factual questions that so infuse the Correction theory's understanding
5 66
of the devices.
Recall that the Correction theory relies on the existence of official
discrimination at Time (or in Area) A and of racial separation in schools
or housing at Times (or in Areas) A and B as the basis for presuming
562. See supra notes 258, 455; supra notes 62, 439-445, 452-457, 515-528 and
accompanying texts.
563. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 203, 210-11, 214 (1973) (quoting
Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)).
564. Id. at 203.
565. See supra notes 92, 143-148 and accompanying text.
566. See supra notes 237-248 and accompanying text.
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that (1) the official discrimination at Time (or in Area) A actually caused
the racial separation existing at that Time (or in that Area), and (2) that
either the official discrimination at Time (or in Area) A or its presumed
effect-i.e., the racial separation existing at that Time (or in that
Area)-actually caused the racial separation existing at Time (or in
Area) B. 5 67 The Correctivist, that is, must defend the Swann and Keyes
devices on the basis of three not obviously reasonable assumptions:
that proof of one of the two traditional elements of compensatory tort
claims (breach of the duty of fairness) establishes the other, qualitatively different element (causation of harm);568 that official discrimination-only one of a number of potential causes of the racial separation
that pervades the nation 5 69-is in fact the cause of the racial separation
established in any and all school desegregation cases; and that, in those
cases, official discrimination caused not only the racial separation existing at the same time and in the same place as the discrimination but
570
also the separation existing later and farther afield.
In place of this unsatisfactorily long, asymmetrical, and empirically
dubious, discrimination/segregative-effect/continuing-segregative-effect chain of presumptive reasoning, Reformative theory deploys a
shorter, more symmetrical, and less empirically doubtful device.
Reformatively understood, the Swann presumption says: If it is shown
that the racist opinion saturated the political system stem to stern at
Time A, and if we observe that same system generating outcomes at
Time B that continue to disadvantage African-Americans, and if the official actors in that process cannot produce evidence that they or others
undertook efforts to cleanse the process in between Times, then we
may assume that the process has continued during the period to be
antipluralistic and corrupt. The Keyes presumption is even easier to explain: Once it has been shown that the racist opinion infused the political system when it separated the races in Area A, then we may
presume, if we observe that same system making similarly racially
separative decisions at the same time in Area B, that the system's actions in Area B are similarly tainted by the racist opinion.
Put less formally, this discrimination/discrimination version of the
presumptions holds that it is reasonable to assume, absent contrary
proof, that a state or local political system that disadvantaged blacks at
567. See Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 786; supra notes 237-242 and accompanying text.
568. See supra notes 201-202 and accompanying text.
569. Among the other potentially important causes of racial separation are personal preferences, "chain migration" (the process by which people moving from one
place to another locate in close proximity to relatives, friends, or persons of like background who previously made a similar move), racially variable economic status, geographically variable housing costs and employment opportunities, and private
discrimination. See supra notes 233, 258 and accompanying text.
570. See generally supra notes 237, 242 and accompanying text (questioning reasonableness of these assumptions).
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Time A (or in Area A) as the result of a deep, broad, longstanding, and
politically realized conviction that blacks are less worthy than whites,
and that has continued disadvantaging blacks until Time B (or has disadvantaged them as well in Area B), undertook the latter action in the
same antipluralistic spirit as the former. If the white majority was pervasively disposed to use the political machinery to discriminate at Time
A or in Area A, why should we doubt its disposition to use it the same
way at Time B or in Area B when, for all we can tell and for all the
majority's representatives can show, the results of both sets of actions
and the political process generating those results are the same?
Now, moreover, unlike in Corrective theorizing, both traditional
justifications for evidentiary presumptions fall into place. First, by
drawing upon standard, uncontroversial indicia of illicit intent-for instance, on an historic pattern of racially tainted political acts the effects
of which, inexplicably, are reproduced by the same system's later (or
geographically separate) action-the, in any event shorter, more symmetrical, and more intuitively satisfying discrimination-now/discrimination-later(elsewhere) chain of presumptive reasoning seems well
suited to "contribute to determination of the truth. '5 7 1 This conclusion is strengthened by the devices' allocation to the system's own representatives of the rebuttal responsibility to show that the system is free
of influential racist opinions. In that way, the party with the best access
to the truth is given the burden of proof.57 2 Likewise, by first recognizing that the constituency shown to be responsible for infusing the political system with influential antipluralistic discourse is the
"wrongdoer"-and only then burdening that constituency with the presumptions' risk of error-the present analysis more clearly demonstrates how the presumptions achieve the "preferred allocation of error
costs."

57 3

d. The "Third-Party Nonviolator" Problem. - The immediately preceding point also helps explain how Reformative theory avoids the
moral problem of exposing assertedly "innocent" white families-so571. Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 786; cf. supra note 247 (Corrective theory's
inability to take advantage of the truth-determination rationale that typically justifies
presumptions). By contrast to Corrective theory's discrimination/effect/continuing-effect chain of reasoning, which curiously insists upon heroic proof of intentional discrimination but virtually no proof of the distinct causation requirements, the interpretation
offered here makes the "controversial" presumptions close to mundane: The evidentiary devices simply allow the presumptive extension of the temporal and spatial margins
of a harmful condition (racism's intervention in a given political process), as to which
heroic proof already has been adduced.
572. See Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 786 n.187.
573. Id. at 786; accord supra note 247. Although the Court has not expressly applied the presumptions outside the school desegregation area, its occasional willingness
to infer current from prior discrimination in nonschool cases seems to depend upon the
same pervasive-prior-discrimination trigger that in my view activates the presumptions
in the school cases. E.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982); cases compared
supra notes 478-479 and discussed infra notes 821-826 and accompanying text.
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called "third-party nonviolators"-both to the risk of the presumptions' "error costs" and to inclusion in what is to them an unwanted
and potentially costly remedy. First, Reformative theory explains why
desegregation-assuming, as I show below, it reforms malfunctioning
political systems-is not generally harmful to the citizens and children
affected by it.574 For by restoring, or for the first time approximating, a
civil society in which all are presumed equal and in which distributive
explanations of the "I am better than you" sort are suppressed, we all
may more securely pursue our distinctive visions of the good.
Once a "systemwide violation" in the sense explained here is established, moreover, the "third-party nonviolator" concept becomes
tenuous indeed. Once, that is, the entire political system down to its
574. Citizens who believe that African-Americans do not deserve equal concern will
continue to consider themselves harmed. That kind of harm, however, does not count,
in my Reconstructive estimation. See infra notes 659-660 and accompanying text. As
for other potential harms: (1) Researchers have produced no credible evidence that
school integration has a harmful effect on white students' academic achievement, selfesteem, interracial attitudes, access to higher education, or job prospects. See infra
notes 664-666, 683-694 and accompanying text. (2) Busing is safer than walking to
school and has virtually no attitudinal or academic effects on students. See sources cited
Liebman, supra note 99, at 364 n.68. On average, busing adds only a few minutes to the
time students spend each day getting to and from school and only a 2% or so increase in
desegregating districts' transportation budgets. See id. Indeed, apart from desegregation, the Court's principal contact with busing has been its adjudication of parents'
claims that the state constitutionally must or at least may bus their children to school.
See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481, 2485-86 (1988) (rural
children demanding to be bused to school free of charge); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1947) (parochial school children seeking to preserve right to be bused
to school at state expense); see also M. Walzer, supra note 52, at 224 (busing has never
been controversial; only busing to achieve integration is controversial); J. Wilkinson,
supra note 1, at 134-36 (similar); Rothman, 'American Icon': Educators Celebrate the
Yellow School Bus's 50th Birthday, Educ. Week, Apr. 19, 1989, at 5, col. 5. Nor do the
amount and distance of busing have much effect on the amount of white flight different
desegregation plans cause. See infra note 672 and accompanying text. (3) "[A] school's
being under court order to desegregate is associated with only a slight increase in the
amount of student violence" in the first two years of implementation; "as time goes on"
and "larger numbers of students are bused to achieve racial balance, the desegregation
process ceases to be a factor" contributing to violence. 1 Nat'l Inst. of Educ., U.S. Dep't
of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Violent Schools-Safe Schools: The Safe School Study Report to the Congress 132 (1978). (4) Desegregation increases white loss from school
districts in the year or two immediately before and after implementation. When certain
kinds of plans are used, however, desegregation thereafter may reduce the rate of white
loss, resulting in a net gain in white students after some years. See infra notes 669-673
and accompanying text. (5) Parental fears about their childrens' physical and academic
well-being do accompany the initial implementation stage but evaporate over time and
eventually give way to surprisingly high rates of satisfaction with desegregation. See
infra notes 667-668 and accompanying text. (6) As members of the Court have noted,
desegregation merely substitutes one mandatory school assignment for another, hence
has far less coercive and redistributive impact on whites ("innocent" or not) than, for
example, the withdrawal of seniority rights, withholding of contracts, denial of admission, and other "race-conscious" remedies. See cases discussed in Liebman, supra note
99 at 365-66 & nn.72-74.
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constituent core is understood as being tainted by the racist opinion,
we may not properly assume that its white-citizen constituency, or most
of its members, are in fact innocent. Moreover, once that constituency's representatives fail to show in rebuttal that at least some aspects
of the status quo are untainted by antipluralistic distributive decision
making-once, that is, the defendants or white third-party intervenors
fail to show how explanations of the "you and I are equally worthy"
variety can explain the disadvantages visited on black Americans by the
political system-there is much reason to believe and little reason to
doubt that persons threatened by changes in the status quo are not innocent. At the very least, we then will have good reason to believe that
most of the affected constituency are neither innocent nor
5 75
nonviolators.
Finally, the constituency's pervasive participation in the violation,
the violation's length and strength, and its offense against the obligations that hold the polity together suggest the kinds of conditions
under which public-law infractions become those of "the community
considered as a moral agent in its own right." 5 76 Such infractions in
turn suggest the kinds of conditions under which citizens do and ought
to feel some responsibility even for
public actions they opposed or that
57
preceded their joining the state. 7
4. Broke Enough to Fix. - Following the plaintiffs' satisfaction of
the system-wide-segregation requirement of Keyes, these things are
clear: (1) The political process has succumbed to and acted upon the
racist opinion not once but many times; not in one neighborhood but
all over; not in a single domain of political concern but throughout the
agencies of government; and not simply via representatives but at the
instance of the entire, uneconomized, republican "state." (2) Despite
an "affirmative" legal obligation to do so, the participants in and opera575. I say "most," recognizing the "innocence" claims of families recently arrived
in the district. But see infra notes 576-577 and accompanying text. Those families do
not present a major problem for Reconstructive theory, however, given their small numbers, their almost certain status as beneficiaries of an array of schools-specific political
decisions that their predecessor-constituents incited, the benefits to them of a pluralistically reconstructed political system, and the theory's departure from any private-law
commitment to perfect congruence between burdened wrongdoer and benefited victim
in favor of a public-law demand for congruence between the damaged political machinery and the politically reconstructive remedy. See infra Parts IV.C, V.A. White children
might claim innocence on a different ground, namely, that they did not vote or otherwise incite the political process. As the paradigmatic case of "virtually represented"
persons, however, particularly in school matters, white children are implicated in the
violation: Their putative interests fueled the misfiring of the political process. See infra
notes 599-607 and accompanying text; see also supra note 574; infra notes 664-668,
683-694 and accompanying text (desegregation benefits but has no known harmful effects on white children).
576. Kahn, supra note 105, at 71 (discussing R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at
168-75); accord supra note 437 and accompanying text.
577. See R. Dworkin, supra note 52, at 172-73.
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tors of the corrupted political system have not themselves reconditioned, restored, or even adjusted it. The system is both broke and
broke enough to require construction or formulation of a new one. 57 8
C. Is There A Workable Redesign?
We come then to the third and last prerequisite to a judicial decision to reconstruct the system-the requirement of an alternative design that averts or eliminates enough of the pre-existing corruption to
justify the design's transition and excess operating costs.
1. Remedial Lacunae. - Although there is no dearth of theorizing
on the equal protection problem, there is precious little theorizing on
equal protection solutions, at least by process-focused theorists addressing post-constitution-making restorative steps. This fact has led outcome-oriented scholars to claim that, even when process-oriented
theory identifies some injustice by the political process that must be
corrected, it yields no "basis for specifying what the corrected process
would look like." 5 79 Because, so the argument goes, process theories
(1) cannot tolerate substantive remedial outcomes, including redistributive ones that otherwise might improve the position of the disadvantaged group in the political process, and (2) are partial to private-law
corrective remedies that are capable of redressing only "isolated actions against individuals rather than . . . a societal policy against an
entire group,"5 8 0 such theories inevitably suffer "a remedial lacuna" at
578. Making proof of systemwide corruption a prerequisite to the violation's broad
accusation against and the remedy's all-out demands on the white majority begs the
question of relief when the proof falls short of the public-law threshold. That question
is not the one I set for myself here and I do not fully answer it. The bare private-law
minimum is a purely Corrective remedy that requires identifiable wrongdoers to compensate identifiable victims. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinknan (Dayton I), 433 U.S.
406, 420 (1977) (discussed supra note 234); see also supra notes 478-479 and accompanying text (private-law approaches in employment and other putatively private-law contexts). Also probably necessary but not assuredly sufficient, see supra notes 265-284
and accompanying text, is the remedy towards which the middle of the Court has been
groping in the affirmative action cases and at which the whole Court arrived in its nonsystem-wide-desegregation decision in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267
(1977), namely, that, even absent identification of actual wrongdoers, victims of identifiable violations receive compensation for their harms via remedies that thinly but widely
distribute relatively circumscribed and noncoercive burdens among innocent whites.
See, e.g., City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 727-29 (1989); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277, 280-81 (1986) (plurality opinion); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980) (plurality opinion). Ultimately, this latter approach
would call for reparations similar to those that the nation has promised the JapaneseAmerican victims of its World War II internment policies. See B. Bitker, The Case for
Black Reparations 8-29 (1973); Mydans, Aged War Detainees Still Unpaid for Lost Freedom, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1989, at Al, col. 2. These residual remedies also are appropriate in system-wide cases to the extent that all-out desegregation leaves
uncompensated any private-law harms that those remedies cure.
579. Fiss, supra note 67, at 131.
580. Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1342.
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the public-law level: "[A]Il that can be done with a violation of the
[public-law]1 type described is to call it one and declare the [act]
58
invalid."
Surprisingly, most process-focused theorists seem to agree that
only two types of public-law remedies are available-judicial imposition
of a new substantive outcome (redistributive), and a judicial order requiring the offending officials to remake the decision (prohibitory)-of
5 82
which, most such theorists conclude, only the latter is appropriate.
Consider, for example, the remedial ruminations of a leading processfocused theorist, John Hart Ely. Professor Ely characterizes his "approach to constitutional adjudication" as
akin to what might be called an 'antitrust' as opposed to a 'regulatory' orientation to economic affairs-rather than dictate
substantive results it intervenes only when the 'market,' in our
case the political market, is systematically malfunctioning. (A
referee analogy is also not far off: the referee is to intervene
only when one team is gaining58 3unfair advantage, not because
the 'wrong' team has scored.)
What is curious about this passage is that, although it neatly summarizes when a violation has occurred (whenever the pluralistic political
process "systemically" malfunctions), it does not say-except by rejecting one obvious alternative (dictating a new substantive result)how the violation is to be remedied. Nor is the referee analogy, instructive as it is on the "when" issue, helpful or even accurate on the "how"
question, given that referees have a number of remedies at their disposal ranging from running the play over again, to penalizing the offender
in some specified way, to changing the process (for example, by requir581. Freeman, supra -note 98, at 1079-80; accord Crenshaw, supra note 3, at
1342-45; Lawrence, supra note 134, at 354; Parker, supra note 160, at 231 n.40.
582. See, e.g.,J. Choper, supra note 216, at 25, 27 ("main" constitutional remedy
"is to nullify the finished product of the lawmaking process"; in "rare" cases, court may
"substitute" its own for legislature's outcome); Baker, supra note 364, at 1048; Brest,
supra note 104, at 12-14 (denial of benefit based on race does not entitle victim to
benefit "but only to have the decisionmaker reconsider her application under the proper
criteria"); Karst, supra note 156, at 281. Noting the unsatisfactory nature of Redistributive and Prohibitory remedies, Professor Sandalow proposes that courts remedy equal
protection violations--defined as deviations from a properly revealed national value
consensus-by forbidding offending local officials to legislate in the area and requiring
them to seek a national value consensus by securing congressional action. Sandalow,
supra note 121, at 1177, 1181-82, 1186-89. This proposal has three problems. It requires courts, in order to determine if a violation occurred, to identify existing national
consensuses that local legislation offends. But seeJ. Ely, supra note 105, at 63-65 (impossibility of identifying national or other public consensuses). It inexorably would
thrust even such paradigmatically local decisions as school district assignment patterns
into the lap of Congress. But see A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at 71-75, 99-101 (strong
defense of local democratic control of public education). It places equal protection at
the mercy of national majorities. But see authorities cited supra note 213 (criticizing
proposals to make minority rights turn on majority views).
583. J. Ely, supra note 105, at 102-03.
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ing the offending team to play shorthanded), to changing the outcome
(as, for example, after a goaltending violation in basketball, when the
unfairly denied points are added to the score of the offended-against
team).
Likewise, although Professor Ely at times alludes to the possibility
of truly process-focused remedies, 58 4 at the only point where he directly confronts the question of post-constitution-making remedies, he
lapses into a purely prohibitory mode: "When [a discriminatory] principle of selection has been employed, the system has malfunctioned...
and the remedy, save only in cases of dearly nonprejudicial error, is to
''5 85
reject the product of the malfunctioning process and start over.
Foul called, play goes over, leaving the offending and offended-against
parties in the same undeterred and unprotected positions that we earlier saw undermine Prohibitory theory's justification and leave proces58 6
sual approaches vulnerable to Redistributivist attack.
I do not find convincing the specific responses that processual theorists have made to claims that a prohibitorily implemented judicial review scheme underenforces and trivializes the systemic rights and
wrongs that process theory identifies. 5 87 Neither, however, do I find
convincing the Redistributivists' identification of that scheme's proces584. See, e.g., id. at 67 (if"legislatures are only imperfectly democratic," appropriate response is "to make them more democratic"); id. at 170 (compelled virtual-representation remedy for explicit racial classifications); id. at 172 (approving fourth
amendment remedy of using search warrant requirement to substitute neutral magistrate's decisional process for that of unsupervised police officers).
585. Id. at 137; accord id. at 138, 157, 169.
586. See supra notes 262, 301-308, 579-581 and accompanying text.
587. Professor Ely has three responses to the claim that motive-centered liability
tests are futile because they permit courts to validate the same offensive law after it is
reenacted for ostensibly different reasons. His first answer-that officials only rarely will
retake the same action--cheats by arguing too easy a case. SeeJ. Ely, supra note 105, at
138-39. For the solace the answer gives in regard to a discrete and difficult-to-disguise
enactment of, for example, a poll tax (1) does not apply to black children faced with a
complex neighborhood school plan that segregates and that easily may be replaced with
a different complex plan that segregates only marginally less, and (2) wholly ignores the
chilling effect in all cases of second-round litigation costs. See supra notes 301-308 and
accompanying text. Second, the support Professor Ely derives from the analogy to the
criminal defendant convicted by a biased jury-who is not released following judicial
review but retried and probably reconvicted, J. Ely, supra note 105, at 139-is misplaced. The accused is not retried by the same-biased-jury but by a new and properly
selected one: The offending process is not simply rerun, but replaced. Finally, although
Professor Ely acknowledges that a prohibitorily enforced intent test inevitably results in
substantial underenforcement and that something "more is needed if the rights of minorities are to be adequately protected," id. at 145; accord id. at 128 n.*, 138-39, 157 n.72,
the something more he offers-the ban on enactments that explicitly "classify on the
basis of" race-is nothing more at all. For explicit racial discrimination went out of style
with butch wax, leaving in its place persistent but covert racial discrimination against
which Professor Ely's prohibitory remedies admittedly underenforce. See id. at 161 n.*,
169; supra note 457.
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sual character as the source of its weakness. 58 8 Rather, the weakness
lies in the puny private-law remedies that process-oriented theorists
typically deploy to redress what they acknowledge are pervasive publiclaw wrongs.
To be sure, processual theorists offer their specific responses to
the remedial-thinness critique merely ti supplement a more general response-that the post-Revolutionary and post-bellum framers
designed the political process so nearly perfectly that processual maladies rarely occur. 58 9 This response in turn prompts the Redistributivists' allegation that processual theory proceeds from a self-evidently
inaccurate assumption that "a racially equitable society already exists" 59 0 -an assumption that many process-oriented theorists, myself
included, are at pains to reject. Rather than deifying the framers' "perfect" but much amended creature, this section uses the framers' constitution-making insights about how to avoid the foibles of persons-asimperfect-citizens merely to suggest post-constitution-making remedies
for use when the process the framers created proves imperfect in practice. In particular, drawing upon de Tocqueville and modern feminist
theory as well as the framers' constitution-making efforts, subsection
two concludes that the preferred constitutional remedy is one that creates an ethicalsituation in which external constraints induce empathy. Subsection three then synthesizes modern philosophical descriptions of the
preferred ethical situation, setting the stage for Part V, which shows
how all-out desegregation emulates that preferred situation.
2. Notes Toward a Filled Lacuna. a. ExternalConstraints.- Ex ante "remedies" that counter the tendency of citizens to abandon civic duty when it conflicts with self-interest or antipluralist prejudices fall into two categories: " 'external
check[s]' "-the "application of rewards and penalties . . .by some
source other than the given individual himself"; and "'internal
checks'-the conscience (super-ego), attitudes, and basic predispositions."' 59 ' The original framers are celebrated, of course, for preferring external checks and "distrust[ing]" internal ones. 5 92 Chief among
the original framers' external checks, in addition to separated powers
and federalism, are (1) frequent elections of representatives by majority
588. See supra notes 468-469, 478-483 and accompanying text.
589. E.g..J. Ely, supra note 105, at 100-01.
590. Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1344.
591. R. Dahl, supra note 369, at 6, 18, 36, 82-83; accord The Federalist No. 51, at
320-22 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
592. E.g., The Federalist No. 9, at 72-73 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); id.
No. 10, at 80 (J. Madison); id. No. 48, at 308-11 (J. Madison); id. No. 51, at 320-22 U.
Madison); id. No. 57, at 350-51 U. Madison); seeJ. Ely, supra note 105, at 90, 131-33,
136 n.*; Ackerman, Discovering, supra note 395, at 1024-31, 1048-49; Rossum, supra
note 409, at 108; Sunstein, Interest, supra note 378, at 32-35, 40, 43-47. But see R.
Dahl, supra note 369, at 18, 22, 76, 82-83, 134-37 (preferring internal checks); Rawls,
supra note 343, at 1,10-11, 23-24 (disapproving exclusive reliance on external checks).
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vote, which check the tendency of rulers to tyrannize the ruled, 593 and
(2) the Madisonian "extended Republic," which limits the power of factions among the ruled to tyrannize each other by requiring each faction
to join forces with others in order to achieve the required majority. 5 94
When the latter external device failed to achieve its implied "equal
protection" goal, 59 5 particularly as to black citizens whom a persisting
white majority persistently subordinated, the post-bellum framers
turned to an internal check-the state's "duty" under the equal protection clause to accord equal concern and respect to all. 59 6 As is often
the case with internal constraints, however, there is good reason to
doubt the clause's self-enforcing capacity. Rather, the Constitution's
presumptive distrust of internal checks and the ante-bellum failure of
pre-existing external checks justify the processualists' reliance upon judicial review to protect minority rights under the clause.5 9 7 More importantly for present purposes, when judicial review reveals persistent
and society-wide apostasy from "equal concern" virtue, that same distrust and failure also justify going beyond the merely prohibitory remedies on which processual theorists have been content to rely. Instead
of an injunctive reprise of the equal protection clause's thus far unavailing internal command to be virtuous, the theme of distrust supports a
remedy for system-wide violations that reconstructs the offending political process and externally checks the propensity of citizens to incite
598
corrupt, "we are better than they" decisions.
This view sees the equal protection clause as embodying yet another economization: In normal times, the Constitution's usual preference for "hard" external constraints is suspended in favor of a "soft"
internal duty of equal concern and respect; in abnormal times, however-i.e., upon proof of a system-wide default of that duty-the
593. See R. Dahl, supra note 369, at 13-14; J. Ely, supra note 105, at 77-78,
100-01.
594. E.g., R. Dahl, supra note 369, at 16, 18-19, 48, 51;J. Ely, supra note 105, at
79-80; Ackerman, Discovering, supra note 395, at 1025-31.
595. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 736-37 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); J. Ely, supra note 105, at 80-81; Sandalow,
supra note 121, at 1164; cf. Note, A Madisonian Interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause, 91 Yale LJ. 1403, 1429 (1982) (claiming that extended Republic largely
achieved its equal protection policy).
596. See supra notes 419-422 and accompanying text (defining the "duty"); supra
notes 423-425 and accompanying text (defining the "state"). The original Constitution's structural equal protection guarantee also failed because it externally constrained
only the federal government, notwithstanding the framers' recognition of the susceptibility of state and local governments to majority tyranny over minorities. See The Federalist No. 51, at 320-22 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
597. See sources cited supra note 510.
598. Outside the criminal justice area, in which repetitive appeals in multiple forums take the place of reconstructive remedies, seeJ. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus
Practice and Procedure § 2.2 (1988), the Constitution's other internal duties have
proved less susceptible to system-wide default and less needful of processual remedies
than the duty embedded in the equal protection clause.
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courts must remedially reconstruct the political process by temporarily
building in more durable, external. protections against "we are better
than they" reasoning.
b. Empathy. - What external constraint, then, should the courts
use to reform lapsed citizens? To answer this question, I extract a concept of "induced empathy" from some old and new theorizing.
Among the Constitution's external antidotes to the citizenry's tendency to lapse from civic virtue is "virtual representation," or, better,
compelled virtual representation. 599 The Constitution's first privileges
and immunities clause,6 oo for example, structurally compels in-staters
to virtually represent the interests of out-of-staters by insisting that any
burden the legislature places on out-of-staters also be placed on similarly situated-and actually represented-in-staters.6 0 1 A remedial
strategy of structurally compelled virtual representation is particularly
suited to equal protection violations given that one theory of the clause,
congenial to the theory I offer above, is that it creates an internal duty
on the part of representatives virtually to represent the interests of citizens. 60 2 Accordingly, when a system-wide equal protection violation
proves the citizenry viscerally incapable of abiding by its duty of virtual
representation, a remedy that externally compels the kind of representation that the clause only internally encourages in normal times draws
4'usdem generis support both from the virtual-representation-favoring
clause itself and the compelled-virtual-representation-favoring Constitu60 3
tion as a whole.
The analogy to old-fashioned virtual representation draws support
from a later American fashion described in de Tocqueville's discussion
599. See J. Ely, supra note 105, at 82-84, 101, 170 (virtual representation links
interests of persons with little political power to those with more). See generally
Michelman, supra note 377, at 50-54 (discussing virtual representation theory). An example of uncompelled virtual representation is that of children by parents. See supra
note 575.
600. U.S. Const., art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
601. Seej. Ely, supra note 105, at 83-84; see also id. at 97-98 &n.* (just compensation clause compels taxpayers virtually to represent condemnees); Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("no more
effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be
imposed generally"); The Federalist No. 57, at 352-53 (J.Madison) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961) ("as a ... circumstance in the situation of the House of Representatives, restraining them from oppressive measures .... they can make no law which will not have
its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of
society").
602. SeeJ. Ely, supra note 105, at 84.
603. By compelling virtual representation of political participants by their political
equals, the remedy proposed here avoids the claim that it unpatriotically relies upon the
distinct doctrine, in opposition to which we fought a Revolutionary War, of voluntary
virtual representation of political nonparticipants by political elites. Compare infra Part
V.A (illustrating compelled virtual representation) with Michelman, supra note 375, at
456-57 (criticizing pre-ante-bellum virtual representation).
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of "How the Americans Combat Individualism by the Doctrine of SelfInterest Properly Understood." 6 0 4 Ridiculing aristocratic myths about
doing good without self-interest, de Tocqueville praised the more modest American route to virtue-the social construction of situations in
which "enlightened self-love" leads persons to help one another6c 5
Rather than expecting virtue to radiate from within or replacing it with
a fear of ex post punishment, the doctrine of self-interest properly understood prefers arrangements that induce the continuous, publicly
italicized experience-and, eventually, the habit-of serving others' interests as a way of serving one's own.6 0 6 Not the invention of de

Tocqueville the political philosopher, the doctrine was the discovery of
de Tocqueville the social scientist. He found it at work "every day" in
America: "At first it is of necessity that [Americans] attend to the public interest, afterward by choice. What had been calculation becomes
60 7
instinct."
These insights draw yet further support from newly fashioned feminist legal theory, most especially feminism's emphasis on the salutary
"habit of putting myself in another person's place" and of taking the
perspective of those on the bottom or margin.6 0 8 Applying this insight
to the remedial problem at hand, what is needed are remedial "strategies for exposing [as merely] conceptions of reality" views that their
holders treat as "natural" and for placing lapsed citizens in "the standpoint of someone who is committed to the moral relevance of contingent" others:
We need settings in which to engage in the clash of realities
that breaks us out of settled and complacent meanings and
creates opportunities for insight and growth. This is the special burden and opportunity for the Court: to enact and preside over the dialogue through which we remake the
normative endowment that shapes current understandings.6 0 9
604. See A. de Tocqueville, supra note 346, at 525-27.
605. Id. at 525-26 (doctrine "turns private interest against itself"); accord id. at
510 ("ambition [to be elected to office] makes a man care for his fellows" by locating
"his self-interest in forgetting about himself").
606. Id. at 527 (doctrine creates a "discipline"; it "does not lead the will directly to
virtue [but] establishes habits which unconsciously turn it that way").
607. Id. at 525; accord id. at 512.
608. Marcus, supra note 367, at 42-43 (Gilligan); Matsuda, supra note 148, at
324-26; accord C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's
Development 24-39 (1982); Benhabib, supra note 367, at 155 ("take the standpoint of
the 'particular other' "); Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1349 & n.71, 1385-86; Minow,
supra note 179, at 51, 62-63, 71, 74, 82 ("stop seeking to get close to the 'truth' and
instead seek to get close to other people's truths"); see alsoJ. Wilson, supra note 105, at
158 ("To identify, to put yourself in his shoes, is essentially to regard him as a being like
yourself, whose aims and purposes are as valid as your own"); Sunstein, supra note 105,
at 155 (citing J. Rawls, supra note 105, at 350) (via "political empathy," "assume the
position of those who disagree"); G. Kateb, supra note 365, at 33 (via "receptivity,"
"lose oneself in appreciation and admiration or in empathy").
609. Minow, supra note 179, at 74, 76, 95.
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Compelled virtual representation, self-interest properly understood, and induced perspectival openness intersect at the concept of
empathy. What each concept calls for-following proof of a systematic
breakdown in the political process and in its participants' ability to accord people different from the majority equal concern and respect-are
structures and settings that make it rational for citizens to "think of
themselves in the position of the class of people" whom they in the past
have treated unfairly.6 10
c. Ethical Situation. - The concept of structured-in empathy
reveals that the dichotomy between external and internal controls need
not be equated with a distinction between purely selfish and at least
partly selfless behavior. Although some structural constraints-for example, separation of powers and federalism-do indeed use an official's self-aggrandizing activities to impose limits on the similarly selfish
conduct of competing officials, 6 1' other structural constraints-for example, compelled virtual representation-seek to induce virtuous or
other-regarding behavior. This insight in turn leads me back to republican theory which, although associated with internal constraints of the
"civic virtue" and "practical reason" sort, actually yields up the idea of
externally imposed "'ethical situation[s]' "-as opposed to pure conscience-out of which spring the citizenry's capacity to be virtuous. 6 12
Republican theory, that is, does not rely on citizens' natural proclivity
to be good but rather on the "careful construction of special formal or
ceremonial contexts designed to place the individual in the special citizen's role-to force that role on the individual by cultural means-on
those special occasions when political, as distinguished from normally
self-regarding private, action is in progress. ' 613 This concept of situationally enforced virtue on "special occasions" captures precisely the
reformative remedial notion endorsed here.
Having discovered in the Constitution itself a preference for external structures that channel citizens' behavior in virtuous directions,
having also discovered there as well as in wider theory an inclination,
particularly in equal protection contexts, toward structured-in empathy, and finally, having addressed the idea of an ethical situation capable of achieving this mix of externally induced internal controls, we are
now ready to state the general specifications for a reconstructive remedy. Upon finding that citizens have persistently and effectively in610. Karst, supra note 156, at 284.
611. See I. Kant, Kant on History 111-12 (L. Beck ed. 1963) (republican government "only a question of a good organization of the state, whereby the powers of each
selfish inclination are so arranged in opposition that one moderates or destroys the ruinous effects of the other").
612. Michelman, supra note 377, at 26 (quoting Cornell, supra note 367, at 294).
613. Michelman, supra note 368, at 184 (emphasis added); accord, e.g., id. at
185-86 ("civic forum" in noticeably public sphere creates "consciousness of political
life"); Pitkin, supra note 392, at 331 (polis "artificially create[s] equality of status as
citizens"); supra notes 399-400 and accompanying text.
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jected "we are better than they" opinions into the political process, the
Court should endeavor to restructure that process and create new political settings in which the "we's" are impelled to assume the political
standpoint of the "theys."
3. The Preferred Ethical Situation. - Although primarily the province of Republican thinkers at the level of practice, the ethical situation
has occupied a wider range of thinkers at the level of theory. Thus, in
deciding how to arrange social institutions to achieve ajust distribution
of rights, resources, and self-respect, political philosophers have long
imagined ideal situations that to one degree or another bracket societal
and genetic contingency and enable hypothetical participants to choose
more or less impartially among competing social arrangements for
themselves and for each other. 61 4 Because the contingencies these philosophers seek to neutralize often encompass the "normed" differences
that the equal concern principle seeks to "denorm," and because some
of these philosophers seek to neutralize contingencies precisely in order to permit interpersonal responsiveness and empathy, it stands to
reason that their "ethical situation" thought experiments might increase the richness of the specifications generally sketched above for
reconstructing corrupt political institutions so as to denorm racial differences and induce political empathy. Among modem conceptions of
the preferred ethical situation, the most familiar is John Rawls's original position. 615
Although highly controversial when assigned other functions-not
the least being its own justification and that of the principles ofjustice it
claims to generate-Rawls's original position has considerable utility
when applied to the modest, remedial task that I assign to ethical situation here. That task requires only what critics charge is the original
position's sole capability-namely, to "model" (but not justify) artificial
(but not spontaneously arising) social structures that foster right think61 6
ing as defined in polities already committed to liberal egalitarianism.
A remedy meeting the specifications of the original position thus commands our attention, not because it identifies an "Archimedean point
of justification" whence universal principles of egalitarian justice naturally flow but only because it imposes conditions compelling empathic
thinking of the sort that our legally ordained egalitarianism already de614. SeeJ. Rawls, supra note 105, at 118-21 ("for each traditional conception of
justice there exists an interpretation of the initial situation in which its principles are the
preferred solution"); id. at 11 & nA (discussing social contract theory of Hobbes, Kant,
Locke, and Rousseau); Dworkin, supra note 154, at 38.
615. See J. Rawls, supra note 105, at 20; see also id. at 15-16, 516, 518 (initial
situation "central" to Rawls's whole theory and critical even if Rawls's specific principles
of justice are not accepted).
616. Nagel, Rawls on Justice, in Reading Rawls, supra note 155, at 1, 14-16
(Rawls's original position models but does not justify a particular conception ofjustice);
accord A. Gutmann, supra note 142, at 120, 168, 254 n.3, 267 n.94 (collecting and discussing critical articles).
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mands. 6 17 The original position is heuristically useful, as well, because
it posits ideal political deliberation by citizens themselves and not, as in
other versions, by some more or less well disguised higher being. 61 8
Rawls's contractarian version of the ideal "initial situation" 6 19
imagines a setting that, by compelling ignorance on the part of citizenparticipants about who they are and what they want, externally "forces"
them to exhibit interpersonal receptivity and empathy in the process of
reaching unanimous agreement on the basic principles of justice.6 20
Most particularly, upon joining the deliberations, the diverse participants in Rawls's imaginary pre-constitutional convention are enveloped
in a "thick" "veil of ignorance" that renders them unaware of the class
position and social status they occupy in the real world, their fortune in
the distribution of natural assets and abilities, the differentiating aspects of their psychology, their particular conception of the good, and
even to what society and to what generation they belong.6 21 All they

know is that objective and subjective contingencies exist in the world,
that all persons have moral convictions of one sort or another, that all
persons generally want more rather than less of certain "primary
617. A. Gutmann, supra note 142, at 120, 165-68; seeJ. Mashaw, supra note 105,
at 194-95. Thus, even if the original position does not justify the dictates of the equal
protection clause, see infra note 628 and accompanying text, it does provide a fitting
model for equal protection remedies. See M. Sandel, supra note 105, at 31-32
(although not useful constructively because it assumes the existence of fallen conditions
that a valid constructive theory would seek to overcome, original position does have
"moral advantage" remedially because of "the repair it works on fallen conditions").
Put another way, I rely on Rawls here not as a philosopher ofjustice but as a technician
of reparative empathy.
618. Cf. B. Ackerman, supra note 123, at 24-33, 57-66, 179, 233 (envisioning deliberations of baggage-less, hence positionally equalized, earthly colonizers bound via
spaceship for an uninhabited planet and required-in order to allocate the planet's resources-to reach agreement by means of dialogue that the ship's all-dialogically-discering Commander holds to a "neutrality" principle); R. Dworkin, supra note 330, at
227-38 (discussed supra notes 328-331 and accompanying text) (machine that perfectly
counts citizens' preferences and in that way perfectly ascertains utility of competing proposals);J. Rawls, supra note 105, at 26-27, 185-87 (discussing utilitarian image of perfectly rational "impartial spectator" endowed "with ideal powers of sympathy and
imagination" who "identifies with and experiences the desires of others as if [those]
desires were his own"). See generallyJ. Rawls, supra note 105, at 187-90, 587 (criticizing impersonality of imagined participants in other theorists' ideal situations).
619. SeeJ. Rawls, supra note 105, at 16-18, 121-22.
620. See id. at 12, 136-42. Rawls frequently adopts the language of compulsion,
arguing, for example, that the veil of ignorance "forces" the participants "to abstract
from the particulars of their plans of life" and "to take the good of others into account."
Id. at 148, 187, 252-56, 516, 543, 584; see also Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral
Theory, 77 J. Phil. 515, 520-24 (1980) (veil of ignorance and other constraints cause
participants to forfeit some of their "full autonomy" in order to achieve the original
position's purer "rational autonomy"-i.e., the desire and ability to make decisions as
"free and equal moral persons" who are capable of devising their own distinctive visions
of the good but are not in heteronomous thrall to any "particular (system of] ends").
621. Rawls, supra note 620, at 522-34, 549-50; accordJ. Rawls, supra note 105, at
12, 137.
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goods" (namely, income and wealth, power and authority, self-respect
622
and esteem), and that those goods are in short supply.
Eschewing heroic or divine internal demands of the sort the framers avoided and de Tocqueville ridiculed, Rawls insists that the initial
participants be "mutually disinterested"-that they view themselves as
equals entitled to press their own claims without any reason to disadvantage themselves in order to bring about greater satisfaction for any,
or all, others. 623 Nevertheless, the external constraint of compelled ignorance induces in the otherwise self-interested parties a surfeit of decisional risk aversion that causes each empathically to legislate from the
perspective of the most oppressed person imaginable, into whose shoes
each faces the prospect of being deposited after being kicked out of
Independence Hall.624
Synthesized, Rawls's description of the preferred hypothetical position from which to legislate imagines an ethical situation that relies on
62 5
innocuous, plausible, and "widely accepted" external constraints
such as the veil of ignorance and mutual disinterestedness to put the
participants in a position of equality. That position in turn "forces"
citizens empathically "to take the good of others into account" given
the possibility that each of the participants could shortly find herself
translated into the position of any one of those "others." 62 6 The preferred ethical situation thereby creates a "pure procedural justice" de622. J. Rawls, supra note 105, at 92-93; accord id. at 128, 137, 142, 206, 220, 256,
433, 544-46 (original parties know that they have moral convictions, but "they do not
know [what those] convictions are"; also known are general facts about human history,
politics, economic theory, social organization, and psychology). It is as if Rawls's original parties are stricken with amnesia, transported to a darkened movie theater, strapped
into seats from which they cannot see themselves or anyone else, and shown a documentary on human history. By the end of the film, the participants know nothing about who
they and their fellow movie-goers are but everything about who they could turn out to
be once reoriented in time and place.
623. See id. at 14, 128-29, 144; see also id. at 584. The only exception to the
mutual-disinterest requirement is that the original representatives know they have ties of
affection to their children. Id. at 128, 583.
• 624. SeeJ. Rawls, supra note 105, at 152-55 ("maximin" theory, which asserts that
ignorance-veiled original participants will choose from among contingency-fraught alternatives the one with the least oppressive worst case). After reaching agreement on
basic principles ofjustice, the Rawlsian original parties pass through two additionalconstitutional and legislative-stages in which they apply the chosen principles ofjustice
in the process of designing and imposing binding constraints on general social and
political institutions, then use the basic principles of justice and basic political institutions to make specific distributional decisions. At each new stage, the veil of ignorance
thins as the parties become aware first of their society's general and then of its specific
time and place. The personal veil remains in place, however, until the legislative stage is
completed and the participants are recalled to their respective places in society. See id.
at 13, 195-200.
625. Id. at 13, 18, 521, 583-84.
626. Id. at 3, 130, 148, 187, 516, 543, 584; accord supra note 380 (original position
does not deny but instead acknowledges and seeks to denorm differences by inducing per-

sons to take seriously the points of view of others).
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cision making mechanism that relies on a "correct or fair procedure,"
to assure
rather than on an independent criterion for the right result,
6 27
that the outcome, whatever it is, is also correct or fair.
What Rawls's original position suggests about the preferred reformative remedy for endemic "we are better than they" political thinking is that: it should compel previously apostate citizens to check their
worst antiegalitarian instincts at the door when they enter upon political deliberation; it should position them once inside so that they are
situationally equal; 628 and it should cause them while deliberating to
intuit the position of the former victims of their antipluralistic
defections.
Constructing an empathy-inducing ethical situation capable of
bridging the remedial gap in process-oriented theory thus seems to require remedies satisfying six detailed specifications: First, the institutional setting should represent or model equality by positioning
citizens equally in the decisional process. 629 Second, the situational
630
symmetry should be publicly announced and visible to all parties.
Third, citizens should be bracketed, to the extent possible, not only
from their differentiating attributes in the deliberative here and now
but also from where they will be situated in the future vis-A-vis the trajectory of their allocative decisions. 6 3 ' For it is only when we cannot
determine who will lose by our antiegalitarian defections that we are
compelled to view the situation empathically-"from all social . . .
points of view"-in order to preserve ourselves and the persons we
627. J. Rawls, supra note 105, at 86; accord id. at 120, 136, 256; Rawls, supra note
620, at 523. By making the "wide acceptability" justification, see supra text accompanying note 625, part of his basis for characterizing the original-position procedure as
"fair" in the "pure procedural justice" sense, and by admitting that acceptability extends only to western democracies, Rawls's later works acknowledge that his "pure procedural justice" model is "fair" only in a culturally contingent sense and that the only
outcomes among which it is "neutral" are those recognized as just in western liberal
democracies. See Gutmann, supra note 114, at 312-14; Rawls, supra note 116, at
224-27; Rorty, supra note 115, at 18 n.12; supra notes 115, 374.
628. SeeJ. Rawls, supra note 105, at 12, 19 ("to represent equality between human
beings as moral persons, as creatures having a conception of their good"); Rawls, supra
note 116, at 236-37 n.19 (discussing Dworkin) ("modeling the force of the natural right
that individuals have to equal concern and respect in the design of political institutions
that govern them").
629. SeeJ. Rawls, supra note 105, at 12; Rawls, supra note 620, at 550. The setting
not only should give all persons equal access to the dialogic podium, seeJ. Rawls, supra
note 105, at 12, 118, 120, 136, but, to the extent possible, should obscure their social
differences so that, politically, they resemble each other, behave similarly, and view
themselves and each other independently of their own and the other's social position.
SeeJ. Rawls, supra note 105, at 511; Rawls, supra note 116, at 235-36.
630. J. Rawls, supra note 105, at 544-45.
631. Id. at 136-37; accord Gutmann, supra note 114, at 312 ("abstract from our
particular but not our shared interests"). Even better, citizens should be blinded not to
their differences but only to the differences' normative significance.
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care for against the fallout from our unfair decisions,63 2 Fourth, the
situational conditions should attempt, notwithstanding the plurality of
voices, to narrow areas of conflict and to emphasize those matters as to
which the parties' considered judgments about just action "converge[]." 6 3 3 Fifth, the situational incentives to proper pluralist behavior should be "external. ' 6 34 Rather than assuming that the parties
automatically will adhere on demand to inner ethical motivations of an
interracially altruistic or benevolent sort, the situational conditions
should be such that the parties rationally must emulate actors having
those ethical motivations even while in fact they are proceeding on the
basis of their own "self-interest properly understood." 63 5 Sixth and finally, is a preference for deliberative participation-for "voice" as opposed to literal or laconic "exit" as a means of expressing
63 6
dissatisfaction with prior or proposed outcomes.
It may seem as though I accord the philosophers' ethical situations
a degree of concreteness and real-world relevance that the idealizations

neither contemplate nor deserve. Even the philosophers, however, after acknowledging the "purely hypothetical" nature of their ideal situations, insist that "we can . . . simulate the reflections" of the ideal
participants: "At any time we can enter the [veil of ignorance], so to

speak, simply.., by arguing for principles ofjustice in accordance with
these restrictions.

' 63 7

Still, when we try to simulate the ideal situation,

632. J. Rawls, supra note 105, at 148, 587; accord supra note 623. If achieved, a
positionally enforced inability surgically to guide one's advantaging and disadvantaging
missiles should (1) make racist or other political expressions of the "I am better than
you, I deserve more than you" sort irrational as well as immoral, because "I" and "you"
are for the nonce indistinguishable, seeJ. Rawls, supra note 105, at 12, 18, 131, 139,
149; and (2) make the parties leery of decisions that are likely to have unevenly distributed
fallout ranging from good to very bad. See supra note 624.
633. SeeJ. Rawls, supra note 105, at 517; Rawls, supra note 620, at 541-42; Rawls,
supra note 343, at 18-23; see also Liebman, supra note 99, at 363 (discussing Bell,
supra note 8) (desegregation should aim to cause interests of blacks and whites to
"converge").
634. See supra notes 591-598 and accompanying text.
635. J. Rawls, supra note 105, at 583-84; accord, e.g., id. at 128, 148-49, 564-65
(achieve "effects of good will" without insisting upon so "strong a condition").
636. See, e.g., id. at 14, 19, 219, 221, 535-36 (virtues of participatory, if hypothetical, argument in original position; dialogic metaphors); id. at 263, 517 (requiring unanimity among original contractors, thus implicitly turning silence or withdrawal into
voice and impelling parties seeking agreement to reason with and convince potential
exiters); Rawls, supra note 620, at 540-41; see also B. Ackerman, supra note 123, at 14,
19 (emphasizing importance of dialogue in discovering preferred conception ofjustice);
A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970) (discussing interplay between "exit" and
.voice" in economic context); authority cited supra note 401 (discussing importance of
communal deliberations in republican theory).
637. J. Rawls, supra note 105, at 19, 120, 567 (emphasis added); accord id. at 139
("one can at any time adopt [the original] perspective. It makes no difference when one
takes up this viewpoint, or who does so"); Rawls, supra note 116, at 238-39 (original
position as accessible as role of landlord in game of Monopoly); see also A. Gutmann,
supra note 142, at 228 ("ideal theory of equality may be able to guide us in seeking just

1614

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1463

we presumedly will find "that our deliberations and judgments are influenced by our special inclinations and attitudes," thus leaving uncertain how successfully individual citizens truly can take the veil. 63 8 The
question remains, then, how to induce empathic political behavior "in
the absence of a real world decision-making device analogous to a
Rawlsian veil of ignorance. '63 9 In the next Part, I argue that all-out
desegregation performs just that simulative feat by adopting a "pure
procedural justice" remedy that reconstructs the systemically corrupted
political process and resituates its antipluralistically inclined participants so that they are subject to the six decisional conditions delineated
above.
V.

A.

DESEGREGATION AS REFORMATION

Veiling our Alter-Egos Behind the School House Walls

Earlier, I listed three prerequisites for a reconstructive remedy. 640
As we have seen, segregation satisfies the first two prerequisites: It
causes harms to the political process that are both great and
recurrent.r 1
Desegregation satisfies the third reconstructive prerequisite: It provides the necessary alternative design for a properly functioning democratic political process free of self-destructively antipluralistic
corruption. It does so by simulating the situational conditions of the
original position. 6 42 While assuming that the critical segment of the
political constituency in the present context-parents-are concerned
solely to advance their own and their children's interests, desegregasolutions to some problems encountered within unjust societies such as our own"); M.
Sandel, supra note 105, at 17,41 (quotingJ. Rawls, supra note 105, at 22, 587) (original
position "'a conception that enables us to envision our objective from afar,' but not too
far"; "a heuristic device"); Nagel, supra note 616, at 5 (original position "a way of recalling someone to... [moral] judgment").
638. J. Rawls, supra note 105, at 147.
639. Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on Civic Republicanism,
97 Yale L.J. 1651, 1652 (1988); accord B. Ackerman, supra note 123, at 33, 196-232,
331 (Rawls gives no reason to believe that "even at our most prophetic moments, we
shall be able to distinguish the higher judge from our own, imperfectly suppressed, social selves"); Barber, Justifying Justice: Problems of Psychology, Politics and Measurement in Rawls, in Reading Rawls, supra note 156, at 292, 295; Minow, supra note 179, at
32 & n.108, 60 n.240, 76.
640. See supra text following notes 510.
641. See supra notes 511-578 and accompanying text.
642. More accurately, it simulates the situational constraints that remain at the
third, society-specific, distributionally focused legislative stage of the Rawlsian constructive process. See supra note 624. For other constitutional lawyers applying Rawlsiantype analysis to specific legal problems, seeJ. Mashaw, supra note 105, at 194-99; D.
Richards, The Moral Criticism of Law 144-57 (1977); Griffin, Reconstructing Rawls's
Theory of Justice: Developing a Public Values Philosophy of the Constitution, 62
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 715,761 (1987); Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution,
56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 50, 72-75 (1987); Michelman, supra note 155, at 319-20, 326.
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tion veils those children-their parents' alter-egos-behind the walls of
a racially integrated schoolhouse.
If the "all-out desegregation" plans ordered by the Court since
Green can be said to entail any defining characteristic, it is that there be
as substantial a condition of racial integration-i.e., school attendance
by black and white children together-as the district's geography,
demographics, and reasonable amounts of additional transportation
permit. 6 43 What is important, that is, is not precise district-wide racial
balance but rather a condition in which as many children in the district
as possible attend schools that are substantially, if not identically, ra644
cially mixed.
This single requirement, moreover, reforms the corrupted political
process in precisely the six-part manner prescribed in the last section.
643. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971).
644. See id. This requirement provides an evaluative complement to social scientific research supporting a "critical mass"--no less than a 20% proportion-of each race
represented at each desegregated school. See supra note 3. Reformative theory imposes only one other remedial requirement in addition to between-school integration,
namely, the conventional post-desegregation ban on within-school segregation. See
Dimond, supra note 123, at 52-53 & n.210 (citing cases); Heaney, supra note 49, at
819-25; Lawrence, supra note 134, at 374 n.270; Note, Teaching Inequality: The Problem of Public School Tracking, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1325 (1989); see also Braddock
& McPartland, supra note 142, at 66-67 (surveying literature) (cross-group contact
"produces desegregation's major benefits for students," so that desegregation makes
little sense if resegregation into separate classrooms is extensive; nationwide study
shows tracking not substantial impediment to desegregation). Maintaining high
achievement levels among students typically targeted for upper tracks does not require
tracking; maintaining high levels among children targeted for middle and lower tracks
may forbid tracking because tracking deprives the latter children of what is potentially
their most important learning resource, namely, their better-performing peers. See,
e.g.,J. Hochschild, supra note 7, at 70-79;J. Oaks, Keeping Track: How Schools Structure Inequality 93 (1985); Hawley & Smylie, supra note 9, at 286; Rosenbaum, Social
Implications of Educational Grouping, 8 Rev. Res. Educ. 361, 363-69 (1980); Slavin &
Karweit, Effects of Whole Class, Ability Grouped, and Individualized Instruction on
Mathematics Achievement, 22 Am. Educ. Res. J. 351, 370-74 (1985); Note, supra, at
1327-34; West, 'Tracking' Hampers Minorities' Access to Math, Science Careers, Study
Finds, Educ. Week, Sept. 26, 1990, at 8, col. 5. For discussions of "cooperative learning," an educational technique that assigns diverse groups of children to work together
on projects requiring a variety of skills, at one or another of which nearly every child will
do well and which appears to maximize the capacity of children to learn from each other
and to promote high levels of achievement across traditional ability levels, see, e.g., E.
Aronson, N. Blaney, C. Stephen,J. Sikes & M. Snapp, TheJigsaw Classroom 33 (1978);
B. Johnson & R. Johnson, Learning Together and Alone: Cooperation, Competition
and Individualization 99-104 (1975); Ames, Competitive Versus Cooperative Reward
Structures: The Influence of Individual and Group Performance Factors on Achievement Attributions and Affect, 18 Am. Educ. Res. J. 273, 275 (1981); Cook, The 1954
Social Science Statement and School Desegregation, in Eliminating Racism, supra note
9, at 237, 250-53; Sharan, Cooperative Learning in Small Groups: Recent Methods and
Effects on Achievement, Attitudes, and Ethnic Relations, 50 Rev. Educ. Res. 241, 245
(1980); infra note 683; see also J. Dewey, The School and Society 15-16, 117-18 (rev.
ed. 1915) (anticipating this reform by 60 years).
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Most especially, it veils the parties in ignorance in a manner suggested
by two more of Green's famous phrases: It positions the citizen-constituents so that they cannot "racially identify" schools or the students in
the schools; so that what before were either "white schools" or "black
schools" are so racially obscured that all one can say about them now is
that they are "just schools." 64 5By this means, to begin with, each parent-citizen is publicly positioned in relation to his or her child in a processually equal and symmetrical way with regard to a factor (race) that the antecedent proof of
the system-wide, deep, and long violation has shown is important in
those constituents' minds. The first two situational conditions (equal
processual positioning and publicly announced equality) are present,
therefore, inasmuch as, on this important criterion, the parents are represented solely as parents and not as parents advantaged or disadvandivergent position
taged by the contingencies of their demographically
46
or by genetic or historical accident.6
The third and most critical condition also is present. Because desegregation inextricably intermingles, hence effectively brackets, the racial identities of children behind the schoolhouse walls, the white
parental constituency cannot take advantaging aim at their own children or disadvantaging aim at African-American children without creating an unacceptably high risk that the effects of their actions will fall
equally on children of the other race. 6 4 7 With the children desegregatively situated behind the schoolhouse walls, that is, constituents otherwise disposed to make decisions on a "mine is better than yours" basis
find that they cannot select who is injured by their antipluralistic defections and do not know how the various alternatives will affect their own
particular case. Consequently, they must evaluate principles empathically, based on how they influence each and every child as well as the
645. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968). Green's "just schools"
rhetoric was not meant to evoke images of colorblind admissions inasmuch as the "freedom of choice" procedure Green ruled unconstitutional was facially colorblind and was
not found to be intentionally discriminatory. Id. at 439-41; see also Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 214 (1973) (following system-wide violation, district may not
simply substitute colorblind neighborhood-schools plan for tainted plan). Rather, Green
stands for the proposition that a "colorblind" but nondesegregative remedy does not
reform the systemically corrupted political process and accordingly is probably the result of"we are better than they" political thinking, and in any event will stigmatize publicly as if it were the product of such thinking. Absent integrative effect, the
colorblindness of decisions reached by political processes shown to be corrupted "root
and branch" cannot confer the dignity that colorblindness entails in ajust world and can
only serve once again to stigmatize by racially separating.
646. SeeJ. Rawls, supra note 105, at 529.
647. Just as the function of the equal protection clause "is largely" to require "that
those who would harm others must at the same time harm themselves," J. Ely, supra
note 105, at 170, so too is that the function of at least one equal protection remedy,
namely, all-out desegregation.
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general, school-wide and interracial, good. 64 8
For this reason, as well as others discussed above and below,
although I agree with Professor Bell in the epigraph that begins this
Article that priority should be given to "desegregating not the students
but the money and the control," I conclude that only by desegregating
children (and, incidentally, benefiting them in the process 649 ) can we
650
desegregate the political process and then the money and control.
Reconstructive theory, that is, promotes desegregation not because
black children cannot learn unless seated next to white children in
school but because persistently discriminatory white citizens cannot
learn equal-concern virtue, and thus be moved to distribute educational
resources fairly to black children, unless their own children sit next to
black children in school. Equal Educational Opportunity theory
notwithstanding, desegregation is not necessary to raise black children's educational boats on whites' rising educational tide,6 5 1 but
rather to raise the political consciousness of white parents by putting
their children in the same educational boat as black children. Corrective theory notwithstanding, desegregation is not mainly needed because of its restorative impact on the stigmatized hearts and minds of
black children but rather because of its transformative effect on the malignant hearts and minds of racist white citizens.
The fourth situational condition-narrowed area of conflict,
648. SeeJ. Rawls, supra note 105, at 136-37. Desegregation thus has all the advantageous effects of the third ideal condition. First, parents are not in a position to tailor
outcomes to their relative advantage. See id. at 139. Whatever advantages the members
of the political majority choose-in the full flowering of their mutual disinterest-to visit
upon their children's schools are visited equally upon the schools of the formerly disadvantaged race. Allocations based on racist doctrines accordingly "are not only unjust,
they are irrational"--the more so because the harms attendant upon irrational behavior
fall not on oneself but on one's children. Id. at 149. Second, given predictably high
risk-averseness where one's children are concerned, there is especially good reason to
expect the moderating impact of worst-case worries to obtain. See supra note 624.
649. See infra notes 665-666, 675-696 and accompanying text.
650. "[E]xperience continues to teach.., that 'green follows white' (that is, in a
society where whites remain the majority, the presence of whites in an institution protects that institution against racially unequal distribution of resources)." Gewirtz,
Choice, supra note 49, at 776; accord W. Hawley, supra note 3, at 164-66; D. Kirp, Just
Schools: The Idea of Racial Equality in American Education 43-46 (1982); Shane, supra
note 52, at 1085-94. The absence of this equality-assuring condition in my view dooms
gilded-ghetto remedies, for in the long run white taxpayersare less likely to gild someone else's schools-particularly those of a race against whom they have discriminated
persistently in the past-than they are to gild their own children's (and, if integrated,
everyone else's) schools. See supra note 139. Until African-American voters gain control of state legislatures and of districts in which their children may be a majority but
they themselves are not, black-control remedies will face similar disabilities. See supra
note 142 (paragraph (5)).
651. In fact, such modest rises as have occurred in national SAT and other testscore averages during the last two decades have resulted not from any improvement in
the scores of whites but instead from substantial gains in the scores of blacks. See infra
note 675.
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broadened area of convergence-obviously is troublesome. Desegregation's selling point has not traditionally been its pacific effect on communities. Before explaining why I think desegregation's accomplishments in this regard have been substantially undersold, let me begin by identifying a proper baseline from which to measure reductions
in conflict.
Recall, first of all, that the original position itself is remedial in the
sense that it assumes and seeks to compensate for an imperfect worldone characterized by scarcity and "the fact of pluralism," hence by the
potential for conflict and violence among people with different and
conflicting goals and values. Moreover, one cannot accept the heuristic
validity of the original position without also reaching two conclusions(1) that plurality (as well as scarcity) is either a good thing or at least
immutable, and, therefore, (2) that we should not spend our time trying
to extirpate plurality but instead should try to ameliorate the conflict
that plurality causes.6 5 2 However controversial these two conclusions
are in Rawls's case,6 53 they are not so in mine, given my interpretation
of the equal protection clause as essentially demanding both conclusions. Further, whether or not Rawls intends to claim that the original
position entirely ends conflict, for me-operating as I am in what by
hypothesis is an unjust world characterized by system-wide violations of
the "equal concern" principle-even a reduction in conflict satisfies the
fourth criterion.
Recall, finally, the violational premises of a reformative remedy:
The racist opinion emanating from many sources among the citizenry
over a long period of time has intervened consequentially in the political process governing the schools. 6 54 That intervention constitutes a

serious, even dangerous, kind of conflict that violates the equal protection clause. 65 5 It is the reconstructive remedy's task to do something
about that conflict. 656 The baseline from which to measure reduction

of conflict, therefore, is the persistent and socially menacing interracial
antagonism that the "system-wide violation" finding documents.
65 7
I realize that some people-perhaps, mostly white people -will
disagree with these premises. For them, the pre- and post-desegregation situation more accurately would be encapsulated by a statement
such as the following: "A year ago, we all were getting along fine.
652. A person who believes that the highest calling in life is to make holy war
against nonbelievers is unlikely to consider the original position's assumption of religious toleration ajustifiable means of decreasing conflict. The analysis here accordingly
applies only to societies in which holy warriors are few and far between and in which
religious toleration, at least in public, is accepted. See supra notes 115, 374, 627.
653. See M. Sandel, supra note 105, at 30-35.
654. See supra notes 439-449, 511-520 and accompanying text.
655. See supra notes 62, 449-464, 505-509 and accompanying text. See generally
supra notes 355-370 (segregation especially egregious equal protection violation).
656. See supra notes 510-578 and accompanying text.
657. See infra notes 667-668.
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Then, a federal judge ordered our children bused to schools on the
opposite side of town. All of a sudden, the whole community was disrupted, its citizens aroused and angry." It is my position, however, that
any such statement is wrong by constitutional hypothesis because it
manifests the speaker's (ongoing?) "racially selective sympathy and indifference" insofar as the black victims of the violation are
658
concerned.
I propose a different description of desegregation's likely and
hoped for effects on existing conflict levels:
Prior to the decree, citizens were not getting along fine. A majority
of them were inciting the political process to treat a minority as unworthy of equal concern and respect.
In the short run following the decree, 65 9 the order is likely to cause
anger and disruption. Some of that anger and disruption, in all
probability, is but the public airing of the conflictual racist opinion that
for so long silently corroded the political machinery from within. This
component of the anger and disruption does not count as an increase
in conflict because it antedated the remedy. At most, it places a limit on
the extent to which desegregation can be said to have lessened conflict.
Other aspects of the anger and disruption may reflect an increase in the
prevalence or intensity of the racist opinion. When this conflict affects
only the angered or disrupted holder of the racist opinion-i.e., when
it merely shifts the impact of the conflict from the victim to the perpetrator of the violation-this conflict also does not count. When, however, this additional conflict feeds back into the political process and
incites additional harms to blacks, then it counts. 6 6° Yet another aspect
of the anger and disruption is the reasoned response of citizens to the
additional burdens that the order places on their lives.
Over the middle run-during the life of the decree-desegregation "externally" will reduce the extent to which the conflictual racist
opinion intervenes in the political process for the reasons stated above
and below. Over the long run, the decree has "internal," virtue-inculcating, or (using de Tocqueville's word) "habit"-forming effects that
may reduce, more generally and permanently, the extent and intensity
of interracial and other antipluralist conflict among the citizenry as a
whole.
Viewed in this way, the questions raised by the fourth remedial criterion are these: How dangerous is the pre-existing antipluralist conflict? How likely and how large are the desegregatively inspired
decrements in that conflict (limited by such obstinate conflict as per658. Brest, supra note 104, at 14-15; accord supra notes 470-472 and accompanying text.
659. See infra note 669 and accompanying text.
660. See Fiss, supra note 61, at 196-97 & n.6; see also Gewirtz, Remedies, supra
note 49, at 598-99 (courts may leave out of remedial balance any disadvantages to
whites, but not to blacks, caused by whites' racially motivated attitudes).
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sists)? And, how likely, large, and dangerous are the desegregatively
inspired increments in conflict?
I already explained why I think the conflict entailed by the systemwide violation is dangerous indeed and why I think the middle-term
ameliorative capacity of the remedy is substantial. 6 6' I also earlier arrayed the empirical data showing that the time (childrens') and money
(taxpayers') spent on desegregation-enhanced transportation and the
incidence of desegregation-increased violence among children are in
662
fact, if not in the wider public's consciousness, minor.
There is, moreover, empirical support for the hypotheses that the
entire range of desegregation-enhanced and revealed conflict is temporary and over the long haul rather limited, and that desegregation significantly ameliorates antipluralist conflict among blacks and whites
over the long run. Thus, although desegregation's typically pre- and
early-implementation racial conflicts are well known, some later-ap.pearing and more permanent countervailing forces are not so well
known, though they are now documented. 663 On the question of the
661. See supra notes 449-464, 505-509 and accompanying text (dangers posed by
systemic legislative racism and system-wide-segregation violations); supra notes
647-651 and accompanying text (capacity of desegregation to discourage legislative racism in sphere of public education).
662. See supra note 574. If the wider public's counterfactual beliefs stem from
racially selective sympathy and indifference, the importance of those beliefs is limited.
See supra text at note 658. What the "wider public" thinks may be misleading in any
event, for opinion polls indicate that "the narrower public" that matters-participants in
desegregation plans-ultimately comes to agree with the conclusions suggested by the
empirical data, namely, that busing is not very costly and disruptive and that desegregated schools are no more unsafe than segregated ones. See infra notes 667-668.
663. The amount and quality of empirical research has increased significantly during the last 10 years. See Kennedy, supra note 64, at 1795-96 n.229, 1811 n.288, 1813
n.295 (offering explanation of hiatus in research in late 1960s and 1970s). Surveys of
the available literature, running from Brown to the present, include: Brown v. Board of
Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 n.11 (1954); Katz, Review of Evidence Relating
to Effects of Desegregation on the Intellectual Performance of Negroes, 19 Am. Psychologist 388, 388-91 (1964); Bradley & Bradley, The Academic Achievement of Black Students in Desegregated Schools: A Critical Review, 47 Rev. Res. Educ. 381, 399-449
(1977); Crain & Mahard, Minority Achievement: Policy Implications of Research, in Effective, supra note 42, at 55, 56-70; D. Kirp, B. Levin, T. van Geel & M. Yudof, Educational Policy and the Law 495-507 (2d ed. 1982); Braddock & McPartland, supra note
142, at 6; Hawley & Smylie, supra note 9, at 284; Mayer &Jencks, Growing Up in Poor
Neighborhoods: How Much Does It Matter?, 243 Science 1441, 1442 (1989) (summarizing C.Jencks & S. Mayer, The Social Consequences of Growing Up in a Poor Neighborhood: A Review (Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research, Northwestern
University, Apr. 1989)). Although within 20 years of Brown-but only a few years after
desegregation actually began in earnest-proponents of desegregation found it "embarrassing to use time as an excuse," Fiss, Fate, supra note 63, at 768, the more recent
increase in the amount and quality of research and its increasingly encouraging results
coursel patience. So does history. See, e.g., C. Woodward, Reunion and Reaction 214
(1951) (tragically premature end to first Reconstruction due in part to absurdly impatient or disingenuous white assessments of progress of former slaves, barely a decade
after emancipation).
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disruptions and enhanced antiblack animosities that desegregation
causes, consider that:
" Apparently no respectable study has ever claimed that desegregation or busing to achieve it decreases the academic
accomplishments of white children on any known measure. 6 6 At worst, desegregation academically is a wash for
whites.
* In the years after desegregation takes place, school districts
characteristically experience an educational renaissance
characterized by curricular reform, modernized grade structures (e.g., middle schools in lieu of junior highs), revitalized teaching staffs, enhanced parental involvement and
financial support for the schools, and-perhaps most importantly-a revived administrative bureaucracy.6 6 5 This effect
has prompted Professor Bell and others to criticize desegregation as a screen for enhancing
the educational opportuni6
ties for white children. "
" Over time, a substantial majority of the white citizens whose
children are forced to ride buses and take other desegregative actions come to view their children's desegregation experiences positively, even when controls for self-selection
are introduced. 66 7 Indeed, whites who have been through
desegregative busing are much more likely to support the
remedy than are whites who have not experienced desegregation, which may explain why, in the last few years, the
steadily rising percentage of young white adults entering
6 68
college who favor busing has exceeded fifty percent.
664. See, e.g., C. Jencks & S. Mayer, supra note 663, at 33, 45, 96; Hawley & Smylie, supra note 9, at 284; Mayer &Jencks, supra note 663, at 1443.
665. See Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary
Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Report on School Desegregation 10 (Comm. Print 1981);
J. Hochschild, supra note 7, at 80-82 & nn.140-44 (disruption not an evil but rather
desegregation's principal asset because it shakes up stultified bureaucracies, induces
"organizational, curricular, and pedagogical improvements for all students," and generates funding); Hawley & Smylie, supra note 9, at 285; You Were Wrong, Mr. President,
supra note 7; Sinclair, Desegregation's Quiet Success, Wash. Post,June 17, 1978, at Al,
col. 4.
666. See, e.g., D. Bell, supra note 2, at 107-08; Monti, supra note 139, at 57-63.
667. See J. Hochschild, supra note 7, at 179-87 (1978-83 Harris surveys). As of
1983, 88%o of white parents and 94% of African-American parents whose children were
bused for desegregation purposes found the experience satisfying, while 64%6 of whites
and 74%o of African-Americans found it "very satisfying." Id.; accord Pettigrew, supra
note 142, at 691 (reviewing attitudes studies that control for self-selection and pre-existing attitudes and conclude that participation in desegregation generally fosters
favorable impression of the reform); Taylor, Sheatsley & Greeley, Attitudes Toward Racial Integration, Sci. Am., June 1978, 41, at 44 (between 1963 and 1970 and between
1972 and 1976, percentage of southerners favoring school integration increased only
5%o per year, between 1970 and 1972, when desegregation actually occurred throughout
the South, support for integration increased 3576 per year).
668. See, e.g., A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at 164-66 (1978 poll data) (although
85%o-89%5 of whites in general population oppose busing, only 167o of whites and 8%6 of
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0 Increased white flight-mainly to the suburbs, and only
modestly, it seems, to private schools-does occur the year
before, the year of, and the year after desegregation. 669
Thereafter, however, white loss normally drops off almost to
pre-desegregation levels and in the case of certain kinds 670
of
plans appears to fall below pre-desegregation levels.
Although the data are fragmentary, they create the possibility that, over the course of a decade or so, certain kinds of
desegregation plans actually produce a net gain in the
number of white children attending school in desegregated
districts. 671 Moreover, white loss depends less on the
amount of busing or the proportion of blacks in the schools
blacks whose children experienced desegregative busing found experience "not satisfactory"); Orfield, supra note 6, at 28 (1986 poll data) (although only 36% of white population has favorable attitudes towards busing, at least 50% of population under 30 does
and 71% of parents in families a member of which was bused as a result of desegregation had "very satisfactory" experience with desegregation; ratio favoring desegregation
in annual poll of 100,000 entering college freshmen climbed from 46% to 56% between
1980 and 1986).
669. E.g., F. Welch & A. Light, supra note 6, at 54-62 & Tables 19-22 (study's
limitations described supra note 10); see id. at 4, 13-15 & Tables 3-5; Rossell & Hawley,
Understanding White Flight and Doing Something About It, in Effective, supra note 42,
at 154, 166-69. White flight has characterized all American cities over the last several
decades, and there is little evidence that desegregation is a principal cause. See Orfield,
supra note 42, at 196-97 (public opinion data showing that parents consider cities unattractive places to raise children irrespective of desegregation). Indeed, some economists argue that white flight enhances municipal efficiency (given the high correlation
between race and socio-economic status) because, all else equal, economically homogeneous populations encounter lower transactions and externality costs in reaching consensus on optimum levels of taxation and spending than do heterogeneous populations.
See Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J. Pol. Econ. 415, 415 (1956); cf.
Grubb, The Dynamic Implications of the Tiebout Model: The Changing Composition
of Boston Communities, 10 Pub. Fin. Q. 17, 26-31 (1982) (Tiebout model predictions
only partly borne out by experience in Boston area between 1960 and 1970). The appropriate white-flight measure for my purposes, therefore, is not the net amount of
flight but the amount by which desegregation increases or decreases white flight.
670. See J. Hochschild, supra note 7, at 52; F. Welch & A. Light, supra note 6, at
48-68 (data summarized infra notes 671-673); Armor, After Busing: Education and
Choice, Pub. Interest, Spring 1989, 2 at 24-27 (desegregation occasioned substantial
white flight in some cities, but recent plans have "produced only minimal white flight");
Hawley & Smylie, supra note 9, at 291-92; see also Rossell & Hawley, supra note 669, at
167-69 (permanence of white flight is in doubt, given that much of flight is to private
schools whence children may return to public schools in the years after
implementation).
671. In its analysis of all-out desegregation plans using a combination of rezoning
and magnet school techniques, the Reagan Administration study found that white enrollment loss was 2.98% per year prior to implementation and 9.027 per year during
the year before, of, and after implementation, but declined to about one-third of one
percent per year thereafter. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text. Applying
these declines to the model district that the federal study uses for exemplary purposes-which had 50,000 white students in 1968 and implemented a desegregation plan in the
fall of 1975-and adopting the study's naive assumptions, see F. Welch & A. Light,
supra note 6, at 49-51, one would project that, by the fall of 1985, the number of white
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(the so-called "tipping point") than on the extent to which a
plan promises that racial proportions and educational offerings will remain stable after the desegregation plan takes effect. 6 72 Even temporary white flight, by the way, is never so

substantial that fewer whites and blacks attend school together after than before implementation. 6 73 Fragmentary
data also dispute the chestnut that desegregation-enhanced
6 74
white flight decreases local tax support for schools.
students enrolled in the district after desegregation would exceed the number that
would have been enrolled in the district absent desegregation:
White Enrollment

1968

1974

1977

1985

No Desegregation
(2.98%5 loss/year)

50,000

41,700

38,082

29,896

Desegregation
(2.98%, then
9.02%, then
.368% loss/year)

50,000

41,700

31,403

30,491

See id. at 55, 57,95 & Tables 19, 19a, A4; see also id. at 57-63 & Tables 19-2 la (aggregate postimplementation declines in white enrollment loss for plans implemented in
Boston, Buffalo, Detroit, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Kansas, Los Angeles, Odessa,
Pittsburgh, Rockford, San Francisco, St. Louis, Shreveport, and Seattle); Hawley &
Smylie, supra note 9, at 290 (although desegregation's long-term effects are unclear,
implementation of school desegregation plans seems to be associated with increases in
housing integration); Rossell & Hawley, supra note 669, at 170-71 (except in districts
with very high minority proportion, "short-term implementation losses appear to be
compensated for by less than normal postimplementation losses").
672. See, e.g., J. Hochschild, supra note 7, at 60 & nn.64-65 (postdesegregation
flight only "weakly related" to whether one's child will be bused); F. Welch & A. Light,
supra note 6, at 7, 59, 62, 64 & Table 22 ("Countywide districts experienced much less
enrollment loss than did other types of districts" although they utilized more busing and
achieved "dramatic reductions in segregation"; little correlation between amount of desegregation achieved or mandatory busing used and amount of white loss suffered);
Levine & Eubanks, supra note 9, at 46-47 ("tipping points" projected in 1960s and
1970s unduly low based on current experience); Orfield, supra note 42, at 202-07, 213
(white flight increases less because of numbers or percentages of races involved and
more because of whites' fear that, once begun, racial change will turn neighborhoods
all-minority; city-suburbs desegregation plans decrease white flight by increasing stability inasmuch as all schools in area will have similar, hence stable, racial enrollments
notwithstanding movement of whites to suburbs); Rossell & Hawley, supra note 669, at
170-71.
673. See, e.g., F. Welch & A. Light, supra note 6, at 6, 56, 66-67 (even after accounting for white flight, "implementation of desegregation plans is usually associated
with sharp reductions in segregation"; commonly used mandatory plans have much
"larger desegregative effects than other plan types"; hypothesis that "desegregation efforts might trigger such a large exodus of white students that racial isolation actually
increases" rejected); id. at 55, 58-59 & Tables 19-20a (combining all 109 plans examined, 300% increase in desegregation accompanied by drop in white enrollment of 6
percentage points more than would have occurred but for desegregation; among "pairing and clustering" plans, 1200% increase in desegregation accompanied by 4 percentage point drop in white enrollment).
674. E.g., Hawley & Smylie, supra note 9, at 289, 291.
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What these data suggest via measures ranging from polls and ambulatory voting to analyses of desegregation's actual effects on white
participants is that the interracial conflict and unhappiness caused by
desegregative burdens on whites are modest and temporary, and that
these effects might possibly be offset over the long haul as the attractions of desegregation-inspired educational improvements induce
whites not only into the attitudinally pro-desegregation camp but also
back into the urban public schools. At least as important, the renaissance effect, the fact that desegregation has some positive impact on
black achievement and greater positive impact on blacks' educational
and economic attainments after graduating high school, and the absence of any proof that white flight causes net integration to decline
suggest that desegregation is not responsible for inspiring antiblack
feeling that has a significant effect on the political process-or, at least,
a greater effect than pre-existing racism has had.
On the questions whether desegregation externally forces greater
concern and respect for blacks over the middle term and whether it
causes "equal concern" virtue to be internalized and perhaps even to
become habitual over the long term (proposition 4), the evidence again
provides a basis for optimism:
* African-Americans benefit in several ways from desegregation, suggesting both that the political system governing
schools works more effectively for them or less effectively
against them and that over the long haul African-Americans
who have experienced desegregation will have less cause for
antiwhite feelings. Without doubt, desegregation improves
black academic achievement. Although the extent of improvement is in doubt, the signs are hopeful, especially
given the dearth of alternative educational interventions
that work as well as desegregation. 6 75 Among African675. See, e.g., id. at 284-85 (comprehensive review of literature, concluding that,
regardless of type of study, "[d]esegregation is generally associated with moderate gains
in the achievement of black students"; the most comprehensive and sophisticated study,
synthesizing 93 earlier studies, finds effect "significant"; the 20 studies among the 93
that employed more sophisticated techniques all showed relatively large effects; "rigorous" studies showed "significantly positive effects"); see R. Crain,J. Hawes, R. Miller &
J. Peichert, Finding Niches: Desegregated Students Sixteen Years Later 10-23, 51-54
(Rand Corp. Report No. R-3243-NIE,Jan. 1985) [hereinafter R. Crain]; R. Crain, How
Successful Are the Graduates of Project Concern? 2-3 (1985) (release accompanying
publication of R. Crain, supra) [hereinafter R. Crain, How Successful] (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); R. Crain &J. Strauss, School Desegregation and Black Occupational Attainments: Results from a Long-Term Experiment, reprinted from Center for
Social Organization of Schools, Report No. 359, Three Reports: Effects of Employer
Recruitment Methods, Employer Job Placement Decisions, and School Desegregation
on Minority and Female Hiring and Occupational Attainment 10-14, 25-29 (July 1985)
(most sophisticated study yet, analyzing one of nation's longest running desegregation
plans finding substantial gains in African-American achievement, some of highest shown
by any study); A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at 161-67;J. Hochschild, supra note 7, at 91,
177; C. Jencks & S. Mayer, supra note 663, at 55-65 ("best estimates" of desegrega-
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American children attending desegregated schools (controlling for socio-economic status, predesegregation achievement levels, and other relevant and measurable criteria), the
likelihood of teenage pregnancy, dropping out, and delinquent behavior is substantially lower than among Africantion's cumulative impact suggest that black students attending mostly white schools in
North score "something like a third of a standard deviation higher on most tests" than
do blacks in all-black schools; this improvement erases a third of overall difference between scores of Northern blacks and whites, hence desegregative gains "substantial"; 12
years in "predominantly white Northern school[s] probably has a substantial positive
effect on black students' achievement"; no similar data available for South); Braddock &
McPartland, supra note 142, at 6 (gains "strongest when desegregation begins in the
early grades, has a metropolitan-wide plan, and takes place in predominantly white
schools with a critical mass of black students"); Mahard & Crain, Research on Minority
Achievement in Desegregated Schools, in The Consequences of School Desegregation
103, 121-25 (C. Rossell & W. Hawley eds. 1983) [hereinafter Consequences]; see also
Braddock & McPartland, supra note 142, at 7 (blacks account for about 40% of recent
overall gains in SAT scores; "most significant gains have come in the South, where
school desegregation has had its greatest impact"); U.S. Dep't of Educ., The Reading
Report Card, 1971-1988: Trends from the Nation's Report Card 14-15 (1989) (in
1971, white high school students on average scored 53 points (10%) higher than blacks
on prestigious testing group's 500-point reading scale; in 1988, the gap was 20 points
(4%), notwithstanding increasing black retention rates that depress black averages;
black improvement continues at time of stagnation in white scores); Carmody, Minority
Students Gain on College Entrance Tests, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1989, at A16, col. 4.
Acknowledging that desegregation improves black achievement somewhat but questioning extent of improvement are: Armor, The Evidence on Desegregation, in School Desegregation and Black Achievement 19-23 (Nat'l Inst. of Educ. 1984); Cook, What Have
Black Children Gained Academically from School Desegregation? Examination of the
Meta-Analytic Evidence, in id., at 64-71; Krol, A Meta Analysis of the Effects of Desegregation on Academic Achievement, 12 Urb. Rev. 211, 220-24 (1980).
Desegregation may have a greater positive impact on I.Q. than on achievement
tests. See Crain & Mahard, supra note 663, at 68-69 (desegregation raises black I.Q.
scores, erasing "nearly half of the 'gap'" between blacks' predesegregation I.Q. scores
and the national norm). Most educational researchers agree that the expectations teachers convey to students are a key factor in determining the impact of schooling on
achievement. See, e.g., Edmonds, supra note 123, at 111-13, 115-16, 121; Pettigrew,
supra note 142, at 696; Ratner, supra note 140, at 802-03 & nn.79-83; Schools that
Work, supra note 140, at 17, 23-25; sources cited infra note 765. Because simply ordering teachers to raise their expectations for low-achieving children does not work, the
problem has been to find means of structuring higher expectations into educational programs for such children. Unlike many other educational reforms, see supra note 142,
desegregation at the classroom level accomplishes this task-and it does so in just the
way Reformative theory predicts, because teachers in integrated classrooms are less
likely than ones in all-black classrooms consciously or unconsciously to convey low expectations to the class. See, e.g., Cohen, Expectation States and Interracial Interaction
in School Settings, 8 Ann. Rev. of Soc. 209, 226-32 (1982); Hawley, Equity and Quality
in Education: Characteristics of Effective Desegregated Schools, in Effective, supra note
42, at 297, 304 (teachers "less demanding of and responsive to minority children in
segregated classrooms than in desegregated [ones]"); Hawley & Smylie, supra note 9, at
285 (studies of exemplary minority schools and educational innovations as yet provide
little promise that this situation can be corrected without desegregation); Walzer, supra
note 142, at 61-62.
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American children in segregated schools. 6 76 Blacks who
graduate from desegregated schools (controlling for similar
criteria) attend college, attendfour-year colleges, 67 7 get high
6 9
marks from their professors, 678 graduate from college, S
and enter predominantly white employment settings in
greater numbers 68 ° than do blacks who attended segregated
public schools, and the former appear to receive higher average salaries as adults than do the latter. 68 1 While desegregation in the earlier grades has the greatest impact on
academic achievement, desegregation at the secondary level
may have the greatest impact
on post-secondary educational
6 82
and economic attainment.
9 Black and white adults who previously attended desegre676. See, e.g., R. Crain, supra note 675, at 13-17, 24, 26-27, 51 (black females'
rate of pregnancy prior to age 18 reduced substantially; black males' drop-out rate reduced by one third to one half; black males' rate of delinquent behavior decreased by
one third to one half); C. Jencks & S. Mayer, supra note 663, at 79, 84-85 (teenage
pregnancy); Furstenberg, Morgan, Moore & Peterson, Race Differences in the Timing of
Adolescent Intercourse, 52 Am. Soc. Rev. 511, 515 & Table 3 (1987); Mayer &Jencks,
supra note 663, at 1442 (drop outs).
677. See Braddock & McPartland, supra note 142, at 8-9 (desegregation increases
likelihood of attendance at four-year and desegregated colleges, controlling for academic credentials, social class, and college inducements; also increases likelihood that
African-Americans major in fields that provide opportunities for higher paying jobs); R.
Crain, supra note 675, at 10-23, 51; C. Jencks & S. Mayer, supra note 663, at 33-34;
Thornton & Eckland, High School Contextual Effects for Black and White Students: A
Research Note, 53 Soc. Educ. 247, 249-52 (1980).
678. See, e.g., R. Crain &J. Strauss, supra note 675, at 3; Crain & Mahard, School
Racial Composition and Black College Attendance and Achievement Test Performance,
51 Soc. Educ. 81, 98-99 (1978);.
679. See, e.g., R. Crain, supra note 675, at 11-12, 51 (black male graduates of desegregated public schools are one and one-half to over two times more likely to complete college than graduates of segregated public schools, after proper controls);
Camburn, supra note 142, at 558-60, 565-66 (recent national longitudinal study of
graduating high school seniors desiring to go to college, concluding that "the higher the
percentage of white students at an individual's [including an African-American individual's] high school, the greater the probability that the student [whatever his or her socioeconomic status] would finish [a four-year] college); Mayer &Jencks, supra note 663, at
1442.
680. See Hawley & Smylie, supra note 9, at 290.
681. See, e.g., R. Crain &J. Strauss, supra note 675, at 13-14, 26-27, 34, 37 (black
adults who previously attended desegregated schools one and one-half times (females)
to three times (males) more likely to secure employment in higher paying occupations
than those who attended segregated schools); Braddock & McPartland, supra note 142,
at 63-64 (well-controlled study showing "statistically significant net income advantage
to black male graduates of predominantly white colleges of nearly $2500," with likelihood of attendance at such colleges being substantially increased by attendance at desegregated secondary schools); Datcher, Effects of Community and Family Background
on Achievement, 64 Rev. Econ. & Statistics 32, 39 (1982); Mayer &Jencks, supra note
663, at 1443; Taylor, supra note 123, at 966-67 & nn.24-25; R. Crain, How Successful,
supra note 675, Table 1. See generally Braddock, Crain & McPartland, supra note 156,
at 261-64 (surveying desegregation's effects on adults).
682. See Braddock & McPartland, supra note 142, at 6, 9-10.
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gated elementary and secondary schools (after proper controls) seem to be less likely to express negative views about
members of the other race and are significantly more comfortable in integrated work and social settings than are black
and white graduates of segregated schools.6 3 Likewise,
black graduates of desegregated schools are less likely than
graduates of segregated schools to believe that antiblack
discrimination is widespread. 6 8 Most heartening is evidence that, upon graduating from desegregated schools,
both blacks (as to whom the evidence is stronger) and whites
vote with their feet in ways that suggest that they carry
"equal concern" virtue with them outside the public educational sphere-indeed outside the public sphere-and into
their private lives: Members of both races who attended integrated schools (again, after proper controls) live in integrated neighborhoods and report having personal
relationships with persons of the other race in significantly
higher proportions 68than
do blacks and whites who went to
5
segregated schools.
683. See, e.g., R. Crain, supra note 675, at 23-30, 51; A. Gutmann, supra note 52,
at 161-63; J. Rosenbaum, L. Rubinowitz & M. Kulieke, Low-Income Black Children in
White Suburban Schools (Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research, Northwestern
Univer., 1986); Braddock & McPartland, supra note 142, at 63, 68-69; McConahay, Reducing Racial Prejudice in Desegregated Schools, in Effective, supra note 42, at 30, 35;
Schofield & Sagar, Desegregation, School Practices, and Student Race Relations, in
Consequences, supra note 675, at 58, 91-99; Cooperative learning techniques, see supra
note 644, are especially productive of positive interracial attitudes. See, e.g., Amir, Contact Hypothesis in Ethnic Relations, 71 Psychology Bull. 319, 328-30, 337-39 (1969);
St. John, The Effects of School Desegregation on Children, in Race & Schooling in the
City 84, 92-94 (A. Yarmolinsky ed. 1981); Slavin & Madden, School Practices that Improve Race Relations, 16 Am. Educ. Res. J. 169, 178-80 (1979).
684. E.g., R. Crain &J. Strauss, supra note 675, at 28.
685. See, e.g., R. Crain, supra note 675, at 24, 51; Braddock, Crain & McPartland,
supra note 156, at 260 (surveying literature) ("Without exception," studies, nearly all
produced in 1980s, show "that desegregation of schools leads to desegregation in later
life-in college, in social situations, and on the job"); Braddock & McPartland, supra
note 142, at 7-8; see also Hawley & Smylie, supra note 9, at 290 (school desegregation
integrates more effectively than fair housing or fair employment programs); Hirsch,
supra note 406, at 443 & n.96 ("vast" empirical literature documents capacity of community members over time, if exposed to previously excluded persons, to accept those
persons as "enough 'like' themselves to merit inclusion").
If desegregation benefits black Americans, why do some black Americans-albeit in
much smaller proportions than whites-oppose it? Compare Armor, supra note 670, at
27 (most blacks feel desegregative benefits in education outweigh costs) and sources
cited supra notes 667-668 with, e.g., Educ. Week, Mar. 28, 1990, at 3, col. 1 (blacks
opposed to busing ask to intervene in Georgia desegregation case). Black ambivalence
towards desegregation no doubt stems from numerous factors, among them (1) the bad
experiences blacks have suffered under ill-conceived and in some instances discriminatory desegregation plans, see, e.g., supra note 252; (2) the view of some AfricanAmerican theorists and politicians-but, it is my impression, relatively few AfricanAmerican parents-that the concentrations in black population that desegregation dissi-

pates are black Americans' best hope of amassing political power at the local level and of
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* Impressionistic evidence of the kinds of political alignments
and outcomes that successfully reformative desegregation
should produce has begun to appear. Among that evidence
are: the recent nominations and elections of AfricanAmericans to high statewide offices in the South, where desegregation has had its greatest impact;6 8 6 the failure of recent antibusing initiatives in cities undergoing mandatory
desegregation; 68 7 the surprising failure of busing to generate the kind of national political backlash that other 1960s
creating public schools that adequately and sensitively educate black children, compare
sources cited supra notes 139-140 (favoring geographic concentration of AfricanAmerican population as means of enhancing African-American political power) with
sources cited supra note 142 (paragraph (5)) (discussing inability of African-American
control of localities to overcome effects of white political power at regional, state, and
national levels); and (3) black separatist values of the sort that pervasive white racism
naturally produces but that, in my view, the equal protection clause condemns-along
with white racism-when it motivates citizens' effective public actions, see supra Part III.
In the last two regards, reconstructive desegregation will seem no more appealing than
other versions because it not only mixes whites with blacks but does so in the politically
reformative interest of whites as well as blacks. See generally Brooks, supra note 160, at
894-98 (summarizing and extending criticism of civil rights scholarship for paying too
much attention to harms to political process and to citizens generally and too little attention to particular injuries of direct victims of discrimination).
686. See Oreskes, Feinstein Wins Primary Race in California, N.Y. Times, June 6,
1990, at Al, col. 1 (discussing, among other primary elections, nomination of Harvey
Gantt to face Jesse Helms in North Carolina's 1990 senatorial race); Apple, The 1989
Elections; Black Success with Measured Approach, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1989, at Al, col.
4 (Douglas Wilder's election as Governor of Virginia). Of particular note is the Democratic Party's nomination of Harvey Gantt for Senator of North Carolina, Mr. Gantt's
election and successes as an African-American mayor of predominantly white Charlotte
have been linked to improvements in race relations in that city accompanying its famous
school desegregation case. See You Were Wrong, Mr. President, supra note 7, at A15,
col. 3. On desegregation's impact on race relations in the South, see generally Talese,
Selma 1990: Old Faces and a New Spirit, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1990, at Al, col. 2 (appraising quarter century of progress in southern race relations and identifying goals not
yet attained); supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text (social acceptability of school desegregation in southern communities).
687. For example, November 1989 and February and May 1990 elections in Cleveland, Seattle, and Denver, each dominated by divisive antibusing issues, produced outcomes that, on balance, favored the continuation of desegregation in those cities,
revealed substantial interracial cooperation on school improvement initiatives, and, in
Seattle, coincided with the election as mayor of a black desegregation supporter who ran
against a white antibusing activist. See Schmidt, Once Divided, Seattle Residents in Accord on Five Goals for Improving City's Schools, Educ. Week, May 30, 1990, at 5, col. I;
Educ. Week, May 30, 1990, at 3, col. 1 (in midst of school desegregation controversy,
Denver voters approve $200 million bond issue for schools); Seattle Voters Approve
Levy: Board Backs Plan for Minorities, Educ. Week, Feb. 14, 1990, at 2, col. 2; Seattle
Board Votes to Reject Controversial Anti-Busing Measure, Educ. Week, Jan. 10, 1990,
at 5, col. 1; Snider, Opponents of Seattle 'Controlled Choice' Initiative Claim 'Victory'
After Race Ends Too Close to Call, Educ. Week, Nov. 15, 1989, at 5, col. 5; Snider,
Cleveland Voters Send Mixed Signals on Desegregation, Superintendent's Job, Educ.
Week. Nov. 15. 1989. at 5. col. 5.
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and 1970s reforms faced in the 1980s; 68 8 the significant increase in the number of black superintendents hired recently by predominantly white school boards; 689 and the
outspoken commitment to desegregation recently demonstrated by some white officials beholden to majority-white
constituencies for their jobs. 69 ° Finally, case studies have
that desegregation inled some researchers to conclude
69 1
creases black political clout.
The community-wide and participatory focus of recent educational and legal innovations may increase desegregation's
politically reconstructive impact. By Reconstructive hypothesis, that impact should rise when parents increase the political attention they pay to schools in which their children are
racially mixed. 69 2 Accordingly, by enhancing parental involvement in the schools, the wide adoption recently of
"school-based management" initiatives should enlarge desegregation's reformative effect in districts where parentally
managed schools are integrated. 6 93 To like effect are two
recent Supreme Court decisions preferring ancillary desegregation remedies that lead to the same outcomes as remedies the Court disapproved, but that assure broader
participation in the political processes that lead to those
688. See Armor, supra note 670, at 25 (discussing failure of late 1960s and early
1970s antibusing sentiments to coalesce into national political movement during conservative ascendancy in 1980s).
689. See Marriott, Great Expectations Hobble Black Superintendents, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 21, 1990, at B5, col. 3.
690. See sources discussed in Liebman, supra note 99, at 393 n.146, 395 & n.157;
supra note 40. But see DeParle, Killing Reveals Racial Divide Beneath Model Communities, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
691. See, e.g., J. Raffel, supra note 9; Kirp &Jensen, supra note 8, at 369-70; Taylor, supra note 123, at 975. Shifting theoretical emphases from Equal Educational Opportunity and Corrective to Reformative approaches might shift empirical emphases
from desegregation's educational and demographic to its political effects, thus overcoming the paucity of research on this last issue.
692. Thus, once parents are situated so that their political activity vis-A-vis the
schools induces interracial empathy, increases in that activity should increase empathy.
693. See sources cited in Liebman, supra note 99, at 394 n.150; Selected Reading
on Parental Involvement in Education, Educ. Week, Apr. 4, 1990, at 24, col. 4; supra
note 142. By advocating parental, not old-style "community," control, cf. supra note
142 (paragraph (6)) (discussing New York's and Detroit's disappointing experiences
with decentralized schools), these initiatives ought to maximize desegregation's reformative impact by giving political power to the segment of the community that desegregation's political therapy most affects. For like reasons, desegregation plans ought
themselves to maximize opportunities for postimplementation parental involvement in
affected districts' wider affairs, for example, via districtwide public goal-setting exercises
on the Seattle model, see sources cited supra note 687, citizen participation in monitoring school success, elective rather than appointive school board positions, and mixtures
of at-large and single-member board positions that create opportunities for cross-racial
representation without diluting the minority vote. Cf J. Hochschild, supra note 7, at
93-112 (questioning utility of citizen involvement in preimplementation planning and
postimplementation monitoring of desegregation plans).
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outcomes. 6 94
"[O]n balance," therefore, "and even though both massive and
passive resistance have been more common than genuine efforts to
make it work, school desegregation has benefited most of those who
have experienced it."' 695 Moreover, "the preponderance of empirical
evidence suggests that [desegregated] schools can contribute to reducing the social stigma of being black and raising the academic achievement of black children [and also] make both black and white students
more comfortable in racially integrated settings." 6 96 Without achieving
the original position's freedom from conflict, therefore, desegregation
seems "externally" to reduce antipluralist conflict (as defined above to
include the conflict that pervades system-wide violations) during the
life of the plan after its first year or two, and holds out a realistic hope
that it will continue "internally" or habitually to reduce such conflict
somewhat even after its implementation (if relatively lengthy6 97 ) ends.
Desegregation also supplies the fifth situational condition, by foregoing heroic assumptions about the parties' ethical motivations. To
borrow President Eisenhower's famous response to Brown, reformative
desegregation does not attempt to "legislate morality"6 98 and only assumes bare (self-interested) rationality and intergenerational concern:
So long as a parent cares to advance the interests of his or her child, the
situational conditions do the rest of the work. 6 9 White parents need
not feel benevolent toward black children or even attend them at allalthough there is the hope that, by acting in and through a political
system in which blacks and whites are situated equally, both processually and with regard to their positionally induced goals, parents of both
694. See Missouri v.Jenkins (Jenkins II), 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1663 (1990) (out of desire
to let local government institutions function and to give those who caused the problem
the responsibility to solve it, Court forbids district judge himself to order tax increase
needed to fund desegregation plan but lets judge enjoin operation of state-law provision
that prevented willing school board and majority of local electorate from adopting the
needed increase); Spallone v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 625, 634 (1990) (overturning
contempt fines against city legislators but approving stiff fines against city itself, which
quickly forced legislators to comply with housing desegregation decree; fines against city
preferred to those against legislators because former prompt legislative action based on
constituents' and city's interests, while latter prompt action based on legislators' "personal interests").
695. Hawley & Smylie, supra note 9, at 281.
696. A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at 163; accord Hawley & Smylie, supra note 9, at
290; see alsoJ. Dewey, supra note 123, at 20-21 (predicting this outcome 75 years ago).
697. See infra notes 805-828 and accompanying text.
698. SeeJ. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 24, 76 (Eisenhower's response to Brown);
see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (law "powerless to eradicate racial
instincts").
699. My point here is not that desegregation does or should encourage people to
behave in self-interested ways but only that it does not and should not rely on them to
do otherwise in the short run. Instead, like any external device worth its salt, desegregation simultaneously co-opts the motive force of self-interest while diverting self-interested behavior in virtuous directions.
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races over time will develop interracial fraternity as a by-product of the
7
remedy. 0
A related point emerges from the "pure procedural justice" aspect
of the remedy. Desegregation has always been perceived as suspect because it is coercive, not only of local governments-whose status as
proven violators is generally understood to justify the force 7 0 1-but
also of white and some black families-whose "innocence" is said to
make desegregation's assertedly coercive aspect problematic. 70 2 The
theory presented here moderates this coercion problem in two ways.
First, as discussed above, the theory advanced here shows how all
parties to the pervasively corrupt political process-citizen-constituents as well as officials-are in the same violational boat. 70 3 Once
viewed this way, moreover, desegregation turns out to be a bit less coercive than typically portrayed, even as to proven wrongdoers. To begin with, in Rawlsian terms, the loss in "full autonomy" caused by the
situationally imposed conditions is justified because it calls forth a
fuller flowering of each participant's "rational autonomy" (her ability
to act, not as the vassal of her heteronomous prejudices but as a "free
and equal moral person") 7 °4 and an egalitarian-premised, hence autonomy-protecting, pluralist political system.
This rationale will not appease unwilling participants in desegregation. They may feel slightly better, however, upon considering a second and somewhat more concrete aspect of desegregation's relation to
autonomy. Once the "pure procedural justice" nature of desegregation becomes clear, we for the first time have a basis for recognizing the
substantial degree to which desegregation preserves autonomy in a manner quite unlike a number of "imperfect procedural justice" remedies
typically but inaccurately lumped together with desegregation, such as
prison reform and school-finance remedies. 70 5 For, unlike those remedies, desegregation is a fair-process, not fair-outcome, device. Once
having made the political process governing schools fair, that is, desegregation leaves the participants free to pursue whatever goals through
whatever means their (to be sure, positionally constrained) rationality
700. See A. de Tocqueville, supra note 346, at 512, 525-27; J. Rawls, supra note
105, at 148-49, 564-65, 583-84; supra notes 377-385 and accompanying text.
701. E.g., Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 786-87.
702. E.g., Dworkin, supra note 104, at 24-27.
703. See supra notes 386-438, 529-564, 574-577 and accompanying text.
704. See supra note 620.
705. See, e.g., D. Horowitz, supra note 281, at 10-12, 168-69; Chayes, supra note
122, at 48-5 1; Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural
Change in Public Institutions, 65 Va. L. Rev. 43, 69-70 (1979); Goldstein, supra note
92, at 46-47 & nn.234, 236, 237; Note, The Dual Role of the Structural Injunction, 99
Yale L.J. 1983, 1983-85 (1990); see alsoJ. Rawls, supra note 105, at 85-86 (imperfect
procedural justice devices posit an independent standard for deciding which outcome is
just but no procedure guaranteed to lead to that outcome).
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recommends. 70 6 Accordingly, by contrast to prison, mental-health,
welfare, school-finance, and other institutional reform remedies, desegand "incomperegation is unfairly included in the usual70 "illegitimacy"
7
tence" critiques ofjudges-as-managers.
Understood reconstructively, desegregation also escapes the
charge that, by substituting judicial for political activism and national
for local standards, the remedy weakens participatory democracy in one
of the few spheres-i.e., public education-in which such democracy
remains important in modem American society. 70 8 Rather than supplanting republican democracy, reformative desegregation takes republicanism more seriously than it was being taken before in at least three
ways. First, reformative desegregation refuses to economize ordinary
citizens out of the process. Second, it recognizes that citizen-participants must pay the republican price of civic virtue (modernized, pluralized, and economized into a duty of "equal concern and respect") in
return for the benefits of participation. Third, it takes steps following a
finding that extra measures are needed both externally (in the short
and middle run) and internally (in the long run, so we hope) to inculcate civic virtue among a constituency whose prior interventions in the
political process have exhibited grievous derelictions of civic duty. Accordingly, although desegregation reconstructs local republican political processes, it does so according to the specifications of modernized
republicanism, then turns the reformed process loose to make such de706. This point helps explain why the Court, the same year it decreed "all-out desegregation" in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 214 (1973), refused to intervene in the school finance area in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973). See supra note 138. Unlike outcome-defining school-finance remedies,
desegregation need not "circumscribe or handicap" (indeed, it often enhances, see
supra note 665 and accompanying text) "the continued research and experimentation so
vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems and to keep abreast of
ever-changing conditions." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 43; see alsoJ. Ely, supra note 105, at
88 (judicial review works best when it "involves tasks that courts, as experts on process
and (more important) as political outsiders, can sensibly claim to be better qualified and
situated to perform than political officials").
707. See, e.g., A. Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government
107 (1976); D. Horowitz, supra note 281, at 278; P. Kurland, Politics, The Constitution,
and the Warren Court 203 (1970); Diver, supra note 705, at 89; Elson, supra note 142,
at 904-11; Glazer, Should Judges Administer Social Services?, Pub. Interest, Winter
1978, at 64, 78-79; see also Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II), 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1673,
1676-77 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (cautioning
against transforming desegregation into hands-on structural remedy). See generally
Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 Colum. L.
Rev. 784, 788-89 (1978) (analyzing expanding role ofjudiciary in reforming public institutions and services).
708. Making that charge are, e.g.: A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at 167-69 (desegregation poses "greatest dilemma of democratic education in our time:" albeit necessary
to prepare children to be able political participanis in future, it hampers democratic
behavior in present by undermining community control);J. Hochschild, supra note 7, at
9-11, 40-45, 144-45, 199-200; M. Walzer, supra note 52, at 255; Glazer, Towards an
Imperial Judiciary?, Pub. Interest, Fall 1975, at 104, 118.
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cisions as its black and white citizen-participants choose. For AfricanAmerican citizens, moreover, desegregation may for the first time create
an ability to participate meaningftdly in the process of locally governing
7 °9
the schools.
Paradoxically, desegregation is conducive both to the sixth preferred situational criterion ("voice") and to its conceptual opposite
("exit"). The voice consideration helps explain one of all-out desegregation's most difficult puzzles from, say, the Corrective perspective:
Why must newly formed all-white suburban areas within a district be
included in the remedy when the district's black schools may be integrated successfully without drawing on outlying whites? The preceding
71 0
explanation of the political meaning of a "system-wide" violation
gives us part of the answer because the requisite process-permeating
violation affords reason to believe that government decisions fostering
the creation of all-white neighborhoods and schools are not "innocent."'71 1 More importantly here, the "voice" condition explains why
even guiltless families need to be included in the desegregative remedy
even though they are not arithmetically needed to integrate the blacks.
For in order to ensure "voice" on the part of the white families that
must be included in the remedy, its alternative, "exit" (in this context,
"white flight"), must be discouraged. 7 12 By removing the exit-inducing
haven that excluding the outlying areas would create, the "all-out desegregation" plan embodies the "enforced voice" condition. Other
things being equal, therefore, the larger the portion of the district the
desegregation plan covers, the more voice (and the less exit) will
result.

713

Regrettably, however, desegregation cannot maximize voice by
minimizing exit, except in places-common in the South but only in a
few parts of the North-where school districts encompass most of the
metropolitan area. 71 4 In less-inclusive districts, desegregation at least
temporarily may have the opposite, exit-inducing effect, as devotees of
the racist opinion and parents fearful about their children's safety and
education abandon ship. 7 15 The data discussed above, however, in709. See Cavanagh & Sarat, supra note 281, at 409-10.
710. See supra notes 529-564 and accompanying text.
711. See supra notes 574-577 and accompanying text.
712. See A. Hirschman, supra note 636, at 33.
713. See F. Welch & A. Light, supra note 6, at 6, 41; Orfield, supra note 42, at
206-07; Rossell & Hawley, supra note 669, at 170, 175.
714. See, e.g., G. Orfield, Must We Bus? 411-13 (1978); sources cited supra note
713.
715. See, e.g.,James, supra note 6, at 964, 975, 981; Orfield, supra note 42, at 213;
Rossell & Hawley, supra note 669, at 170. Schools, like other public institutions, are illequipped and (given inelastic financing) ill-disposed to respond to exit, hence there is
little reason to expect that voice-reducing exit will have the same salutary effects on
schools as on profit-oriented firms. See A. Hirschman, supra note 636, at 51-52; Shane,
supra note 52, at 1116.
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cluding those generated by the Reagan Administration's white-flight
study, suggest that desegregation-induced exit not only dissipates after
three years to at most a trickle but that in some cases, it actually stops
and is replaced with desegregation-induced white entrance. 716 Desegrevoice in ways other than retarding exit or ingation also may enhance
717
spiring entrance.
Even in districts that do not encompass the metropolitan area or
otherwise discourage flight and increase voice, this, at worst only modest, failure of the sixth condition comes nowhere near counterbalancing
the substantial success desegregation displays in achieving the other
five prerequisites to a reformed and pluralistically healthy political process. When, finally, I deny the doctrinal predicate to the nay-sayers'
identification of "exit" as desegregation's achilles heel-namely, that
interdistrict relief-this moderate minus
Milliken I effectively forbade
718
will narrow even further.
By situating black and white children together in positions of
equality in schools and classrooms, desegregation places their citizenparents in a position of publicly visible equality in the political process
that governs the public schools (conditions 1 and 2); externally links
the fate of the previously discriminatory white majority and its offspring
to that of previously victimized blacks and their children so that action
favorable to the former also favors the latter, action hurtful to the latter
also hurts the former, and both groups, it is hoped, eventually internalize the conflict-quelling and difference-"denorming" 7 1 9 possibility of
coincident interests (conditions 3-5); and creates conditions sufficiently
conducive to voice and discouraging of long-term exit as to preserve
the remedy's other accomplishments (condition 6). As long as the remedy remains in effect, therefore, it reforms the political process, assures
that the products of that process will be fairer and in all likelihood more
beneficial to African-American children than before, and-incidentally
but not insignificantly-cures some of the developmental, psychological, and demographic harms caused by the previously corrupted political process. To this last-mentioned extent, moreover, reformative
desegregation, as a by-product, enhances Equal Educational Opportunity and Integration as much as the Court heretofore has been willing
to do without committing itself to those theories' perfectionist-seeming
goals; is as reparative as so-called "narrowly" Corrective desegregation
without wanting for an explanation of its manifest undercorrection and
partial public-law redistribution; and it is more effectively Prohibitory
716. See supra notes 667-674 and accompanying text.
717. See Hawley & Smylie, supra note 9, at 285 (data suggesting that desegregation
intensifies "community pressures for school performance" and generates more resources); supra notes 665-666, 675 and accompanying text (data suggesting that desegregation improves school performance, possibly as result of increased public concern).
718. See infra notes 829-872 and accompanying text.
719. See supra notes 367, 380, 384, 609, 614-615 and accompanying text.
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and more
justifiably Prophylactic than are the theories by those
20
names.7
But, absent a commitment to coercive permanency, can desegregation reform the political process permanently? Apart from making the
political process and its products fairer and curing some of the previously corrupted process's tainted products while the remedy lasts, can
reconstructive desegregation inculcate "equal concern" virtue so that
coercive (external) mechanisms may cease functioning, yet continue reforming? The jury is still out on these questions, it seems to me,
although there are a couple of bases, some discussed above and some
below, for a cautious optimism.
B.

Why Especially Schools?

Although it happens in schools, desegregation is not a remedy for
schools. At least not merely so. Rather, it is a surprisingly successful
remedy for a mortally serious, infrastructure-threatening malfunction
of a public institution more important even than the schools-our plurality-protecting democratic political system. In this one field of public
education, that is-having first satisfied ourselves that systemic reconstruction is necessary because (1) the political system governing the
schools is influentially processing racist preferences, and that (2) this
720. Unlike Corrective and Prohibitory theory, see supra notes 257-264, 311-322
and accompanying text, Reformative theory imposes only a modest "remedial limit,"
namely that desegregation be forsworn when the district(s) encompassing the discriminatory constituency do(es) not have a "critical mass" of black and white students. See
supra notes 3, 590. The critical mass caveat, however, together with the intent and system-wide-discrimination requirements and the remedy's confinement to the constituency actually implicated in the violation, impose important limits on the likely scope of
Reformative plans and may foreclose desegregation in some of the nation's largest cities. See Liebman, supra note 99, at 371; supra notes 541-564 and accompanying text;
infra notes 851-872 and accompanying text. Reformative theory also is limited because
it is not Redistributive: like Corrective, Prohibitory, Prophylactic, and some versions of
Equal Educational Opportunity and Integrative theory, Reformative theory does not
strike directly at the economic and demographic legacies of slavery and segregation that
relegate many black Americans to a subordinate class in a physical ghetto. For the reasons given supra notes 156, 176-179 and accompanying text, however, I question the
capacity of constitutionally redistributive strategies to fit our deepest cultural convictions; for the reasons given infra notes 745-767 and accompanying text, I believe that
political reformation and consequent democratically implemented redistribution in the educational sphere provide our best hope-absent revision of our deepest convictions-of
cabining and contracting the legacies of prior discrimination; for the reasons given in
Liebman, supra note 99, I believe that litigatively enforcing the educational entitlements
that many state legislatures recently have created provides a supplemental means of redistributing educational resources to the minority children promised those resources by
the democratic process; for the reasons given supra notes 449-457 and accompanying
text, I believe that if we do not carry on with the political reform begun in 1954 and
supplement it with democratically implemented educational reform, then over the long
haul we may have to reconsider our resistance to nondemocratically mandated redistribution or face violent social disintegration.
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self-destructively antiegalitarian defect is pervasive and intractable,
hence intrinsic to the system's original design-it turns out to be possible (3) judicially to redesign the failed process in a pluralistically, democratically (and, by the way, educationally) productive way.
Whether temporary or permanent, desegregation's success in this
regard is no mean feat. For this first modem pluralist-democratic political system of ours has been assiduously computing racist preferences
for 200 years now, notwithstanding a civil war, three constitutional
amendments, periodic more or less organized interracial violence, and
the development of a largely racially defined underclass that presents as
big a domestic problem as the country now knows. 721 The problem,
therefore, is worth-indeed it demands-a cure. Through desegregation, a part of that cure, temporarily at least, is at hand.
The difficult question, then, is not "Why School Desegregation?"
but "Why Just Schools?". After all, federal, state, and local political
systems in the past have been found routinely to have discriminated
and segregated in the fields of public employment, 722 housing, 72 3 pub7 26 to name a few.7 27
lic transportation,7 2 4 recreation, 72 5 and marriage,
Why not, then, job desegregation, golf-course desegregation, even
marriage desegregation? In other words, why does the analysis here
not lead us-instrumentally, it is true, but nonetheless directly-back
to Universalism?
721. See, e.g., D. Bell, supra note 2, at 45-49; R. Farley & W. Allen, supra note 13,
at 188-208; A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at 161 & n.78 (half of all African-American
children live below the poverty line, one-fourth below half the poverty line; comparable
figures for white children are one-fifth and one-twentieth); A. Pinkney, The Myth of
Black Progress 111-29 (1984); W. Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City,
the Underclass, and Public Policy 63-89 (1987); Brooks, supra note 160, at 960-63;
Orfield, supra note 6, at 27 (black children growing up in urban ghettos may be "more
totally isolated from... mainstream... society and economy than were southern black
children during Jim Crow segregation"); Pettigrew, supra note 142, at 674-86.
722. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167-69 (1987); Rogers v.
Paul, 382 U.S. 198, 200 (1965) (per curiam).
723. See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 286 (1976); Clients' Council v.
Pierce, 711 F.2d 1406, 1410-23 (8th Cir. 1983); Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d
1236, 1241 (6th Cir. 1974); Young v. Pierce, 544 F. Supp. 1010, 1013 (E.D. Tex. 1982).
724. See, e.g., Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 352 U.S.
903 (1956) (per curiam).
725. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 218-19 (1971) (swimming
pools); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122, 123 (5th
Cir.), afF'd, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (parks); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d
93, 94 (5th Cir.), vacated, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (golf courses); Mayor of
Baltimore v. Dawson, 220 F.2d 386, 387 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), aff'd, 350 U.S. 877
(1955) (per curiam) (beaches).
726. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
727. See also Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 386-88 (1986) (agricultural extension services; 4-H and Homemakers Clubs); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333
(1968) (per curiam) (prisons); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 61-62 (1963) (per
curiam) (courtrooms).
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For those of us who want to see racism removed from the political
process governing every field, the answer to this question is disheartening. Remember that the goal of desegregation is to solve a specific (if
immense) problem. That problem is the destruction of a political system in which autonomous but intensely plural adult citizens engage in
successful social cooperation without destroying each other's autonomy
in the process. A principal tenet of such a system is that the government cannot tell its adult citizens that they must work for it, live in its
houses or anywhere else, play golf on its courses, or get married (much
less to whom). In all these fields, that is, our exit and nonentrance options must be maintained absolutely, else the government would deny
us our pluralistic right to define our own senses of self and our own
plans of life.
Notice what this means. In order to use desegregation to cure the
antipluralistic intervention of racism in the field of golf, for example,
the government would have to engage in the equally antipluralistic sin
of telling citizens that they must golf, how they must golf (publicly, not
privately), and, accordingly, where they must golf. Short of that, the
best the government through its judicial arm can do-in classically prohibitory fashion-is to tell citizens that, should they not decide to exit
from the field of public golfing on municipal courses, they must be prepared to golf with members of whatever other races include public golfing devotees with access to public courses. Of course, should racist
constituents thereafter desire to continue in their racist ways-for example, by diverting tax dollars from public golf courses or those located near black neighborhoods to improvements in municipal services
out by the country club-they quite rationally can do so until they get
caught again and get their wrists prohibitorily slapped again. In this
and many other fields of political concern, that is, there are no ready
pluralism-preserving means of effectuating a desegregative cure for
7 28
racism's antipluralist damage to the political system.
Schools are different (as, to a lesser extent, are a few other spheres
of public activity72 9 ). In the first place, schools involve children not
728. See also Liebman, supra note 99, at 363-64 (similar point illustrated with public employment example).
729. As discussed infra note 741; infra notes 819-828 and accompanying text, the
political processes governing the armed forces and those governing the electoral system
also may be amenable to politically reconstructive remedies. See also Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35, 80 (1986) (single-member districts permitted to assure actual
representation of many, and virtual representation of all, minority voters after racially
polarized voting reveals absence of interracial equal concern on part of white citizenvoters); Liebman, supra note 99, at 412 n.214 (politically reformative uses of procedural
due process remedies that effectively remand issues to legislature for reconsideration via
a process forced to reckon with the interests of previously ignored plaintiffs). So, too,
are the political processes governing subsidized housing. See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux,
425 U.S. 284, 305-06 (1976) (dispersing subsidized complexes in white neighborhoods); Young v. Pierce, 640 F. Supp. 1476, 1482-83 (E.D. Tex. 1986), vacated on other
grounds, 822 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1987) (suggesting need for mandatory transfer policy
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adults, so autonomy worries are lessened. Children are not autonomous. For a few years of their lives, they are subject to their parents'
nearly absolute control with few or no exit options. Moreover, at age
five 7" 0 that preadulthood parental control is coercively removed in one
major respect and replaced by governmental control: Children are required-without any exit option-to go to school. At least through the
eighth grade,7 3 1 the government may-and nearly every state government in the country does-compel attendance at a state-accredited
school. 7 2 By publicly providing that expensive service free of charge,
moreover, the government discourages the partial exit option offered
by private schools; 7 3 and by forbidding private nonsectarian schools to
discriminate on the basis of race while enjoining public financial aid to
to rearrange African-American and white households in existing public housing projects
in thirty-six East Texas counties in order to integrate intentionally segregated complexes). On the other hand, the small proportion of the housing market controlled by
the government, the wide range of private-housing exit routes, the problematic nature
of privately enforced "integrative" housing quotas, see, e.g., United States v. Starrett
City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1101-03 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988), and
the incomplete positional equality achieved by locating subsidized black renters and
nonsub$idized white owners in the same neighborhoods and political constituencies
help explain courts' reluctance to order blacks and whites to live together in the same
compleEes and neighborhoods, as opposed to ordering officials to adopt schemes that
encourage the two races to do so. Even further afield, some of the Supreme Court's employment-discrimination decisions may be interpreted as permitting judicial and other
remedial efforts to reform systemically racist economic institutions. See, e.g., City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 729-30 (1989) (dicta) (local government may
"remedial[ly]" reform local construction industry by spurring formation of minorityowned firms upon proof of widespread discrimination in that industry); United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 154-66, 185 (1987) (plurality opinion) (upon proof of egregious
discrimination in employment of black state troopers and massive resistance to lower
courts' non-Reformative remedies, Court permits race-conscious remedy that hastens
placement of blacks in decision-making positions); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers'
Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 448-49, 477 (1986) (futility of "endless enforcement
litigation" along corrective and prohibitory lines following union's "long continued and
egregious" discrimination permits order reforming union by requiring it to accept more
African-American members); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806
(1973) (discussing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)) (in order to reform
economic system that theretofore imposed "cumulative and invidious burden" on black
entrance to labor market, employers must accept into labor force blacks possessing essential job qualifications ).
730. Or four. See Early Schooling Is Now the Rage, N.Y. Times Apr. 13, 1986,
§ 12 (Education Life), at 24, col. 1.
731. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221-27 (1972).
732. See, e.g., Dimond, supra note 123, at 40 & n.165 (citing statutes); Shane,
Compulsory Education and the Tension Between Liberty and Equality: A Comment on
Dworkin, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 97, 100-01 (1987). The Court has distinguished school desegregation from other potentially race-conscious remedies on the ground that the former merely substitute judicial for pre-existing legislative coercion while the latter
initiate governmental coercion. See cases discussed in Liebman, supra note 99, at
365-66 & nn.72-74.
733. See Bush Rejects Tax Break for Private School Cost, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30,
1989, at A20, col. 3 (Bush Administration opposes tuition tax credits for cost of private
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religious schools that discriminate, the government further narrows
even that partial escape route in the respect relevant here. 73 4 To this

extent, therefore, elementary and secondary education in this country-even when carried on in so-called "private schools"-is substantially removed from the "private" and located in the "public"
73 5
sphere.

This treatment of children is not some antiautonomous blemish on
an otherwise autonomous body politic. Rather, compulsory attendance
at publicly sanctioned schools that are not entirely controlled by parents with homogeneous views of the good is a critical aspect of any

thoroughly plural and autonomy-regarding society. 73 6 By giving children the ability to select among a broader range of career and value
options than their parents could hope to provide, schools enhance autonomy-indeed, they make autonomy possible-on the part of young
adults otherwise imprisoned by social contingency. 73 7 Thus, following

the reproductive process-in which parental autonomy is supreme-its
creation gradually takes on his or her own autonomy interest, which the
parents and, as the child matures, the state share in representing and in
protecting against the other representative's tyranny. 73 8 In this pro-

cess, compulsory, publicly regulated education-the more so if it adheres to the "equal concern" principle in its administration and

pedagogy-serves the crucial functions of (1) moderately expanding
the limited set of life-plan possibilities that parents, family, and locality
education); supra note 670 (proportion of students attending private schools declined
over last two decades).
734. See BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-04 (1983) (Internal
Revenue Code constitutionally forbids tax-exempt status to sectarian elementary, secondary, and post-secondary educational institutions that deny African-Americans admission); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-79 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of
Civil Rights Act of 1861, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988), insofar as it forbids private nonsectarian schools to deny blacks admission). Public education is thus not merely a "metonymic placeholder" for the activist welfare state, but rather its epitome. Cf. Ackerman,
Constitutional, supra note 395, at 540 (public education context in Brown a symbol of, or
"metonymic placeholder" for, modem welfare state).
735. See Liebman, supra note 99, at 369 & n.87 (broad public regulation of private
schools); supra notes 495-499 and accompanying text.
736. See, e.g., J. Mill, On Liberty 175 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1985); J. Dewey, supra
note 644, at 16, 23-27, 115;J. Rawls, supra note 105, at 100-01; Dworkin, supra note
154, at 1; Gutmann, Children, Paternalism, and Education: A Liberal Argument, 9 Phil.
& Pub. Aff. 338, 349 (1980); sources cited supra note 155.
737. SeeJ. Dewey, supra note 123, at 20, 87 ("it is the office of the school environment" to see "that each individual gets an opportunity to escape from the limitations of
the social group into which he is born, and to come into living contact with a broader
environment"); A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at 30 (education "makes choice meaningful
by equipping children with the intellectual skills necessary to evaluate ways of life different from that of their parents"); sources cited supra notes 155, 674.
738. See A. Gutmann, supra note 52 at 27-33, 42, 50-58, 69; M. Walzer, supra
note 52, at 215-16; Liebman, supra note 99, at 365.
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reveal to the child, 73 9 and of (2) preparing the child for
the "equal con740
cern" duties of citizenship upon reaching adulthood.
739. See A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at 33; sources cited supra notes 155,
674-676.
740. See, e.g.,J. Dewey, supra note 123, at 21, 87, 119; A. Gutmann, supra note 52,
at 32-33, 39, 46, 134, 162; M. Walzer, supra note 52, at 215-17. Counterbalancing the
State's power in these respects is the citizen-parent's capacity-tempered by the "equal
concern" principle-to govern the schools through local political activity and the parent's essentially untempered control over the child's activities outside of school. The
fact that a child remains dependent upon (including for protection from the state) and
partly definitive of her parents at the same time as her own individuality is blossoming
makes unpalatable Plato's proposal that the state separate children from parents at birth
and subject the former to an unqualifiedly virtuous education from the start. See, e.g.,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); J. Dewey, supra note 123, at
88-91, 93-94; A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at 27 ("our good as parents.... not just the
good of our children, [should] be considered in designing the educational system for
our society"); Shane, supra note 732, at 102 (guiding upbringing of one's child a "core
experience of self-avowal"). This same intertwining of needs and interests answers
Aquinas's, Locke's, and Milton Friedman's proposals thatparents exercise unlimited control over their children's education. See B. Ackerman, supra note 123, at 160-62 (criticizing Friedman); A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at 31-32 (criticizing Locke and Aquinas).
At stake in this effort to untangle the intermingled interests of child, parent, and society
is the proper resolution of a range of questions running from the constitutionality of
"privatizing" public education via vouchers, see supra note 733, to that of compelling
public education. My own view is that the extent of public control over the schools, the
growing interest in professionalism within the schools, e.g., A. Gutmann, supra note 52,
at 76-79, and the extent of the parents' ability to shape their children's destinies outside
of school, e.g., id. at 50-58, 69, is such that the greater danger lies not in state tyranny
over child or parent but rather in parental tyranny over the child. See B. Ackerman,
supra note 123, at 160-62. To my mind, therefore, any change in the status quo ought
not be in the direction of voucher systems but rather in the direction of compulsory
public education. But seeJ. Chubb & T. Moe, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools
215-26 (1990). True, the Supreme Court seemed to reject the latter proposal in a series
of decisions in the 1920s. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 535; Bartels v.
Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 411 (1923); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-03 (1923). But
those decisions are ripe for reconsideration given: (1) their discredited, Lochner-era preoccupation with the economic autonomy of the plaintiff private schools, e.g., Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 535-36; see also Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. at 412 (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's solicitude for economic rights); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. at 399-400 (citing, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and focusing in part on right of German teachers to pursue the occupation of their choice); (2)
their concern more with the question whether the state may forbid private schooling
(surely it may not) and less with the question posed here whether the state may insist
upon public education during some part of the day, see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. at 534-36 (although state may not put private and parochial schools out of business, it may "regulate ... [,] inspect, supervise, and examine" all schools and teachers
and prescribe secular curriculum for all children, including instruction in "good citizenship"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 401-03 (although state may not "interfere with
the calling of modern language teachers" by forbidding private and parochial schools to
conduct classes in languages of schools' choice, the "[plower of the State to compel
attendance at some school[,] ... to make reasonable regulations for all schools, including a requirement that they shall give instructions in English," and "to prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it supports" is not questioned); (3) the succeeding half
century's firmer implantation of education in the "public" sphere, see supra notes
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Desegregation of schools is not, therefore, uniquely required because schools are uniquely fit objects of universalization. Rather, desegregation is less problematically used to reform the political process
governing schools than that governing most other social activity because, unlike other activity, education in our country is, and in any liberal state ought to be, universal. 74 1 Public education's universality,
moreover, uniquely serves rather than destroys autonomy. So, too,
does desegregation's autonomy-preserving reformation uniquely work
without in the process requiring a qualitatively equal and opposite reduction in individual freedom. Accordingly, whereas prohibitory decrees must ineffectually suffice in most other areas subject to
antipluralist legislative racism, reformative desegregation is uniquely
' 74 2
capable of solving that problem "in the field of public education.
In the same way, Reformative theory finally answers the question
Hannah Arendt posed thirty years ago concerning the curious choice of
children as the vanguard in the figurative and literal battles against segregation. 743 The theory also answers the related and heretofore
equally perplexing question concerning the 744
limitation of all-out desegregation remedies to the field of education.
The subject-matter-specific solubility of what is a society-wide
problem is, as I said, disheartening. We need not be totally despondent, however, for if we had to choose a single sphere of political concern in which to accomplish the most political reform by applying a
thoroughly reconstructive remedy, education almost certainly would be
that sphere. First, education is a principal concern of the political process-perhaps, as Brown I postulated, "the most important function of
state and local governments." 74 5 The $231 billion spent annually on
public elementary and secondary education accounts for one-third to
one-half of the budgets of many local governments (by far their largest
495-499 and accompanying text; and (4) that period's reinvigoration of the equal protection clause and the recognition that unfettered parental control over the education of
children can eclipse the development of young citizens' constitutionally mandated duty
of equal concern and respect.
741. The only analogue to schools in this regard is the army, which was desegregated by presidential directive six years before Brown and remains today the most successfully integrated American public institution. See A Common Destiny: Blacks and
American Society 67-74 (G. Jaynes & R. Williams eds. 1989); see also Walzer, stipra
note 142, at 57 ("Except in armies and juries, adults are not coercively brought together
by the state").
742. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); cf. supra note
729 (listing other fields in which reformative remedies sometimes are available).
743. See Arendt, supra note 172, at 50 (quoted supra note 172).
744. Struggling with the "Why just schools?" question are, e.g.: City of Richmond
v. JA. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706, 736-37 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment);
Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 729-30; Minow, supra note 179, at 57 & n.229;
Soifer, supra note 255, at 396-97; Yudof, supra note 61, at 411-19, 447.
745. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493; accord Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213
(1972); sources cited supra note 156.
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single expenditure 74 6), a substantial proportion of the people they em748

ploy, 74 7 and over four percent of the gross national product.

Looked at another way, public schools probably account for over threefourths of all interactive encounters on any given (week) day between
citizens and officials of government.
Second, education is a principal concern of every citizen, if measured only by the amount of time each of us, by law, must devote to it.
The average child spends over 15,000 hours in public schools (assuming no extracurricular activities). 74 9 Going to school is what most children "do" for twelve or thirteen (and soon to be fourteen 750 ) years of
their lives.7 5 ' More importantly, going to school is what the average
parents' children do during fully eighty percent of the time those children live at home. And there is no measuring the proportion of parents' political attention devoted to their children's welfare.75 2 In short,
viewed from its official top down or from its constituent bottom up,
perhaps the largest and most important part of local political processes
is the one most capable of being desegregatively reformed.
Third, elementary and secondary education is the most important
sphere of ongoing community participation in politics in this country. 753 Reforming citizenship in that sphere accordingly is likely to
have a broader impact on more citizens than doing so in other spheres.
Fourth, citizens concerned with schools are likely, because of that
746. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d 217, 229, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843,
851 (1981), modified, 57 N.Y.2d 27,439 N.E.2d 359,453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982) (28-45%
of local tax revenues spent on education in various districts in New York).
747. This point, along with the autonomy-enhancing need for diversity in the public schools, helps explain why the Court treats faculty integration as a potentially important element in desegregation plans. See, e.g., Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198, 200 (1965)
(per curiam); Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965) (per curiam).
748. A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at 139; accord id. at 69; K-12 Spending Rises by
7.2 Percent to Record $231 Billion for 1990-91, Educ. Week, Jan. 24, 1990, at 2, col. 3;
State Investment in Education, Educ. Week, Jan. 24, 1990, at 3, col. 3 (state expenditures on education accounted for 33% of state spending in fiscal year 1988); U.S. Is Said
to Lag in School Spending, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1990, at A23, col. I (in 1985, United
States spent 4.1% of its gross national product on elementary and secondary education);
Education Secretary to Quit Reagan Cabinet Next Month, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1984, at
Al, col. 4 (quoting Secretary of Education Terrell Bell) ("education is so special that it
ranks in priority alongside and possibly ahead of the Department of Defense").
749. See M. Rutter, B. Maughan, P. Mortimore, J. Ouston & A. Smith, Fifteen
Thousand Hours: Secondary Schools and Their Effects on Children 1 (1979).
750. See supra note 730 and accompanying text.
751. See, e.g., Walzer, supra note 142, at 58 ("the school years are long, a substantial part of a human life").
752. See, e.g., A. Gutmann, supra note 52, at 67, 73, 168-69, 282-91;J. Wilkinson,
supra note 1, at 45; Walzer, supra note 142, at 58 (given "parental concern, educational
debates have significant short-term results [and] are likely to generate adult political
activity of a very intense kind").
753. See, e.g., A. Gutmann, supra note 142, at 177-78; Michelman, supra note 375,
at 487-89; sources cited supra note 708.
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concern, to care a great deal about other matters of political concern.
Most parents want their children to attend schools in safe areas and,
other things equal, prefer to live near those schools. Consequently,
white constituents situated so that assertions of the racist opinion are
irrational in regard to administering schools are also unlikely to inject
such views into the political processes affecting public safety, municipal
services, recreational facilities, and housing in the vicinity of the
schools. 75 4 It should be no surprise, therefore, that districts with stably
integrated schools also tend to have significantly greater amounts of
stably integrated housing near those schools. 7 55 Accordingly, there is
reason to expect that the desegregative reformation of the political process affecting schools will have significant reformational ripple effects
elsewhere in the political process, at least when a majority of the constituency are, have been, or contemplate being parents.
Fifth, it is the egalitarian's hope, at least, that life in an equalityrepresenting and empathy-inducing ethical situation can have a pluralistically educative effect on the people living it-that it can reveal connections fashioned out of our shared distinctness. 75 6 Rawls, for
example, predicts that the publicly visible and affirmed condition of
processual equality in which he situates his original participants-and
in which desegregation positions its participants insofar as racial equality is concerned-will "forge[] the basis of comity amidst the disparities
that persist. Citizens [will be] able to recognize one another's good
faith and desire for justice even though agreement may... break down
'7 57
De Tocqueville claims to have found
...on many issues of policy."
"self-interest properly understood" actually producing such effects
"every day" in ante-bellum America. 7 58 We at least can hope, therefore, that, after being positioned for a time so that their habit is too
harmfully irrational to be indulged in one sphere of political endeavor,
habitues of the racist opinion may come to realize that they can survive
without indulging it in other spheres as well. Lest this sound like pie in
the sky, there is evidence that racist attitudes fade in the years following
desegregation. 7 59 Maybe we can legislate morality.
754. This point helps explain why courts often resist desegregation plans calling
for closure of schools in black neighborhoods. See, e.g., Valley v. Rapides Parish School
Bd., 702 F.2d 1221, 1227 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 914 (1983); Arvizu v.Waco
Indep. School Dist., 495 F.2d 499, 504 (5th Cir. 1974); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 539 F.
Supp. 335, 340-41 (W.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 722 (3d Cir. 1983). See generally
Note, supra note 31, at 2009-12 (political science research demonstrating that schools
issues often dominate politics affecting local agencies other than school boards).
755. See Hawley & Smylie, supra note 9, at 290 (surveying sources).
756. See supra notes 377-385, 604-607 and accompanying text.
757. J. Rawls, supra note 105, at 517.
758. See supra note 607 and accompanying text.
759. See supra notes 667-668, 683-685 and accompanying text. Compare supra
notes 139-140 and accompanying text (Professor Bell's view that further desegregation
is doomed because we societally have reached the point where the interests of the white
middle class, which desegregation originally served, have now diverged from the
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Sixth, whether or not parents are pluralistically educable, a liberal
society assumes that children are. And just as desegregation positions
parental constituents equally vis-A-vis their children, so, too, does it position the children equally vis-A-vis each other. We can hope, therefore-and here again the social scientific data is encouraging 7 6 '-that
desegregatively positioned children will matriculate to adulthood with
more fully developed racial "bonds of civic friendship" than did previous, racially estranged and unequal, generations.
Finally, school desegregation may contribute to alleviating one of
the'broadest and most dangerous effects of the racist disorder affecting
the political machinery as a whole, namely, its entrapment of some rural and central-city blacks in an adhesive culture of poverty, which
seizes children at birth and thereafter constricts them at home, on the
streets, and in such workplaces to which they are able to gain admittance. 76 1 A key element of persistently imposed poverty is an underdeveloped, indeed barely nascent, set of societal expectations for the
culture's inhabitants. Nicholas Lemann provides a wrenching example:
At Orr High School in the center of Chicago's ghetto the societal expectation reflected in what qualifies as an "A" composition in a sophoof the
more English class is the ability to write one's name at the top
762
page.
the
on
else
anything-anything-somewhere
and
page
Desegregation provides a potential avenue of escape from this culture-perhaps the only escape route readily at hand.7 63 For it is now
clear that "great expectations" for children are (1) by far the most edu7 64
cationally important resource dispensed by the public schools;
(2) the resource that political systems corrupted by the racist opinion
distribute to African-American children in by far the most inequitably
low proportions; 76 5 and (3) a resource that the white constituents of a
desegregative interests of blacks) with Liebman, supia note 99, at 362-63 and supra
notes 377-385, 650, 652-697 and accompanying text (both constitutional duty of
"equal concern" virtue and desegregation remedy for defaults of that duty designed,
and have capacity, to compel white and black interests to converge).
760. See supra notes 683-685 and accompanying text.
761. See supra note 721 and accompanying text.
762. Lemann, The Origins of the Underclass, New Republic, July 1986, 52 at
59-63; see Kennedy, supra note 64, at 1761 n.68, 1768; supra note 675.
763. See generally Orfield, supra note 6, at 27 (discussing urgency of efforts to
"place school desegregation in the forefront of national politics" given "deepening isolation of children growing up in inner city ghettos and barrios").
764. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 140, at 126; Pettigrew, supra note 142, at 696; supra
note 675 (citing educational research demonstrating important impact of teacher expectations on student achievement).
765. See, e.g., E. Leacock, Teaching and Learning in City Schools 16 (1969); Committee on Policy for RacialJustice, supra note 140, at 4, 16-17; Franklin, supra note 142,
at x; Rist, Student Social Class and Teacher Expectations: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
in Ghetto Education, 40 Harv. Educ. Rev. 411, 447-49 (1970); supra notes 644, 675; see
supra notes 458-465 and accompanying text (segregation as "divide and demean" strategy generally).
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desegregatively reformed political system find difficult to withhold from
black children because doing so requires them to withhold it from their
own children as well. 7 66 Remember, too, that the schools' capacity to
expand horizons and to neutralize social contingency is the reason why
compulsory participation not only is not anathema to a liberal pluralist
state but is essential to it.767 Accordingly, while there may be little reason for optimism that racially corrupted constituencies and political
processes will find meaningful answers to persistent poverty among
blacks, there is some reason to hope that desegregatively reconstructed
political systems will begin to provide part of the answer in the schools.
C. Some Other Philosophicaland DoctrinalAdvantages and Implications of
Reformative Theory
As I have proceeded, I have noted a number of moral and doctrinal
problems that trouble the five competing theories but are solved by
Reconstructive analysis: As a process-focused theory, reformative desegregation avoids the antiperfectionist critique of some versions of the
Equal Educational Opportunity and Integration theories as well as their
controversial commitment to "all-out" redistribution. It likewise answers, as those theories cannot, the "Why just intent?," "Why especially race?," and "Why especially segregation?" questions. 768
Reformative theory's public-law bent also largely addresses the attacks
made on the Correction theory from both the right and the left. Thus,
it explains why transactions, error, and antiautonomy costs are imposed
on persons who, for all Correction theory can explain, are "innocent
third party nonviolators" 769 while also eschewing an isolated-event766. See W. Hawley, supra note 3, at 164 (research showing that "teachers are generally less demanding of and responsive to minority children in segregated than in desegregated classrooms"); sources cited supra notes 644, 675 (research showing that
simultaneously integrated and cooperative learning settings raise expectations for minority children and enhance their achievement levels).
767. See supra notes 736-740 and accompanying text.
768. Compare supra notes 134-179 and accompanying text (criticizing Equal Educational Opportunity and Integration theories for failing to explain desegregation decisions' emphasis on intentional discrimination, race, and racial segregation) with supra
notes 439-483 and accompanying text (Reformation theory's explanation of decisions'
emphasis on intent, race, and segregation); cf. supra notes 206-226, 342 and accompanying text (Correction and Prophylaxis theories' problems answering "Why just intent?"
question).
769. Compare supra notes 231-248 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties
Correction theory encounters in explaining and justifying desegregation because it condudes that desegregation burdens many people who are "innocent" and considers that
outcome immoral) with supra notes 574-575, 701-707 and accompanying text (Reformation theory's explanations of why desegregation imposes few burdens on people who
genuinely can claim to be innocent and why the burdens it does impose are justifiable).
In so doing, Reformative theory also avoids Corrective theory's justification problems
with-and all the other theories' criticisms of-the Swann and Keyes presumptions.
Compare supra notes 143-148 and accompanying text (Equal Educational Opportunity
theorists' criticism of Swann and Keyes presumptions) and supra notes 237-248 and ac-
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specific remedy and adopting a systemically reconstructive one for what
7 70
on analysis is a systemic malfunction of society's political processes.
Reformative theory also provides an answer, where the Correction and
Prophylaxis theories cannot and where the Prohibition theory will not,
to the question "Why (all-out) desegregation?"-as opposed, for example, to damages, negative injunctions or "gilded ghetto," "black
power," and partial desegregation remedies.7 7 1 In addition, the Reformative theorist builds directly and naturally into his analysis what
other theorists find embarrassing-for example, the role of the Massive
Resistance era in causing the Court's desegregation doctrine to
evolve, 7 72 the role of "green follows white" reasoning, 77 3 and the
courts' process reforming but not supplanting intrusion into the political sphere.7 7 4 It also explains why this society-wide problem receives
treatment in the school arena that is so different from the treatment it
7 75
receives in other spheres of political concern.
Reconstructive analysis also solves the otherwise puzzling doctrinal
conundrums posed by, for example, holdings that integration is critical
but precise racial balance is not;7 7 6 evidence of discrimination by nonparty, nonschool officials is relevant; 77 7 outlying all-white portions of
districts must be included in desegregation plans even when the white
children there are not needed numerically to integrate AfricanAmerican children in the district;7 78 and desegregation requires withinas well as between-school desegregation 7 79 and the continued use of
formerly all-black as well as all-white school buildings7 80 and prefers
companying text (criticizing Correction theory's treatment of presumptions) with supra
notes 565-573 and accompanying text (Reformative explanation of presumptions).
770. Compare supra notes 249-284 and accompanying text (criticizing Correction
theory's inaccurately episodic and individualistic view of violation and remedy) with
supra notes 529-564, 579-590 and accompanying text (Reformation theory's socio.
structural view of violation and remedy). Reconstructive theory also avoids the asymmetry accompanying process theory's frequent acceptance of paltry prohibitory remedies to
cure pervasive processual violations. See supra notes 579-590 and accompanying text.
771. Compare supra notes 227-229 and accompanying text (Correction theory's
inability to answer "Why just desegregation?" question) and supra notes 295-310 and
accompanying text (Prohibition theory's rejection of desegregation as proper remedy)
and supra notes 347-352 and accompanying text (Prophylaxis theory's inability to answer "Why just desegregation?" question) with supra notes 579-721 and accompanying
text (Reformation theory's answer to "Why just desegregation?" question).
772. See supra notes 515-528 and accompanying text.
773. Compare, e.g., Yudof, supra note 61, at 439, 455 (suggesting that there is

something unseemly about "green follows white" justification for desegregation) with
supra note 650 and accompanying text (defending "green follows white" rationale).
774. See supra notes 705-707 and accompanying text.
775. See supra notes 722-744 and accompanying text.
776. See supra notes 643-644 and accompanying text.
777. See supra note 556.
778. See supra notes 712-713 and accompanying text.
779. See supra note 644.
780. See supra note 754.
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plans assuring a so-called "critical mass" of members of each race in
each desegregated school. 78 1 Reconstructive theory also makes it eastest's requireier to understand, if not necessarily to satisfy, the 78intent
2
ment of "reading the mind of the school board.
Let me make a few other claims on Reconstructive theory's behalf.
1. Balancing Cardinalsand Ordinals. - The Equal Educational Opportunity and Correction theories run into difficulty because they rely
on causal judgments regarding the relationship between segregation
and below-average academic achievement, on the one hand, and discriminatory acts and segregative demographic conditions, on the other.
These judgments have been branded as empirically uncertain and, accordingly, as too morally frail and unstable to serve as justifications for
all-out desegregation; they are in any event exceedingly expensive for
courts to make. 7 83 The Reformative approach, by contrast, relies upon
interpretive judgments-judgments of a sort that judicial factfinders
have made from time immemorial, if not on so grand a scale, concerning the good or bad motivation of actors in public life and the fairness
and unfairness of law-making and implementing procedures.
Reconstructive theory, however, does not leave the judge interpretively on her own. Rather, Reconstructive theory insists that, before
the judge decides that a sufficiently "system-wide violation" has occurred to require system-wide reconstruction, the parties-in the manner of Professor Black in his famous article on Brown-must amass
root-and-branch "evidence of what segregation means to the people who
impose it and to the people who are subjected to it," and must prove
is
that the particular political process as it actually has been functioning
784
not "'equal' in intent, in total social meaning [or in] impact.
Relatedly, the Equal Educational Opportunity, Correction, and
Prohibition theories have been obsessed with the admittedly "treacherous task" of balancing segregative harms to blacks against busing and
other "transitional" costs that desegregation imposes on whites. 7 85
How, for example, does one make the cardinal judgments necessary to
compare the degree of educational or demographic harm suffered by a
black child attending, for example, a seventy-five-percent black school,
to those a white child faces if she is bused forty-five minutes each way to
make the same school only forty-percent black? 78 6 Reformative theory
avoids this problem in two ways: First, the compulsion to balance these
781. See supra note 3; Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1344.
782. See supra notes 466-483 and accompanying text.
783. See supra notes 150-153, 265-284 and accompanying text.
784. Black, supra note 123, at 426; see also supra text accompanying note 561 (example of interpretive judgment in trial judge's description of his findings in well-known
desegregation case).
785. Fiss, supra note 61, at 196; accord, e.g., L. Graglia, supra note 55, at 262-77;
Gewirtz, Remedies, supra note 49, at 633-42.
786. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 49, at 36-39, 188-91; Gewirtz, Remedies, supra
note 49, at 630-31. The difficulty of this enterprise is revealed by the thumb-on-scale
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harms recedes, as I have noted, once it is realized that the deep, broad,
'78 7
and long systemic violation brooks few "third party nonviolators.
Second, and more importantly, Reformative analysis substitutes one
evaluative ordinal judgment for the Equal Educational Opportunists',
Correctivists', and Prohibitionists' scores of empirical cardinal judgments: Is a reformed, hence properly egalitarian and pluralistic, political process-achieved at a cost of assigning children to schools
different from the ones to which they previously were assigned and the
ones to which their parents, beforehand at least, preferred to see them
assigned-better than one that generates ubiquitously, then relies determinatively upon, "my race is better than your race" opinions? It
seems to me, moreover, that the answer to this ordinally simplified
question is also relatively simple: Because the "extreme harmfulness"
judgment regarding the intervention of the racist opinion in the political process is philosophically easy 78 8 and in any event is embedded in
the fourteenth amendment, 789 the moral justification for the reform becomes clear and uncontroversial once plaintiffs, as required by Keyes,
establish that the antipluralistic intervention is deep, wide, longstanding, and-short of systemic reconstruction-intractable. Finally,
although important, the moral costs of reform turn out to be moderate
790
and relatively short lived.
2. Choice. - Until the Supreme Court effectively banned them as
desegregatively ineffective in Grifin and Green, "voucher" and "freedom-of-choice" plans played an important role in school desegregation
cases. 7 9 ' Recently, "choice" proposals have reappeared both inside
and outside the desegregation context. 79 2 In the desegregation conmeasurement standard that both Professors Fiss and Gewirtz find it necessary to use.
See Fiss, supra note 61, at 198; Gewirtz, Remedies, supra note 49, at 606-08.
787. See supra notes 574-577 and accompanying text.
788. See supra notes 505-509 and accompanying text.
789. See supra notes 484-485 and accompanying text.
790. See supra notes 574, 664-674 and accompanying text.
791. SeeJ. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 94, 97-109; Dimond, supra note 123, at 41
& nn.169-70; Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 741-49; supra notes 520, 525 and accompanying text.
792. Outside desegregation contexts, choice proposals call for ending mandatory
assignments within or among districts or (via voucher systems) disbanding public
schools altogether and allowing parents to choose among available public or private
schools. See, e.g., J. Chubb & T. Moe, supra note 740, at 215-26; Boyd, Public Education's Last Hurrah?: Schizophrenia, Amnesia, and Ignorance in School Politics, 9 Educ.
Eval. & Pol. Anal. 85, 92-99 (1987); Raywid, Drawing Educators to Choice, 2 Metropolitan Educ. 1, 7-23 (1987); Wells, Quest for Improving Schools Finds a Role for Free
Market: Consumer's Choice in Public Education, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1990, at Al, col.
2; Snider, Cavazos Couples Parental Choice, Site Management, Educ. Week, Oct. 25,
1989, at 1, col. 1; Perpich, Choose Your School, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1989, at A17, col. 1;
Fiske, Parental Choice in Public Schools Gains, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1988, at AI, col. 4;
see also J. Coons & S. Sugarman, Education by Choice: The Case for Family Control
(1978) (anticipating more recent proposals to establish voucher and other mechanisms
for increasing parental choice in regard to schools children attend). But see Educ.
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text, choice options range from the use of magnet schools as occasional
"sweeteners" in mandatory desegregation plans, 793 to plans that "magnetize" and insist upon a substantial degree of racial balance at most or
all schools in the district,79 4 to more or less voluntary city-suburbs exchange and transfer programs, 795 to proposals-most closely mirroring
the former era's freedom-of-choice plans-that would supplant desegregation entirely with what amount to district-wide open admissions
policies subject only to facilities-utilization and other not necessarily
796
desegregative constraints.
Nearly all the choice plans the courts actually have ordered in
school desegregation cases-which typically require students to attend
schools with children of other races but afford a certain amount of
choice among integrated schools-cross Reformative theory's desegreWeek, Apr. 25, 1990, at 15, col. 5 (in Iowa, which recently opened enrollment in all its
districts save those undergoing desegregation to students from other districts, less than
a third of one percent of the State's students applied for transfer, among whom "about
77 percent" were seeking to escape districts with excessively small enrollments); Walker,
Business Leaders Challenge Bush's School Priorities: Emphasis on Choice Is Called
Misplaced, Educ. Week, Nov. 8, 1989, at 1, col. 1; Olson, N.E.A. Opposes Mandated
State, Federal 'Choice', Educ. Week, Aug. 2, 1989, at 8, col. 5; Jennings, In Poll, Slim
Majority of Board Chiefs Oppose Choice; 62% for Decentralizing, Educ. Week, Mar. 8,
1989, at 5, col. 1. Choice plans promise to raise racial equity and segregation issues of
their own, see, e.g., Backlash Against Choice Plans Emerges Among Minorities, Educ.
Week, June 21, 1989, at 7, col. 1; Snider, School Choice: New More Efficient 'Sorting
Machine'?, Educ. Week, May 18, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
793. See F. Welch & A. Light, supra note 6, at 94-96 (collecting plans).
794. See, e.g.,Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1299-1301 (8th Cir. 1988), aff'd
on other grounds, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990) (Kansas City); Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d
809, 811-13 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984) (Buffalo); Snider, Seattle
Happy With 'Choice' Plan, Educ. Week, June 15, 1988, at 4, col. 1; see Price & Stem,
Magnet Schools as a Strategy for Integration and Reform, 5 Yale L. & Pol. Rev. 291, 294
(1987).
795. Mandatory city-suburbs transfer plans include the one implemented in the Indianapolis area. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1112,
1116 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); see also Little Rock School Dist. v.
Pulaski County Special School Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404, 430, 436 (8th Cir. 1985) (en
banc) (readjusting boundaries and providing special transfer programs and interdistrict
magnet schools in lieu of requiring consolidation of three defendant school districts),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986); Cunningham v. Grayson, 541 F.2d 538, 540 (6th Cir.
1976) (interdistrict busing plan imposed to achieve greater racial balance), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1074 (1977). Semi-mandatory plans (suburban districts must accept students
who volunteer to transfer) include the plan implemented in St. Louis area. See Liddell
v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1308-09 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816
(1984). Wholly voluntary plans include the plan operating between Hartford and its
suburbs. See R. Crain &J. Strauss, supra note 675, at 5-6.
796. See, e.g., Armor, supra note 670, at 30-36; Armor, Unwillingly to School, 18
Pol'y Rev. 99, 111 (1981); Cuddy, A Proposal to Achieve Desegregation Through Free
Choice, Am. Educ., May 1983, 25 at 25-31; Dimond, supra note 123, at 40-44 &
nn. 167-68; Chancellor's Task Force on School Integration, Report on High School Admissions (Nov. 10, 1988) (New York City).
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gative threshold 79 7 and warrant no special discussion here. 7 98 My concern, instead, is with the notion that choice of schools is such an
important consideration that, when the dictates of desegregation and
choice clash, desegregation should give ground or give way. 7 9 9 As I
discuss above, although choice is "a fundamental value" in other walks
of American life,8 00 it plays, and deserves, a less central role in
American educational theory and practice. Choice recedes in importance in the educational sphere in large part because parents, not children, make the choices and because the tendency of parents to limit
their children's choices justifies governmental compulsion.8 0 ' More
importantly, once the question of whether to attend schools (and, if so,
whether to attend public schools8 0 2) is put to one side and the question
of which public school to attend is taken up, it becomes clear that choice
has had almost no role at all in this nation 8 0 3-except, ironically, in
school systems subject to desegregation decrees. As the latter caveat
suggests, therefore, choice often may provide a desegregatively effective, if expensive, enticement for families that otherwise would exit the
system; but as an alternative to (as opposed to a component of)
mandatory desegregation, choice is a red herring. 8 4
797. See supra note 3; supra note 644 and accompanying text.
798. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 794-795.
799. E.g., Arendt, supra note 172, at 55 ("To force parents to send their children to
an integrated school against their will means to deprive them of rights which clearly
belong to them in all free societies-the private right over their children and the societal
right of free association"); sources discussed supra notes 740, 796.
800. Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 782; accord id. at 730.
801. SeeJ. Dewey, supra note 123, at 82-83 (public schooling necessary because
"[flamily life may be marked by exclusiveness, suspicion, and jealousy as to those without, [althouth it is] a model of amity and mutual aid within"); A. Gutmann, supra note
52, at 28-30; M. Walzer, supra note 52, at 214 (children "not enrolled [in school] but
conscripted. Abolish the conscription, and children are thrown back, not ...upon their
own resources but upon the resources of their parents"); J. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at
173; see also Cottle, Bus Start, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 20 (quoting
an 11-year-old black youth from Roxbury explaining his understanding of busing: "Busing's just got to be, man. Got to be.... We got to open up ourselves, spread out. Get
into this city, man. Move into all those places we can't go at night, you know. Go to
That's why they're busing
good schools, live in good places like white folks got ....
us."). This is not to say that parents have no cognizable interest in their children's education but only that the parental interest competes with the child's and state's and is
trumped by those interests in the matter of compulsory education and, if public schools
are chosen, school assignments. See supra note 740.
802. See supra notes 733-734, 740.
803. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 408 (1986) (White, J., concurring,
joined by Burger, CJ., and Rehnquist, Powell, and O'Connor, JJ.) ("school boards customarily . . . designate the school that particular students may attend"); J. Wilkinson,
supra note 1, at 109; Dimond, supra note 123, at 33, 44 ("the neighborhood school is
the antithesis of free choice: it is the traditional method by which attendance at a particular school is now and always has been coerced").
804. Put bluntly, desegregation is important enough to justify bribing families with
"choice" in order to make the remedy work better, see supra notes 711-718 and accompanying text; but choice is not important enough to justify making desegregation work
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3. Termination. - Although the prevailing Correction theory
makes clear that desegregation decrees are temporary, it has a great
deal of difficulty explaining when the remedy should terminate.8 0 5
This is an important problem: The Supreme Court will confront the
termination question this Term, its first direct foray into the desegregation field in a decade.8 0 6 Moreover, the Reagan and Bush Justice Departments have exploited Corrective confusion both by lacing their
"model consent decree"-used, for example, in Phoenix and Bakersfield-with a presumptive three-year termination date and by encouraging school districts to seek termination of desegregation decrees on the
80 7
theory that the districts have become "unitary."
The termination confusion is inherent in Corrective theory.8 0 8 Recall that to establish the existence of continuing demographic effects
requiring correction, Corrective theory relies on a black-box presumption of continuing effects. 80 9 If that presumption is preserved in the
termination analysis-following the usual rule placing proof burdens
on proven wrongdoers 8 1 0-then the decree may not expire as long as
residential segregation persists, as it is likely to do at least partially for a
long time to come.8 1 1 If, on the other hand, the presumption is foregone, the difficult-to-meet causal burden immediately switches back to
the proven victims, and the Reagan-Bush Administrations' three-year
8 12
period suddenly looks about three years too long.
Reformative theory does not solve this problem, but it at least facilitates analysis. First, Reformative theory more clearly identifies what
must be corrected before the remedy may terminate, namely, the proclivity of the political system at its constituent and official levels to rely
upon the racist opinion as a basis for distributive decisions. Likewise,
the length, depth, pervasiveness, and accusatory nature of the violation
less well simply in order to give the constituency whose racist choices prompted the
remedy in the first place even more nonsituationally-constrained choice. See Armor,
supra note 670, at 28-30 (public opinion data reflecting parents' amenability to magnet
options; magnet programs "often more expensive than regular school programs").
805. Corrective analyses of termination include: Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at
753, 789-98; T. Shaw, Unitary Status: Original Sin andJudicial Absolution, 29-38 (paper delivered at the National Conference on School Desegregation, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., Nov. 14, 1986); Note, Unitary School Systems and Underlying
Vestiges of State-Imposed Segregation, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 794, 803 (1987).
806. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
807. See Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 759, 790-91 &n.196; Note, supra note
805, at 798-99; supra note 4.
808. See generally Note, supra note 805, at 794-99 (conflicting lower court decisions; lack of guidance from Supreme Court).
809. See supra notes 237-245 and accompanying text.
810. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1789-90 (1989) (citing
cases); id. at 1799-800 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
811. See, e.g., Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 788-92, 796 & n.217; T. Shaw,
supra note 805, at 36-38; sources cited supra note 258.
812. See Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 49, at 796 (termination analysis necessarily
afflicted with Correction theory's "empirical uncertainties").
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whose proof triggers a reconstructive remedy support placing the burden of proof of processual reform on the citizens and officials whose
racist opinion so recently and thoroughly corrupted the political system.8 13 Finally, given the "schools-only" reach of this solution to a societally pervasive problem, there is good reason to fear that the
problem will prove persistent, if not as persistent as residential segregation. Hence, even accepting the reformability assumption underlying
Reconstructive theory-that the six situational conditions for and incentives to egalitarian decision making can mature constituents' senses
of political justice-and crediting the moderate amounts of empirical
data tending to confirm that assumption,8 1 4 it is unlikely that more or
less permanent processual reform will occur before an entire generation of constituents has seen its children through desegregated schools
and has seen those children reach the age when their own children
enter school.8 1 5

These reconstructive considerations suggest two things: First, the
courts ought to be skeptical of efforts to abandon the reformed political
structure for at least a generation. Second, before granting "unitary"
status, the courts should require the defendants on behalf of their citizen-constituents to marshal sufficient objective evidence to convince
the court that the citizenry no longer is disposed to incite the political
system to act upon, and that the political system no longer is disposed
to process, the racist opinion.
A necessary but not always sufficient component of proof that durable political reform has occurred is a showing that the desire to remove judicially imposed external barriers to the racist opinion is not
the recrudescence of the political system's previous corruption but 8in16
stead a product of equal concern and respect for affected persons.
In addition to making that showing, or as a means of making it, the
courts should require the defendants to identify objective indicia of the
political process's actual durable reform. Such indicia include the development of alternative external barriers to the racist opinion and of
alternative means of inculcating "equal concern" virtue-for example,
8 17
substitution of effective but less onerous school integration devices;
the growth of housing integration; the effective use of single-member
813. Advocating similar allocation of burden, but for different reasons, are: id. at
797; Note, supra note 805, at 815; T. Shaw, supra note 805, at 28; sources cited supra
note 810.
814. See supra notes 665-671, 683-696 and accompanying text.
815. See also Lawrence, supra note 134, at 323, 330, 334 (psychological literature
showing how children learn racism from parents); supra note 663 (disastrously premature termination of Reconstruction after halfa generation). See generally Hirsch, supra
note 406, at 443 (development of equal concern virtue a "slow and painful process").
816. See Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof After a Finding of Unitariness in
School Desegregation Litigation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 653, 665 (1987).
817. See, e.g., Seattle Happy With 'Choice' Plan, Educ. Week, June 15, 1988, at 4,
col. 1.
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voting districts; and a history of substantial minority representation
among the leadership and staff of the various previously discriminatory
agencies. Alternatively, defendants might point to an identifiable series
of actions taken by or on behalf of the previously corrupted political
constituency, but outside the judicially reformed sphere of education,
that manifests respect for the needs of the community's minority members, is not obviously opportunistic, and for those and other reasons
evidences the internalization and expression of "equal concern"
virtue.8 1 8
Illustrating the proper analysis of termination issues is a line of
cases both inside and outside the school desegregation sphere that,
while quite sensible in reconstructive terms, have caused a good deal of
puzzlement among scholars operating from other theoretical viewpoints.8 1 9 In all of these cases, the Supreme Court invalidated changes
in the electoral or political structure that were not intentionally discriminatory in themselves (hence the scholarly puzzlement) but that occurred in political jurisdictions shown to have pervasively and
systemically discriminated against minorities in the immediate past. In
Gaston County v. United States,8 20 the Court invalidated a North Carolina
county's apparently racially neutral reimposition of a literacy test for
voting, citing the county's long history of school segregation.8 2 1 In
United States v. ScotlandNeck City Boardof Education,822and Wright v. Council of Emporia,823 the Court invalidated presumptively race-neutral efforts to deannex predominantly white portions of desegregating school
districts based upon the harm deannexation would inflict upon ongoing
efforts to remedy prior system-wide school segregation. 8 24 Finally, in
White v. Regester,8 25 the Court invalidated the race-neutral reapportionment via multimember districts of two Texas counties long governed by
818. In a surprisingly moderate amicus curiae brief filed in the termination case
currently pending in the Supreme Court, see Snider, supra note 4, at 1, col. 5, the Justice Department has taken a position similar to the one advocated here. See Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, 22-29 Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 110 S. Ct. 1521
(1990) (No. 89-1080), ("three broad inquiries should inform the question of unitariness:
(1) whether the district has continuously complied with the desegregation decree in
good faith; (2) whether the school district has abandoned any and all acts of intentional
discrimination; and (3) whether the school district has eliminated, as far as practicable,
the "vestiges" of prior discriminatory conduct.").
819. See, e.g.,J. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 100-01, 124; Brest, supra note 104, at
26, 43-44; Freeman, supra note 98, at 1088-92; Kurland, supra note 55, at 158;
Lawrence, supra note 134, at 320 n.7; Ortiz, supra note 123, at 1131-34.
820. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
821. Id. at 293-94, 296.
822. 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
823. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
824. Scotland Neck, 407 U.S. at 485, 489; Emporia, 407 U.S. at 455-56, 464-66; see
also Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 229-32 (1964) (without finding discriminatory intent, Court invalidates effort by Virginia county to close previously segregated
schools now subject to desegregation order and to institute voucher program).
825. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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political processes lacking any "good-faith concern for the political and
'8 2 6
other needs and aspirations of the [minority] community.
Understood reconstructively, these decisions are not controversial.
Each may be understood as the Court's refusal, following proof of a
systemic political violation, to terminate a politically reconstructive
"remedy" (unfettered access to the polls by African-Americans in
Gaston,8 27 single-member voting districts in White, 82 8 and reformative
desegregation in Scotland Neck, Wright, and Griffin) absent passage of
sufficient time and presentation of sufficient evidence to convince the
Court that external political reforms no longer were necessary. Accordingly, as difficult as may be the evaluative question posed in termination situations-whether the previously corrupted political process
and constituency evince an externally structured or internally inculcated capacity, absent continued judicial reform, to render black persons equal concern-the Court at least has some experience answering
the question.
826. Id. at 766-69; see also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623-25, 627 (1982)
(system-wide racist corruption of political process leads Court to invalidate at-large election system originally adopted without racial intent).
827. In Gaston, the remedy the Court continued was statutorily, not judicially or
constitutionally, imposed by § 4(a) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b(a). Section 4(a) requires certain jurisdictions to forego literacy tests unless they
prove that the tests do not have the purpose or effect of denying African-Americans the
right to vote. The question in Gaston was whether the district court properly looked
beyond the purpose of the literacy test itself to the county's history of educational discrimination in determining the legality of the voting requirement. See Gaston County v.
United States, 395 U.S. 285, 291-92, 293-95 (1969). By making the legality of reimposed literacy tests turn on the absence of a recent history of system-wide discrimination
against blacks, the unanimous Court in Gaston interpreted § 4(a)'s temporary ban on
literacy tests reformatively-i.e., as designed not only to ferret out literacy tests that
themselves were discriminatorily imposed but also to increase the number of black voters and thereby to reform political processes that theretofore systemically had acted
upon the racist opinion. See also supra note 729 (similarly reformative interpretation of
§ 2 of Voting Rights Act, as applied in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)).
828. White is not on its face a termination case. The two Texas counties involved
had long used multimember districts for electing state representatives, and the Court
itself initiated the single-member remedy in the case. Nonetheless, in context-the case
involved Texas's first decennial reapportionment in the wake of the watershed "oneperson-one-vote" ruling in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)-the Court's holding
has termination and reformative connotations as follows: Political jurisdictions like
those involved in White with long histories of processing and acting upon the racist opinion, see Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 725-37 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (three-judge
panel), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), thereafter have a continuing affirmative duty to reform themselves through available means,
including via legally mandated periodic reapportionment procedures. Coming as the
decennial reapportionment did so close upon the heels of the two counties' lengthy
histories of racial and ethnic discrimination and in the absence of any proof of durable
reform, that remedial duty persisted, and the counties accordingly had to adopt singledistrict apportionment schemes that served to enhance minority political power and in
that way reform the corrupted political process.
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Multi-DistrictReformation

One problem remains, a problem that foiled all five competing theories 82 9 and that, absent a reformative solution, threatens the sixth
("voice, not exit") condition to effective Reconstructive desegregation.8 30 That problem, of course, is Milliken v. Bradley 1.831 There, the
Supreme Court emphasized the principle that the nature and scope of
the violation determine the nature and scope of the remedy. 83 2 The
Court then overturned an order requiring suburban school districts
outside of Detroit to participate in a remedy for a system-wide violation
committed by the State of Michigan and the Detroit School Board
within Detroit.833 As a result, thousands of admittedly discriminatedagainst black children in Detroit's eighty-percent-black system remained in all-black schools.
How, then, is it possible to square the no-desegregation decision in
Milliken I with the all-out-desegregation decisions in Swann and Keyes
decided before Milliken I and in the Dayton II and Columbus cases decided after it?834 It is possible by means of a straightforward applica835
tion of Reconstructive theory.
Consider the three toughest doctrinal questions in the interdistrict-desegregation realm: (1) Did Milliken I foreclose interdistrict desegregation relief entirely?8 3 6 If not, (2) does Milliken I at least require
proof that any school board whose district is included in the remedy be
guilty of wrongdoing;8 3 7 and (3) does the fact of segregation at present,
829. See supra notes 145--148, 167, 248, 256, 264, 295, 342 and accompanying
text.
830. See supra notes 711-718 and accompanying text ("voice, not exit" prerequisite to effective reformative desegregation undermined if predominantly white suburbs
are immunized from participation in desegregation plans).
831. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). The voluminous literature on Miliken I includes the sources cited supra note 49.
832. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 738.
833. Id. at 725-27, 745-46, 753.
834. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
835. Reconstructive analysis also makes sense of-indeed, it accepts as a core proposition-the Court's own explanation for the divergent outcomes in Dayton Bd. of Educ.
v. Brinkman (Dayton I), 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (remedy limited to curing "incremental
segregative effects") and Dayton II (ordering all-out desegregation). See Dayton II, 443
U.S. at 540-42. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton11), 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (three
minor, chronologically and geographically isolated, violations found in Dayton I did not
prove system-wide violation and intractability predicates to all-out desegregation, but
predicates thereafter sufficiently established on remand); supra note 578.
836. See sources cited supra note 49.
837. Compare Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 673 (8th Cir. 1986) (plurality
opinion of Gibson,J.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 70 (1987) (culpability of suburbs required
or a major consideration) and J. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 222 (suburbs "need not be
part of the cure" if not part of cause) withJenkins, 807 F.2d at 689 (Arnold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("a school district can be made to participate in an
interdistrict remedy even if it is not 'personally' guilty of violating the Constitution")
and id. at 697-700 (Lay, CJ., dissenting) ("school districts which [are] not themselves
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following proof of a violation in the past, in any way lessen a plaintiff's
burden-in short, does the Swann presumption apply in interdistrict
cases? 838
1. Is InterdistrictDesegregationDead? - Interdistrict desegregation
is not dead. It lives quietly, for example, in metropolitan
Wilmington,8 3 9 Little Rock,840 Indianapolis, 8 4 t and Louisville; 4 2 sub8 45
urban Pittsburgh 843 and St. Louis; 8 44 rural North Carolina,
Arkansas, 8 46 and Texas; 84 7 and, in a peculiar form, in metropolitan
St. Louis, 848 Kansas City, Missouri, 849 and Milwaukee.850
found to be constitutional violators [may] ...be included in the interdistrict relief") and
Note, supra note 254, at 340 ("official housing discrimination should [be] a basis for...
desegregation remedies even if plaintiffs offer no proof of discrimination by school
officials").
838. Compare, e.g., United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101,
1113 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980) (suggesting affirmative answer: Swann
presumption does apply in interdistrict cases) and Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1107,
1121 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824 (1982) (same) and Evans v. Buchanan, 582
F.2d 750, 765 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 916 (1980) (same) and
Cunningham v. Grayson, 541 F.2d 538, 541-42 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1074 (1977) (same) withJenkins, 807 F.2d at 670 (suggesting negative answer) and Lee v.
Lee County Bd. of Educ., 639 F.2d 1243, 1254 (5th Cir. 1981) (same).
839. See Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328, 344 (D. Del. 1976), aff'd, 555 F.2d
373 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977).
840. See little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School Dist. No. 1, 778
F.2d 404, 433 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986).
841. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 637 F.2d at 1113.
842. See Cunningham, 541 F.2d at 540.
843. See Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 510 F. Supp. 615, 622 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 672
F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824 (1982).
844. See United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 951 (1975).
845. See Turner v. Warren County Bd. of Educ., 313 F. Supp. 380, 386 (E.D.N.C.
1970).
846. See Morrilton School Dist. No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d 222, 228 (8th Cir.
1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980); Haney v. County Bd. of Educ., 429
F.2d 364, 372 (8th Cir. 1970).
847. See United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043, 1059-62 (E.D. Tex. 1970),
aft'd, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972).
848. See Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1302-05 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984) (city-suburban interdistrict transfer plan established in part
by voluntary agreement of participating districts and in part by court order requiring
state to fund plan).
849. SeeJenkins v. Missouri, 904 F.2d 415, 417 (8th Cir. 1990);Jenkins v. Missouri,

807 F.2d 657, 682-85 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 70 (1987) (state
ordered to pay for tuition and transportation of white children from suburban districts
who choose to attend magnet schools in city district and black children from city district
who choose to attend, and are accepted for admission in, suburban districts); O'Connor,
New Era Dawns for District and for Transfer Students, K.C. Star, Sept. 5, 1990, at A-I,
col. 3 (first minority students from Kansas City begin attending school in suburban district under court-ordered interdistrict transfer plan).
850. See Board of School Directors v. Thompson (E.D. Wis. settlement agreement
filed Aug. 10, 1988). Decisions denying interdistrict relief are Goldsboro City Bd. of
Educ. v. Wayne County Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 324, 332-33 (4th Cir. 1984) (North Caro-
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Interdistrict desegregation also lives on doctrinally. Contrary to
Corrective and Prohibitory lore,85 1 Milliken I is not a more or less misguided definitional balancing of the private-law costs and benefits of
multidistrict desegregation relief for any and all kinds of segregation
violations. Nor, notwithstanding the view of most Equal Educational
Opportunity and Redistributive scholars, 85 2 did Milliken I for some
other reason draw an inviolable line at the school district boundary.
Rather, as most lower courts have recognized,8 53 the Supreme Court in
Milliken I simply did not find present the first two prerequisites of a
multidistrict, system-wide remedy. Thus, as the Milliken I majority repeatedly emphasized, with one minor exception, every violational act
shown in that case (which involved only the Detroit city district until the
trial judge discovered the suburbs during remedial proceedings) occurred within the boundaries of the Detroit School District, and the intended and actual locus of every effect of every violation in the case also
was Detroit.8 54 To be sure, the State of Michigan was one of the agents
lina); Taylor v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 648 F.2d 959, 964 (5th Cir. 1981) (Louisiana); Lee v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., 639 F.2d 1243, 1270 (5th Cir. 1981) (Alabama);
Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058, 1069 (4th Cir. 1972) (Virginia), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973); Bronson v. Board of Educ., 578 F. Supp. 1091, 1108
(S.D. Ohio 1984); Armour v. Nix, No. 16708, slip op. at 33 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd mem.,
446 U.S. 930 (1980); Tasby v. Estes, 412 F. Supp. 1185, 1203-04 (N.D. Tex. 1975), aff'd
in relevant part, 572 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 444 U.S. 437 (1980); see
also Berry v. School Dist., 698 F.2d 813, 817 (6th Cir.) (Michigan) (mandatory interdistrict relief denied because only minor interdistrict violation found), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 892 (1983).
851. See supra notes 264, 315 and accompanying text.
852. See sources cited supra note 49.
853. See sources cited supra notes 837-850.
854. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 724 (1974) ("Detroit-only"
violation); id. at 730 n. 1I (proof of dejure segregation offered only in regard to Detroit
city district); id. at 735-36 ("no constitutional violation by the outlying districts had
been shown and... no evidence on that point had been allowed"); id. at 739 (district
court's findings of "condition of segregation were limited to Detroit"); id. at 745 ("The
record before us, voluminous as it is, contains evidence of dejure segregated conditions
only in the Detroit schools"); id. at 749 ("Where the schools of only one district have
been affected, there is no constitutional power in the courts to decree relief balancing
the racial composition of that district's schools with those of the surrounding districts");
id. at 751 (violation "within the city of Detroit produced de jure segregation within the
city itself"); id. at 752 ("theory upon which the case proceeded related solely to the
establishment of Detroit city violations" and "neither the parties nor the trial judge was
concerned with a foundation for interdistrict relief"). The one exception to the Detroitonly character of the violation involved a predecessor district of one of the 85 suburban
school districts included in the district court's remedial deliberations. See id. at 748.
For a single year, that district transferred its black children to a black high school in
Detroit. Id. Thereafter, the district was annexed to a nearby nearly all-white suburban
district. Id. at 725 n.4, 749-50; see also Missouri v.Jenkins (JenkinsII), 110 S.Ct. 1651,
1656 & n.3 (1990) (lower courts denied interdistrict relief because state operated segregated system "within the [urban district]" and violation produced no "lingering interdistrict effects" (emphasis added)); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706,
727 (1989) ("We have never approved the extrapolation of discrimination in one juris-
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of those violations, but so far as the evidence in the case revealed, the
constituents on whose behalf the State of Michigan, like the Detroit
School Board, discriminated (i.e., all those in any way affected by the
violation) lived within the Detroit School District.8 5 5 Accordingly,
although there was indeed a system-wide violation found in Milliken I
(and, to the extent possible given the demographics, remedied8 5 6), the
political "system" found there to be corrupted by the racist opiniondiction from the experience of another. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974)
('Disparate treatment of white and Negro students occurred within the Detroit school
system, and not elsewhere, and on this record the remedy must be limited to that
system').").
855. See Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 750-51 (Michigan's violation "had no causal connection with the distribution of pupils by race between Detroit and the other school
districts"; no evidence that state's conduct "within Detroit affected the racial composition of the school population outside Detroit" or that State's "activities within the outlying districts affected the racial composition of the schools within Detroit"). Although
the district court record contained evidence of housing discrimination that may have
extended beyond the boundaries of Detroit City, that evidence was not directed to establishing a violation occurring, benefiting, or harming persons outside Detroit's boundaries, see supra note 854, and was sufficiently elusive that the Sixth Circuit, although
affirming the district court's interdistrict remedy and willing to rely on housing evidence
in contemporary desegregation cases, see Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508
F.2d 178, 184 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975), eschewed reliance on
housing evidence in this case, see Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 242 (6th Cir. 1973),
rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). The Milliken I majority accordingly concluded that, "in its
present posture, the case does not present any question concerning possible state housing violations." Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 728 n.7. There are several reasons for rejecting
the view, seeJ. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 223-24, that Milliken I forecloses evidence of
official housing segregation in desegregation cases in favor of an understanding of
Milliken I as permitting such evidence to establish the length, breadth, and depth of the
relevant constituency's effectual injection of the racist opinion into the various political
processes that affect the schools, see sources cited supra note 556. First, the majority
opinion does not reject housing evidence or even repeat its earlier reservations about
such evidence. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-23
(1971) (reserving housing question). Rather, among the circumstances the majority lists
as justifying interdistrict relief are apparently all "racially discriminatory acts of the state
[that] have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation." Milliken I, 418 U.S. at
745. Second, in joining the majority opinion and casting the deciding vote, Justice
Stewart explicitly read the Court's opinion as permitting interdistrict relief when state
officials "contributed to the separation of the races by... discriminatory use of state
housing or zoning laws." Id. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring). Third, a year later, the
Court summarily affirmed a decision premising interdistrict school desegregation relief
in part on local, state, and federal housing discrimination, Buchanan v. Evans, 423 U.S.
963, 963, aff'g mem., 393 F. Supp. 428, 434-38 (D. Del. 1975) (three-judge panel).
Finally, a majority of lower courts that have addressed the question have allowed plaintiffs to rely, inter alia, on housing evidence to reveal the length, breadth, and depth of
the political constituency's effectual racist inclinations. See sources collected in Jenkins
v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 687-90 (8th Cir. 1986) (Arnold, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 70 (1987); Note, supra note 254, at 341-43
nn.5-18.
856. See Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 753 (remanding for prompt formulation of intradistrict decree); see also Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 11), 433 U.S. 267, 279 (1977) (affirming appealed aspects of all-out desegregation plan).
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i.e., the circuit of constituent impulses, consequent governmental acts,
and segregative effects-extended no further than the constituency of
7
85
the Detroit School District.

Compare the Wilmington case, 8 58 which classically illustrates a system-wide, deep, and long processual violation. There, in addition to
the usual violation by the Wilmington district, the court found that:
suburban districts before and after Brown racially segregated their
schools by educating their white children at home and sending their
black children to all-black schools in Wilmington; after explicit segregation ended in Wilmington, the surrounding white districts encouraged
white children to transfer out of Wilmington's desegregating schools
and into all-white suburban schools; state courts with jurisdiction
throughout the area enforced racially restrictive covenants confining
African-Americans within Wilmington and forbidding their movement
to the suburbs, the State Real Estate Commission enforced the same
policy by penalizing brokers who sold homes in white areas to black
families, and the Federal Housing Administration did its part -by refusing to provide mortgage-insurance subsidies to blacks or whites moving
into integrated neighborhoods; the regional public housing agency explicitly segregated its facilities for years and thereafter built new facilities only in black areas in the city, notwithstanding that most of its
multidistrict jurisdiction lay in white areas in the suburbs; the
Wilmington school district, by shielding its outer areas from desegregation, placed the entire burden of desegregation on the white areas at
the margin of the ghetto and precipitated the rapid flight of many of its
white margin-area constituents to the suburbs; when the State passed
legislation seeking school district consolidation, it excluded the substantially black Wilmington district from the universe of districts that
the State Board of Education could consider as mandatory consolidation partners for the surrounding nearly all-white districts; and so
on.

8 59

As the district court and Third Circuit concluded, and as the
857. For the same reasons that courts may not use interdistrict remedies to cure
intradistrict violations, they generally may not use politically reformative school desegregation remedies to cure politically corrupting nonschool segregation violations. In
both cases, the remedy drafts one constituency to cure violations that almost certainly
were committed by a different constituency. The requirement that the constituency affected by desegregation's politically reformative impact be the constituency guilty of
segregating the schools also helps explain the courts' otherwise perplexing reliance at
the liability phase, see Note, supra note 31; supra notes 254, 556, 855 and accompanying text, on some (i.e., schools-focused) but not other (i.e., nonschools-focused) instances of discrimination by nonparty and nonschool officials.
858. Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.) (three-judge panel), aff'd
mem., 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
859. See 393 F. Supp. at 432-38, 442-46; Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328,
334-41 (D. Del. 1976), aif'd, 555 F.2d 373 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
880 (1977); Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 762 n. I1 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980).
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Supreme Court summarily affirmed a year after announcing Milliken I,
the plaintiffs' proof of discriminatory behavior on a decidedly metropolitan basis, in one school district after another, by one governmental
agency with area-wide jurisdiction after another, from one year to the
next, and so on, made manifest that racial segregation within and between school districts in the Wilmington area was the chosen "policy"
of a pervasively racially corrupted political process extending from the
metropolitan-wide constituency up through three levels of government
and back, from one end of northern New Castle County to the other,
and from the Civil War to the present. In both Milliken I and the
Wilmington case, therefore, the nature and scope of the violation-in
the one case a corrupted single-district political process, in the other a
corrupted multidistrict process-determined the nature and scope of
the respective intradistrict and interdistrict reformative desegregation
decrees.
Notice, too, how simply Reformative theory explains the otherwise
curious intervention in Milliken I of an extended discussion of the history and practice of local control over education in Michigan and elsewhere in the nation.8 60 Taken to its conclusion, a dispositive concern
for the value of local control over education would forbid desegregation entirely, for that remedy at the least takes the decision whether to
segregate out of the hands of local officials and in most cases also deprives them of the critical authority to decide where to assign children
to schools. On the other hand, the discussion of local control makes
good sense, in a reconstructive light, if it is seen simply as in aid of
efforts to determine precisely what constituency was antipluralistically
at fault: Insofar as the violation occurred in the educational sphere,
and an exclusively local constituency governs that sphere through its
exclusively local representatives, we need look no further for the
861
boundaries of the corrupted political process.
2. Is Innocence Irrelevant? - A suburban school board's "innocence" is relevant but may not be dispositive. Thus, the violational activity of a suburban school board on behalf of its constituency surely
helps prove that the political system which includes that school board is
racially corrupted.8 6 2 But other evidence of systemic corruption also
ought to suffice. Accordingly, if a group of citizens-as was true in a
860. See Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 741-44; cf. id. at 744 ("School district lines and the
present laws with respect to local control, are not sacrosanct and if they conflict with the
Fourteenth Amendment federal courts have a duty to prescribe appropriate remedies.").
861. The decade-long trend in this country away from local control over schools
may well increase opportunities for interdistrict violations and relief. See Liebman,
supra note 99, at 380-81, 400, 416 & n.227. So might the onset of another of this
country's periodic phases of school district consolidation. See Newman, School Consolidation Garnering Legislators' Attention, Educ. Week, Jan. 10, 1990, at 15, col. 1.
862. See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 735-36, 745, 746, 748, 748-49, 752 (lack of proof
of suburban districts' guilt included in disjunctive lists of evidentiary failings causing
Court to deny interdistrict relief).
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number of the suburban districts in the Wilmington case-choose to
segregate the metropolitan area's schools and neighborhoods through
their representatives in state educational agencies and in local, state,
and federal housing agencies, the political-processual violation, hence
the reformative remedy, must be the same as if those constituents had
advanced (or got caught advancing) their racist goals through local
school officials as well. 863 Once it is realized that desegregation of the
schools is designed instrumentally to reconstruct the politicalsystem governing the schools, the innocence of officials at a given school or district is not dispositive as long as that school and district fall within the
jurisdiction and were part of the focus of some broader political system
found to be systemically corrupted in its treatment of that school or
district. If that broader political system is sufficiently (i.e., deeply,
widely, and lengthily) "guilty," the fact that some of its agents and employees are not guilty cannot absolve the system from curing itself or
components of the system are most able
being cured-using whatever
8 64
task.
the
in
to assist
Here again, several of Milliken I's key passages come into reformative focus. The Milliken I Court repeatedly notes the absence in the
case of any proof of "substantial" interdistrict effects for which state
actors-the suburban districts or any others-are invidiously responsible.8 6 5 Embedded in Milliken I's intrinsically interpretive concept of
"substantiality" is the interdistrict analogue of Keyes's interpretive concern for "systemwide-ness." The controlling issue, then, is not the status of the political agents through whom the antipluralist violation
occurred but rather whether that violation was sufficiently wide, deep,
and long to justify a systemically reformative remedy encompassing
863. Evans, 416 F. Supp. at 340 ("[wlhere the State has contributed to the separation of races by redrawing school lines, necessarily the districts on both sides of the lines
are part of the violation itself, and exclusion of the suburban districts cannot be predicated on their own purported innocence"); accord, e.g., Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d
1107, 1110-11, 1119-20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824 (1982); United States v.
Board of School Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1112-16 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
838 (1980); Morrilton School Dist. No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d 222, 225, 227-29
(8th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980). But see contrary sources
cited supra note 837.
864. See supra note 556. Indeed, the local school officials in the Virginia and
South Carolina (but not the Kansas) cases consolidated in Brown were "innocent" insofar as it was not them but state legislators who had mandated segregation. This fact, of
course, did not stop the Court from ordering local officials to cure the violation.
865. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 745 (proof insufficient because no showing that "racially
discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have
been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation"); id. (plaintiffs must prove "violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district");
id. at 748 ("no showing that either the State or any of the 85 outlying districts engaged
in activity that had a cross-district effect"); id. at 749 ("Where the schools of only one
district have been affected, there is no constitutional power in the courts to decree [interdistrict] relief .... ); see Lee v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., 639 F.2d 1243, 1256 (5th
Cir. 1981) (emphasizing substantiality requirement).
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those agents, the constituency they served, and the schools and districts
8 66
that they governed or helped control.
3. Is Continuing Segregation Irrelevant? - The analysis in the last
section suggests how uncontroversial and even unnecessary the Keyes
presumption 67 becomes in inter- (and intra-) district Reformative analysis. Assume the plaintiffs establish that legislative racism inundated a
given single- or multi-school-district constituency and many of its governmental representatives, and that much of the action those representatives undertook was intended to, and in fact did, segregate the area's
neighborhoods and schools. At that point, either: (1) the processual
character of the violation is sufficiently clear to require systemic reform,
regardless of whether the plaintiffs have shown (or the Court has had
the patience to let them show) that every decision made by every official
within that system was corrupted; or (2) one could say that, given proof
of a system-encompassing violation, additional proof that other officials
within the system simultaneously took other, similarly segregative-infact actions creates a presumption that those actions also were purposively segregative. Either approach is reasonable, it seems to me, with
the only difference being that the latter, presumption-dependent approach favors the defendants. Only the latter approach, that is, affords
defendants or white intervenors an opportunity to avoid inclusion in a
remedy by showing that the political process, albeit corrupted "root
and branch," nonetheless was capable in one instance or another of
making segregative-in-fact decisions on the basis of neutral reasoning.
Once plaintiffs have identified the relevant "system" or "process" and
shown it to be comprehensively and intractably corrupted by the racist
opinion, it is not controversial to reform the entire system. Surely,
therefore, a remedial approach is not especially controversial because it
affords participants in the system an opportunity to distance themselves
or individual segregative-in-fact decisions affecting them from the racist
8 68
corruption.
The Swann presumption actually does relieve plaintiffs of a meaningful part of their burden. It allows a systemically comprehensive antipluralist violation at Time A, plus proof of comprehensively
segregative-in-fact decision making by and within the same political
process at some later Time B, plus an absence of corrective action in
between Times, to create a presumption that Time A legislative racism
has persisted through Time B. As discussed above, the time- and
money-saving aspects of this discrimination-then/discrimination-now
presumption are well justified both by the device's truth-serving rea866. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 859.
867. See supra notes 565-573 and accompanying text.
868. Reformatively understood, the Keyes presumption does not extend the geographic area of the violation but rather the court's assumptions about the violation's
ubiquity within the area already shown by plaintiffs to be governed by an antipluralist
political system.
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sonableness and its allocation of error costs to participants in the
wrongdoing system. 86 9 The over 200-year history of this Republic
leaves no room for controversy that a political process shown by actual
proof to be pervaded by legislative racism at a given point in time remains dangerously susceptible to the same corruption thereafter, if its
decisions are shown to be comprehensively producing the same segregative-in-fact results some years later and if the process is not shown to
have reformed itself in any appreciable way in the meantime. Nor is
there any reason to treat interdistrict cases differently in this respect
from intradistrict ones. Indeed, the willingness of constituents to inject
their racist opinions into the deliberations of a geographically and substantively wider collection of public institutions at Time A should make
us more comfortable assuming that segregative-in-fact actions by the
same collection of institutions at Time B is not fortuitous.
Here, however, I would not deem it fair (as I would with the Keyes
presumption) to dispense with a rebuttal opportunity altogether. For
the idea of reformability should encourage the courts to hope, if not
expect, that discrimination-then does not conclusively bind a system to
discrimination-now. Accordingly, the defendants or intervening segments of their constituency should retain the opportunity to show that
time has scrubbed the racist-opinion out of the political process,
notwithstanding its continued segregative-in-fact operation.
4. How Likely Is InterdistrictRelief? - Although interdistrict relief
doctrinally survives Miliken I, as accordingly does the possibility of desegregation for millions of urban African-American children, the likelihood of multidistrict relief is in doubt. On the one hand, pervasive
governmentally implemented discrimination is no stranger in this
country and no respecter of school district boundaries.8 7 0 Moreover,
the occasions for interdistrict constituencies to mobilize in aid of racist
goals are probably proliferating as local control over education wanes
and interest in consolidating school districts begins to rise.8 7 1 On the
other hand, the Reformative theory's tough requirement that the plaintiffs locate all persons included in the remedy within a political constituency actually found guilty of intentional and system-wide
discrimination assures that interdistrict relief will not come easily,
cheaply, or in all likelihood, frequently. The most that can be said from
a Reformative perspective, therefore, is that cross-district desegregation remains available to urban black communities that are victimized
by pervasive cross-district corruption of the political processes governing their schools and that can muster the will and resources to expose it.872
869. See supra notes 565-573 and accompanying text.

870. See supra notes 258, 449-457, 529-535 and accompanying text.
871. See supra note 861.
872. Among the major desegregation lawsuits now pending or being considered by
potential plaintiff groups, see supra notes 25-41 and accompanying text, those in
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CONCLUSION

You may think I've cheated. Anyone can make a solution look simple and important by sufficiently upping the problematic ante; and I
have, indeed, tried to show that the problem in the desegregation cases
is about as menacing in its systemic destructiveness as is imaginablenot simply to schools and to black children, but to all of us and to our
pluralistic polity as well. But that is the problem that systematic racism
poses to this country, and if we are serious about solving it, then desegregation is a relatively simple (not to mention the only) solution. For,
by simply and naturally situating citizens vis-i-vis their integratively enschooled children in a difference en-veiling "ethical situation," and in
the process making legislative racism irrational, desegregation finds a
way where none has been found before to exorcise that shameful and
mutually destructive evil from our political midst.
Charleston, Hartford, Kansas City, Memphis, Nash County, and St. Paul, and the initiatives in Arkansas, Connecticut, and Mississippi have interdistrict implications.

